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 Abstract 
 
This ethnographic study explores an anomaly in the reproductive health 
situation of poor rural women in Bangladesh, namely the coexistence of 
significant fertility reduction at the same time as continued high maternal 
mortality due to dependency on home deliveries in the absence of skilled 
health professionals and health complications resulting from unsafe abor-
tions. Inspired by the feminist conceptualisation of agency, the study resur-
rects the importance of considering culture and context in understanding 
reproductive decisions, as opposed to a rational individualistic notion of 
agency. Comparison between mainstream patrilineal Bengali and matrilineal-
matrilocal indigenous Garos in the same rural location enables the study to 
demonstrate how complex factors intersect and interact to form gender 
power structures in shaping reproductive practice. 
A combination of the capabilities framework and the social relations 
framework informed by feminist concepts of gender, agency and empow-
erment guided the data collection process and analysis of the findings. A 
village named Gachhabari (Tangail district, Dhaka division), Bangladesh, 
was purposively selected for its mixed ethnic population of patrilineal Ben-
gali (mainstream Muslims and Hindu minority) and indigenous matrilineal 
Garo communities. By incorporating women’s “voices” articulated through 
their own narratives, the study aims to show how poor women from differ-
ent ethnic backgrounds experience and navigate power at the household, 
community, market and the state level in relation to their reproductive prac-
tice. 
The study contends that reproductive health policies and discourses are 
an outcome of existing power structures. Due to donor dependency, na-
tional population policies have been articulated in line with the donor dis-
course. In the mid-1990s the Bangladeshi population policy adopted a com-
prehensive reproductive health care approach to ensure health equality and 
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. However, the findings of the 
study point to a more nuanced picture. Multiple interest groups and institu-
tional arms of the state exercise forms of covert power via policies, dis-
courses and knowledge produced by disciplinary institutions to govern the 
reproductive behaviour of the poor. 
 ABSTRACT XXVII 
 
The depiction of household poverty as a result of higher fertility among 
the poor, which in turn pushes households to remain in poverty and results 
in poor reproductive health, interwoven with the national concern about 
macro-economic development justifies aligning fertility reduction under 
macro-economic development goals. Knowledge produced by disciplinary 
institutions that construct a discursive reality of poor women’s need for 
long-acting contraception, fosters the interests of a powerful alliance of ser-
vice providers, international donor and multinational pharmaceutical com-
panies. By offering long-acting (implant) and permanent contraception (ster-
ilisation) through an Essential Service Package (ESP) under donor 
supported “safety net programme” in the public health care system to the 
poor further shapes the reality by shaping reproductive practice. 
The ways in which women’s subject positions are constructed and nor-
malised in policies and discourses, further explains high maternal mortality 
resulting from the absence of skilled health professionals during childbirth 
as “the lack of demand for maternal health care services” by the poor. This 
depiction of poor women as homogenous and powerless victims of culture 
justifies female focused Maternal Child Health and Family Planning (MCH-
FP) programme to ensure health equality. Such a discourse serves the inter-
est of the health care providers by creating demand and supply of reproduc-
tive health care goods and services through dual health care systems, private 
health care for the well-off and public health care system for the poor. Pol-
icy discourse remains silent about how privatisation of health care in com-
bination with market mechanism, class inequality, gender and ethnic differ-
ences created existing health inequality. 
Despite being critical of the government policy approach, women’s or-
ganisations realise that the availability of contraception and Menstrual Regu-
lation (MR) services, although inspired by population control motives, could 
be empowering for women provided that women are not integrated under 
an oppressive gender system. Women’s organisations articulate existing 
health inequality in relation to women’s subordinate position, patriarchal 
norms and unequal gender power relations. Yet, a major absence in the 
mainstream women’s organisations is the tribal women’s voice and in that 
sense they also treat poor women and their needs as being self-evident and 
homogenous. 
Contrary to the individualistic notion of agency, the study provides in-
sight how a complex interplay between gender, ethnicity and economic 
forces shape contraception and menstrual regulation/abortion practices. 
Across all ethnic groups most women take up the contraceptive responsibil-
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ity for the greater benefit of the household. A stigma attached to vasectomy 
and men’s role as the breadwinner discourage households to use vasectomy, 
since households are mainly dependent on men’s labour. Men and women 
both believe vasectomy reduces men’s physical power. Although the bread-
winners’ norm is not equally strong among Garos, they too show reluctance 
towards vasectomy. A range of concerns including cost, pleasure, safety, 
gossip, fear of mistrust and rumours create a negative perception towards 
condoms as expensive, unreliable and inconvenient method of contracep-
tion. Ideological restrictions against invasive modern contraception and 
abortion make Garos more dependent on natural methods and less use of 
menstrual regulation and abortion services. A more balanced intra-
household gender relation is however reflected in proportionately higher 
condom use among Garos as compared to Bengalis. Older Garo women 
also showed their agency by using sterilisation, being the only available 
method in earlier times. 
The research findings indicate that the outcome of negotiation does not 
represent women’s autonomous choice, but that notions of masculinity and 
femininity are linked to different contraceptive methods to make women 
take on the contraceptive responsibility along with the side effects. This 
process is reinforced by female focused family planning programmes, which 
requires minimum involvement from men and further reinforces gender 
hierarchy by demanding husbands’ consent to use MR service.  
Women’s narratives show they are resilient and deploy resources at their 
disposal to deal with side-effects of contraception by switching between 
different methods or sending their husbands to get the pill from private 
market or to get medicine to treat the symptoms. Women also use existing 
cultural norms to their advantage to assert their claims to exercise their right 
to use menstrual regulation services, manoeuvre official rules for the time 
limit or husbands consent to use menstrual regulation service or use secret 
abortion practices, although this sometimes puts women’s health and well-
being at risk. This indicates that even if women are able to negotiate in the 
household to exercise their choice and agency they face constraints in the 
health care market. This finding resurrects the importance of looking at 
gender power relations beyond the boundaries of the household in explain-
ing women’s agency in reproductive decisions. 
In contrast to the notion of women as ignorant victims of static, rigid 
cultural norms to explain the low institutional childbirth, the study provided 
insight how structural factors are enmeshed with cultural factors to render 
poor women’s access to childbirth, after delivery and other reproductive 
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health care services inaccessible. Women do not mindlessly follow a tradi-
tion of home delivery but rather rely on informal Traditional Birth Atten-
dants (TBAs) based on trust, expertise, familiarity, affordability and prox-
imity of the providers. Although cultural norms play a role, hidden cost, 
doctor’s absenteeism and inadequate quality of care in the public hospital 
remains a constraint on poor women’s access to reproductive health care 
services. Poor women also find it difficult to negotiate between their work 
responsibilities in the household and outside and biological reproduction in 
favour of their own wellbeing. This is reflected even in rejecting the option 
of a Caesarean in a complicated delivery, since it could affect their work ca-
pacity. This linkage with women’s responsibilities for household reproduc-
tion remains largely invisible in policies and discussions in Bangladesh. 
The findings of this study suggest that agency in reproductive behaviour 
is multifaceted. Questioning the conventional indicators of women’s em-
powerment, despite enjoying significant autonomy in terms of intra-
household gender relations under the matrilineal system, comparatively 
higher age at marriage, relatively higher education and no restrictions on 
mobility, the study found matrilineal Garo women use less contraception, 
rely on home deliveries and experience higher fertility compared to patrilin-
eal Bengalis. Ethnic differences are not only based on cultural elements, but 
deeply rooted in the structural system which has far reach political and ma-
terial implication based on inclusion/exclusion in access to resources in the 
broader social system. Garo ethnic identity is based on the experience of 
exclusion from the state authority by banning their traditional livelihood 
systems, denying access to their ancestral land and forest resources and ex-
cluding and marginalising them in forest development projects. 
Given that socio-economic and political context, Garo women’s choice 
for relatively high fertility is an outcome of negotiations between their eth-
nic identity, the desire for daughters to carry on their matrilineal kinship 
system and the perceived need to increase their numbers due to inter-ethnic 
tension with dominant Bengalis and political struggle to reclaim their ances-
tral land. The patronage from the Church which provides security and ref-
uge along with an ideological influence towards larger families contribute to 
this. Garo women further experience relative economic return from their 
children due to alternative livelihood opportunities for younger Garo girls 
and boys created in the NGOs via the Church and other informal sectors. 
All these contribute to Garo women’s practice of raising somewhat larger 
numbers of living children as compared to their Bengali counterparts. 
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Interpreting Bengali and Garo women’s reproductive decisions as ra-
tional individualistic choice detached from the cultural context and existing 
structures of inequality (as neoliberal policy suggests), ignores the complexi-
ties of culturally defined conjugal contracts, differences between patrilineal 
and matrilineal systems as well as the broader political and socio- economic 
context which shape gender power relation in reproductive decisions. 
 
 xxxi 
Reproductieve gezondheid op het platteland in Bangladesh: 
staat, gender en etniciteit 
 Samenvatting 
 
Dit etnografische onderzoek is gericht op een anomalie op het gebied van 
de reproductieve gezondheid van arme plattelandsvrouwen in Bangladesh: 
een aanzienlijke fertiliteitsvermindering en tegelijkertijd blijvend hoge 
moedersterfte door thuisbevallingen zonder de hulp van verloskundigen en 
complicaties die het gevolg zijn van onveilige abortussen. Geïnspireerd door 
de feministische opvatting van agency, benadrukt het onderzoek het belang 
van cultuur en context om beslissingen op het gebied van de reproductieve 
gezondheid te kunnen begrijpen, in tegenstelling tot een rationele en indi-
vidualistische opvatting van agency. Door de grootste bevolkingsgroep, de 
patrilineaire Bengalen, op dezelfde plattelandslocatie te vergelijken met de 
matrilineaire-matrilokale inheemse Garo, laat het onderzoek zien hoe 
machtsstructuren op basis van gender ontstaan en in een samenspel van 
complexe factoren de reproductieve-gezondheidspraktijk bepalen. 
Bij de verzameling en analyse van de data is een combinatie van het ca-
paciteitenkader en het sociale-relaties-kader gebruikt op basis van fem-
inistische opvattingen van gender, agency en empowerment. Het dorp 
Gachhabari (district Tangail, regio Dhaka) in Bangladesh is gekozen van-
wege de etnisch gemengde bevolking bestaande uit patrilineaire Bengalen 
(meerderheid moslims, minderheid hindoes) en een inheemse matrilineaire 
Garo-gemeenschap. Door de ‘stemmen’ van de vrouwen, die tot uitdruk-
king komen in hun eigen verhalen, in het onderzoek op te nemen wordt 
geprobeerd aan te tonen hoe arme vrouwen uit verschillende etnische 
groepen omgaan met macht op het niveau van het huishouden, de gemeen-
schap, de markt en de staat met betrekking tot hun reproductieve gezond-
heid. 
In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat het beleid en debat op het gebeid 
van reproductieve gezondheid voortkomen uit bestaande machtsstructuren. 
Door afhankelijkheid van donoren is het landelijk bevolkingsbeleid in over-
eenstemming met het discours van de donoren. Midden jaren 90 werd er in 
de bevolkingspolitiek gekozen voor een allesomvattende benadering van 
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reproductieve- gezondheidszorg om te zorgen voor gelijkheid op het gebeid 
van gezondheid en de kloof tussen arm en rijk te verkleinen. Uit de resul-
taten van het onderzoek komt echter een genuanceerder beeld. Verschil-
lende belangengroeperingen en institutionele staatsorganen oefenen achter 
de schermen macht uit via beleid, debatten en kennis die wordt verzameld 
door monodisciplinaire instellingen om het reproductieve gedrag van de 
armen te reguleren. 
Het kenschetsen van armoede van huishoudens als een gevolg van gro-
tere vruchtbaarheid van de armen waardoor huishoudens arm blijven en wat 
tot slechte reproductieve gezondheid leidt, gecombineerd met de nationale 
preoccupatie met macro-economische ontwikkeling, rechtvaardigt het 
scharen van vruchtbaarheidsreductie onder macro-economische ontwik-
kelingsdoelen. Kennis die wordt geproduceerd door monodisciplinaire in-
stellingen die een voorstelling van de realiteit construeren waarin arme 
vrouwen behoefte hebben aan langwerkende anticonceptie, dient de belan-
gen van een machtige alliantie van dienstverleners, internationale donoren 
en multinationals in de farmaceutische industrie. Het aanbieden van lang-
werkende voorbehoedsmiddelen (anticonceptiestaafjes) en permanente anti-
conceptie (sterilisatie) aan de armen door middel van een Essential Service 
Package (ESP) als onderdeel van een door donoren ondersteund ‘vangnet-
programma’ in de openbare gezondheidszorg geeft verder vorm aan de 
werkelijkheid en de praktijk van reproductieve gezondheid. 
Verder verklaart de wijze waarop de positie van de vrouw wordt bepaald 
en genormaliseerd in beleid en discours dat de hoge moedersterfte door af-
wezigheid van verloskundigen bij de bevalling wordt toegeschreven aan ‘het 
gebrek aan vraag naar gezondheidszorg voor moeder en kind’ onder de ar-
men. Dit beeld van arme vrouwen als homogene groep en machteloze 
slachtoffers van de cultuur rechtvaardigt het op vrouwen gerichte Maternal 
Child Health and Family Planning (MCH-FP)-programma dat voor 
gelijkheid in de gezondheidszorg moet zorgen. Een dergelijk discours dient 
de belangen van zorgverleners door het creëren van vraag en aanbod van 
goederen en diensten op het gebied van de reproductieve gezondheidszorg 
door middel van een tweeledig zorgstelstel met particuliere gezondheidszorg 
voor de welgestelden en openbare gezondheidszorg voor de armen. Dat de 
bestaande ongelijkheid op het gebeid van de gezondheidszorg is ontstaan 
door privatisering van de gezondheidszorg in combinatie met marktmecha-
nismen, klassenverschillen, gender en etnische verschillen, blijft onbespro-
ken in het beleidsdebat. 
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Ondanks hun kritiek op het overheidsbeleid leeft bij vrouwenorganisaties 
het besef dat anticonceptie en menstruatieregulering weliswaar beschikbaar 
gesteld worden uit het oogpunt van bevolkingspolitiek, maar tegelijkertijd 
tot empowerment van vrouwen kunnen leiden mits er geen sprake is van 
een onderdrukkend gendersysteem. Vrouwenorganisaties wijzen erop dat 
bestaande ongelijkheid op het gebied van de gezondheidszorg te maken 
heeft met de ondergeschikte positie van vrouwen, patriarchale normen en 
scheve gendermachtsverhoudingen. In de meeste vrouwenorganisaties 
wordt de stem van de tribale vrouw echter niet gehoord en in die zin be-
handelen deze organisaties arme vrouwen en hun behoeften ook als iets 
vanzelfsprekends en homogeens. 
In tegenspraak met de individualistische opvatting van agency blijkt uit 
het onderzoek dat gender, etniciteit en economische krachten in een com-
plex samenspel de praktijk van anticonceptie, menstruatieregulering en 
abortus bepalen. In alle etnische groepen zijn het vooral de vrouwen die in 
het belang van het huishouden de verantwoordelijkheid voor de anticoncep-
tie op zich nemen. Het stigma dat kleeft aan vasectomie en de rol van de 
man als kostwinner ontmoedigen de toepassing van vasectomie aangezien 
huishoudens grotendeels afhankelijk zijn van het werk van de man. Zowel 
mannen als vrouwen geloven dat een vasectomie de fysieke kracht van 
mannen vermindert. Hoewel de kostwinnersnorm minder sterk leeft onder 
de Garo, staan zij ook terughoudend tegenover vasectomie. Condooms 
worden vanwege zorgen over kosten, genot en veiligheid en door roddels, 
wantrouwen en geruchten beschouwd als een dure, onbetrouwbare en on-
handige anticonceptiemethode. Door ideologische bezwaren tegen invasieve 
moderne anticonceptie en abortus maken de Garo meer gebruik van natuur-
lijke methoden en minder van menstruatieregulering en abortus. Een even-
wichtigere genderverhouding binnen het huishouden komt echter tot uit-
drukking in een relatief hoger condoomgebruik onder Garo in vergelijking 
met Bengalen. Oudere Garo- vrouwen tonen ook agency door gebruik te 
maken van sterilisatie, wat vroeger de enige beschikbare methode was. 
De resultaten van het onderzoek wijzen erop dat het onderhandelingsre-
sultaat geen weerslag is van de autonome keuze van de vrouw, maar dat op-
vattingen van mannelijkheid en vrouwelijkheid verbonden zijn met verschil-
lende anticonceptiemethoden waardoor vrouwen de verantwoordelijkheid 
voor anticonceptie op zich nemen en met de bijwerkingen te maken krijgen. 
Dit proces wordt nog versterkt door op vrouwen gerichte geboortebeperk-
ingsprogramma’s die nauwelijks enige betrokkenheid van mannen vergen en 
die bijdragen aan de genderhiërarchie omdat voor deelname aan het men-
struatiereguleringsprogramma de toestemming van de echtgenoot vereist is.  
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Uit de verhalen van vrouwen blijkt hun veerkracht; ze bestrijden de bi-
jwerkingen van anticonceptie door verschillende methoden af te wisselen of 
hun echtgenoten te vragen de pil te kopen op de vrije markt of medicijnen 
te halen om de symptomen te behandelen. Vrouwen maken ook gebruik 
van bestaande culturele normen om hun recht op menstruatieregulering op 
te eisen, om officiële regels met betrekking tot de tijdslimiet of vereiste 
toestemming van hun echtgenoot voor menstruatieregering te omzeilen, of 
om illegale abortussen te laten uitvoeren, hoewel ze daardoor soms hun ge-
zondheid en welbevinden op het spel zetten. Dit wijst erop dat zelfs wan-
neer het vrouwen lukt om binnen het huishouden hun eigen keuzes te 
maken en agency te tonen, ze op beperkingen stuiten binnen de gezond-
heidszorg. Dit onderstreept dat het belangrijk is om buiten de grenzen van 
het huishouden te kijken naar de gendermachtsverhoudingen bij het verk-
laren van agency van vrouwen bij beslissingen op het gebied van de repro-
ductieve gezondheid. 
In tegenstelling tot verklaringen van het lage geboortecijfer in gezond-
heidscentra waarbij vrouwen worden gezien als onwetende slachtoffers van 
statische, rigide culturele normen, laat dit onderzoek zien dat structurele en 
culturele factoren ziekenhuisbevallingen en andere vormen reproductieve-
gezondheidszorg ontoegankelijk maken voor arme vrouwen. Vrouwen 
houden niet vast aan thuisbevallingen vanwege de traditie, maar maken ge-
bruik van traditionele vroedvrouwen (TBA’s) op basis van vertrouwen, 
deskundigheid, vertrouwdheid, betaalbaarheid en nabijheid van de di-
enstverleners. Hoewel culturele normen ook een rol spelen, beperken ver-
borgen kosten, absentie van artsen en slechte kwaliteit van de zorg in open-
bare ziekenhuizen de toegankelijkheid van reproductieve gezondheidszorg 
voor arme vrouwen. Het is voor arme vrouwen ook moeilijk om hun werk 
binnen en buiten het huishouden te combineren met hun reproductieve ge-
zondheid. Er zijn zelfs vrouwen die geen keizersnede willen bij een gecom-
pliceerde bevalling omdat ze dan minder inzetbaar zouden zijn op het werk. 
Dit verband met de reproductieve verantwoordelijkheid van vrouwen bin-
nen het huishouden blijft grotendeels onzichtbaar in het beleid en debat in 
Bangladesh. 
De resultaten van het onderzoek wijzen erop dat er veel kanten zitten 
aan agency in reproductief gedrag. In tegenspraak met de conventionele in-
dicatoren van empowerment, blijkt uit het onderzoek dat Garo-vrouwen in 
het matrilineaire systeem weliswaar behoorlijk autonoom zijn binnen het 
huishouden, relatief later trouwen, hoger opgeleid zijn en niet beperkt 
worden in hun mobiliteit, maar tegelijkertijd minder gebruikmaken van anti-
conceptie, vaker thuis bevallen en vruchtbaarder zijn dan patrilineaire Ben-
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galen. De etnische verschillen komen niet alleen voort uit culturele factoren, 
maar zijn diep verankerd in het systeem, wat verstrekkende politieke en ma-
teriële implicaties heeft vanwege (het gebrek aan) toegang tot voorzieningen 
in het bredere sociale stelsel. De etnische identiteit van de Garo is gebaseerd 
op de ervaring van uitsluiting omdat de staat hun traditionele middelen van 
bestaan onbereikbaar maakt, hen toegang weigert tot het land en de bosge-
bieden van hun voorouders en hen uitsluit en marginaliseert bij bos-
bouwprojecten. 
Binnen deze sociaal-economische en politieke context is de relatief hoge 
vruchtbaarheid van Garo-vrouwen het gevolg van een afweging tussen hun 
etnische identiteit, de wens om dochters te krijgen om hun matrilineaire 
verwantschapssysteem voort te zetten en de behoefte om hun bevolkings-
groep uit te breiden vanwege inter-etnische spanningen met de Bengaalse 
meerderheid en de politieke strijd om het land van hun voorouders. De 
bescherming door de kerk die een veilig toevluchtsoord biedt en de ideolo-
gische voorkeur voor grotere gezinnen komen hier nog bij. Verder bieden 
Garo-kinderen een economisch voordeel door werkgelegenheid die wordt 
geschapen door ngo’s en via de kerk en andere informele sectoren wordt 
geboden aan jonge Garo-meisjes en -jongens. Al deze factoren dragen eraan 
bij dat Garo-vrouwen gemiddeld iets meer levende kinderen hebben dan 
Bengaalse vrouwen. 
Door beslissingen van Bengaalse en Garo-vrouwen op het gebied van 
hun reproductieve gezondheid te interpreteren als rationele individual-
istische keuzes los van de culturele context en bestaande ongelijkheidsstruc-
turen (zoals in neoliberaal beleid gebeurt), wordt voorbijgegaan aan de 
complexiteit van cultureel gedefinieerde huwelijkscontracten, verschillen 
tussen patrilineaire en matrilineaire systemen en ook aan de bredere poli-
tieke en sociaal-economische context. Al deze factoren beïnvloeden de gen-
dermachtsverhoudingen bij beslissingen op het gebied van de reproductieve 
gezondheid. 
 
   
1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Women’s reproductive health practices in rural 
Bangladesh 
This study adopts a qualitative, intersectional approach to investigate 
women’s reproductive health practices in relation to the unequal gender 
relations and systematic structures of inequality in rural Bangladesh. Fo-
cusing on gendered socio-cultural practices and processes, the study 
highlights the ways in which state policies, privatisation of health care 
services, the politics of ethnic identity and intra-household relations in 
rural Bangladesh impinge on the ways different categories of women can 
express their agency and abilities to assert their reproductive rights and 
gain capabilities to ensure their health and wellbeing. 
I would like to begin with my personal experience, being born a year 
before the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Throughout my child-
hood, I grew up (like most probably many of the children of my genera-
tion) learning that population growth is the main cause of poverty and 
underdevelopment in Bangladesh. I vividly recall memorising, 
“jonoshonkha barey jemetik harey aar khadho utpadon barey ganitik 
harey” (population grows geometrically and food production grows ar-
ithmetically). The main reasons for population growth, I learned, were 
son preference, the demand for family labour in a predominantly agricul-
ture dependent country and the lack of urbanisation and modernisation. 
Later during my bachelor and masters education in Sociology, my aca-
demic knowledge regarding the relation between population growth and 
underdevelopment further elucidated these issues. The implications of 
population growth were seen not only in terms of more pressure on agri-
cultural land, but also in terms of deforestation, environmental degrada-
tion, rural-urban migration, over urbanisation, unemployment and social 
unrest in the country. 
In this historical context, my childhood friend Kabita and I experi-
enced different life trajectories. Due to my father’s job in the jute indus-
try, I spent my childhood in a rural setting, where I attended the same 
school as Kabita, who came from a farmer’s family. When I was a teen-
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ager, due to my father’s new posting, I moved to the capital city of 
Dhaka. Having the privilege of being born and raised in a middle class 
educated family, I obtained a university degree and started my career at a 
public university before getting married and planning to have any chil-
dren. My childhood friend Kabita however, stayed in the village and was 
married off right after leaving secondary school at the age of 15. After 
my university graduation, I went to visit my childhood village and met 
Kabita. She looked like someone I never knew before. Due to eating 
“paan” (betel leaf), she looked much older than her actual age with her 
black spotted teeth. By that time she had become a mother of five chil-
dren. According to Kabita, she was pressured to bear a son. Although 
after giving birth to three daughters her fourth child was a son, her fifth 
daughter was an “accident” (she did not want to bear another child any-
more, used birth control pills but forgot to take it regularly). Kabita’s 
situation was not uncommon to many rural Bangladeshi women in the 
recent past. 
The persistent high fertility in Bangladesh in the 1970s and early 
1980s had been given competing explanations including the absence of 
effective forms of family planning, the resilience of pro-natalist values 
and norms and the existence of material constraints, which led to the 
reliance on children as economic assets (Kabeer 2001:29). As far as 
women were concerned, population literature had widely suggested an 
inverse relationship between female autonomy and fertility, at least when 
other conditions were favourable (Cain 1993; Amin et al 1994; Balk 
1994; Basu 1992; Hashemi et al. 1999). The higher fertility and low con-
traceptive usage had usually been explained by the low status of women, 
their lack of access to resources within the household and beyond and 
their inability to obtain economic security or social acceptance except by 
bearing many children, particularly sons (Cain et al 1979; Cain 1984; Lin-
denbaum 1981; Germain 1975; Rahman 1990; Ahmed 1981; Bairagi et al. 
1986). 
Right after independence, faced with an annual population growth 
rate of 2.6 per cent, the government of Bangladesh did not wait long to 
incorporate the family planning programme in the national policy (Mah-
mud 2003). Recognising population control as a priority concern, the 
First Five Year Plan (1973-1978) declared that “No civilized measure 
would be too drastic to keep the population of Bangladesh on the 
smaller side of 15 crores for the sheer ecological viability of the nation” 
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(quoted in Demeny 1975: 307). Lowering the birth rate through modern 
contraceptive supply was the goal of the policy. With support from the 
World Bank through its International Development Agency (IDA), a 
large scale service delivery system was created to supply subsidised con-
traception at the doorstep of the rural population (Demeny 1975). In 
addition, there was also a motivational change campaign to promote a 
two-child norm and to legitimise the use of modern contraception 
(Mahmud 2003). At the same time, traditional methods such as periodi-
cal sexual abstinence and withdrawal, which were age-long traditional 
methods of birth control, were considered ineffective. Therefore any 
publicity of traditional methods was prohibited in the media (Akhter 
2005a). 
When the first population policy was unveiled in 1973, there were se-
rious questions about the likelihood of its success. The evidence for the 
existence of demand for modern contraception was not believed to be 
sufficient to justify building up a large scale service delivery system an-
ticipating a yet-to-be-proven demand for contraception (Demeny 1975). 
The motivational change to generate demand was thought to be ex-
tremely unlikely to generate behaviour change, in a context where higher 
fertility was the accepted cultural norm. While several prominent studies 
have concluded that fertility reduction is not to be anticipated from sup-
ply oriented family planning policies, in the mid 1970s, ICDDR,B1 con-
ducted a pilot project, now known as Matlab model, showing impressive 
success in fertility decline through a “carefully designed or conscien-
tiously implemented” family planning programme (Phillips 1988). Many 
elements of the Matlab model have subsequently been incorporated in 
the government family planning programme (Kabeer 2001) and fertility 
started to decline since the mid 1980s. Much to everyone’s surprise, the 
first Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 1993-1994 showed a 
rapid decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)2 from 6.3 to 3.4 between 
1975 and 1993-1994 (Mahmud 2003). It has been claimed by some as 
evidence that the lessons of Matlab had been successfully reproduced at 
the national level (Kabeer 2001:31). A World Bank publication by Cle-
land et al. (1994) suggests, “the crucial change that has taken place con-
                                                 
1 International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh. 
2 The total fertility rate (TFR) is defined as the total number of births a woman would have by 
the end of her childbearing period if she were to pass through those years bearing children at 
currently observed Age Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) (BDHS 2012: 60). 
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cerns acceptability of and access to birth control and not structural 
change that has driven down the demand for children” (Cleland et 
al.1994: 134). 
Given the long standing interest of the Bangladesh government and 
external donors, this rapid fertility decline has largely been attributed, 
firstly to the government family planning programme and the presence 
of a strong government commitment to reduce population growth 
(Schuler 1999; Cleland et al 1994; Donovan 1995), secondly to interna-
tional donors’ support particularly the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) and thirdly to the grassroots based out-
reach programmes by NGOs (Perry 2005:15; Rohde 2005). However, 
critics of the family planning programme hold the view that the effects 
of contraceptive services are a consequence of prior changes in repro-
ductive motives. In this view modern contraception can substitute tradi-
tional birth control methods, but it can neither initiate demographic 
change nor influence reproductive motives (Egero 1998; Caldwell 
1999b). Based on demographic surveillance data, Bairagi and others 
(2001) argued that keeping the desired family size constant, the family 
planning programme had no major role to play to bring the fertility level 
down. In the same line Kabeer (1994b, 1999a, 2000) further argued that 
demand for smaller families is generated by change in the socio-
economic context. This leads to differential motives to limit family size 
in different socio-economic classes. 
However, following this rapid fertility decline at the initial stage, the 
rate of decline slowed down and TFR remained at a plateau at 3.3 since 
the mid to the end of 1990s. At that stage, many experts argued further 
decline in fertility required changes in socio-economic conditions which 
would generate motivational change for further decline in the desire fam-
ily size (Bairagi 2001). 
Irrespective of this debate, following the International Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo (ICPD), the government shifted 
its focus from family planning to a comprehensive reproductive health 
care approach with emphasis on gender equality and women’s empow-
erment in its national Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP) 
in 1998. After a period of initial stagnation, fertility continued to decline. 
So far Bangladesh has created almost near universal access to modern 
contraception with a corresponding TFR decline from 6.3 to 2.3 be-
tween 1975 and 2014 (BDHS 2014). 
 INTRODUCTION 5 
 
Diagram 1.1 
Trends in total fertility rates in Bangladesh 1975-2014 
 
 
Source: (BDHS 2014:11). 
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that convenient, inexpensive and effective contraceptive services can ini-
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tional societies (Cleland et al.1994; Phillips et al. 1988). Therefore, a low 
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spective of their socio-economic conditions (Phillips et al 1982:137). 
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societies with active agency and traditional societies with passive agency, 
the diffusion theory assumes that human beings are free to behave ra-
tionally in both traditional and modern societies (Carter 1995:55; Schnei-
der and Schneider 1995). Following this theory, the recent fertility de-
cline in transitional societies like Bangladesh is explained by an active 
concept of agency. As far as women are concerned, declining fertility is 
associated with improvement in women’s status due to increase in educa-
tion, labour force participation and mobility due to initially NGO-driven 
micro credit programmes in combination with the easy availability of 
cheap and effective methods of contraception (The World Bank 2008; 
Hashemi et al. 1999; Schuler et al. 1997; Planning Commission 2011). 
Inspired by feminist scholarship on gendered agency (Evans 2013), 
this study departs from the standard approaches in explaining fertility 
reduction where the focus has been given only to the means and goals, 
ignoring the gendered processes through which fertility has declined. 
There are three significant aspects and processes that need to be ad-
dressed to explain fertility decline among Bangladeshi women: 
1. Systematic investigation is needed of the processes through which 
fertility has declined among women from different socio-economic and 
ethnic groups. Existing literature shows that in the early 80s a sectoral 
shift from agriculture to non-farm livelihoods fostered a declining de-
mand for children, particularly among the poor, which was regarded as a 
cause of rapid fertility decline between 1985 and 1995 (Mahmud 2004). 
However, it is yet to be examined whether the reduction in fertility has 
been experienced in the same way among women from different ethnic 
groups. 
2. The use of abortion, as a method of fertility regulation, needs in-
vestigation to provide a complete picture of the process through which 
fertility has declined. Some studies have (Bairagi et al 2001; Haque and 
Barkat-E-Khuda 1996) indicated that in the absence of effective contra-
ceptive methods, couples rely on induced abortion to obtain their de-
sired family size. 
3. The process of fertility decline further requires a more comprehen-
sive gendered analytical approach, taking into account structural and cul-
tural factors. One significant aspect of the fertility decline in Bangladesh 
is that more than 90 per cent of the contraceptive users are women. In a 
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Muslim dominated country where the prevailing purdah3 norms keep 
women outside the power structure (White 1992), the mass use of con-
traception by women demands an explanation of what changes, if any, 
have occurred in gender relations (Start 2000). 
This study does not intend to discuss fertility reduction as such. It 
aims instead to broaden the framework of analysis from a narrow focus 
on fertility to a more comprehensive understanding of women’s repro-
ductive health behaviour through real life experiences and variations in 
rural Bangladesh. 
Such a focus is needed since behind the much-applauded statistics of 
the success in fertility reduction, there are anomalies in other reproduc-
tive health components. For instance, in spite of reduction in the Mater-
nal Mortality Ratio (MMR) from 574 per 100.000 live births in 1990 to 
194 in 2010 (BDHS 2014), maternal deaths still remain significantly high. 
The lack of Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) during childbirth re-
mains a major cause of such deaths. According to the most recent data, 
42 per cent of childbirths are attended by medically trained professionals 
and the rest are attended by untrained traditional birth attendants and 
relatives (BDHS 2014). In addition, unsafe abortions remain another sig-
nificant cause, contributing to 26 per cent of maternal deaths (Rashid et 
al. 2011). 
This raises further issues, going beyond just better provision of ser-
vices to improving the reproductive health situation of women, requiring 
an interrogation also of the assumptions and priorities in policies. The 
study hence takes policy formulation as a part of the problematic, and 
therefore engages in a critique of macro level policy formulation in the 
area of reproductive health. Policies are mainly based on macro level 
quantitative data such as Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 
(BDHS), which do not capture the diversity among women beyond re-
gional and urban rural differences. Feminist scholars (Wilson 2013; Ev-
ans 2013; Yuval-Davis 2006) argue that existing health inequality in a so-
ciety is a result of long term cultural practices, created over time and 
maintained through different institutional domains. Hence, social norms 
                                                 
3 Purdah can imply a range of practices from covering women’s face or head to physical segrega-
tion of the sexes, which restricts women’s mobility in public spaces. Depending on age, class, 
religious belief or geography the practice of purdah varies. In Bangladesh, purdah can manifest in 
three different ways, covering, confinement and personal morality of women (White 2010:322; 
Hossain and Mashuduzzaman 2006a:42). 
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and values might constrain women’s access to reproductive health care 
services depending on their class, marital status, location and ethnicity, 
even if services are available. This realisation demands a micro level 
qualitative study to document the decision making process of individual 
women regarding their reproductive choices. 
In addition, policy interventions are based on a unitary model of the 
household, where households are seen as a single decision making unit, 
ignoring intra-household power dynamics. In order to contextualise 
women’s agency, this study sheds light on intra-household power dy-
namics and its intersection with existing power structures in the market 
and the community which mediate individual women’s access to health 
care services. 
Finally, Bangladesh is not a country consisting of homogenous groups 
of population. Besides mainstream Bengalis, 1.5 per cent of the total 
population in Bangladesh are Adivasi (indigenous) consisting of 27 dif-
ferent indigenous groups with distinct ethnic, cultural, religious and lin-
guistic background (Minority Rights Group International 2012). Macro 
data shows disparity in terms of health care access among indigenous 
groups (Planning Commission 2011:2). To understand the diverse reality 
of reproductive health experiences of women in Bangladesh, it is impor-
tant to compare and contrast variations and commonalities between 
mainstream Bengalis and indigenous ethnic groups. 
1.2 Justification of the research problematic 
The study is located within current developments and shifts in the ways 
reproductive health related issues have been addressed in the population 
and development discourse and policies4 since the International Confer-
ence on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994. The way popula-
tion and development has been conceptualised has underpinned specific 
population control policies in the recent past. Over the last two decades, 
it has been realised that “human reproduction” cannot be addressed as a 
separate entity. It became clear that in the developing countries women’s 
fertility rate will not drop until children survive beyond infancy and 
young childhood; until men also share reproductive responsibilities; until 
                                                 
4 Appendix 1 provides a summary of dominant development discourse and population policies to 
date. 
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women have the right to control their own fertility and unless there is a 
conducive environment to secure that right (Nair et al. 2004:1). The re-
productive health status of the present generation has an impact on the 
health of the next generation, and all these factors are of crucial impor-
tance for socio-economic development of a country. This realisation has 
resulted in the emergence of a multidimensional Sexual and Reproduc-
tive Health and Rights (SRHR) approach to address human reproduc-
tion. During the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 
and the ICPD in Cairo 1994, feminist scholars from the global South 
and North worked together to replace the old population control para-
digm with a broad Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) 
approach (Petchesky and Karen 1998). The SRHR approach originated 
from the idea that women in particular must be able to decide whether, 
when, and how to have children. The sexual and reproductive health and 
rights of women are broadly defined as: 
Right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters 
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of 
coercion, discrimination and violence (Nair et al. 2004:3). 
To enable women to make informed and autonomous reproductive 
health decisions this SRHR framework suggests replacing the old welfare 
approach to improve women’s status that advocated female education 
and employment by broader gender equality and women’s empowerment 
approach (Correa and Reichmann 1994:7). 
The International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in 1994 is considered a milestone in bringing this SRHR ap-
proach into the population and development discourse (Sen et al. 1994). 
During the conference international commitments were made to estab-
lish population policies which will provide reproductive health care ser-
vices not just family planning. The ICPD Programme of Action defined 
reproductive health as: 
A state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproduc-
tive system and to its functions and processes. people are able to have a 
satisfying and safe sex life, that they have the capacity to reproduce and 
the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so (Nair et al. 2004:4). 
Basic elements of reproductive health include attention to the follow-
ing: 1) Family planning; 2) Safe motherhood; 3) Safe abortion facilities; 
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4) Infant and child care; 5) Male participation and responsible behaviour; 
6) Adolescent reproductive health; 7) Infertility treatment; 8) Reproduc-
tive tract infections (RTI); 9) Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs); 10) 
HIV/AIDS; 11) Cancers of the reproductive tract and 12) Reproductive 
health needs of the disabled (UNFPA 2008:6). 
However, the incorporation of the reproductive health and rights ap-
proach (RHR) in contemporary population policy under the ICPD pro-
gramme of action has serious conceptual ambiguities and contradictions. 
The formulation of reproductive health and rights approaches in popula-
tion policy is a regression from the complex and integrated SRHR ap-
proach formulated during the ICPD in 1994 and the fourth World Con-
ference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (UN 1995). In reality, the 
reproductive health and rights framework continues to explain develop-
ment as a transition from higher to lower fertility regimes with a neo-
Malthusian overtone (Dixon-Mueller 1993a:4; Reddy et al. 2012). Under 
this framework, women’s reproductive rights and empowerment are seen 
as a pre-requisite to reduce fertility (Smyth 1998:217; Presser 2000). This 
is a departure from the SRHR approach where gender equality and 
women’s empowerment must be treated as ends in themselves and not 
merely as means towards the goal of fertility reduction (Petchesky 
2003:9). 
The incorporation of “right” and “choice” concepts in contemporary 
population discourse has also been criticised by Southern feminists for 
its highly westernised and narrow frame of reference. These scholars ar-
gue that the conceptualisation of rights and choice in population policies 
narrowly focuses on fertility control at best and on the single issue of 
abortion at worst. For example, in the early 1930s the feminist birth con-
trol movement that used the term reproductive rights had eugenic prem-
ises (Sen et al. 1994:8). Second wave feminists that used the slogan 
“women’s right to choose” with reference to abortion evoked individual-
istic notions of rights, and had racist and eugenic population control un-
dertones behind “a feminist face” (Akhter 2005a; Hartmann 1995; Sen et 
al. 1994). Hence, these scholars criticised the narrow notion of rights 
which are being incorporated in the dominant reproductive health dis-
course as rhetoric: 
Cairo failed to address macro-economic inequities and the inability of pre-
vailing neoliberal, market–oriented approaches to deliver reproductive and 
sexual health for the vast majority. These failures blocked any real progress 
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in transforming the reproductive and sexual health and rights agenda from 
rhetoric into policies and services (Harcourt 2009:50). 
Whereas feminists affirm that women’s reproductive health choices 
are determined by a complex interplay between economic forces and its 
intersection with existing culture and gender systems (Greenhalgh 1995; 
Harcourt 1997), the contemporary development discourse turns poor 
women’s agency into individualistic strategies of self–improvement de-
tached from the cultural context and structural inequalities (Madhok et 
al. 2013:5). Population policies remained dependent on the assumption 
that market strategies are gender-neutral, therefore they do not confront 
existing structures of inequality. Ultimately women’s reproductive health 
has been subsumed under the neoliberal macro-economic development 
agenda of trade and economic growth with a market–led health policy 
logic, that is about creating new areas for investment and expansion of 
biomedical goods and services, rather than about women’s “rights” and 
“choice” per se. (Bovill 2006; Harcourt 2009:54; Potts et al. 1999; Pots 
and Walsh 1999). 
The current focus on reproductive health and rights does not take 
into account that many countries have been subject to a “fiscal squeeze”, 
resulting in reductions in expenditures on health, education, welfare and 
social safety nets which put constraints on women’s capabilities and ac-
cess to resources (UNRISD 2004; Grown 2006; Gideon et al. 2014; Har-
court 2001). In the context of such economic constraints, the “right to 
choose” makes little sense for women (Menon 1995). In addition, the 
incorporation of gender in the reproductive health framework not only 
considers women as reproductive vessels, it is also trapped in a false per-
ception of seeing women as a homogenous group.  
Despite these conceptual ambiguities and contradictions, this repro-
ductive health and rights framework was incorporated in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) during the UN Millennium Summit in Sep-
tember 2000. Although the extent to which national governments adopt 
the MDG framework and how they are integrated in the national devel-
opment policies, varies greatly across countries and regions (Reddy and 
Sen 2012), the MDG framework has been taken by International devel-
opment agencies to allocate donor aid for development interventions in 
the underdeveloped countries, including Bangladesh (Kabeer 1994a). 
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1.2.1 The adoption of MDGs in Bangladesh: current achievements 
and gaps 
As a signatory of the millennium summit, the Bangladesh government 
incorporated MDGs in its current policy goal. In spite of the commit-
ment of Bangladesh government to provide affordable, assessable and 
good quality reproductive health care services to all by 2015 (Rashid et al 
2011), there is a persistent inequality in reproductive health situations. 
The following section elaborates on the kind of development interven-
tions initiated by the Bangladesh government focusing on achieving the 
MDG goal five (to improve maternal health). 
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Table 1.1 
MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health (Targets with indicators) 
GOAL Target Indicators 
Base year 
1990 
Current status 
(source) 
Target 
by 2015 
Goal 5 
5.A. Reduce by 
three quarters 
between 1990 and 
2015, the Maternal 
Mortality Ratio 
(MMR) 
5.1 Maternal Mor-
tality Ratio (death 
per 100,000 live 
births) 
574 
194 
(BMMS 2010) 
209 (SVRS5 2011) 
218 (Sample census, 
2011 BBS & UNICEF) 
143 
Improve 
Maternal 
health 
 
5.2 Proportion of 
births attended by 
skilled health 
personnel (%) 
5.0 
42 (BDHS6 2014)7 
31.7 (BDHS 2011) 
34.4 (UESD8 2013) 
43.5 (MICS9 2012-2013) 
 
50 
 
5.B. Achieve by 
2015, universal 
access to 
reproductive 
health 
5.3 Contraceptive 
prevalence rate 
(%) 
39.7 
61.2 (BDHS 2011) 
61.8 (MICS 2012-2013) 
58.4 (SVRS 2011) 
72 
 
  
5.4 Adolescent 
birth rate, (per 
1,000 women) 
77 
118 
(BDHS 2011) 
59 (SVRS 2010) 
- 
  
5.5 Antenatal care 
coverage (5.5.a at 
least one visit and 
5.5.b at least four 
visits) (%) 
27.5 7& 
5.5 
(1993-94 
BDHS) 
67.7 & 25.5 
(BDHS 2011) 
100 & 50 
 
  
5.6 Unmet need 
for family planning 
(%) 
21.6 
(1993-94 
BDHS) 
13.5 
(BDHS 2011) 
13.9 (MICS 2012-2013) 
7.6 
Source: (Planning Commission 2013:62). 
 
                                                 
5 Sample Vital Registration System (SVRS). 
6 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS). 
7 2014 BDHS data has been added to the MDG progress report published in 2013. 
8 Utilisation of Essential Service Delivery (UESD). 
9 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). 
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The Bangladesh government adopted a broad-based Health, Nutrition 
and Population Sector Programme (HNPSP) for 2003-2011, in order to 
improve maternal health and to reduce maternal mortality as part of the 
commitment to the MDGs. To achieve the MDG Goal 5, emphasis was 
given to increasing access to obstetrics, prenatal and antenatal services. 
Table 1.1 shows indicators that have been set to measure the reduction 
in maternal mortality are (5.1) Maternal mortality ratio and (5.2) propor-
tion of birth attendants by skilled health personnel. The Bangladesh gov-
ernment adjusted its country specific target to reduce the maternal mor-
tality ratio (target 5.A) from 574 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1991 to 
143 by 2015 and to increase the proportion of birth attended by skilled 
health personnel from 5 per cent to 50 per cent between 1991 and 2015. 
However, in spite of reductions, maternal mortality still remains high. 
According to the Bangladesh Maternal Mortality Survey (BMMS), mater-
nal mortality declined from 322 in 2001 to 194 in 2011, a 40 per cent de-
cline in ten years (planning commission 2013; WHO 2012). However, 
this report further indicated that within the overall 40 per cent decline in 
the MMR, only 15 per cent decline is due to behavioural change as a re-
sult of i) improved access to health care; ii) increase in girl’s education 
and increase in age at marriage; iii) increased awareness among women 
due to NGO’s mobilisation programmes; and iv) improvement in the 
economic condition (planning commission 2013:59). A major proportion 
of this reduction in MMR (25 per cent out of 40 per cent) is due to the 
reduction in fertility rate. The survey indicated that the decline in fertility 
has a positive implication on the reduction of risks of maternal deaths. 
Hence, the survey shows that the reduction in maternal deaths does not 
necessarily indicate improvement in health care access. It should be 
noted that other surveys found relatively higher mortality during 2001 to 
2011. 
Moreover, the BMMS 2010 data shows that the maternal mortality 
due to indirect obstetric causes has somewhat increased, which is related 
to a lack of access to Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) during child-
birth. According to the survey Haemorrhage and Eclampsia are the 
dominant direct obstetric causes of deaths; together they were responsi-
ble for more than half of the MMR (Planning Commission 2013:59). 
These statistics exemplify the significance of ensuring EmOC during 
childbirth to prevent maternal mortality and morbidities. 
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However, evidence shows an anomaly between policy priorities and 
real implementation. In the MDG, the target was to increase the propor-
tion of skilled health providers10 during childbirth to 50 per cent by 2015. 
According to the most recent BDHS data the proportion of deliveries by 
skilled health provider increased from 16 per cent to 42 per cent between 
in 2004 and 2014 (Diagram 1.2), but didn’t reach the 50 per cent target. 
Diagram 1.2 
Trends in births attended by skilled health attendants & facilities 2004-2014 
 
Source: (BDHS 2014:30) 
 
BDHS data (summarised in Diagram 1.2) shows a disparity in terms 
of access to institutional health care facilities during childbirth. The pro-
portion of births delivered at health facilities has increased from 12 per 
cent to 37 per cent between in 2004 and 2014. However, 63 per cent of 
the delivery still occurs at home (BDHS 2014:30), most of which are as-
sisted by untrained Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) or relatives in 
the absence of EmOC. 
                                                 
10 A qualified doctor, nurse or midwife, family welfare visitor (FWV), or community skilled birth 
attendant (CSBA) 
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In addition, there is disparity in terms of access to institutional child-
birth across socio-economic groups. According to the most recent 
BDHS data, 15 per cent of births in the past three years to women in the 
lowest wealth quintile compared with 70 per cent of births in the highest 
wealth quintile were delivered in a health facility. This translates to a ratio 
of about 1 to 5. (BDHS 2014:28). 
Diagram 1.3 
Trends in births delivered by C-section (percentage) 2004-2014 
 
Source: (BDHS 2014:28) 
 
The use of Caesarean section (C-section), which is sometimes consid-
ered to be a proxy indicator of women’s access to skilled care for com-
plicated deliveries, has increased from 4 per cent in 2004 to 23 per cent 
in 2014 (Diagram 1.3). Putting the data from Diagram 1.2 and 1.3 to-
gether, this implies that six in ten births in a health facility are delivered 
by C-section. However, there is disparity in terms of access to Caesarean 
services by location and socio-economic groups. Urban women are twice 
as likely as rural women to deliver by C-section (38 and 18 per cent, re-
spectively). In addition, half of the births among women who have sec-
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ondary or higher education and those who are in the highest wealth 
quintile are delivered by C-section (BDHS 2014:28). These data are evi-
dence of persistent inequality in health care access during childbirth. 
1.2.2 Critical concerns regarding contraception use practice 
A major aspect of contraception use practice in Bangladesh is that the 
great majority of contraception users are women. Since the beginning of 
the family planning programme, the contraceptive prevalence rate has 
increased from 8 to 62 per cent between 1975 and 2014 (BDHS 2014) 
(Diagram 1.4). Although contraception is offered to “couples”, more 
than 90 per cent of the contraceptive users are women (BDHS 2012). 
Diagram 1.4 
Trends in contraception use among currently married women (Percentage), 
1975-2014 
 
Source: BDHS 2014:17 
 
According to the most recent BDHS data, among the users, the Pill is 
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cent). The use of male dependent method is significantly low. While Fe-
male sterilisation is 5 per cent, male sterilisation is only 1 per cent and 
condom use is 6 per cent (BDHS 2014:16) (Graph 1.1). Women thus 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs of using modern contraception 
(Mahmud 2004). 
Graph 1.1 
Trends in contraceptive method use in Bangladesh 1975-2014 
 
Source: Author generated from (BDHS 2014:14). 
 
Actually, before independence, in the 1960s, sterilisation was geared 
towards men, because female sterilisation required a lot of skilled per-
sonnel. Later in India a parliament fell due to protests against male ster-
ilisation (Kabeer 1994b). In fear of this happening in Bangladesh, the 
government shifted the promotion towards female sterilisation. Nowa-
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days, the non-scalpel vasectomy (NSD) is easier and the safest method 
and is available everywhere in the country. However, by only making the 
service available, without encouraging men to use it, the share of male 
sterilisation remained stagnant at the 1970s level. 
This bias is reflected also in the recruitment, from 1973 onwards, of 
100 per cent female fieldworkers to motivate “couples” to use contra-
ception. Culturally these female field workers were not expected to dis-
cuss family planning matters with men. In reality, the intention of the 
family planning programme was precisely to target women to change 
their mind set towards modern contraception. 
Diagram 1.5 
Source of supply of contraceptive methods 2004-2014. 
 
Source: Author generated from (BDHS 2014:20). 
 
Diagram 1.5 shows a shift in contraceptive market from the public to 
the private sector. Although the public sector is still the most prominent 
source of contraceptive supply, the share of public sector in contracep-
tive supply reduced from 57 per cent in 2004 to 49 per cent in 2014 
(BDHS 2014:20). Over the years the private sector has become a major 
player to supply modern contraception in the market. The share of the 
private sector as a source of contraceptive supply has increased from 36 
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per cent in 2004 to 47 per cent in 2014. This data shows increasing reli-
ance on the market for contraceptive supply over the years. 
Diagram 1.6 
Source of supply of contraceptive methods by sector and type 2014 
 
Source: Generated by the author based on (BDHS 2014:19) 
 
A closer look at the BDHS data further reveals that public and private 
health care sector don’t offer the same type of contraception. The public 
sector is the predominant source of long-acting methods such as IUD 
(92 per cent), injectables (61), implant (93 per cent), female sterilisation 
(69 per cent) and male sterilisation (85 per cent). The private sector is the 
predominant source of supply of the Pill (51 per cent) and condoms (83 
per cent) (Diagram 1.6). 
The data discussed above suggest that despite success in achieving 
almost universal access to contraception, the poor’s reliance on the con-
traception supplied by the public sector means that they are largely de-
pendent on long-acting contraception. 
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Not surprisingly, the data show disparities in methods used by 
women from different socio-economic groups. After oral pills, rural 
women are more likely to use injectables while urban couples use con-
doms. In addition, the poor and less educated women are more likely to 
use injectables compared to non-poor and higher educated women, 
while the reverse is true for condoms (BHW 2008; BDHS 2014:15). 
Methods requiring male participation are much more likely to be used by 
well-off and educated women compared to non-educated women. 
Women with no or lower education are also more likely to use sterilisa-
tion than educated women. Poor women are more likely to rely on unre-
liable traditional methods (BHW 2008). This situation further demands 
attention to look into the use of Menstrual Regulation (MR) and abor-
tions to regulate poor women’s fertility. 
1.2.3 Abortions/Menstrual regulation as a means for fertility 
reduction 
The approach to abortion in Bangladesh is an interesting example of re-
strictive laws circumvented by tactful programme planning. Under the 
British Colonial Law Penal code of 1860, which is still operational in 
Bangladesh, abortion, self-induced or otherwise is a criminal offence, 
punishable by imprisonment or fines (Blanchet 1992; Akhter 2000). The 
only exception is to save the life of the mother. After the Liberation war 
in 1971, the abortion law was waived for women who were raped during 
the liberation war (Akhter 2000). Since abortion was illegal, the term 
Menstrual Regulation (MR) was used by the policy makers, which was 
considered socially acceptable to get rid of the foetus due to rape during 
war (Caldwell et al. 1999a). 
Later in 1974, the Bangladesh government integrated Menstrual 
Regulation (MR) services as “an interim method of establishing non-
pregnancy” in a few isolated family planning clinics as a public health 
measure because of high rates of hospitalisation due to complications 
from induced abortions (Dixon-Mueller 1988; Obaidullah 1996). In 
1979, the government incorporated MR in the National Family Planning 
Programme and free MR services were made available in all government 
hospitals and in health and family planning complexes (Akhter 1996a; 
Akhter and Rider 1996). 
The Health and Population Sectoral Program (HPSP) for 1998 to 
2003 has incorporated MR as one of its reproductive health care pack-
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ages. However the MR service remained under the jurisdiction of the 
directorate of family planning division, and not as a part of the main-
stream health care service delivery system. Though MR policy has been 
incorporated in the family planning policy since 1979, the service is not 
provided widely (Akhter 2001; Akhter 1996b). 
MR is also done in an ambiguous way. It is done for “establishing 
non-pregnancy” no matter if the woman is pregnant or not. Therefore, 
pregnancy test is not required. However, the service is only provided to 
the married women and requires consent from their husbands. More-
over, MR related information is not well disseminated to the population 
because of the fear of backlash. (Akhter 2001; Amin and Hossain 1995). 
Though a difference has been made between MR and abortion in the 
policy, it is difficult to make a distinction between these two in practice. 
MR can be performed during the pregnancy up to 8 weeks from the last 
menstruation period (Akhter 2000) by a paramedics and 10 weeks by a 
physician. However, the providers sometimes perform the procedures 
beyond the permitted duration of gestation (Obaidullah 1996; Akhter et 
al. 1996b; Blanchet and Fauveau 1992; Begum and Jalil 1996). In the ab-
sence of a pregnancy test there is an obvious chance to misclassify the 
duration of pregnancy. Unnecessary health hazards can arise in the case 
of women with matured pregnancy or women who were not pregnant at 
all. No systematic research has been done to investigate the impact of 
legalisation of MR to reduce the number of unsafe abortions. 
In 1998 the government incorporated MR in the “essential service 
package” (Chowdhury and Moni 2004), however in assessing the MDG 
goals there is no discussion about the number of abortions. Given its 
illegality there is limited information available on the number of actual 
abortions in Bangladesh. According to one estimate 653,100 abortions 
using Menstrual Regulation (MR) provision and 646,600 induced abor-
tions were performed in Bangladesh in 2010, the majority of which were 
unsafe (Hossain et al. 2012). Another research estimates that unsafe 
abortion contributes to 26 per cent of all maternal deaths (Rashid et al 
2011:21). 
A decade long development initiative focused only on MDGs can’t 
explain these anomalies in the reproductive health situation of Bangla-
deshi women. In this study the links between unsafe abortion and a sys-
tematic result of lack of access to MR/legal abortion facilities is explored 
through the narratives of rural women. 
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Taking a bottom up intersectional approach this study attempts to 
understand women’s reproductive health experiences at the receiving 
end of policy intervention. Through capturing voices of individual 
woman, articulated through their own narratives, this study intends to 
show how individual women from different socio-economic and ethnic 
backgrounds are constantly engaged in a process of negotiation in the 
household, the community, the market and the state level in relation to 
their reproductive practices. 
Taking gender as an organising principle of reproductive life, this 
study aims to illustrate how both men and women give meaning to their 
reproductive health practices and participate in the reproduction and 
contestation of prevailing cultural norms, looking at four interrelated 
elements of reproductive life: childbirth, use of contraception, 
MR/abortion and fertility behaviour. 
While there are multiple axes of power relations that may shape 
women’s reproductive decision, I take gender as cross-cutting with other 
dimensions of power such as class and ethnicity. By comparing the real 
life experiences of mainstream Bengali and indigenous Garo women, this 
study hopes to provide insight how complex factors intersect and inter-
act to form gender power relations and shape reproductive practices in 
rural Bangladesh. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main goal of this study is to gain understanding about the anomaly 
in the reproduction health situation of rural Bangladeshi women in rela-
tion to significant fertility decline (which is considered a family planning 
success story), yet persistent high maternal mortality due to the lack of 
access to health care services during childbirth and fatal problems arising 
from abortion complications (although MR has been made legal up to 12 
weeks of pregnancy). In doing so, the study goes beyond the surface of 
success stories and looks into the gendered processes and negotiations in 
reproductive practice. One anomaly in the success story which doesn’t fit 
the rhetoric is that fertility among tribal population didn’t decline in the 
same way as in the mainstream Bengali population. 
Likewise the study aims to go beyond the problems associated with 
health care access or problem in policy implementation to reach rural 
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poor and/or tribal women, but to unravel underlying assumptions, si-
lences and hidden areas which are not fully addressed in the policy. 
By uncovering the multiple experiences of women, which challenges 
the notion of homogeneous women, the study aims to contribute to the 
existing gap in the policy to ensure reproductive health and wellbeing of 
women. Knowledge produced through this study seeks to contribute to 
the literature on how the cultural construction of masculinity and femi-
ninity come to interplay not only with other structures of power relations 
such as class and ethnicity, but also the ways in which subject positions 
are constructed in the policy, in shaping reproductive practice. 
1.4 Research Questions 
To achieve the aforementioned research objectives, the study explores 
the following research questions: 
1. How are reproductive health and gender equality framed, defined 
and interpreted in the population/reproductive health policy? 
2. In what way do gendered and ethnic power relations shape 
women’s reproductive practices and processes of negotiation? 
3. In what way does the socio-economic and cultural setting shape 
reproductive health practices of women from different eth-
nic/socio- economic backgrounds? 
These questions will be explored through research at the level of three 
interlinked institutions: the household, the community, and the state. 
1.5 Organisation of the dissertation 
This Chapter has introduced the study, indicating its importance and in-
troducing its research objective and research questions. Chapter Two 
describes the theoretical framework and methodology followed to guide 
this ethnographic study. Chapter Three addresses the first research ques-
tion. This chapter investigates underlying assumptions and silence areas 
in the policy. It analyses how reproductive health and gender equality 
have been framed, defined and interpreted in the policy and in policy 
discussions. Chapter Four provides a description of the study village of 
Gachhabari, its socio- economic and ethnic composition, as well as that 
of the health care providers in and around the village. 
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Chapter Five addresses the second research question. This chapter il-
lustrates how the complex interplay between gender, ethnicity and eco-
nomic factors shape women’s use of contraception, MR and abortion 
practices. The chapter highlights how notions of masculinity and femi-
ninity are linked to contraception practice, which places the contracep-
tive responsibility and risks on women. 
Chapter Six addresses the third research question, delineating the 
socio-cultural and economic setting that shape poor women’s access to 
public hospitals during pregnancy, delivery and reproductive health care 
need. It highlights poor women’s dependency on home delivery and in-
formal health care providers during childbirth and other reproductive 
health problems in the absence of affordable and adequate formal health 
care services. 
Chapter Seven goes further to address a new puzzle that has emerged 
from the analysis. By focusing on Garos, this chapter illustrates how mi-
nority ethnic identity, desire to have daughters to carry on matrilineal 
system, inter-ethnic tension with mainstream Bengalis and political 
struggle to reclaim their ancestral land, ideological belief and relative 
economic return from children shape Garo women’s preference for 
higher fertility. The chapter thus illustrates how complex factors interact, 
influence and inform each other to shape gender power structure in re-
productive practice. 
Chapter Eight highlights the main findings drawn from women’s re-
productive health practices and indicates issues for future research. 
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2 
Analytical framework and 
research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The introductory chapter discussed the conceptual contradictions and 
ambiguities in the incorporation of reproductive health and gender 
equality in contemporary population and development discourses that 
inform population policy. To frame the examination of reproductive 
health practices and processes of negotiation of rural Bangladeshi 
women, in this chapter I put forward a conceptual analytical framework 
which incorporates and combines the capabilities and social relations 
frameworks. I also introduce the methodological steps taken to guide the 
empirical work. 
2.2 Integrating the capabilities and social relations 
frameworks 
The capabilities approach developed by Sen provides a powerful broader 
framework to re-conceptualise women’s reproductive health and wellbe-
ing in contemporary population and development discourse, if it is also 
informed by key concepts in feminist analysis. 
The capabilities approach evaluates policies according to their impact 
on people’s lives. This approach covers the full range of dimensions of 
human wellbeing. It asks whether the resources necessary to exercise 
people’s capabilities are available to them. According to this framework, 
individual capabilities are transformed by so-called “social arrangements” 
which either support or deny their capabilities. This framework identifies 
disaggregated household interests and the different power positions of 
various members in the household and describes an ideology of altruism 
in combination with the lack of perception of personal interest and a 
great concern for family welfare as a reason for existing health inequality 
(Sen 1991). 
After Sen, Nussbaum further developed the capabilities framework 
with a particular focus on women’s capabilities in developing countries. 
Nussbaum introduced capabilities in plural and made a distinction be-
tween “basic capabilities” (innate from birth), “internal capabilities” 
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(state of a person) and “combined capabilities” (an appropriate political, 
economic and social environment) (DeJong 2006). Nussbaum gave a list 
of indicators to compare the quality of life across societies beyond the 
distribution of wealth and income. For example life expectancy, infant 
mortality, educational opportunities, access to health care, land rights 
and political liberties (Nussbaum 2000a; Nussbaum et al. 1993). Ac-
knowledging that existing value systems are highly paternalistic towards 
women, Nussbaum proposed a set of cross-cultural norms based on le-
gal systems like CEDAW, and covering broadly shared human activities 
irrespective of time, space and culture. This framework provides citizens 
with justification and arguments to demand resources from their gov-
ernments (Nussbaum 2000b:239). The capabilities framework thus en-
ables policy makers to set forth a rationale for spending unequal 
amounts of money on the disadvantaged groups (Evans et al. 2001). 
Given the differences between Sen and Nussbaum’s approach to ca-
pabilities, where Sen focuses on the role of policy and public action and 
Nussbaum on legal constitutions (Gasper and Staveren 2002) based on 
an ethos of justice (Gasper 2014; Elson 2002), my research adopts the 
broader notion of capability developed by Sen, and its incorporation of 
unequal gender relations in the family and the society in explaining exist-
ing inequality (Sen 1995; Robeyns and Humphries 2003; Alkire 2002). 
One major theoretical contribution of Sen’s capabilities approach rele-
vant to my research is the distinction between capabilities and function-
ing. The capabilities framework expresses the concern that positive 
trends in female capabilities do not always translate automatically into 
greater opportunities for women. A distinction between “functioning” 
and “capabilities” thus helps us to understand the nature and role of the 
“social arrangements” in translating women’s capabilities into function-
ing11. 
Another significant relevance of the capabilities approach to my study 
is the distinction between “wellbeing” and “agency”. Sen argues that 
wellbeing achievements should be measured in functioning. If we add 
                                                 
11 Functioning refers to the “beings and doings” of a person, the set of things that she/he is and 
does in life. Functioning is therefore directly related to living conditions, an achievement. 
Whereas capability is merely the ability to achieve, the real opportunities one may have regarding 
the life s/he may lead (Sen 1987:36). Thus, capabilities are the various combinations of opportu-
nities one may have in life (Robeyns and Humphries 2003:11). 
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the outcomes of living conditions or achievements, we measure wellbe-
ing, whereas agency is reflected by a person’s capability set (Sen 1994). 
Despite the positive contribution of Sen’s capabilities framework, 
there are certain conceptual limitations. This framework doesn’t chal-
lenge existing “social arrangements”, but suggests affirmative action by 
the benevolent state to ensure gender equality and wellbeing of women 
(Gasper et al. 2002; Truong 2006). 
Some scholars argue that the capabilities framework resonates with 
the neoliberal formulation of agency and either explicitly or inadvertently 
reinstates liberal assumption of rational individual exercising “free will” 
and maximising self-interest, albeit within the material constraints (Wil-
son 2013:85). Such formulations of agency have a tendency to shift focus 
away from any systematic analysis of gender relations and structural ine-
quality (Wilson 2013:86), which mediate individual women’s capabilities 
into functioning. 
To overcome this limitation, my research combines the capabilities 
approach with the Social Relations Framework (SRF) for its analysis of 
gender relations in determining the access to and distribution of re-
sources. 
According to the SRF, resources are distributed through an “implicit 
contract” which spells out the claims, rights and obligations of different 
members to each other which are backed by the norms and rules of the 
wider society. Taking a dynamic view of gender relations, SRF recognises 
the conflicting and collaborative aspects of gender relations involving 
men and women in a constant process of bargaining and negotiation in 
determining access to and distribution of resources. The outcome of the 
bargaining will favour the member or members with the largest bargain-
ing power (Kabeer 1999:27). 
The centrality of the power dimension of gender relations brings the 
importance of women’s empowerment to the forefront in the SRF ap-
proach. Kabeer (1999b) mentioned three inter related dimensions to 
women’s empowerment process: a) Resources: Conditions under which 
choices are made; b) Agency: Process by which choices are made; and c) 
Achievements: Outcome of choices (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 
Dynamics of empowerment 
 
Source: (Kabeer 1999b:20) 
 
Such a formulation of empowerment helps to make a conceptual dis-
tinction between agency and empowerment. According to Kabeer 
agency refers to the “operationalisation of choice” and there is nothing 
inherently empowering about the exercise of agency (Kabeer 2011, Wil-
son 2013). In this study, I take the definition of agency, as: 
A reflexive monitoring and rationalization of a continuous flow of con-
duct, in which practice is constituted in dialectical relation between per-
sons acting and the setting of their activities. In this way both cultural con-
cepts - the values assigned to different behaviours and political economy - 
the forces creating the setting - become ingredients to, rather than external 
to, action, and the human agent is placed centre stage (Greenhalgh 
1995:19). 
This way of defining agency suggests considering culture as a social 
construct which is constantly under the process of reproduction, nego-
tiation and change. According to feminist scholars, agency can’t be de-
termined by looking at the outcome of choices but must instead focus 
on the process of decision making in everyday practices (Madhok 
2013:104). Agency is always exerted in a particular context and within 
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structures of constraint. This structural constraint is a result of long last-
ing engagements and negotiations of existing social arrangements (Evans 
2013, Yuval-Davis 2006). Therefore, agency is always culture and context 
specific. 
According to Kabeer, for agency to be empowering, it needs to chal-
lenge or transform existing inequality rather than reproducing it (Kabeer 
2010). I adopt the definition of Kabeer (1999b:437), where “empower-
ment is the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in 
a context where these abilities were previously denied to them”. Thus, 
empowerment implies a choice made from the vantage point of real al-
ternatives. 
The concept of empowerment that has been used within the liberal 
policy framework is somewhat different. The assumption that no inher-
ent conflict of interest can arise during the process of people gaining 
empowerment has been a cornerstone of the “equal opportunity” policy 
in both formal institutes and voluntary sectors (Yuval-Davis 1994). The 
underlying assumption of such policy is “a non-problematic transition 
from individual to collective power as if it is always possible for some 
people to take more control over their lives without sometimes having 
negative consequences on the lives of others” (Yuval-Davis 1994: 181). 
Policy based on such assumptions hides internal power differences 
within social categories. 
Discussions of agency and empowerment have to be addressed 
through an intersectional lens. Although the term “intersectionality” was 
first introduced by Crenshaw (1997, 1989) to denote the various ways in 
which race and gender interact to shape the mutual dimensions of Black 
women’s empowerment, feminist scholars from the South have long ar-
gued the internal complex structure of gender which cross-cuts other 
structures of inequality such as class, race and ethnicity (Miller and 
Razavi 1998; Yuval-Davis 2006). It also interacts with nationality and 
global world order (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:849). Therefore, 
women’s empowerment strategies must recognise women’s unequal po-
sition based on gender and its intersection with other structures of 
power including the national and the global power structure (Antrobus 
2002; Parpart 2010). 
A missing aspect in the SRF is the concept of masculinity. Connell in-
troduces a threefold model of the structure of gender relations incorpo-
rating i) power (cultural dominance of men and subordination of women 
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ii) production (based on gender divisions of labour and iii) cathexis 
(emotional attachment) (Connell 1995:73-74). In Connell’s view the main 
grid that connects these three aspects is masculinity. 
Connell’s work is useful since it shows how masculinity is not a fixed 
set of biological determinant or personality trait of individuals, but rather 
a range of popular ideologies of what constitute ideal or actual character-
istics of “being a man” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:848). Mascu-
linity is hence a relational concept always constructed in comparison with 
some notion of femininity. Gender regimes, in Connell’s view are the 
state of play in gender relations in a given institution in a particular cul-
tural context, in a particular point in time (Connell 1987:120).  
To understand and explore the complex factors that intersect and in-
teract with each other to form the gender power structure that shape re-
productive health practice of rural Bangladeshi women this analytical 
framework highlights three institutions; the household, the community 
and the state. Each of these institutions constitutes various types of gen-
der regimes. 
2.2.1 The Household 
The household is an important concept in my analytical framework not 
only as a site for reproduction and contestation of gendered identities 
and conflict of interest but also because of the differing policy conse-
quences implicit in varying conceptualisations of the household. The 
early unitary conceptualisation of the household as a site for altruistic 
distribution of resources has been challenged by the feminist scholars 
that define the household as a complex and deeply contested space 
(Agarwal 1997; Kandiyoti 1998). In this study I adopt the definition of 
the household as: 
A site of competing interests, rights, obligations and resources, where 
household members are often involved in bargaining, negotiation and pos-
sibly even conflict (Moore 1994:139). 
The outcome of bargaining and negotiation determines who does 
what, who gets what and how each member is treated (Agarwal 1997). A 
bargaining model thus argues that household members co-operate be-
cause co-operation makes them better off than non-cooperation (Sen 
1993). Sen (1993) highlighted a) endowment (what a person owns, such 
as assets and labour), and b) exchange of entitlement possibilities (to use 
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these entitlements) in explaining bargaining power. However, Sen’s bar-
gaining model has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on in-
come/lack of waged work, as being sufficient basis for bargaining. 
To determine access to and distribution of resources, feminist analysis 
has extended Sen’s bargaining model with other non-economic factors 
which can affect bargaining such as perceived contribution (Kandiyoti 
1998; Kabeer 1999b). Agarwal further emphasises the role of qualitative 
factors, such as social norms and perceptions in affecting bargaining 
processes and their link to extra-household socio-economic and legal 
institutions within which households are embedded and how these insti-
tutions are subject to change (Agarwal 1997:2). 
The bargaining model further extends to explain household decisions 
in relation to context and culture (Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 1994a; Moore 
1994), which include power differences; normative understandings and 
practices; allocation, access and control over resources; and the social 
processes that perpetuate domination and engender resistance (Chhachhi 
2004). Outcomes of negotiations in the household may also be affected 
by the supra-local discourse about the “right and needs” of a particular 
group of women, which might be made manifest through the targeted 
provision of advice or service provided by interventionist programmes 
(Kandiyoti 1998; Eveline and Bacci 2005; Agarwal 1997). 
Acknowledging that resources are distributed through a variety of dif-
ferent institutions in a society, this model expands bargaining from the 
households to the market, the community and the state. Gender power 
relations operate in all these institutions in determining differential 
claims, rights and entitlements of man and women (Sen and Presser 
2000). Access to and distribution of resources will be determined by 
gender regimes in each of these institutions. 
While this model provides a useful way of looking at intra-household 
power dynamics, it is important to also contextualise the model in rela-
tion to variations between patrilineal and matrilineal households. 
A patrilineal household follows a male-traced lineage, whereas a mat-
rilineal household follows a female-traced lineage system. While the for-
mer follows a patrilocal household residence the later follows a matrilo-
cal residence pattern following marriage, which gives a particular 
dynamics to the household relations and male and female roles in fun-
damental ways (Mann 1987). In the former women are typically charac-
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terised as a “weaker” sex, with no independent claim to property, limited 
access to the labour market, and little real household decision-making 
power (Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979; Lindenbaum 1981); in the latter, 
households are typically characterised by mutual co-operation rather than 
domination (Burling 1963; Playfair 1909; Kar 1982; Sangma 1981; Rao 
1985). Jackson (2014) criticises such simplistic binary construction of 
matrilineal and patrilineal household relations and argues that these 
modes shadow each other and co-exist to varying degrees. In the context 
of Bangladesh, where mainstream Bengali households follow a patrilineal 
system, the co-existence of house-husband (ghor jamai) (Hossain and 
Masuduzzaman 2006:490) is a typical example of a co-existence of 
matrilocal norms. Similarly among matrilineal Garos, there is also space 
for patrilocal residence (Nokrek 2013). 
Although some authors make an explicit link between matrilineal sys-
tems and women’s greater autonomy (Dyson and Moore 1983; Khaleque 
1986), studies on matrilineal Garos in Bangladesh show contested views. 
Most of these studies draw their conclusions on household gender rela-
tions based on the gender division of labour. Some authors (Bal 2000; 
Dey et al 2013; Khaleque 1986; Playfair 1909) argue that Garo women’s 
work is more restricted to subsistence production, reproduction and 
care, while males dominate in the public affairs. Another author argues 
that Garos simply follow a natural division of labour (Burling 1989). It 
remains overlooked in these debates how the gender division of labour 
gets reproduced, contested and renegotiated over time in interaction with 
other social institutions such as the market, the community and the state. 
This study looks at how the cultural construction of masculinity and 
femininity shape reproductive practice in both matrilineal and patrilineal 
households and the ways in which notions of masculinity and femininity 
get reproduced, negotiated or contested in interaction with other social 
institutions including policy. 
2.2.2 The Community 
In South Asia “community” could be defined with reference to either 
ethnic or religious differences (Sangari 1995; Chhachhi 1992). This um-
brella concept embraces groups or communities defined by colour, lan-
guage, or religion; it covers tribes, races, nationalities and castes (Chandra 
2006:397). Hence ethnicity is not specific to oppressed or minority 
groupings only (Yuval-Davis 1994). Ethnicity refers to the individual 
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level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense on 
the part of the individual that she or he belongs to a particular cultural 
community (Hutchinson, 1996:5). 
Contemporary construction of community goes beyond fixed and 
mutually exclusive boundaries between different communities (Yuval-
Davis 1994; Hutchinson 1996; Cohen 1996). It relates to the politics of 
collective boundaries, using any aspect of culture, dividing the word into 
“us” and “them” (Banks 1995; Vermeulen and Govers 1996; DeVos 
1975). 
Ethnic identity constructs the collectivity and its interest, not only as a 
general positioning of the collectivity in relation to others in the society, 
but also as a result of the specific relations of those engaged in “ethnic 
politics” with others within that collectivity (Yuval-Davis 1994; Ander-
son 1991). The politics of identity construction might mobilise all avail-
able relevant resources such as political, economic and cultural relating 
to customs, language, religion etc (Cohen 1996). Since identities shift 
boundaries and one can belong to multiple identity groups, they might 
overlap, contradict or reinforce each other. Different historical or politi-
cal contexts might also reinforce one particular identity over another 
(Chhachhi 1992). 
Even as it is important to look at variations between ethnic communi-
ties, contrary to conventional development discourse where community 
is seen as a harmonious unit, I take the notion of community as a deeply 
contested space consisting of multiple identities and conflicting interests 
(Sangari 1995; White 1992). Through an analysis of different religious 
communities in India, Sangari (1995) has coined the term multiple “pa-
triarchies” which allows for a more nuanced understanding of gender 
regimes in South Asia. Hence both the external factors as well as the in-
ternal power dynamics within a community need to be analysed. 
In this study I refer to Muslim Bengalis, minority Hindu and minority 
indigenous Garos as ethnic communities. I refer to majority Muslims and 
minority Hindus12 as mainstream Bengalis. Apart from some cultural dif-
ferences in terms of language, dress code, restrictions on food, kinship 
systems there are also religious differences between mainstream Bengalis 
and indigenous Garos. 
                                                 
12 In this study I do not go in details about discussing minority Hindus, rather refer to them as 
mainstream Bengalis. 
36 CHAPTER TWO 
 
In this study the differences between the mainstream Bengali and 
matrilineal Garo communities will be incorporated in analysing existing 
cultural norms as well as internal diversity and material differences 
(Bhabha 1990) among Garos and its link to the process through which 
gendered identities are reproduced, contested and take shape in a par-
ticular historical context. 
2.2.3 The state 
I refer to the state as a regulating, constraining and structuring network 
of power relations existing in cooperation and also in tension (Rai 1996). 
Early feminist analysis especially in the 1980s looked at the state either as 
patriarchal (Kandiyoti 1991) or as reflecting patriarchal and capitalist in-
terests (Wilson 1977; Eisenstein 1979). These feminist theories were 
functionalist and reductionist and saw the role of the state as “perpetra-
tor of violence”. Contrary to that, in countries with strong welfare orien-
tation the role of the state is seen as an arena of bargaining of interests 
(Hernes 1987). Some poststructuralist feminists reject the theory of the 
state as too abstract and argue that the focus of feminist analysis should 
be micro-level organisations and institutions that affect everyday prac-
tice. However, these debates are particular to western feminism, and do 
not capture the experience of women from Southern and post-colonial 
countries. 
Rai, a Southern feminist (Rai 1995), argues that the legacy of colonial-
ism in post-colonial states has been material, cultural and political. A fea-
ture of colonial intervention which is highly relevant here is the simplifi-
cation of traditional social and economic arrangements in order to be 
able to extract resources. In order to extract forest resources colonial 
government labelled the traditional livelihood system of jhum13 cultiva-
tion as environmentally destructive and justified abolition of jhum culti-
vation and customary land rights among indigenous Garos. At the same 
time Garo masculinity was constructed by viewing Garos as “blood 
                                                 
13 The form of land cultivation varies from region to region depending on the variations in the 
land tenure system, forest clearance process, types of produce, duration of cultivation and the 
fallow period. The most common form of shifting cultivation follows the slash-and-burn tech-
nique which begins with the burning of the forest growths to allow the release of nutrients into 
the soil. After 5-6 years of cultivation, when the nutrients have been exhausted, the land is aban-
doned as fallow to ensure the regeneration of the forest (Dey 2007). 
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thirsty head-hunters” while at the same time romanticising their matrilin-
eal kinship system (Nokrek 2013). 
In the broader context of Bangladesh, the role of the state in relation 
to women is ambivalent. Although the state was founded in 1971 on 
secular principles, with the advent of military rule in the mid-1970s 
Islamist political parties came to re-assert themselves in the political 
sphere. General Ershad (1982-1990) declared Islam as the official relig-
ion of Bangladesh in 1988 (White 2010:344). By 1991, when parliamen-
tary democracy was restored after years of de facto military rule, the 
Islamist party was able to play a pivotal role in electoral politics by forg-
ing strategic alliances with the centre-right BNP (Naher 2010:316). Moh-
sin points out that the state ideology with military and Islamic influences 
has been increasingly masculine (Mohsin 2010:10). 
Conversely a considerable emphasis has been given on the role of the 
state as legislative power to formulate, legislate and enforce laws regard-
ing equality between men and women (Chowdhury 2006)) and as protec-
tor of women from domestic violence (Khan 1993). In the context of 
Brazil Alvarez argues that: 
Feminists should neither dismiss the state as the ultimate mechanism of 
social male control nor embrace it as the ultimate vehicle for gender based 
social change. Rather, under different political regimes and at distinct his-
torical conjunctures, the state is potentially a mechanism either for social 
change or social control in women’s lives (Alvarez 1990:273). 
In most post-colonial Southern countries the state is characterised as 
“weak”, which implies a lack of infrastructural capacity in tandem with 
corruption in implementing state legislation and action (Rai 1996). Con-
temporary feminist analysis of the state further argues that the state is 
not homogenous: it is a collection of agencies, institutions, discourses 
and contested power relations. In post-colonial countries like Bangla-
desh, it has been argued that the state apparatus tends to get co-opted by 
the neo-colonial bourgeoisies to pursue their class interests (Alavi 1972).  
In this study the focus is not on the state per se but on specific state 
policies and discourses related to reproductive health and rights and the 
ways in which these undermine or reinforce unequal gender relations. 
These are not homogenous and reflect different interests. In relation to 
this aspect Foucault’s approach to the state and power is particularly use-
ful. 
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Power, according to Foucault, is not exercised from the exterior; it is 
not possessed by an individual, nor is it centralised in the law, the econ-
omy or the state. Rather it is immanent in everyday relationships includ-
ing economic exchanges, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc. 
Contemporary feminist reading of the Foucauldian notion of govern-
mentality helps us to understand the link between the micro and macro 
politics of gender: 
Governmentality is simultaneously individualising and totalising. On the 
one hand, governmentality is simultaneously subjectivising (i.e. it concerns 
itself with the constitution of individualised subjectivity) and objectivising 
(i.e. through the operation of bio-power the individual is transformed into 
an object or docile body). On the other hand, the individual is implicated 
in large-scale normalising structures and regulatory controls. Governmen-
tal analysis, thus, attempts to interlink the micro-effects of power (e.g. self-
technologies) with the macro-strategies of power without privileging one 
or the other (Macleod and Durrheim 2002:45). 
This study doesn’t deal with bio-power, or how power operates 
through chain of networks and is dispersed through body politics (Har-
court 2002) as a form of governmentality. My focus is how the power 
dimension works in and through policies- assumptions and discourses by 
different actors located within and outside the state. The aspect of gov-
ernmentality relevant to this study is what Foucault called disciplinary 
technology. This study shows how knowledge produced through disci-
plinary institutes regularise and normalise subjects through systematic 
production of concepts categories and subject positions to construct the 
reproductive health need of women at the same time shape the reality by 
enabling or constraining certain reproductive practice. I explore the dis-
courses of need for long-acting contraception among poor women. 
Foucault has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on dis-
course which constructs subjectivity and too little attention to the 
“messy empirical reality” (Li 2007). The understanding of discursive 
power has to be balanced by in depth ethnographic study, particularly if 
we wish to identify possibilities of change and transformation. My study 
hence deals with the problematic by looking both at discourse as well as 
the voices of rural poor women. 
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2.3 Research methodology 
Taking a bottom up approach, by capturing the voices of women, articu-
lated through their own narratives, this study hopes to provide insight 
into how power operates in different institutional domains in shaping 
women’s reproductive health practices in rural Bangladesh. 
The following sections describe the methodological steps taken to 
carry out the research. This includes the following: the research location, 
the rationale for choosing a qualitative research approach, and a matrix 
linking the research questions, information needed and methods em-
ployed to answer the research questions. It then provides details on 
methods of data accumulation and steps taken to analyse and synthesise 
data/information. The last part of this section provides information on 
research process and reflexivity including ethical dilemmas and questions 
of reliability and validity of the study. 
2.3.1 The research location 
To explore reproductive health experiences of women from poor socio-
economic and different ethnic backgrounds, I purposively chose a village 
with a mixed ethnic population to conduct my research. The main ethnic 
population in Bangladesh is called “Bengali”. Bengalis consists of Mus-
lim majority and Hindu minority groups. Besides Bengalis, adivasi14, and 
Mandis were selected purposively for this research due to their distinct 
matrilineal system which gives them a sharp contrast with mainstream 
Bengali population. Mandis are mostly known as Garos to the interna-
tional community. In this research I use the term Garos15 and Mandis 
                                                 
14 To refer to the indigenous population the Bangla term ‘Adivasi’ is generally used. Besides 
Bengalis 1.5 per cent of the total population in Bangladesh are indigenous.The term Adivasi 
represents a broad category of more than 27 different indigenous groups. Adivasis offer major 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic distinctions from the mainstream Bengalis (Minority 
Rights Group International 2012). 
The main Adivasi groups in Bangladesh are the Santal, Chakma, Marma and Mandi. Chakmas 
and Marmas live in the mountains Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT), while Santals and Mandis are 
plain-dwelling Adivasi. Santals live in the north-west and Mandis live in the north-central of 
Bangladesh (Sherpur, Mymensingh and Tangail district) (Minority Rights Group International 
2012). 
15 The term Garo came into being to refer to Mandis in mainstream Bengali writings following 
colonial writings, which has underlying assumptions that indigenous Garos are originated from 
the Garo Mountain of India and travelled to current Bangladesh. Such an assumption denies their 
claim as adivasi, which literary means native. 
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interchangeably. However, I would like to emphasise that Garos prefer 
to call themselves Mandis, which literally means human (Bal 2000). 
The village called Gachhabari in Madhupur upazila, Tangail district 
was purposively selected for this research. Please refer to Map 2.1. 
(Chapter Four provides detailed information on the study village). To 
give an idea of the research location, Bangladesh is divided into divi-
sions, districts (jela/zila) and sub districts (thana/upazilas). Dhaka is the 
central division among 7 divisions and Tangail is one of the 17 districts 
under Dhaka Division. Madhupur is the largest upazila among the 12 sub 
districts/upazilas in Tangail district. 
Map 2.1 
Map of the village 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
The Madhupur upazila was established in 1951 as Thana and up-
graded up to Upazila in 1983. The name Madhupur originated from its 
availability of madhu (honey). This area was known for its jungles and 
forests with a large number of bee hives. People used to collect honey 
and sold it at the local market; the area thus became known as Madhu-
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pur. Madhupur Sub district/upazila consists of an area of 500.67 sq km. 
It is bordered by Jamalpur Sadar upazila on the north, Gopalpur and 
Ghatail upazilas on the south, Muktagacha and Fulbaria upazilas on the 
east, Sarishabari and Gopalpur upazilas on the west (Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics 2007). 
Under the Madhupur upazila, Gachhabari village’s mixed ethnic com-
position made it most suitable to conduct this study. According to the 
census report Gachhabari village consists of 294 Muslim households, 24 
Hindu households and 63 Buddhist households (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics 2007). In the national census the classification was based on 
religion rather than ethnicity. Therefore, Garos were classified as Bud-
dhist, due to their old religion: Animism. In fact, almost all the Garos are 
converted into Christianity. 
This composition of ethnic diversity and the presence of public, pri-
vate and NGO health care services, made Gachhabari an ideal location 
to explore and analyse women’s reproductive health practices in rural 
Bangladesh. 
2.3.2 Rationale for a qualitative research approach 
The nature of this investigation required adopting a qualitative approach. 
It allowed extracting and interpreting the meaning of individual women’s 
reproductive health experiences. 
The epistemological stance I adopted is a feminist standpoint ap-
proach. Feminist standpoint methodologists consider women’s own ex-
periences a valid source of knowledge production which can provide a 
more inclusive, and less distorted explanation of the reality (Harding 
2004; Harding 1991, Wolf 2011). To understand women’s real life 
choices and negotiations, within qualitative research traditions, an ethno-
graphic approach was considered most suitable for offering a holistic 
rather than a reductionist understanding of the reality (Bloomberg 
2008:80). 
Many feminist researchers argue that exploring women’s “real” life 
experience means taking real life as the starting point and investigating its 
subjective concreteness as well as its societal entanglements (Mies 
2005:92). To understand the complexities of socio-cultural context under 
which women perceive their social world and make meaning of their re-
productive practices, an “emic” viewpoint (Kottak 2006) was called for. 
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An ethnographic approach also allowed me long term interaction to 
build rapport with research participants to provide an “emic” under-
standing of women’s own interpretation of their reproductive behaviour. 
The main data collection technique employed in this research was 
documenting individual woman’s real life experiences articulated through 
their own voices through in-depth interviews. Women’s own voices 
could best portray women’s feelings, thoughts, aspirations, choices and 
decisions: the realities that women experience in everyday life. 
In qualitative research, validity of data is not only a matter of concep-
tualisation and of the methods used. It involves researchers’ moral integ-
rity and practical wisdom for evaluating the quality of the knowledge 
produced (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:248). Detailed and thick descrip-
tion, reflexivity, extensive time spent in the field and the closeness of the 
researcher to participants are the primary validation criteria in qualitative 
research (Thomas 2016; Geertz 1973; Creswell 2007). 
In qualitative research, triangulation of data implies combining more 
than one set of insights in an investigation, which can be achieved 
through combining diverse sources of data, researchers and/or theoreti-
cal and methodological aspects (Downward and Mearman 2007:81). In 
this study triangulation was achieved through combining qualitative and 
quantitative data collection tools as well as collecting data from diverse 
sources, to cross-check and verify information throughout. 
2.3.3 Matrix: research questions, information needs and methods 
The information needed to conduct the research was guided by three 
main research questions. The link between these research questions, in-
formation needs and the combination of different data collection tech-
niques is summarised in the matrix below: 
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Table 2.1 
Matrix of research questions, information needs and data collection tech-
niques 
Research Ques-
tions 
Required information Methods employed 
1) How are repro-
ductive health 
and gender equal-
ity framed, de-
fined and inter-
preted in the 
population policy 
and programme 
implementation? 
 
 
Contextual: 
How reproductive health and gender equal-
ity have been conceptualised, framed and 
interpreted in the population policy and 
programme implementation. 
 
Review of official re-
ports, BDHS and other 
secondary research 
reports and policy 
documents. 
 
Perceptual: 
Views, assumptions, biases and silences in 
the policy document and among key devel-
opment actors in relation to population 
policy, reproductive health and gender 
equality. 
Content analysis and 
argumentation analysis 
of policy documents. 
Key policy stakeholder 
interviews. 
2) In what way do 
gendered and 
ethnic power 
relations shape 
women’s repro-
ductive health 
practices and 
processes of nego-
tiations? 
 
 
Demographic: 
Reproductive health practices depending on 
socio-economic and ethnic diversity. 
Contextual: 
Explanation of cultural norms and gender 
relations in the community 
Household survey. 
 
Literature review, ob-
servation, focus group 
discussions, service 
provider interviews. 
Perceptual: 
Individual women’s and men’s narratives on 
their decision making process regarding 
reproductive health practices. 
In-depth interviews of 
individual women and 
In-depth interviews of 
individual men. 
3) In what ways 
does the socio-
economic and 
cultural setting 
shape reproduc-
tive health prac-
tices of women 
from different 
ethnic/socio- 
economic back-
grounds? 
 
Demographic: 
Access to services depending on socio-
economic and ethnic diversity. 
Contextual: 
Explanation of socio-economic and cultural 
setting 
Household survey. 
 
Literature review, ob-
servation, focus group 
discussions, service 
provider interviews.  
Perceptual: 
Description and explanation of individual 
women’s experiences regarding their access 
to reproductive health care services. 
In-depth interviews of 
individual men and 
women. 
 
The preparatory phase for the selection of research location and for-
mulation of guidelines for collecting information was between Novem-
ber 2007 and January 2008. The actual fieldwork was between February 
and November 2008. The field research followed several systematic steps 
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to collect information from diverse sources. Some of these steps were 
informed by previous steps and some were done simultaneously. A snap-
shot of the various steps I took is the following: 
1. A continuous review of literature was conducted for a solid theo-
retical grounding of this research. 
2. A content analysis of policy documents was done to understand 
how reproductive health has been defined and what it implied in 
terms of policy and programmes available to women. 
3. 35 key policy stakeholders were identified, contacted and inter-
viewed following a semi structured questionnaire to explore the un-
derlying assumptions and power dynamics behind policy formula-
tion. (Questionnaire is attached in appendix 2 and the list of key 
informants in appendix 3). 
4. A household survey was conducted to get general information on 
reproductive health practices among the total 502 households in the 
research village. (Survey questionnaire is attached in appendix 4). 
5. 21 Local service providers/key informants were interviewed to un-
derstand providers’ attitudes and availability of reproductive health 
care services in the community. (List of personnel interviewed in 
appendix 7). 
6. Five focus group discussions were conducted among men and 
women groups separately to explore community perception and atti-
tude towards reproductive health practices and available reproduc-
tive health care providers in the community. 
7. In-depth interviews of 50 women from diverse socio-economic and 
ethnic backgrounds were conducted to document individual 
women’s narratives of their own reproductive health experiences 
and their processes of negotiation in the household and the com-
munity. (List of female participants in appendix 5) 
8. To understand and explore intra-household decision making proc-
esses, 25 men were interviewed to incorporate their attitudes and 
perceptions regarding existing reproductive health practices. (List of 
male participants in appendix 6). 
9. Observation was used throughout the research while participating in 
the community or during personal visit to the health facilities or 
conducting interviews. 
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2.3.4 Methods of information accumulation 
Literature Review 
Prior to my fieldwork an extensive review of literature was conducted to 
ensure a solid theoretical grounding for my research. However, literature 
review was a constant process to update information or to incorporate 
new insights into my research. 
Content Analysis of policy: documents and discourses 
An important aspect of the study was to go beyond the problems associ-
ated with issues of access and service delivery of reproductive health care 
to also critically interrogate the policies to analyse how the issue of re-
productive health was conceptualised, framed and interpreted in the state 
policy. A content analysis and an argumentation analysis of the most re-
cent policy documents was undertaken to systematically explore underly-
ing assumptions, biases and silences in the policy (Reinharz 1992a; 
Reinharz 1992b; Yanow 2000). There is often a disjunction between 
what is stated in policies and how these are interpreted and applied by 
policy makers and other relevant actors. To explore these further, inter-
views with key policy stakeholders and main development actors were 
held and principles of discourse analysis applied to the data generated. 
Key informant interviews for policy perspectives 
Key informant interviews have been a very useful tool to understand and 
explore the underlying assumptions and power dynamics underpinning 
policy formulation. The key informants represented a cross-section of 
donors, government representatives, civil society organisations, academ-
ics, research institutes, major political parties and women’s rights organi-
sations. Their involvement ranged from direct policy formulation to pure 
research, health service provision, technical assistance and support, to 
lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising. Key informant interviews 
highlighted the ideologies, resources, power dynamics, agreement and 
contestation among different stakeholders regarding the conceptualisa-
tion of reproductive health and the ways and strategies to ensure health 
equity in Bangladesh. 
I identified a list of 35 key informants to conduct interviews. Political 
leaders were not initially considered as key informants. However, during 
several interviews it became apparent that with the change in political 
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regime there were policy changes in Bangladesh. Therefore it became 
important to incorporate some representatives of political parties as key 
policy stakeholders. 
Interviews were done in Bangla or English depending on the respon-
dents’ preference by two research assistants and by me. The interview 
questionnaire was sent before the actual interview, to allow the infor-
mants to better prepare for the interviews. All the interviews (except 
USAID) were recorded and transcribed by research assistants in English. 
Processing and analysing the data based on key informant interviews was 
done by me. Key informant interviews were analysed using themes that 
summarised their views and meanings related to policy and programme 
implementation. 
Household Survey 
At the beginning of the fieldwork primary data were generated through a 
household survey conducted in the study village to understand the socio-
economic, demographic characteristics and reproductive health care 
practices in the research village. The household survey questionnaire in-
cluded information on TFR, infant mortality, place of child delivery, use 
of contraception, health services used in last six months prior to the sur-
vey, and the type of health care providers visited. 
A structured questionnaire was developed following the BDHS sur-
vey questionnaire to conduct the household survey. Ten research assis-
tants, five male and five female from the studied location from different 
ethnic background were selected and trained for three days in February 
2008. After the training a pre-test was conducted in a neighbouring vil-
lage called Chunia. The questionnaire was then modified and adjusted 
for the final survey. The initial survey questionnaire was too long and a 
part on “knowledge on HIV and AIDS” was taken out from the survey, 
while new information on the use of contraception was added. 
Another adjustment was made in the operational definition of 
“household”. Initially, the household was defined as “where members 
cook and eat from the same pot and share the income”. However, dur-
ing the pre-test I realised that members from many households migrated 
to different places, however they share income and other responsibilities. 
Since my research was interested in fertility behaviour, physical presence 
in the household was not a necessary criterion to be considered as a 
household member. Biological children, who have not started a separate 
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family yet, but live outside the village and share income were considered 
as household members, even though they did not literally “cook and eat 
from the same pot” during the survey. 
It was difficult to get reliable information on monthly income, as 
many of household members do not have a fixed monthly salary. Many 
of them are dependent on agriculture, where they are dependent on har-
vest twice a year. An estimate of monthly income was generated by 
combining previous year’s income and monthly consumption and ex-
penditure data. This has to be seen as approximate. 
During the survey, the research assistants worked in pairs, conducting 
the survey in 502 households in 20 days. According to the government 
population census done in 2001, the total number of households was 382 
in Gachhabari village (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2007). According 
to my household survey, however, the total number of households was 
actually 517. Out of 517 households, one adult female in the reproduc-
tive age group (15-54) from 502 households was interviewed. In 15 
households there was no adult female in this age group to take an inter-
view. I focused on women respondents during the household survey and 
included men in the focus group discussions and interviews. 
Focus Group Discussions 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)16 tools were very useful in focus 
group discussions to explore the community perceptions and attitudes in 
determining women’s reproductive health practices and identifying dif-
ferences between men and women’s perceptions in prioritising reproduc-
tive health needs. 
The PRA techniques used during focus group discussions included 
community mapping, mobility mapping and body mapping (shown in 
Chapter Four, Drawings 4.2 & 4.3 and in Chapter Five, Drawing 5.1). 
The community mapping provided information on the village’s geo-
graphical boundaries, infrastructure, population distribution and envi-
ronmental setting. The mobility mapping identified availability of repro-
ductive health care providers to the community in terms of childbirth, 
supply of contraception, MR/abortion and other sexual and reproduc-
                                                 
16 PRA approach has received recognition for its usefulness of understanding of contextual, sub-
jective and non-material dimensions of human experience (White 2006). It allows poor people to 
express and analyse the realities of their live and conditions (Chambers 2005). 
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tive health care services. The body mapping technique was used to assess 
the existing knowledge and perception in relation to childbirth and use 
of contraception on human body (Picture 2.1). 
Picture 2.1 
PRA technique: Traditional health attendants drawing body mapping 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo during FGD, TBAs, 25 April 2008. 
 
The FGDs further provided me with opportunity to be familiar with 
local terms to refer to different reproductive health matters or events, 
which made further communication smooth. It also helped me in identi-
fying potential key informants from the community, who were a great 
support in accessing individual men and women for in-depth interviews. 
Prior to conducting focus group discussions a guideline was devel-
oped to stimulate discussion among participants to explore shared cul-
tural meanings pertinent to reproductive practice. (The guideline is at-
tached in appendix 8). One focus group was arranged to test and develop 
the guideline further in the field. However, it did not match my expecta-
tion. The setting of the focus group following an open structured guide-
line, but steering the discussion in a particular direction to explore per-
ceptions of the participants was a disappointing experience. As a 
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researcher I felt I was trying to explain my own understanding of certain 
concepts related to reproductive health issues, which seemed not to be 
familiar to the participants at all. Younger participants didn’t feel free to 
discuss certain issues such as abortion and sexually transmitted diseases 
openly in front of elder women, while my intension was to maximise di-
versity in the group discussion by including participants from diverse 
groups including young and old, educated and uneducated, poor and 
rich, Bengalis and Garos. 
After the test focus group discussion a literature review on qualitative 
research techniques helped me to apply new techniques for focus group 
discussions. To get the perspective of younger people, participants be-
tween 25-45 age groups from a range of poor to medium socio-
economic backgrounds from Bengali and Garo households were selected 
for the focus group discussions using PRA techniques. Male and female 
group discussions were conducted separately. 
The use of PRA tools immediately changed the atmosphere to a more 
informal setting which facilitated active involvement of the participants 
and opened up space to discuss sensitive issues. PRA techniques encour-
aged participants to engage in the research with confidence by creating a 
non-hierarchical atmosphere where I became merely a listener and an 
observer. 
PRA techniques help, the analysis of local structures of gender rela-
tions and gender divisions of labour (Humble 1998:36). The PRA ses-
sions also made apparent that the reproductive health practices in the 
village are closely linked to health care services available in and around 
the village as well as community attitudes and perceptions. 
Exploring community perceptions also implied including men. A 
male research assistant17 conducted FGDs among men. I did not choose 
anyone from the community to conduct the focus group discussions 
                                                 
17A male anthropologist, working with Bangladesh Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge 
(BARSIK) and with long experience of research with indigenous communities, was recruited to 
conduct focus group discussions with men. He had no prior training on reproductive health is-
sues, but became interested and was generous to help me with the focus group discussions. De-
spite being long involved with community-level research on “indigenous knowledge on agrarian 
production systems”, after the focus group discussions he mentioned that he was “brought to a 
new world which he was not aware of” and acknowledged a great deal of learning from the use of 
PRA techniques in qualitative research. 
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with men because I realised that participants don’t feel free to express 
their private matters to a person from their own community but are less 
hesitant to share their views and perceptions to a trusted outsider. 
The FGDs involved participation from poor and medium socio eco-
nomic and different ethnic backgrounds. Two BRAC health workers as-
sisted in organising female participants and a local key informant helped 
organising male groups. In total, five focus group discussions were con-
ducted. Two focus groups involved 19 and 21 men. Three focus groups 
involved 18, 19 & 7 (TBAs only) women in each group. The body map-
ping was organised among seven midwives/TBAs (four Bengalis and 
three Garos). In the previous two focus group discussions it was noticed 
that those TBAs were more vocal and knowledgeable due to their mobil-
ity as TBAs in the community; one of them was also a government field 
worker, which involved visiting door-to door to supply contraception. 
Special attention was given to organise the time for focus group discus-
sions. Considering that the best time for the participants could be the 
worse time for the researcher (Chambers 1998:xvii) preference was given 
to the participants. The most suitable time for conducting female focus 
groups, was after lunch between 2.00 p.m. and 5.00 p.m. when partici-
pants were relatively less busy with their household work. 
Men’s focus group discussions were conducted between 5.00 p.m. 
and 9.00 p.m. Men did body mapping in a bigger group, while only seven 
female TBAs did the body mapping. The men’s group discussions took 
less time than the women’s groups, but provided more details on com-
munity mapping and mobility mapping, which suggests that men are in 
general more mobile than women. It was also easier to access male par-
ticipants for FGDs. 
The application of PRA techniques implied a constant process of as-
sessment and adjustment as new aspects emerged. This process allowed 
for a rich generation of data. 
In-depth Interviews with individual women and men 
To achieve a deeper understanding how women from poor socio-
economic and ethnic backgrounds articulate and negotiate within the 
family and community to make their reproductive health choices, open 
ended in-depth interviews were conducted to document individual 
women’s narratives. The use of in-depth interviews in qualitative re-
search empowers respondents to analyse their own situation (Wood-
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house 1998), unlike structured questionnaire interviews in quantitative 
research, where respondents are considered as passive and merely vessels 
of answers (Bleek 1987; Brady et al. 2004). Allowing respondents to pro-
vide narratives of their own life experiences also helps to redress some of 
the power differentials women experience in their everyday lives (Cam-
field 2006) and to explore the meanings women attach to their own re-
productive health reality. 
Purposive sampling was used to identify information-rich cases for in-
depth interviews. Besides informal conversation with numerous women 
in the village, 50 women were selected from different age groups and 
different ethnic backgrounds. My research participants are predomi-
nantly poor. However, I also included a few participants from better-off 
households (medium to rich). Although the proportion of mainstream 
Bengali and indigenous Garos in the village are 82 and 18 per cent re-
spectively, initially I intended to interview 25 women from each ethnic 
group. The intention of my sampling was not to give a statistical repre-
sentation of the total population or to generalise the findings to the lar-
ger population. Information-rich cases were identified (for example re-
cently delivered women, or women who have had an abortion or are 
using certain type of contraception across different ethnic groups) to in-
vestigate deeper meaning and explanation of their reproductive practices. 
In the end, 22 Garo women and 28 Bengali women were interviewed 
until the study reached the stage of “saturation”, when no new insights 
seem to emerge from further interviews.  
In-depth interviews were unstructured and followed a natural way of 
sharing the respondents’ reproductive health history and the ways they 
dealt with their reproductive health events and the choices they made. 
Interviews were taken in their own environment and space. To keep the 
natural atmosphere and not to interrupt the flow of the conversation in-
terviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards. During transcription 
new questions emerged which resulted into another follow up interview. 
The same respondents were visited several times over a period of nine 
months to follow up the conversation or just to have a private moment 
to share their deep personal feelings, emotions and experiences.  
To fully understand women’s decision making process and intra-
household gender dynamics it was also important to incorporate men’s 
perspective in the research. 25 men (11 Garos and 14 Bengalis) from 
poor and medium socio-economic backgrounds were interviewed by a 
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research assistant for this purpose. Interviews were conducted in Bangla. 
The translation of these interviews and analysis was done by me. 
Local level service provider/key informant Interviews 
To triangulate information, health care service providers/key informants 
were interviewed at the local level to understand reproductive health 
practices and men/women’s access to reproductive health care services 
in the vicinity of the research location. Service provider interviews 
helped me to understand providers’ attitudes and provided information 
on existing reproductive health practices. At the local level 21 service 
providers/key informants included doctors and nurses at the Upazila 
Health complex (UHC) and private medical practice in Madhupur 
upazila; village doctors at the local pharmacy; Family Welfare Visitors 
(FWV) and Family Welfare Assistants (FWA) at the Satellite Clinic; 
Government and NGO field workers in the village; Smiling Sun health 
care providers in the neighbouring village Kakraid; Pirgacha Missionary 
head father Homrich and two nurses at the missionary maternity centre; 
Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA), and a religious healer. 
Observation 
Throughout the research, as an important tool in ethnographic study, 
observation technique was used to validate information collected 
through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and key informants 
interviews. To understand the cultural context, intra household gender 
relations and access to reproductive health care services available to the 
community observation helped me to develop a personal insight. Ob-
serving a Garo couple smoking together while taking a break from their 
work, may reveal more about their intra-household gender relations than 
several interviews. (Picture 2.2). 
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Picture 2.2 
Garo husband and wife smoking together during a break while working in 
the field 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
2.3.5 Data analysis and synthesis 
The household survey data was analysed using SPSS showing patterns of 
reproductive health practices across different socio-economic and ethnic 
backgrounds. Quantitative information such as demographic, income, 
land ownership, and fertility and contraceptive use data have been pre-
sented in various tables, graphs, charts and diagrams. To analyse policy 
texts, content analysis was done using ATLAS.ti. An argumentation 
analysis model developed by Toulmin (1958, 1979), modified by Dunn 
(1994) and adapted by Gasper (2000) was also used to analyse contents 
of the policy documents. 
To analyse and synthesise qualitative information (Denzin and Lin-
coln 2003) generated through in-depth interviews, key informant inter-
views, FGDs and service provider interviews open coding (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990:61) was used. Following the principle of constant compari-
son for similarities and differences (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009) infor-
mation was categorised in different themes that capture the meanings 
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that participants attached to their world or summarise key informant’s 
views, assumptions and biases in relation to policy priorities. Coding was 
done manually going through interview transcripts, assigning a code to a 
specific expression or experience. Coding helped to reduce the complex 
information in longer interview statements to a few simple catego-
ries/themes. These themes provided the building blocks for my analysis 
of their complex interconnections to one another, which make up the 
complex social whole within which women make their reproductive de-
cisions. 
Since the spoken language and specific terms used by research par-
ticipants are culture specific and might get lost in the process of transla-
tion, coding and interpretation by the researcher (Johnson 2001; Yanow 
2000), I tried to maintain authenticity by using quotations in participants’ 
own words. 
2.3.6 The research process and reflexivity 
In the process of conducting the research, I have learned an important 
lesson on power dynamics between the researcher and the research sub-
jects in qualitative research. In order to capture the diverse reality of 
women’s reproductive health experiences, my intention was to conduct 
the research in a mixed ethnic population. I was fascinated by learning 
about the matrilineal Garos, therefore was interested to include this par-
ticular indigenous group in my study. However, the Garo population live 
in three Districts: Sherpur, Mymensingh and Tangail. The selection of 
Madhupur upazila in Tangail district was my well investigated conscious 
choice.  
Having lived in the capital Dhaka, growing up with the news items on 
violence against women every day, and personally being robbed twice, as 
a woman, before selecting a research location, the first thing that came to 
my mind was my personal safety. I was looking for personal connections 
where I could carry on my fieldwork. One of my university friends was 
posted as a District Commissioner (DC) of police in Sherpur district. I 
contacted him and he organised a visit to Haluaghat upazila and Jhenai-
gati upazila which are known as most Garo populated areas. Haluaghat is 
the far north sub-district under Mymensingh district and Jhinaigati is the 
far north sub-district under Sherpur district within the Dhaka Division. 
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Due to its remote location, in both places there was no possibility to 
arrange my stay with a family in the village. The most suitable place to 
stay in those areas could have been at the missionary settlement. My 
friend tried that option but it wasn’t possible to arrange a long term stay 
at the missionary to conduct my fieldwork. In Sherpur, my friend ar-
ranged with an NGO called Caritas, who would have provided me with a 
room in their office space in a month’s time. It was the only possibility 
to stay close to the community. However, it meant I would be sleeping 
in an office, where nobody would be present at night. Considering the 
safety situation I opted against this. Another option was to rent a house 
in the nearest town, from which I would have to travel every day to 
reach the community. I tried this option by staying for two weeks in Sa-
dar upazila in Sherpur at my friend’s residence and I travelled to a few 
villages in Jhinaigati upazila, as a tentative research location. 
However, my intuition told me this wasn’t working. Every place that I 
visited, people were very friendly and hospitable but I felt there was an 
invisible wall between me as a researcher and my research participants, 
which was created by the power difference that was created immediately 
at the moment I entered into “their” place. In both Haluaghat and 
Jhenaigati upazila, Garos were living in remote areas. To access them I 
was dependent on my friend’s police vehicle. At the moment I stepped 
out from a vehicle I was taken as an “outsider”. I became aware how 
physical appearance (clothing, perfume, mobile phone, even a bottle of 
mineral water) creates a power difference between a researcher and the 
research subjects. I realised how important the entry point into a com-
munity is and how difficult to balance the power difference between the 
researcher and the research subjects. Even if I were to stay in Caritas of-
fice or in the nearest town and would have arranged different transport, I 
would be entering into the community as an “outsider”. After two weeks 
I returned to Dhaka. 
Before investigating my third tentative research location in Madhupur 
upazila under Tangail district, I looked for a different entry point. My 
objective was to find a way to live in the community, not to enter the 
community as an “outsider” just to collect information. I was looking for 
connections and found that one of my university friends was working 
with Action Aid, a well-known NGO, who was conducting a programme 
among indigenous Garos on legal awareness. I contacted my friend and 
he referred me to a Garo leader Probal Mri. He was kind enough to in-
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vite me to stay with his family to explore the area. I visited Chunia, Pir-
gacha and Gachhabari and after some time selected Gachhabari as the 
most appropriate site to conduct my research, due to the fact that 
Chunia and Pirgacha were mostly Garo populated, while in Gachhabari 
Garos and Bengalis were more mixed. Having selected, I accepted the 
invitation to stay with the Garo family of Probal Mri as a paying guest 
until I finished my fieldwork. In retrospect Madhupur was the best 
choice to conduct my research. It provided not only a proper representa-
tion of the ethnic mix between Garos and Bengalis, but also a greater 
acceptance from the community. 
Another important lesson I learned is in gaining trust of the research 
participants. The intention of qualitative research is to understand a so-
cial situation in a particular context and point in time by allowing a re-
searcher to enter the world of “others” (Bloomberg 2008:80). However, 
before exposing personal life histories in front of an “outsider”, research 
participants also judge the researcher. As a mainstream Bengali woman I 
assumed I wouldn’t have any problem to get acceptance among the Ben-
gali population. But I realised that mainstream Bengalis were judging me 
for staying with a Garo family. 
I must acknowledge that without the help of Probal Mri and his wife 
it would have never been possible to receive such acceptability among 
the Garo community. I was invited to participate in festivals like wed-
dings, Wangala (harvest festival), celebration of indigenous day and all 
other festivals like an extended member of their family. 
However, during informal conversations, a few Muslim participants 
expressed their curiosity about my food. They asked me whether being a 
guest in a Garo family, I ate the same food as my host family cooked for 
them. I realised that in a mixed ethnic community people identify them 
not only based on ethnic origin or religion but also cultural habit and 
food. As a Muslim woman, I was not supposed to eat pork meat or crab 
or drink rice beer, which are the traditional food and drink among Ga-
ros. Ajay da and his wife offered me their traditional food, but they al-
ways respected my preference what I would like to eat and drink and 
what not. 
Muslim participants’ curiosity regarding my food expressed their con-
cern whether I could be trusted in the Muslim community. After two 
months of staying at Ajay da’s house, one room with an attached toilet 
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and shared cooking facility became available in the village. The owner of 
that room was also a Garo family, but I had a justification that it was the 
only available place to rent in the village. Soon I started to do my daily 
shopping in the village market and cook my own meal on fuel-wood in a 
shared kitchen with my house owner. Soon I came to be seen as a local 
resident of the village. In this way I was able to maintain a neutral posi-
tion to both the Garo and the Bengali community. 
Picture 2.3 
researcher with Garo Participants 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
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Picture 2.4 
researcher with BRAC health workers 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
Being a resident of the village, I was easily accepted in the community 
(Pictures 2.3 & 2.4). Soon I became a good friend of two BRAC (a well-
known NGO in Bangladesh) health workers: one Garo, one Bengali. 
Their job was to pay house visits, check pregnant women and motivate 
women to plan small families. They also organised group meetings at 
different locations in the village to give health and sanitation advice. I 
became a part of the team of health workers, visiting every household 
and attending group meetings. In this way I became familiar with my re-
search participants. 
Due to my presence with health workers at the beginning of my 
fieldwork, sometimes participants referred me as family planning apa 
(sister), however, I always conveyed my identity as a researcher and an 
assistant professor at Dhaka University who is pursuing her research on 
“women’s health issues”. After knowing my identity many research par-
ticipants, especially men, compared me with professor Khaleque, a re-
searcher from another University, who conducted an anthropological 
study in this area a few years prior to my fieldwork. 
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Being with the BRAC health workers, one of whom was from the 
Garo community, provided me the rare opportunity to learn a few 
phrases in Garo language. Nowadays the medium of instruction at 
school is Bangla and Garos don’t have any written script. Therefore the 
young generation Garos are slowly losing their traditional language. My 
few phrases in local language helped me enormously in building rapport 
with Garo participants. 
Knowing some Garo language further provided me a great advantage 
in building connections with young generation Garos in the capital city. 
A number of young Garo girls from the village migrated to the capital to 
work in the beauty parlours, while their family was living in Madhupur. I 
visited “Personalia”, one of the famous beauty parlours where the major-
ity of the parlour workers are Garo girls. Thanks to my few words of 
Garo language I immediately had a better connection with them than the 
common customers of the parlour. It was not only a matter of speaking 
a few phrases in their language but also about showing respect to and 
interest in the “other” culture. They were impressed to know that one of 
their city customers knew the name of their family members who live in 
Gachhabari. I have met two of these parlour girls when they visited their 
family in Gachhabari. One of them, Kazoli, went to Gachhabari fre-
quently since she had left her daughter in Gachhabari with her mother. 
Kazoli said it was difficult to work in a parlour in the city and raise a 
child at the same time. For me, it was a moving experience. After having 
lived in Gachhabari for nine months and getting to know these parlour 
girls who are supporting their family back in Madhupur, I have learned 
to appreciate them more than before. 
Staying long term in the community provided me the opportunity to 
build trust and rapport with my research participants and key informants, 
however it also has the risk of establishing a pattern of power relation-
ship. 
Socio-economic class rather than gender identity played a major role 
in how I was perceived in the community. I never helped anyone with 
money to prevent any false expectation. However I once took a Garo 
woman to the hospital to do a menstrual regulation, which didn’t happen 
in the end. During my visit to the hospital (Upazial Health Complex), the 
nurse or the staff (peon) would call the duty doctor on his mobile phone 
to come to his office (while he was busy in private practice during his 
office hours at the MCH centre of the upazila hospital), while other rural 
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women would have to wait for hours. As an educated academic I was 
invited as a special guest during the celebration of the “International In-
digenous Day” and received enormous appreciation from both Garo 
men and women. During my visit to the households, both Garo and 
Bengali men and women would offer me a bench or a chair to sit on, 
while other women would stand or sit on the ground and offer tea when 
I visited them. Rickshaw pullers would give me priority over other cus-
tomers. Some women also informed me that local shopkeepers and vege-
table vendors charged me more than the local villagers, which was un-
derstandable and not news to me of course. 
I believe I remained a sympathetic trusted “outsider” (Rashid 2010) to 
the community. However, I didn’t experience this “outsider” status as a 
serious barrier in conducting ethnographic research. At the beginning of 
my fieldwork, I was accompanied by a Garo health worker from the 
community, considering there might be a communication problem and I 
might need translation. However, I experienced that women were more 
comfortable sharing their personal stories with a trusted “outsider” than 
someone from their own community. Language was not a barrier to in-
terview Garos. I found that almost all Garos in Gachhabari speak fluent 
Bangla (mainstream Bangladeshi language). But they would speak Garo 
language among themselves when they want to maintain a distance from 
the “outsiders”. If the trust is gained the barrier of language disappears. 
Once I felt I was accepted in the community, I decided to conduct the 
interviews alone. I could even personally interview two men (one Garo 
and one Bengali) who had undergone vasectomy, which I couldn’t have 
imagined at the beginning of my fieldwork. 
I experienced that power has also a spatial dimension. Due to my 
previous experience in Haluaghat and Jhinaigati upazila, I preferred trav-
elling up and down from the capital Dhaka to Gachhabari by public 
transport. Being a woman, I felt quite uncomfortable in the public trans-
port. However, as soon as I arrived at the Jalchata bus stop I had the 
feeling of comfort and safety. 
2.3.7 Ethical dilemmas in qualitative research 
Ethical concerns in qualitative research include informed consent, confi-
dentiality and taking into consideration that the consequence of the re-
search does not harm the life of those involved with the research (Kvale 
 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 61 
 
and Brinkmann 2009). However, the idea that a field researcher can fully 
ensure these requirements in practical situations remains questionable. 
The practicality of informed consent: issue of suspicion and mistrust 
Informed consent is supposed to ensure voluntary consent of the re-
search participants after receiving prior information about the overall 
purpose of the investigation as well as any possible risks and benefits 
from the participation. I was confronted with an ethical dilemma in my 
efforts to obtain written informed consent from my participants. My ini-
tial entry into the village was through my host, a Garo leader of an “in-
digenous peoples’ organisation”. I was introduced to one of the volun-
teers in this organisation, an educated young man, Toufiq, who would 
help me to find ten Garo and Bengali assistants including himself to 
conduct an initial household survey in the village. I was offered a space 
in the office to organise training sessions prior to the survey. On the first 
day of the training, after initial introduction and skimming through the 
household questionnaire, I presented a consent form (in Bangla) and ex-
plained the importance of obtaining it. One of the participants men-
tioned that some adults in the survey area cannot read. So the idea was 
that the surveyors would read the consent form to them and ask them to 
sign it. But the question emerged, what if someone cannot sign? I said, 
“they can put their figure print” and we moved on with the training. Af-
ter the day of training while I was about to walk from the training venue 
to my host family’s house, Toufiq asked if he could join me. He took the 
opportunity to speak to me alone what he didn’t want to speak in the 
group because it might offend the Bengali training participants. What he 
told me is that Garos have a deep rooted fear of signing papers. If one of 
my Bengali surveyors went and asked for informed consent to a Garo 
woman it would have created suspicion and mistrust regarding the objec-
tive of the survey. 
Subsequently I heard stories that many Garos have lost their land to 
Bengali money lenders. In many cases they had not realised that they had 
signed land transfer forms. Given the sensitivity in the local context I 
had to compromise with the idea of a written consent, and settle for a 
verbal consent. 
Participants were informed of the objective of the survey and that 
they would not receive any financial benefit or compensation for their 
time invested by participating in the research. Participation in the re-
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search was voluntary and it was explained why we would select one 
woman preferably in the reproductive age group from each household 
for the interview to document their socio-economic and health situation. 
Participants were given the freedom to withdraw at any point in time. 
They were informed that the outcome of the survey would be used for 
academic purpose only and the information they provided would be con-
fidential. 
Confidentiality and negotiated privacy 
Confidentiality implies that the identity of participants who have exposed 
their private life in front of the researcher will not be disclosed (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 72). To respect the privacy and dignity of the re-
search participants, participants are given pseudonyms. Parker argues 
(2005:17) that while anonymity can protect the confidentiality of the par-
ticipants; it can also deny them the very voice in the research that has 
been claimed as its aim. 
Confidentiality also entails ensuring privacy during the data collection 
process. I wonder, however, whether a field researcher is able to ensure 
absolute privacy when the researcher has very little control on the re-
search context, especially in ethnographic research when a researcher 
literally enters into the space of the “others”. 
My experience is that, since ethnographic research relies a great deal 
on gaining trust of the host (if any) and the community, it may require 
the researcher to negotiate or even compromise his/her own privacy. 
Maintaining one’s own privacy can be seen as suspicious, something to 
hide from the “others”. This was highly relevant for me as a Bengali 
woman wanting to do research on Garos, those who are discriminated, 
marginalised and even cheated by the mainstream Bengali population 
and the Forest Department, representing a “Bengali national state”. Dur-
ing my stay with the host family, I always kept my door ajar and never 
locked my room. If I did, it might have conveyed a message that I don’t 
trust “them”. Since it was an inside room, with no risk of theft from out-
side, then why would I lock my room? 
My host family was my initial contact in the village. They introduced 
me to two BRAC and one government health worker in the village. My 
entry point to individual women was through these health workers, who 
were from the community, which greatly facilitated access to individual 
women. I never had to ask permission from in-laws or husbands to in-
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terview women. In this sense, most women that I interviewed were not 
under surveillance or monitoring by other adults as is often the case for 
adolescent married women (Rashid 2007), yet, ensuring privacy during 
interviews was more nuanced. 
One morning, the Bengali health worker, Fatima, took me to visit 
Anita, who had recently given birth. The idea was she would drop me at 
Anita’s house and go to do her official households visit. As planned, 
Fatima had left for her house-visit and I started to interview Anita, but in 
the presence of her mother. After documenting Anita’s personal infor-
mation, at the time I started asking about her pregnancy check–ups, her 
mother Modhubala, started to dominate the discussion. Being the host 
and given the fact that senior adults are respected, being a researcher, I 
did not have the power position to say, “could you please leave us alone 
for a while”? Considering the fact that Madhubala was a health worker 
herself and given her interest and experience, I decided to include her as 
a participant. After I interviewed Madhubala, she left the room to pre-
pare for the cooking, when I could continue my interview with Anita 
alone. When I went to interview Shobita, a Garo woman, she was alone 
in her house, giving us absolute privacy. The privacy of my other Garo 
participant Ambia was compromised by the presence of a Garo BRAC 
health worker, who was from the same community. In general, I was 
able to achieve more privacy while interviewing Garos than Bengalis. 
According to my observation, there are three possible explanations for 
that: i) Garos live in nuclear-family households, ii) their houses are more 
spatially scattered, and iii) they have a different notion of privacy. I can-
not say for sure whether Garos who I did not interview personally, were 
more reluctant to come in front of a Bengali researcher. 
The notion of privacy as “secrecy” among Bengali participants was 
the main constraint to ensure complete privacy. When I went to inter-
view Rabeya about her abortion, her sister-in-law from next door came 
in. By that time I had learned the strategy to show interest in “others” 
besides the research participant only. I initiated an “informal talk” about 
how many children do they have, what kind of method they use, etc. and 
when they realised there is nothing “secret” going on the sister-in-law 
went back to her “daily routine”, giving some privacy. Given the sensi-
tivity of the issue, I had first to chat with her sister-in-law, satisfy her cu-
riosity regarding the research. In several instances, such situations caused 
frequent interruptions during an interview. During the interview with my 
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Garo participant Mohua about her abortion experience, we didn’t have 
such interruptions. In most cases, I went back again to complete the in-
terview. In three instances, I decided to drop them from my participants’ 
list; all of them were young, Bengali women. 
Privacy was also gendered. My male research assistant reported that 
privacy was generally ensured while interviewing men, although most of 
his interviews were conducted in “public” spaces. Given the sensitivity 
of male vasectomy, although my research assistant was not from the 
community (but from the capital city), to preserve the confidentiality of 
Jamal Miah (Bengali) and Shuvas (Garo) I decided to interview them my-
self. I made arrangement via their wives. At the time I arrived at their 
homes, in both cases, suddenly their wives disappeared with their chil-
dren ensuring our privacy. When I interviewed important public figures 
(Garo leaders and the chief of the missionary in their offices), nobody 
entered the room without asking permission, although these public fig-
ures did not care about confidentiality; on the contrary, they expressed a 
desire for publicity for their views. 
Ethics and moral integrity 
Some scholars argue that truly ethical research is impossible, since every 
research has a political consequence (Asad 1993; Patai 1991; Harding 
2004). In the qualitative research process, researchers play the role of 
convenors, catalysts and facilitators by participating in research and by 
promoting research participants to reflect and analyse their own social 
reality (Chambers 2005; Humble 1998). It would be naive to imagine that 
an ethnographic researcher can be completely detached from the life of 
those they become a part of. This is even more valid for feminist re-
searches, where the motivation of undertaking such research originates 
from the deep desire to change the life of marginalised women for the 
better. 
My engagement with research participants and drive to understand 
their reality once put me in a situation where initially I did not expose my 
identity. During a regular visit to the UHC, one afternoon I was looking 
for a nurse, a key informant. She was not on duty. So I was roaming 
around the hospital entrance. I saw two middle aged women sitting un-
der a mango tree in a large open space at the parking area next to the 
entrance. Out of curiosity I went to them and asked if they knew any 
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female doctors around. One of them stood up and asked me to follow 
her, while she started to walk towards the exit of the hospital. 
Before this incident I had learned from several women in the village 
about their illegal abortion experiences. Although I had heard about 
abortion brokers, it was a pure coincidence that I encountered one of 
them, while I thought these women might have come to visit their pa-
tients to the hospital. I realised the lady asked me to walk behind her, so 
that I wouldn’t be seen walking with a broker. I immediately understood 
where I was heading to. On the other side, the broker thought I was a 
client who could have brought her a good commission. I could have ex-
plained to the broker that I was not a client but a researcher, but I fol-
lowed her blindly. I was directly brought to a female illegal abortion pro-
vider’s chamber breaking the queue of other general patients. When I 
entered into the so-called “female doctor’s chamber”, I saw the female 
practitioner accompanied by a man in her chamber. Apparently, the man 
was not a medical practitioner, but he would not leave the consultation 
room to give me privacy to talk to the female abortionist alone. 
At that moment, I felt quite powerless. I experienced two mixed emo-
tions. One was a guilty feeling for the broker that the abortionist, due to 
her power position, would scold or financially punish her for revealing 
the illegal abortion practice to me. Secondly, knowing from my research 
participants how illegal abortions were performed behind her general 
“maternal health consultation”, I could imagine she had a powerful net-
work with local elites and even law and order enforce authority to run 
her “business”. The presence of a man in her consultation room and re-
alising that the abortionist did not have the authority to ask him to leave 
her consultation room while she was about to talk with a female “client” 
(me), obviously showed his power position, which made me insecure. 
The fact that I did hide my identity, it meant that I could be charged as 
an impostor. But, my determination to know the “truth” made me more 
stubborn than worried about the consequence of not revealing my iden-
tity. 
After the man had finally left the consultation room, the lady asked 
me where my husband is. I replied “abroad”. It was the truth. But she 
could not have possibly imagined that I was married to a man who lives 
abroad. She thought I might have become pregnant while my husband is 
away, therefore need an abortion. After some conversation she realised 
that I would have gone to a “proper” place to do an abortion. I con-
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veyed an apology for the misunderstanding and I explained my research 
objective to her and she co-operated. But she was nervous thinking I was 
a government secret agent (I have explained our conversation in details 
in Chapter Five). On the other hand, while I was afraid of the man in her 
consultation room, as being someone from the local power elite or a law 
enforcement agent that she maintains a network with, she said, he was a 
representative from a pharmaceutical company. If I were to arrange a 
formal interview with this provider, it would have never been possible to 
get access. The conversation with the provider helped me to validate in-
formation that I gathered through interviewing women about their secret 
abortion experiences. To understand these secret practices that endanger 
women’s lives, I wondered which ethical criteria a qualitative researcher 
should follow. In this case, my ethical criteria were based on a personal 
moral judgement. 
Ethical considerations in this study have meant more than simply ob-
taining informed consent of the research participants to fulfil an ethical 
protocol. They concern moral integrity, in the entire research process 
from the start of the study to final report writing taking into considera-
tion that the choices I have made should not harm my research partici-
pants (Chomsky 1968, Campbell 2006). I tried to be reflexive about the 
decisions and choices I have made and undertook all possible measures, 
I could, to preserve the privacy, confidentiality and dignity of my re-
search participants. 
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State, policy and reproductive 
health discourses in Bangladesh 
3.1 Introduction 
The introductory chapter of this study discussed the disparity in repro-
ductive health between the rich and the poor in Bangladesh. This dispar-
ity partly reflects the disjunction between women’s real reproductive 
needs, how policy interprets and prioritises poor women’s needs, and the 
services made available to women. To understand and analyse the dispar-
ity in health care access between the rich and the poor, this chapter high-
lights how policies conceptualise, frame and interpret health inequality 
and propose specific solutions to ensure equality in health care access. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a 
brief overview of population policy in Bangladesh and its shift in the 
mid-1990s towards reproductive health care approach. It also introduces 
policy actors and their conceptual premises behind that shift. The second 
section provides a content analysis and an argumentation analysis of pol-
icy documents highlighting underlying assumptions, biased and silences 
underpinning policy formulation and service delivery mechanism. The 
third section analyses how diverse development actors conceptualise re-
productive health and envision ensuring reproductive health and wellbe-
ing of poor Bangladeshi women. 
3.2 A Brief Overview of Population Policy and its shift in 
the mid-1990s 
Before analysing any specific policy document, in this section, I provide 
a brief overview of population policy and health care service delivery ap-
proach and its shift in the mid-1990s to set the context. 
Population policies in Bangladesh are not articulated in a single 
document. Historically, the five-year strategic development plans pro-
vided by the planning commission, under the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MOHFW), are considered to be the most important 
population policy document (GoB 2006). Since independence, a major 
focus of these five-year plans has been to ensure increasing access to 
health care service delivery to the disadvantaged population in rural areas 
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and to close the health gap between different socio-economic groups 
(Barket 2006; GoB 2004; GoB 2005. To achieve this objective the coun-
try’s health and population policy has witnessed two distinct phases in 
terms of setting priorities and health care service delivery approach. 
3.2.1 Phase1: Population policy focusing on family Planning 
Program 
The first phase of population policy lasted till 1997 focusing on centrally 
managed top-down family planning programmes with the intention to 
reduce population growth. Bangladesh had inherited an urban based 
health care system with emphasis on curative services. After independ-
ence in 1971, the government realised that the health care system had 
never been able to deliver even the most basic services to the population 
living in rural areas. Hence, the objective of the First five year plan 
(1973-1978) was to create a rural health infrastructure to provide inte-
grated and comprehensive health care services to the rural population 
(BHW 2007:30). 
However, since the mid-1970s, as dependency on international donor 
assistance started rising, the government began to initiate policy and or-
ganisational changes following donor direction (Jahan 2003:184). Keysers 
described the role of donors in shaping national policy agenda at this 
time as follows: 
Aid not only serves internally the elites of Bangladesh, it is also a powerful 
instrument in the hands of donors to exert pressure on the policies of the 
recipient country. In 1974 when Bangladesh desperately needed food and 
finance to counter the foreign exchange crisis and the shortage in govern-
ment food stores, “aid donors” put pressure on the Bangladesh Govern-
ment to accept the formation of a multilateral Aid consortium. This Aid to 
Bangladesh Consortium was formed and chaired by the World Bank. 
Bangladesh was immediately subject to a greater exercise of foreign lever-
age. Regularising aid commitments in the long run meant immediate con-
cessions outlined in a stabilisation programme of IMF (Keysers 1982:194-
195). 
Proclaiming family planning a national priority, along with six other 
development partners with the help of the World Bank, the government 
created a large scale subsidised contraceptive service delivery system to 
supply modern contraception at the doorstep of the rural population. 
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The programme was geared to the transfer of modern contraceptive 
technology through a centralised bureaucratic system (Demeny 1975). At 
this stage the health and family planning services were bifurcated due to 
the strong belief, especially among donors, that programme effectiveness 
would be maximised if family planning activities were totally segregated 
from health activities. This also allowed allocating donor funds exclu-
sively for family planning programmes. 
Following the Amla Ata Declaration in 1978, the Second Five Year 
Plan (1980-85) took a comprehensive community based primary health 
care approach. The objective was to provide basic public health services 
with an integrated family planning programme through doorstep service 
delivery. The private sector was encouraged to share the health care re-
sponsibility. However, the government largely failed to translate the 
Alma Ata commitment into service delivery (BHW 2007:40). With assis-
tance from the World Bank led donor consortium, the government 
channelled most resources and programme interventions targeted to-
wards family planning through its four consecutive five-year population 
and health projects (Jahan 2003). 
One significant aspect of the population policy during this time was 
the legalisation of Menstrual Regulation (MR)18 services within the family 
planning programme in 1979 (Akhter, Khan et al. 1996, Akhter 2001, 
BHW 2007). 
3.2.2 Phase 2: A shift to Sector Wide Approach to reproductive 
health care services 
The second phase of population policies started in the wake of the ICPD 
in 1994. This phase marks a transition from target driven centralised top-
down family planning programme to a client centred integrated Sector 
                                                 
18 Under the British Colonial Law Penal code of 1860 which is still operational in Bangladesh, 
abortion, self-induced or otherwise is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment or fines 
(Akhter et al, 2000). The only exception permitted is to save the life of a mother. However, dur-
ing the nine months long liberation war in Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) with Pakistan 
(former West Pakistan) thirty thousand women were raped (Akhter et al, 2000). After the Libera-
tion War, in 1972 the first thing that came to the mind of the government is to get rid of the 
foetus, born out of rape. Since abortion is illegal, medical practitioners used the term Menstrual 
Regulation (MR) which is considered to be socially acceptable because of the distinction made 
between Abortion and MR (Caldwell 1999a). Later in 1979, Menstrual Regulation (MR) which is 
considered “an interim method of establishing non-pregnancy”, is made available at all major 
public hospitals and health facilities within 10 weeks of pregnancy. 
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Wide Approach (SWAp). The ICPD programme of action, which the 
Bangladesh government and the donors endorsed, required supporting 
reproductive health and rights rather than simply to achieve demo-
graphic targets. 
The Bangladesh government thus incorporated a conceptual shift in 
service delivery approach from pure contraceptive delivery to compre-
hensive reproductive health care approach in its first Sector Wide Ap-
proach (SWAp) the Health and Population sector strategy (HPSS) in 
1996. The first SWAp, the Health and Population Sector Program 
(HPSP) was implemented during 1998-2003, the second was the Health, 
Nutrition and Population Sector Program (HNPSP) for 2003- 2011, and 
the third is the ongoing Health, Population and Nutrition Sector Devel-
opment Program (HPNSDP) for 2011-2016. 
The objective of the first SWAp was to increase access to health ser-
vices by enabling the community to meet their needs in one single visit. 
To achieve its objective, in the HPSP, the first SWAp, a number of re-
forms was outlined such as: a) Transition from a vertically integrated but 
horizontally segregated project based approach towards a sector wide 
approach; b) Unification of the health and family planning wings of 
MOHFW at upazila level; c) Introduction of Essential Service Package 
(ESP) which included basic services. The doorstep service delivery ap-
proach was phased out in favour of services delivered through 16,000 
community clinics, each serving a population of 6,000. (BHW 2011:18). 
The most significant aspect of the SWAp is the introduction of a cli-
ent centred ESP delivery through the primary health care system to en-
sure health care access to the most vulnerable groups - women, children 
and the poor (Jahan 2003:180). After 2003, when the HPSP ended the 
second SWAp, the HNPSP for 2003-2010 reverted to the unification of 
health and family planning wings of the MOHFW, with a partial return 
to earlier practices of domiciliary services to reach underserved poor 
populations, and suspended community clinics where about 10,000 of 
the planned 16,000 were already constructed. Instead, the programme 
adopted the Demand Side Financing (DSF) option for vouchers to preg-
nant women entitling them to access free antenatal, delivery, emergency 
and postpartum care services at the upazila level, as well as offered cash 
transfer for transportation and incentives for delivering with a qualified 
health provider (BHW 2011:20). 
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Under the third SWAp, the objective of the ongoing HPNSDP for 
2011-2016 is to “improve access to and utilisation of essential health, 
population and nutrition services, particularly by the poor” (Planning 
Wing, Ministry of Health and Family welfare 2011:2). Emphasis has been 
given to revitalisation of community clinics (satellite clinics) to ensure 
health care service delivery at the community level and make improve-
ments in the health care system to allow the service providers to perform 
their duties timely and effectively including establishing a sustainable 
Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) along with developing Health 
Information Systems (HIS) (Planning Wing, Ministry of Health and 
Family welfare 2011:2). 
3.2.3 Policy actors, conceptual premises and logics behind the 
policy shift 
The shift in policy and service delivery approach in the mid-1990s was 
an outcome of negotiation among powerful policy actors. In Bangladesh, 
broadly, policy formulation is an outcome of negotiation between four 
types of policy stakeholders: the government, donors, NGOs/civil soci-
ety organisations and professional organisations. Negotiation between 
these four types of actors determines the policy outcome. Since these 
categories are not monolithic, meaning there are variations in interests 
and ideology within each category of actors, thus the pattern of negotia-
tion varies among and between them. However, generally speaking, the 
main actors in negotiation are the government and the donors. Accord-
ing to a government representative: 
Government is the powerful actor to formulate policies. Government is in 
the driver’s seat and that the role of the donor community is to provide 
guidance, or to give thrust to certain areas where the government lacks ca-
pacity. Most of the time donors speak along the similar lines. There is not 
really reconciling disagreement among donors and the government (Key 
informant interview, representative, DG FP, Ministry of Health and Fam-
ily Welfare, 29 May 2008).  
Contested views however existed among different stakeholders in this 
regard. For instance, a representative from a national research institute 
said: 
Theoretically, the government is the powerful actor, but in reality, most of 
the population programmes are donor-driven. One of the reasons of do-
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nor influence is the lack of knowledge among government employees, not 
their political weakness. At the Ministry level, government employees are 
frequently changing between ministries. They don’t know much about the 
programmes, so whenever anything comes up, they become dependent on 
“expert” knowledge. Though, the donors should never hand over a pre-
scription—this is the medicine, two times a day, five days a week. It is the 
government and the people of Bangladesh who will adapt according to the 
national law and international guidelines. However, then the WB comes 
up, or the donor, or some development partners come up with some pro-
posal that looks good, these ministry people with their lack of knowledge 
become dependent on the prescription given by the donors (key informant 
interview, representative, NIPORT19, 5 May 2008). 
Donor influence played a significant part in the shift in policy ap-
proach. Following the ICPD, when the government started negotiations 
with the donors for the preparation of the fifth Five Years Plan in 1995, 
the donors pressed for policy and structural reforms to provide repro-
ductive health care through an integrated, multi-sectoral Maternal, Child 
Health and Family Planning mostly known as MCH-FP based service 
delivery approach (BHW 2007:39). 
However, the donors and the government had different logics under-
lying the shift toward the integrated reproductive health care approach. 
Along with equity, programme efficiency and long-term financial sus-
tainability was the common and urgent donor concern of the health sec-
tor reform (Jahan 2003:185). Expansion of already massive door-to-door 
service delivery system was not considered to be a viable mode for the 
future. At the same time reproductive health services were not feasible to 
offer through doorstep service delivery model. Therefore, service deliv-
ery model had to be clinic based (Mahmud 2003; Schuler 1999). Also, an 
integrated MCH-FP service provided through periodic satellite clinics, 
were tested in two ICDDR,B projects and appeared to be promising 
(Phillips et al. 1996). In addition, a shift to sector wide approach was be-
lieved to cut down wastage of human and material resources, leading to 
better coordination among donors and better management of aid at na-
tional level. On the other hand the government concern was mainly to 
incorporate the reproductive health agenda into the existing family plan-
                                                 
19 National Institute of Population Research and Training. 
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ning programme without compromising its success in population control 
(Mahmud 2004). 
A conflict of interest between contraceptive delivery and other repro-
ductive health care services was anticipated as it was believed that with-
drawal from the ongoing door–step contraceptive supply would con-
strain contraceptive use. Around that period, a series of studies 
conducted by ICDDR,B and the Population Council argued that cutting 
down on home visits by family planning workers was most likely to re-
sult in higher discontinuation of family planning method use (Hossain et 
al 1996), lower contraceptive prevalence rates (Phillips et al. 1996) and 
diminished quality of care (Hossain et al 1995). 
Despite this conflict of interest, the donors pressed for structural re-
forms and the government adopted its first SWAp and initiated integra-
tion of service delivery. In the first three years of HPSP implementation 
(1998-2000), the government unified health and family planning services 
at the upazila level (lowest level of government primary health care ser-
vice) and below and started to establish one stop community clinics to 
provide Essential Service Package (ESP) (Jahan 2003). 
However, the translation of the broader health sector reform into 
comprehensive reproductive health care service delivery was compro-
mised by administrative and financial resource constraints (Mahmud 
2004). The core strategy of HPSP approach was to allocate 60-65 per 
cent of the national health budget to be delivered through the Primary 
Health Care (PHC) system at the upazila level and below (BHW 
2011:18). However, MOHFW could not channel the target allocation 
towards upazila and the lower administrative levels (Mahmud 2004). 
Implementing the overall reproductive health agenda also required 
major reorganisation including service provision, supervision and moni-
toring (Mahmud 2004). The institutional capacity of the government to 
implement the reorganisation was weak. For instance, HPSP proposed to 
establish community groups consisting of MOHFW field workers, 
members of local government and representatives of primary stake-
holders as management committees for the community clinics. However, 
in most cases these committees were formed by MOHFW without 
community participation and many of the community clinics remained 
non-functional (Jahan 2003:189). 
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The transition from doorstep to clinic based service delivery was also 
not well planned, which had an impact on the performance of the pro-
gramme implementation. According to a key policy actor: 
After Cairo and at the beginning of the health and population sector pro-
gram, the government integrated the health and the family planning direc-
torates. And we thought that we had to form community clinics, for each 
6000-population. And we thought we would take the fieldworkers out of 
the field and station them, for some of their weekdays, in the community 
clinics, and they will go for fewer field visits; only to the difficult clients20, 
not the door-to-door visits that we had earlier. But later on, what hap-
pened? We could not build the community clinics. At the same time, the 
fieldworkers said, “Oh, I don’t have to go to the field anymore”. So that 
shift created a lot of supply problems. 
Theoretically, it was a good idea to have a clinic for each 6,000 population, 
but in reality, we could not do any good service delivery there. And an-
other problem is that we had some difficult clients in the community, but 
we don’t have any information about identifying who are those difficult 
clients. So this was really a mess. (Key informant interview, representative, 
NIPORT, 5 May 2008). 
The conflict of interest between two implementing wings of the 
MOHFW was further revealed to compromise the quality of care at the 
upazila level. According to a policy stakeholder: 
To monitor the quality of care in the Health and Population Sector Pro-
gram, we tried to form a position of Health Manager at the upazila /sub 
district hospitals. But it created conflict of interest between the family 
planning and the health directorates. The doctors’ community opposed us 
and said that the Thana health and family planning official should be the 
head of the health division. The doctors took the upper hand (used politi-
cal influence), the family planning people felt that they were being left out, 
while the doctors were mostly involved in their private practices (key in-
formant interview, representative, NIPORT, 5 May 2008). 
As a response to this situation, despite strong support from the do-
nors, three years after implementation the integration was halted and 
health and family planning directorates were bifurcated again. Donors 
and some scholars largely blamed bipartisan politics for this reversal of 
                                                 
20 Meaning the tendency to drop out from using contraception. 
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integration (Jahan 2003). This sentiment was echoed in the following 
donor representative’s statement: 
Personally, I think that management improves through integration. There 
are of course political and power dynamics at play, though. People fear 
losing their territory when directorates are integrated. And then corruption 
is always a factor. (People lose chance to collect money when the bureaus 
are integrated). When HPSP ended, the government was pro-segregation, 
and the donor community was generally pro-integration. (...) The donors 
had proved that the one-stop delivery system worked, but the government 
wanted to shift away from that and go back to door-to-door delivery. 
I think it was largely a political decision; it was not evidence-based. Basi-
cally, the new party came to power, and they wanted to change things up 
as a new administration, change the previous regime. Of course, at that 
time, the clinic based approach wasn’t completely in place, so it’s difficult 
to say which approach would be most effective. (key informant interview, 
representative, USAID, 3 July 2008). 
Part of the truth behind the reversal of integration also lies in the fact 
that programme success was evaluated in terms of contraceptive preva-
lence rate (CPR) and associated fertility decline (I will come back to this 
point later in this chapter). In any case, the conflict of interest and the 
difference in opinions are still there. Since 2001, two directorates are 
working separately at the upazila level, under the broader umbrella of 
MOHFW. 
To understand the nature of integration between the two implement-
ing wings, representatives from the Family Planning and the Health di-
rectorates were interviewed as a part of this study. As expected, both 
Ministry representatives claimed that the two directorates are adequately 
integrated, unified in policy vision, and “just implementing the decisions 
that come down the pipeline”. However, the Health directorate inter-
viewee challenged the claim of perfect cooperation, strongly hinting that 
while the two directorates were united in their policy vision at the minis-
try level, their cooperation at the upazila level left something to be de-
sired. 
Not surprisingly, both government representatives highlighted the 
lack of human resources to achieve policy targets saying that without 
skilled “manpower”— gynaecologists, obstetricians, paramedics, and 
field workers—not even the most uncontested policy measure will be 
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effectively implemented. As the Health Sector actor admitted, “we will 
try our best to improve the facility-based services, but even the most 
modest goal of training and deploying skilled birth attendants remained a 
long-term and difficult-to-achieve priority for Bangladesh”. 
It was revealed that the incorporation of reproductive health agenda 
in the (1998-2003) population policy was inspired by the change in inter-
national donor discourse, “since it was easy to receive money for repro-
ductive health programmes, as long as one doesn’t talk about abortion 
(Key informant interview, representative, Engender Health, Dhaka, 4 
May 2008)”. In practice, there was not much change at the level of pro-
gramme implementation level. It was implicit in the government repre-
sentative’s remark: 
Policy is important, but if we focus too much on policy, that’s not good. 
It’s time to go less into policy and go into how to do it. In reality existing 
family planning programme has been expanded to cover a few aspects of 
reproductive health components including maternal health, safe mother-
hood, adolescent’s reproductive health, HIV and RTI (key informant in-
terview, representative, Maternal and New born, reproductive Health 
programme, DG health services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
13 June 2008). 
The conceptual premise behind the shift in service delivery mecha-
nism seemed to be about programme performance and sustainability of 
the service delivery mechanism rather than embracing a broader repro-
ductive health agenda as outlined in the ICPD programme of action. In-
stead the policy and programmes adopted a targeted ESP, offering lim-
ited health care services to the poor, women and the marginalised 
population. The switch back and forth between doorstep and commu-
nity clinic, again a partial return to doorstep, abandoning the community 
clinics and again revitalising them, and the integration and disintegration 
of two implementing wings of the MOHFW indicates how policy actors 
with their diverse power relations give meanings, set priorities and con-
test the interpretation of evidence to evaluate the success of policies. 
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The following section moves provides analysis of policy texts to fur-
ther decipher the underlying assumptions, biases and silences underpin-
ning the most recent policy document21. 
3.3 The underlying assumptions, biases and silences in the 
policy 
Policy documents are ensemble of words, concepts and ideas that con-
vey specific meanings (Van Dijk 1996) and give a particular shape to a 
phenomenon (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996). By using the computer as-
sisted programme ATLAS.ti, a word cloud and a frequency table of se-
lected words used in the most recent policy document is presented in the 
following tables. 
Diagram 3.1 
“Word cloud” of Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 - 2016 
 
Source: Word count of Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 - 2016 
                                                 
21 Since the five year strategic plan is considered to be the most important policy document to 
break down the policy into programme implementation for consecutive five years, the contempo-
rary Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 – 2016 has been selected for the analysis. 
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Table 3.1 
Selected words and corresponding frequency of Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 
2011 - 2016 
Selected words Policy document Executive summary 
Health 616 29 
Service(s) 481 41 
Management / managers / managing 313 8 
Development(s)  184 22 
System  167 9 
Strengthening / strengthened / strengthen 
Programme 
157 
125 
10 
10 
Facilities 114 5 
Public  113 5 
Improving / improved / improvement(s)  102 9 
Quality  102 9 
Intervention(s) 83 6 
Private  82 5 
Priority  76 0 
Implementation 69 6 
Coordination / regulation 61 0 
Budget / Budgetary 60 10 
Women 52 2 
Poor/poorer/poorly/poorest 43 4 
Allocation / allocations / reallocation 34 0 
Reproductive 29 1 
Gender 21 1 
Equity 20 2 
Voice 10 0 
Adolescents 7 1 
Tribal  1 0 
Men 2 0 
Source: Selected words and corresponding frequency of Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 – 2016 
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A content analysis of 50 most used words in the policy document 
represented in the word cloud shows the dominant use of words such as 
health, services, sector, MOHFW, programme, budget, development, 
public, facilities, planning, intervention, system, management etc. (Dia-
gram 3.1).  
Table 3.1 provides the frequency of some selected words in the policy 
document and in its executive summary showing the similar trend. For 
the analysis I also looked at how words are placed in relation to other 
words. For example women were mentioned in relation to women-
friendly services and discrimination and violence against women. Gender 
was mentioned in abstract forms such as “gender based violence” and 
“gender mainstreaming”. The term reproductive health was used in rela-
tion to service delivery such as “reproductive health services including 
family planning” and in association with adolescents such as reproduc-
tive health and the adolescents. Surprisingly while women were men-
tioned 52 times, men were mentioned only twice in the 38,698 word pol-
icy document. Tribal women were mentioned once in the policy 
document. However, in the executive summary the term men and tribal 
women were completely absent. 
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Table 3.2 
Word concurrence in the Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 – 2016 
Themes Service(s) Health 
Target-groups Nutrition service (1) 
New-born services (1) 
Midwifery service (1) 
MNCH service (1) 
Family planning services (3) 
Reproductive and Adolescent health (1) 
Health and family welfare centres (1) 
 
Implementation 
of services  
Coverage of health services (4) 
Priority health services (7) 
Hospital service (2) 
The essential service package (2) 
PHC services (2) 
 
- 
- 
Access to health care (1) 
Health care coverage (1) 
Health system (1) 
Health information system (1) 
Primary health care (2) 
Improvement in 
the service 
delivery 
System 
Improving health services (2) 
Improving EmOC service (1) 
Women friendly services (1)  
- 
Strengthening health systems (2) 
Policy and Fi-
nance  
 Health (sector) financing (3) 
Climate change and health (1) 
Health strategy (1) 
Human resource Motivation and counselling of 
service providers (1) 
Performance of service providers 
(1) 
In-service training (1) 
Service sharing (1) 
Human resource for health (1) 
Health workforce (1) 
Source: Word concurrence in the Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 – 2016 
 
Taking the two most frequently used two words, health and service(s), 
table 3.2 shows how these words are used in concurrence with other 
words and their frequency in the executive summary of the policy docu-
ment. These “groups of words” can be categorised under five main 
themes. They are: target groups, implementation of services, improve-
ment in service delivery system, policy & finance and human resource 
management. These two words also combine together in “coverage of 
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health services”, “improvement in health services” and “priority in 
health services”. These themes provide an idea how policy language 
tends to be biased towards service delivery. This lead to further close 
investigation of the policy document. 
Given the length of the policy document, as the core of the policy 
document, the executive summary was selected to systematically analyse 
the framing, who is actually included and how and what and who is ig-
nored and excluded (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996:6). A tabular format of 
argumentation analysis model developed by Toulmin22 (2009), modified 
by Dunn (1994) and adapted by Gasper (2000) is used here. The tabular 
format of the Toulmin-Dunn model presented in table 3.3, allows a clear 
presentation of how policy arguments follow specific structures and the 
types of justification used for the policy claim. The model includes four 
columns. Starting from the top left corner, the model first looks at the 
Claim, then the proposed supporting Grounds (Data), then the Warrant, 
principles that are supposed to bridge the move from Grounds to Claims 
(including stated or unstated assumptions), then the possible counter-
arguments, Rebuttals (Gasper 2000:14). Each row represents a particular 
Claim. 
Table 3.3 
The argument structure of the Strategic Plan for HPNSDP 2011 - 2016 
[Claims] Grounds [given data] Warrant 
[stated/unsta
ted 
principles/as
sumptions] 
Rebuttal 
[Qualifier, 
Silences] 
(C1R123) 
[Main claim] 
Quality and 
equitable health 
(C2R1) 
1. [Previously] Both HPSP and HNPSP 
focussed on pro-poor essential services 
packages (ESP)/ESD, which resulted in 
reducing gap between rich and poor 
(C3R1) 
[Implied as-
sumptions] 
1. Pro-poor 
(C4R1) 
[Counter argu-
ments] 
1. Despite expan-
                                                 
22 Toulmin considers three central elements in an argument: i) the Claim, the proposed conclu-
sion; ii) Grounds or data supporting the claim and iii) the Warrant, a rule or principle relevant to 
the Claim. Toulmin adds some additional categories for practical argumentation these are: iv) 
Backing, to justify Warrant v) a Qualifier, to modulate the Claim and iv) a Rebuttal, a counter 
consideration. (Gasper 2000:5-6). 
23 C=Column, R=Row 
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care for all citi-
zens particularly 
for the poor will 
be ensured by 
improving access 
to and utiliza-
tion of health, 
population and 
nutrition ser-
vices. (Planning 
Wing, MOHFW 
2011:viii) 
 
with respect to outcomes in rural 
areas. (Planning Wing, MOHFW 
2011:viii). 
2. The strategic plan document speci-
fies strategies to achieve its objec-
tives, of particular ones are: (i) ex-
panding the access and quality of 
MNCH services, (ii) revitalizing various 
family planning interventions to attain 
replacement level fertility, (iii) main-
streaming nutrition within the regular 
DGHS and DGFP services, (iv) 
strengthening preventive approaches 
as well as control programs to CDCs 
and NCDs at all levels, (v) strengthen-
ing the various support systems by 
increasing the health workforce at 
Upazila, Union and CC levels, (vi) 
improving MIS with ICT and establish-
ing M&E system, (vii) strengthening 
drug management and improving qual-
ity drug provision, (viii) increasing 
coverage and quality of services by 
strengthening intra and inter-sectoral 
and private sector coordination, and 
(ix) pursuing priority institutional and 
policy reforms, such as decentraliza-
tion and LLP, incentives for service 
providers in hard to reach areas, PPP, 
etc. (Planning Wing, MOHFW 
2011:viii). 
ESP proved to 
reduce health 
inequality 
between the 
poor and the 
rich. 
2. Pro-poor 
ESP improves 
access to ser-
vices 
3. Expanding 
the access and 
improving the 
quality of 
MNCH services 
is necessary to 
achieve the 
policy goal. 
 
sion of ESP ser-
vices since mid-
1990s health 
inequality per-
sists. 
2. Although the 
main objective of 
the policy is to 
reduce health gap 
between the rich 
and the poor, 
Family Planning 
remains as the 
second priority 
area to achieve 
the policy objec-
tive to reduce 
gap between the 
rich and the poor 
(see C1R3). 
[silences] 
Policy remains 
silent about how 
intersection of 
class, gender and 
ethnicity created 
existing health 
inequality.  
(C1R2) 
[supporting 
claim] 
Improving ser-
vice delivery 
and strengthen-
ing health sys-
tems will ensure 
better access 
and coverage. 
(Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 
2011:viii) 
[main assump-
tion to achieve 
the policy ob-
jective]  
(C2R2) 
1. The major components of the 
HPNSDP are: (i) Improving Health Ser-
vices and (ii) Strengthening Health 
Systems and these are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing. The compo-
nent of improving health services aims 
at improving priority health services in 
order to accelerate the achievement 
of the health related MDGs by capital-
izing on and scaling up the interven-
tions undertaken under the HNPSP as 
well as introducing new interventions. 
(Planning Wing, MOHFW 2011: ix). 
2. The HPNSDP will have elements 
that would be different and or add 
value to the current program (HNPSP), 
particularly in addressing maternal, 
neo-natal health and nutrition. Some 
notable ones are: (i) emphasizing 
MNCH interventions/services in the 
urban slums through a separate OP, 
(C3R2) 
[Unstated 
assumptions] 
1. Availability 
of services in 
geographical 
and socially 
disadvantaged 
population will 
ensure their 
access. 
 
2. Service 
providers are 
not women 
friendly 
enough. 
(C4R2) 
[Counter argu-
ment] 
Service delivery 
itself will not 
ensure access 
unless other cul-
tural and struc-
tural factors are 
not taken into 
consideration.  
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(ii) increasing number of skilled birth 
attendants, (iii) gradually increasing 
facility based 24 hour/7 days services 
for appropriate management of ma-
ternal complications, (iv) prioritizing 
areas of high maternal mortalities, 
geographically and socially disadvan-
taged population, (v) women-friendly 
services at the CCs and domiciliary 
level and by NGOs (where feasible and 
appropriate), (vi) sharing of expertise 
and facilities between DGHS and DGFP 
for MNH services, (vii) strengthening 
sick new-born services including 
home-visit by a trained worker within 
two days of child birth, (viii) rapid and 
effective referral systems for sick 
new-borns, (ix) emphasizing LAPM and 
unmet needs of FP services, and (x) 
mainstreaming nutrition services 
through DGHS and DGFP. (Planning 
Wing, MOHFW 2011:viii). 
 
(C1R3) 
[Implied claim] 
The government 
and the devel-
opment partners 
need to con-
tinue investing 
in the family 
planning ser-
vices.  
(C2R3) 
1. Strong investments have led to 
continuous reduction in the annual 
population growth rate and the total 
fertility rate (TFR). (Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:viii). 
2. Family planning services are yet to 
reduce the TFR at the desired level. 
(Planning Wing, MOHFW 2011:viii). 
3. Diversified and country wide mass 
scale effective family panning service 
delivery will be emphasized during the 
next sector program. Increase in popu-
lation size is set to impede the 
achievement of economic develop-
ment of the country. (Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:ix). 
 
(C3R3) 
[Unstated 
assumptions] 
1. The desired 
level of fertil-
ity reduction 
requires 
stronger com-
mitment to 
invest in fam-
ily planning 
programme. 
2. Higher fer-
tility remains a 
constant 
threat to eco-
nomic devel-
opment. 
(C4R3) 
[Rebuttal] 
Unless the gov-
ernment and the 
development 
partners continue 
to invest in family 
planning services 
population 
growth will im-
pede economic 
development. 
[silences] 
Root causes of 
economic under-
development 
remains unad-
dressed. 
(C1R4) 
[supporting 
claim] 
Combined public 
and private 
resources will 
strengthen the 
health system. 
(Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 
(C2R4) 
1. Currently the combined public and 
private sources of health financing are 
insufficient to achieve full coverage of 
health services to all. (Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:x). 
2. To strengthen the health systems, 
the second major component of 
HPNSDP, MOHFW will give priority to 
addressing issues in the areas of stew-
(C3R4) 
[unstated as-
sumptions] 
1. Investment 
in health care 
system will 
improve ac-
cess. 
2. Private 
health care is 
(C4R4) 
[Rebuttal] 
Although there is 
scope for im-
proved utilization 
of available funds 
and achieving 
greater equity, 
the HPN sector 
merits a higher 
84 CHAPTER THREE 
 
2011:ix). 
[Backing, sup-
porting argu-
ment for C1R2] 
ardship and governance, legal and 
regulatory framework, mainstreaming 
gender, equity and voice in the core 
programs, like MNCH, nutrition and 
strengthening roles of the parasternal 
organizations like BMA, BMRC, BMDC, 
etc including effective use of the NGO 
and PPP. (Planning Wing, MOHFW 
2011:x). 
3. On an average, about 3.2 per cent 
of GDP is spent on the HPN sector in 
Bangladesh, of which about one per 
cent of GDP is allocated by the public 
sector. This share is low for ensuring a 
sustainable development of the sec-
tor. (Planning Wing, MOHFW 2011:x). 
3. This also calls for incremental fund-
ing from the Development Partners 
(DPs), who have been providing sup-
port to the development of the HPN 
sector in Bangladesh. (Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:x). 
effective in 
service deliv-
ery. 
3. The public 
sector alone is 
not able to 
ensure health 
coverage 
without the 
private sector 
investment. 
4. Unless a 
higher alloca-
tion in every 
fiscal year and 
an incremental 
funding from 
the Develop-
ment Partners 
(DPs), who 
have been 
providing sup-
port to the 
development 
of the HPN 
sector is not 
ensured, full 
coverage will 
not be 
achieved. 
allocation in 
every fiscal year 
and an upward 
rise year by year 
in the share of 
HPN allocation to 
national budget is 
very much 
needed. 
(Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:x). 
[Counter argu-
ment] 
Policy promotes 
dual health care 
systems private 
for the well-off 
and public for the 
poor, offering 
limited ESP ser-
vices.  
(C1R5) 
[supporting 
claim] 
ESP service to 
difficult to 
reach (marginal-
ized and socially 
excluded) popu-
lation through 
appropriate 
arrangement 
with NGOs/CBOs 
will reduce 
health inequal-
ity. (Planning 
Wing, MOHFW 
2011:ix). 
[Backing, sup-
porting argu-
ment for C1R2] 
(C2R5) 
1. The HPNSDP will give priority to 
address difficult to reach populations 
through motivating and counselling 
the service providers for giving ade-
quate care to the marginalized and 
socially excluded population, 
strengthen collaboration with the 
MOSW, MOCHTA, the CHT Board, the 
NGOs and the private sector. Planning 
Wing, MOHFW 2011:x). 
2. ESP will be provided in the difficult 
to reach areas through appropriate 
arrangements with NGOs/CBOs to 
overcome shortage of public sector 
human resources. Planning Wing, 
MOHFW 2011:x). 
3. To strengthen the health systems, 
the second major component of 
HPNSDP, MOHFW will give priority to 
addressing issues in the areas of stew-
ardship and governance, legal and 
regulatory framework, mainstreaming 
(C3R5) 
[Stated as-
sumption] 
Collaboration 
with the 
NGOs/CBOs 
and motivating 
and counsel-
ling the ser-
vice providers 
for giving ade-
quate care to 
the marginal-
ized and so-
cially excluded 
population will 
ensure their 
access to ser-
vices. 
[Unstated 
assumption] 
The poor, 
(C4R5) 
[Counter argu-
ments] 
1. Poor are seen 
as a homogenous 
group undermin-
ing their class, 
gender and ethnic 
diversity. 
2. Instead of 
providing broader 
health care ser-
vices policy offers 
only ESP services 
to the marginal-
ised population. 
What is included 
in the ESP service 
is open to inter-
pretation of dif-
ferent develop-
ment actors. 
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gender, equity and voice in the core 
programs, like MNCH, nutrition and 
strengthening roles of the parastatal 
organizations like BMA, BMRC, BMDC, 
etc. including effective use of the 
NGO and PPP. Planning Wing, MOHFW 
2011:x). 
women and 
geographically 
disadvantaged 
population are 
seen as pas-
sive, powerless 
and victims of 
culture.  
 
Source: Planning Wing, MOHFW 2011:viii-x. 
 
The main claim of the policy document is its objective. The objective 
of the policy is “to ensure quality and equitable health care for all citizens 
particularly for the poor by improving access to and utilisation of health, 
population and nutrition services”. The main assumption underlying the 
policy claim is that pro-poor Essential Services Packages (ESP) will en-
sure health care access to the poor and the marginalised to reduce health 
inequality. Several layers of claims have been made to achieve the policy 
objective through expansion and improvement in service delivery to 
achieve greater coverage through Public Private Partnership (ppp). 
The main rebuttal shows that policy has given enough thought about 
its shortcomings and therefore includes a qualifier arguing, “unless a 
higher allocation in every fiscal year and an incremental funding from the 
Development Partners (DPs), who have been providing support to the 
development of the HPN sector in Bangladesh is ensured, full coverage 
will not be achieved” (see C4R4 in table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 further helps to examine logical arguments, how problems 
are framed and solutions suggested. Health inequality is framed in terms 
of problem of access to services. Therefore solutions have been framed 
in terms of strengthening service delivery through collaboration between 
public, private and NGOs to ensure access to the poor, women and 
marginalised population (see C1R5 in table 3.3). 
This model further helps to systematically identify biases in the logical 
reasoning in setting priorities. The tone used in the logic for family plan-
ning programme reflects such bias, arguing that “unless the government 
and the development partners continue to invest in family planning ser-
vices will impede economic development”(see C4R3 in table 3.3). The 
use of the language “population growth will impede economic develop-
ment” reflects an unstated assumption that higher fertility is a constant 
threat to economic development if not taken care of. Policy language is 
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also formulated in a pleading way to the development partners to con-
tinue their commitment in investing in family planning programme. 
Coming back to the point I made earlier in relation to evaluating pro-
gramme success in terms of Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) and 
associated fertility recline, here I provide some evidence from the pre-
ceding policy interventions to support my argument. The plateauing of 
the TFR since the early 1990s gained prominence in the first SWAp, the 
HPSP to achieve the target of attaining replacement level fertility. The 
excessive bias in the family planning programme was reflected in the fact 
that programme success was measured in terms of CPR (Mahmud 
2004:8). After three years of integration of health and family planning 
wings of the MOHFW, an assessment of HPSP’s performance indicated 
that maternal mortality and under-five mortality had declined signifi-
cantly and antenatal care had doubled (Bates et al. 2003), however, con-
traceptive prevalence rate remained stagnant and the fertility rate was not 
near replacement level as targeted. This outcome was used as a justifica-
tion for the reversal of the integration of two implementing wings (as 
discussed earlier). This is reflected in the second SWAp, HNPSP docu-
ment: 
It is also crucial that there are no slippages in areas where significant gains 
have already been achieved as for example in the area of population 
growth. An emerging concern is the plateauing of the total fertility rate 
(TFR) since the mid-1990s particularly among the poorer strata. Increased 
importance of temporary methods over permanent methods in family 
planning, health sector reform in the late 1990s which promoted a one-
stop service centre in place of domiciliary (door-to-door) services may 
have contributed to the observed TFR plateauing. Any reversal in the 
population frontier clearly stands to weaken the fight against poverty 
(Planning Commission 2005:xvii). 
The vision and targets outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa-
per (PRSP) document have been taken as overarching ling-term policy 
framework and political commitment of the government, upon which 
the HNPSP developed (GoB 2006:9). Reasserting the priority of fertility 
decline in order “to fight against poverty” successive five year plans un-
der the second SWAp continued to set narrow time bound targets to 
achieve replacement-level fertility through progressively high levels of 
contraceptive prevalence (Mahmud 2003:5). A progressive target up to 
70-75 per cent was set in the HNPSP. An integrated infant and child 
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health care approach was also inspired by the intention to reduce higher 
fertility among poor households, as reflected in the policy: 
One major reason for larger household size contributing to the probability 
of being poor is the uncertainty arising from a low life expectancy at birth 
and up to five years of age. It is expected that an expansion of the basic 
health services aimed at reducing IMR and U5MR will help reduce family 
size. However, the evidence of TFR remaining on a plateau is a major 
cause of concern which may have negative impacts on population stabili-
zation, household size and the poverty situation. Thus, attention must be 
given to reactivate the population programme to attain demographic tar-
gets (Planning Commission 2005:9). 
With the intention to drastically reduce fertility rate among the poor, 
long-acting and permanent family planning methods were given high 
priority in the pro-poor Essential Service delivery Package (Planning 
Commission 2011). A key policy actor from the national research insti-
tute justified the shift to long-acting contraception saying: 
If you look at the scenario for the use of contraception, you will see that 
some users have a preference for certain methods. They prefer steriliza-
tion, injectables, these are mostly preferred by the poorer women. It’s 
cheaper, easy to use, easily available and also because many women don’t 
even have a proper place to store the condoms. They’re living in one room 
with their children. So there are a lot of advantages for going for in-
jectables, implant or sterilizations (Key informant interview, representative 
of NIPORT24, 5 May 2008). 
This statement supports a strong emphasis for long-acting contracep-
tion among the poor, however misinterprets it as poor women’s prefer-
ence. 
  
In the third SWAp, the current HPNSDP sets an even more ambi-
tious target of CPR of 80 per cent by 2016 (Planning Commission 
2011:347). Several studies have documented that target specific pro-
grammes have a negative effect on the quality of care and promote sub-
tle pressure or outright coercion (Hardon 1997). The government family 
planning workers are often poorly trained, callous or careless, and under 
pressure to meet impossible targets. They also neglect to tell about the 
                                                 
24 National Institute of Population Research and Training. 
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side effects of the targeted family planning methods (Hartmann 1995). 
Naripokkho (a women’s organisation) further found that in the official 
discourse of research and dissemination of knowledge, the criteria of 
“safety” of contraception is determined by the probability of contracep-
tive failure rather than the effects on women’s health (Kabeer 
1994a:208). Given the absence of provision of adequate information and 
medical back-up and low quality care and non-accountability of service 
providers (Hartmann 1985, Mahmud 2004), this target raises serious 
concern about violation of women’s choice and agency. 
What emerges from the analysis is that despite incorporating a com-
prehensive reproductive health agenda, high fertility continues to be 
framed as the main cause of poverty among the poor, justifying the 
alignment of fertility reduction under the imperative of macro- economic 
development goals even at the cost of women’s wellbeing. The root 
cause of poverty and inequality and its link to the global structure of 
power remains unaddressed (see C4R3 in table 3.3). 
3.3.1 Assumptions underlying service delivery mechanism 
Although policy suggests that greater availability of services would en-
sure access to the poor, especially women and the marginalised, the evi-
dence is thin. To ensure equity in health care during childbirth, acknowl-
edging the importance of skilled health personnel during child delivery in 
the rural areas, the Bangladesh government initiated a program called 
Community Skilled Birth Attendant (CSBA) under the first SWAp in the 
mid-1990s. Development agencies such as United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) and World Health Organisation (WHO) and IDA col-
laborate in this programme (WHO 2000; USAID and others 2011). The 
main objective of this programme was to provide a special nine-months 
training on pre and post-delivery to Family Welfare Assistants (FWA), 
those who were primarily responsible for contraceptive method supply 
and counselling at the doorstep. These community-based FWAs are 
trained to identify high-risk pregnancies and advise women to give deliv-
ery at the public health facility (Ahmed and Jakaria 2009; Murakami et al. 
2003). 
To provide facility based comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care 
(EmOC) services to the rural poor, the government established and up-
graded Maternal and Child Welfare Centres (MCWCs) in sub-district 
hospitals. The Bangladesh government, with the help of UNPFA and 
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WHO, committed to educate approximately 3,000 midwives by 2015. 
This new cadre of midwives is proposed to provide twenty-four-hour 
services in sub-district hospitals (Mince 2011). Despite these initiatives, 
the utilisation of childbirth services at the sub-district hospitals, on which 
poor women are dependent, remains low. 
To address the low use of institutional childbirth services by poor 
women, the government, in collaboration with the World Bank and 
WHO, initiated a “demand-side financing maternal health voucher 
scheme” for poor pregnant women in the HNPSP, the second SWAp. 
Under this scheme poor pregnant women in 21 sub-districts/upazilas 
were identified by local committees and provided with vouchers to buy 
maternal health care services (including treatment for obstetric complica-
tions). However, concern has been raised that the incentives (maternal 
voucher) might have discouraged women from poor households to re-
duce their number of pregnancies, since the reduction in maternal mor-
tality was not associated with corresponding fertility decline during that 
period (as discussed earlier). Therefore, this measure has been on hold in 
the most recent HNPSDP for 2011-2016. According to the policy 
document: 
The demand side financing scheme (maternal voucher scheme) has evi-
dence that this has helped to increase the utilization of safe motherhood 
service, but there are some concerns […] the risk that some aspects of the 
design of the incentives (e.g. cash payment, service coverage) may be 
changing provider and patient incentives in ways that are not supportive of 
the maternal health objectives (Planning Wing, Ministry of Health and 
Family welfare 2011:8). 
This indicates a policy priority for fertility control over real commit-
ment to ensure maternal health, if it compromises the former. 
At the same time health care continues to be commoditised in Bang-
ladesh (Rashid et al 2011; Sobhan 2005). Since the 1980s the govern-
ment’s inability to provide quality care in the public health care system 
has been filled by rapidly expanding private health facilities not only in 
urban areas but also in rural areas. In the mid-1990s, the shift towards 
integrated reproductive health care service delivery approach in SWAp 
was particularly geared towards financial and programme sustainability, 
which advocated reduced reliance on public financing and greater em-
phasis on mixed public and private mechanisms (Jahan 2004). Following 
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this trend, the current policy puts more emphasis on private sector in-
volvement, arguing: 
The government recognizes the need for wider involvement of the private 
sector, including non-state institutions for enhancing effective health ser-
vice delivery. Public Private Partnership (PPP) in services delivery and in 
the areas of medical and allied education will be further expanded and 
strengthened with effective monitoring and regulatory mechanisms. PPPs 
can help address innovations in service design and management expertise, 
empowerment of the service recipients, protection of environment, social 
justice and right based service provision. (Planning Wing, Ministry of 
Health and Family welfare 2011:33) 
While the government is encouraging the private sector for innovative 
and effective health care service delivery, unfilled posts of medical offi-
cers at the Thana level, widespread absenteeism, poor performance and 
negligence are widely documented in public sub-district hospitals. Other 
research (Mahmud 2004) supports the conclusion that only the poorest 
section of the population who cannot afford private services have no 
choice but to rely on the public health sector. 
To ensure better quality of care in public hospitals, Naripokkho, a 
woman’s right organisation has been lobbying with the government since 
2001, to revive the so-called “upazila Health Advisory Committee” to 
make the providers accountable by engaging the local people and re-
sources to set up an effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system. 
During a key informant interview a Naripokkho representative men-
tioned that policy language is strong enough but at the sub-district level 
there is no accountability and functional monitoring mechanism, saying: 
There has been a huge investment: a lot of production of doctors, nurses, 
there are huge health complexes. At the sub-district level, 31- to 50-bed 
hospitals, there are 9 doctors, including the specialists. Also the emergency 
obstetric services, there is a post-operative room; everything is there. All of 
these investments are going to be wasted, because they are not function-
ing, the doctors are not available there. To make the system functional 
monitoring and accountability is the key (key informant interview, repre-
sentative, Naripokkho, 17 May 2008). 
In a baseline study covering a pilot hospital at the sub-district level, 
Naripokkho showed that the number of visitors rose from 1,500 to 
6,000-7,000 per month. This shows that if services are improved, more 
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people will use them. Naripokkho was thinking to replicate this in other 
areas. However, Naripokkho expressed concern that to continue the 
committee is very challenging due to lack of commitment from the doc-
tors, saying: 
Doctors are very powerful and they don’t want to revive the committee. 
Because if they become accountable there will be pressure on them and 
they will lose their private business. So they are not eager, there is a need 
to constantly push them. (Key informant interview, representative, Nari-
pokkho, 17 May 2008). 
The current policy also recognises these limitations, but assumes that 
better governance in the health care system will solve these problems. 
This is reflected in the policy document: 
Weak governance in the public sector has led to unavailability of desig-
nated health personnel, pilferage of drugs and other essential supplies, mis-
treatment and negligence, unauthorized and illegal payments in public 
health facilities while internal monitoring and oversight mechanisms re-
main weak. The poor and the vulnerable members of the society bear the 
brunt of the weak governance in health sector both in terms of cost and 
deficient service delivery. (Planning Commission 2011:31) 
To make improvements in health care service delivery, the most re-
cent SWAp reasserted the need to establish a sustainable Monitoring and 
Evaluation System (M&E) along with developing Health Information 
Systems (HIS) and recruiting health care personnel including midwives 
to provide 24/7 service at the sub-district hospitals (Planning Commis-
sion 2011:2). 
Despite acknowledging the problems with quality of care and mis-
management in the public health care facilities, persistent health inequal-
ity in terms of access to institutional childbirth continues to be framed as 
low utilisation of public health care services by the poor: 
Utilization of public health facilities by the poor remains low despite the 
huge expansion/construction of physical facilities for service delivery by 
both DGHS and DGFP. (Planning commission 2011b:5). 
The underlying assumption behind such formulation projects poor 
women as passive, powerless and victim of culture that lack agency to 
demand for health care services. Therefore, the solution has been sug-
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gested in terms of creating demand for services through targeted pro-
grammes to women, reflected in the policy document: 
The life-cycle approach will be undertaken to address the need of women 
for general reproductive health and to ensure reproductive health in 
phases. The vast network of state facilities will be further strengthened for 
appropriate women, adolescents and reproductive health. The demand for 
services will be created through strengthened health product involving 
community and different stakeholders (Planning Commission 2011b:356). 
This proposed solution indicates how the crux of the policy has been 
to create demand and supply of health care goods and services through 
fostering a network of public, private and NGO/CBO health care pro-
viders. This in turn promotes a dual health care system: private for the 
well-off and public safety net for the poor (see C4R4 in table 3.3).  
It has to be understood that the quality of care in the public health 
sector is tied to the broader policy that promotes privatisation as a solu-
tion to effective health care service delivery, seriously undermining in-
vestment in the public health care system. Most of the MCH-FP pro-
grammes under the “safety net programme” are not part of the broader 
health care system, making these programmes unsustainable without do-
nor support. 
Instead of a holistic reproductive health care approach as outlined in 
the ICPD programme of action, lack of resources, a real commitment to 
ensure comprehensive health care and prioritising family planning ser-
vices all lead to adoption of a narrow “essential service package”, offer-
ing limited health care services to the poor, women and tribal population 
(see C2R5 in table 3.3). 
Gender inequality is also addressed in a limited way. Although the 
policy document recognises discrimination in terms of gender and eth-
nicity, the policy frames gender inequality in terms of “difficulty to reach 
the poor”. According to the policy document: 
Discrimination in terms of gender, disability, age, type of disease and cul-
tural differences is found with regards to access, equity and utilization of 
services. Poor women and children, especially those from tribal popula-
tions are poorly served by the current system. (Planning Commission 
2011:32). 
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Policy and discourses further homogenise poor women and their 
need. This was reflected in policy stakeholder’s attitude, when he said: 
Actually we are a small country, so we are not so much different culturally, 
and behaviours are more or less the same. There are some differences in 
the indigenous (adivasi) areas. There may be some problems with the lan-
guages, but the fieldworkers will adapt according to the programme needs 
(key informant interview, representative, Maternal and New born, repro-
ductive Health programme, DG health services, Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare, 13 June 2008). 
The underlying assumption is that if services are made women-
friendly, poor and tribal women will use them. Therefore policies include 
motivating and counselling the health care providers to offer women-
friendly services (see C2R2 in table 3.3). Framing health inequality as a 
problem of access further suggests extension of services to the hard-to-
reach areas through collaboration with NGOs/CBOs. A separate section 
devoted to “gender, equity and voice” in the policy document further 
suggests: 
Voice and accountability mechanisms will be mainstreamed into the gov-
ernance and stewardship functions of the overall program. A local level 
accountability mechanism will be developed in participation with the 
community people and local NGOs. Representation and participation of 
the particularly disadvantaged and marginalized groups must be ensured in 
community planning and management mechanisms to cater to their needs 
and to improve utilization of health services by such groups. (Planning 
commission 2011:32).  
Again the solution is suggested in terms of decentralisation of health 
care planning and ensuring community participation to include voices of 
the poor, women and socially disadvantaged population. But what re-
mains silent in the policy discussion is how intersection of class, gender 
and ethnicity create the inequality women’s access to health services that 
in turn creates the existing health inequality (see C1R1 in table 3.3). 
Above all, what policy means by “reproductive health” and what is 
“essential” for the poor, women and socially disadvantaged population 
greatly remains dependent on the interpretation of different develop-
ment actors. 
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3.4 Contested meanings of reproductive health among 
development actors 
Since meanings given in the policy might be “read” and interpreted dif-
ferently by various audiences (Goodwin 2013), this section discusses 
how different development actors further give meaning to the policy in 
relation to women’s reproductive health and outline strategies to achieve 
it. 
3.4.1 Donor agencies: UNFPA and USAID 
Two representatives from UNFPA and USAID were interviewed25. The 
UNFPA has the reputation and stated goal of working directly with the 
Bangladeshi government to uphold international UN commitments to 
women, while USAID is recognised to be primarily responsible to its 
constituents in the US and their strict adherence to the Mexico City Pol-
icy26. 
Meaning of reproductive health 
Both donor representatives conceptualised reproductive health in line 
with the ICPD definition. However, there were also differences in per-
spective between USAID and UNFPA. UNFPA considers ICPD Cairo 
as the foundation of a “more holistic” approach to population, repro-
ductive health and women’s empowerment. At the same time, the repre-
sentative expressed a continued need for a specific population strategy 
and was wary about diverting donor support and policy attention away 
from population goals and the “unmet need” for family planning ser-
vices in the context of Bangladesh. 
Although USAID has been harshly criticised by women’s right or-
ganisations for emphasising population control at the expense of 
women’s health and gender equality, the USAID representative claimed 
that the organisation has shifted its strategy since 2006 to incorporate 
                                                 
25 Representatives from the donor community were difficult to make contact with for an inter-
view, due to their busy schedules and an unspoken understanding that a “gatekeeper” was needed 
to make an appointment. Unfortunately, this situation precluded an interview with the World 
Bank, to whom many of the stakeholders refer as the dominant decision-maker in the population 
sector in Bangladesh. 
26 Both of the interviewees seemed to offer very cautious statements rather than candid conversa-
tions (the USAID office would not allow a recording of the interview). 
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more comprehensive reproductive health and rights goals. As a proof, 
the representative stated that the health budget of USAID this year 
would be “nearly half-half”—half of the budget would go to family 
planning programmes, while the other half will go to reproductive health 
and general health programmes. He saw ICPD Cairo as a paradigm shift, 
but in his explanation, he inadvertently acknowledged that the donor 
shift to health care approach was motivated principally by the desire to 
reduce fertility: 
First, we saw family planning as just a vertical activity. [But] after 15 years, 
people realised that looking only at family planning isn’t very successful. 
So the programme wasn’t totally redone, but it was integrated into a 
broader health strategy (Key informant interview, representative, USAID, 
3 July 2008). 
The representative redefined the notion of reproductive health and 
rights in the Bangladeshi context, narrowly referring to family planning: 
Reproductive health and rights is about the clients’ rights and choices. But 
the Bangladesh perspective is different from maybe the western perspec-
tive. Women have the right to choose any method, even permanent ones, 
but we are only promoting reproductive rights within the framework of 
the Government policy. If we wanted to promote sterilisation for women 
with one child only, for instance, there would be vehement objections 
from the community. So there is some discrepancy, yes, between a western 
or international approach and the local cultural context (Key informant in-
terview, representative, USAID, 3 July 2008). 
Despite giving reference to the definition of reproductive health in 
line with the ICPD, the donors seem to adapt a local definition of repro-
ductive health in line with Bangladeshi population policies prioritising 
family planning. At the same time, the UNFPA representative further 
rejected any critique of population control objective of the population 
policy by other stakeholders, especially women’s right organisations, say-
ing: 
If the government had a strict population control mentality, then there 
would have been 100 per cent CPR, because the messages have been dis-
seminated. The fact that the CPR is not 100 per cent indicates that the cli-
ents have total free choice and will. The gap is in the attitude, which takes 
time to change (Key informant interview, representative UNFPA, 18 June 
2008). 
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Perceived obstacles/proposed strategies to ensure reproductive health 
Donors see cultural barriers as a persistent problem to ensure reproduc-
tive health. According to the UNFPA representative “It’s not a question 
of supply or un-affordability of services, there is still a question of tradi-
tion; maybe wanting a son, maybe mothers-in-law are uneducated”. Be-
sides the cultural factors “lack of trained midwives in rural areas” is seen 
as the main obstacle to ensure EmOC during childbirth. 
Given the shortage of human resources in the government health care 
sector, both representatives supported privatisation of health care ser-
vices. While encouraging private sector involvement in ensuring health 
care access (mainly to the middle class), UNFPA was the only stake-
holder to bring up the issue of corporate social responsibility and in-
sisted that private sector actors “have an ethical and moral responsibility 
to the country”. She emphasised the common consensus that the gov-
ernment must continue to provide a strong safety net for the poorest of 
the poor: 
Private sector should be encouraged more to provide health care services. 
And also I’ve seen the Corporate Responsibility—it’s coming up, but very 
negligible. It should be more. They are making so much profit selling their 
products to the clients and to the poor, but they are not feeling debt to the 
society. They have an ethical and moral responsibility to the country be-
cause all the products have been produced here, they have been sold here. 
If people could take some areas to share the responsibility in the health 
sector, that will be good. (Key informant interview, representative 
UNFPA, 18 June 2008).  
A major donor of many NGOs, USAID overtly promotes fees-for-
service and partial privatisation of the family planning and reproductive 
health services. The representative considered that access to contracep-
tives and basic health services was fairly well ensured by the supply-side 
approach and saw relatively minor rural-urban disparities in health care 
access. 
The real problem to ensure reproductive health according to these 
donor organisations is not related to policy but to problems in pro-
gramme implementation. The UNFPA representative considered the in-
ternationally-led establishment of measurable, result based strategies, 
such as the MDGs and PRSP, to be a landmark in the policy process in 
Bangladesh.  
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UNFPA viewed the shortage of skilled personnel as a problem. While 
strongly supporting the Government’s strategy to improve community-
based health care and train skilled birth attendants, the representative 
was suggesting an intermediary, semi-professional cadre to meet the hu-
man resources shortage in the health care sector. In this case, the repre-
sentative called for training of a professional midwifery cadre, as this 
group would require fewer years of training and would be more willing 
than professional nurses to go out to the rural areas. 
The two representatives differed in their perceptions of political 
shortcomings. According to the UNFPA representative the govern-
ment’s reproductive health and population policies are a successful out-
come of the cooperation between donors, NGOs and the government 
saying: 
In Bangladesh, it has always been very development-oriented….I think it’s 
one of the smoothest programmes in the world, if you look at other 
neighbouring countries. I don’t think that politically there are any prob-
lems. In fact, there has always been the highest level of commitment, from 
the highest levels of the government (Key informant interview, representa-
tive UNFPA, 18 June 2008). 
In contrast, the USAID representative was willing to recognise that 
political factors—particularly shifts from one government regime to the 
next—strongly influence the direction and outcomes of health policies 
and strategies. He believed that the government’s cyclical shifts from 
door-to-door to community-based service provisions were the result of 
political regime changes, rather than solid evidence:  
The quality [of reproductive health services] has been impeded by changes 
of the government. New approaches are coming with the new employees. 
For example, rather than emphasising on-going door-to-door family plan-
ning, the government is now thinking of training skilled birth attendants 
for community clinics (Key informant interview, representative, USAID, 3 
July 2008). 
The USAID representative contended that stability and continuity of 
political and financial support for a particular policy were far more im-
portant than the choice of a particular service-delivery strategy, arguing: 
Some are talking about midwifery…Others are talking about creating a 
cadre of community level health professionals [Whatever it is,] we have to 
come up with a strategy that won’t shift when a new government comes 
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into office. (...) The bureaucrats are not really a problem, they understand 
the issue, but ultimately the politicians influence the process. So maybe we 
need to launch a programme to raise awareness among the politicians. 
(Key informant interview, representative, USAID, 3 July 2008). 
The donor representative’s wish seems to have been realised. To en-
sure programme continuity, for the first time in Bangladesh, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) known as National Strategy for Accel-
erated Poverty Reduction II (NSAPR) for 2009-11, (under which popu-
lation and health strategy papers are prepared), was placed in the cabinet 
and in the parliament for people’s representation. It was further incorpo-
rated in the political manifesto of the political party (Awami League) that 
was and still is in power. 
3.4.2 Political Parties 
Representatives from four major political parties27, Bangladesh National-
ist Party (BNP), Awami League (AL), Communist Party of Bangladesh 
(CPB) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were interviewed. 
Meanings of reproductive health 
National level political party representatives expressed fluid and some-
times contradictory meanings of reproductive health and rights ranging 
from welfarist to right based approaches. Despite ideological differences 
between the four parties, all of them considered population growth as a 
problem, though there were differences in the way they approached the 
problem. BNP and Awami League (AL) consider population reduction 
as a means to achieve development goals. According to the AL represen-
tative: 
There is a need to control population, because those who can afford, who 
are able to provide and give proper education to their children and turn 
them into human resources are limiting their fertility. But those who need 
                                                 
27Among four main political parties, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Awami League 
(AL) represent the main two ruling parties that were in power. Their political ideology is reflected 
in the policies they had pursued during their political regime, while the Communist Party of 
Bangladesh (CPB) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Party provided a template for the policies they would 
have pursued if they were in power. The Jamaat-e-Islami interview was highly controlled; the 
questions were requested ahead of time, and the interviewee returned a typed statement in re-
sponse to the main themes covered. Specific questions about gender equality and/or minority 
groups’ access to services were not answered. 
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to control are having more children. (Key informant interview, representa-
tive AL, 12 December 2014). 
In the same line the BNP representative said:  
Look, all over the world we are facing food shortages, water shortages. 
How do you tackle this? I think [whatever may be said against population 
control], there has to be a way of addressing this. We should have fol-
lowed the path that China took a long time ago (meaning one child policy). 
(Key informant interview, representative BNP, 12 May 2008). 
The AL representative thus favours fertility limitation policies for the 
lower classes, while the BNP representative’s statement shows a strong 
support for repressive family planning measures. Looking back to the 
1970s and 1980s as the most successful years of reduction in population 
growth rate and most concentrated political will and resource allocation, 
the BNP representative argued that: 
A few decades ago, population control was a very popular theme among 
government and among the political parties. The allocation of government 
resources in this area was also pretty high. But if the government would 
have [continually] pursued an aggressive policy, it would have worked even 
better. (Key informant interview, representative BNP, 12 May 2008). 
The JI representative specified that “there is no state coercion or reli-
gious coercion (in family planning practices) except for some sporadic 
cases.” Nonetheless, the party representative noted that the high mater-
nal mortality rate in Bangladesh is a result of the “anomalous focus of 
the program, mainly aims at reducing birth rate” rather than ensuring 
comprehensive maternal health care and wellbeing. He used language of 
the Capabilities Approach to describe a view of population as a resource, 
rather than an obstacle, for development. 
The JI representative felt that the term “reproductive rights” did not 
accurately describe the limited claims and understanding of illiterate and 
underprivileged rural women in Bangladesh. He defined reproductive 
rights in terms of “a woman’s right to motherhood”, describing mother-
hood as a woman’s “born purpose”. He also sharply criticised the “neo-
colonial” influences of multinational corporations for “encouraging a 
culture of free sex” by marketing emergency contraceptive pills in Bang-
ladesh, saying: 
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Multinational companies are promoting emergency contraception and 
post-abortion care, while simultaneously forbidding MR-related services—
are “hypocritical” and “the most fundamentalist of all”. (Key informant in-
terview, representative JI, 21 May 2008). 
The representative of the left wing political party CPB also criticised 
the meaning of reproductive health saying: 
Reproductive health is considered by most people as something that 
doesn’t need much attention. If a woman gives birth, it’s considered her 
job. If she falls sick, people say she must have done something wrong, 
that’s the mentality. The very idea of reproductive health is absent from 
the social psychology. In the countryside, there’s the tradition of using 
Traditional Birth Attendants, but their activities aren’t organised. Until we 
can provide enough maternal clinics, we should provide training to these 
Traditional Birth Attendants. (Key informant interview, representative, 
CPB, 8 May 2008). 
He also criticised the use of the reproductive rights concept arguing 
that Bangladesh has imported poorly understood concepts of reproduc-
tive rights rather than developing concepts that make sense in the coun-
try specific cultural context:  
The concept of reproductive rights isn’t properly understood; it’s just be-
ing imported wholesale from the west in our efforts to be more modern, 
and it’s creating a cultural divide between the masses and the elite. Even-
tually, this will create a backlash. (Key informant interview, representative, 
CPB, 8 May 2008). 
Perceived obstacles/ proposed strategies to ensure reproductive 
health 
The Jamaat-e-Islami Party and CPB share a political vision of establish-
ing a social welfare state in Bangladesh to ensure health care for all. De-
spite radically different ideological orientations, both party representa-
tives identified their goals for the reproductive health and population 
sector as being part of a holistic picture of improving national health and 
standards of living. Both argued that the recent population strategies had 
been geared too much toward family planning and not enough toward 
ensuring basic health care of the poor. Both parties believe that it is es-
sential to continue restraining population growth, but with greater em-
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phasis on improving overall health and (especially for CPB) more equal 
distribution of national resources. 
According to the JI party, the main obstacles to better reproductive 
health care service provision and policies are corruption and misman-
agement at the national level. Specifically, the party representative criti-
cised the high degree of centralisation and corruption in the health sec-
tor, the emphasis on hospital care rather than prevention and the shift 
from field-based services to community clinics. He also urged greater 
mobilisation of community resources and emphasised several times the 
need to investigate the potential of alternative and traditional medicines 
in ensuring people’s health. 
The CPB representative criticised the donor community (particularly 
the World Bank and IMF) on the basis of its neoliberal, private-sector 
orientation, its deference to the interests of “the corporations”, and its 
excessive influence over national policy-making decisions saying: 
The policy we have now is piecemeal; we are just trying to respond to in-
ternational requirements. Actually, donor money is our main source of 
capital accumulation at the moment. Only it’s not being invested in any-
thing productive. The old conservative of “trickle-down” economics is still 
in place, supported by the donors. Actually, in Bangladesh we have two 
health care systems now; one for the elite and one for the poor. Health is 
being turned into a commodity, like purchasing groceries. (Key informant 
interview, representative CPB, 8 May 2008). 
In contrast, the BNP and AL representatives both strongly lauded 
and encouraged the private sector in improving the quality of reproduc-
tive and specialised health services. Described in terms of “trickle-
down”, the AL representative candidly admitted that the private sector 
had mainly helped those people who can afford more upscale medical 
services, and that the government would have to remain responsible for 
meeting the needs of the poorer segments of the population, resonating 
his support for a dual health care system: 
We are strongly giving emphasis on the public health sector. But, the pri-
vate sector is providing service to a certain group of population who can 
afford. It reduces the load on the public hospitals. For example, in the 
Dhaka medical college hospital we had the capacity for 500 patients but 
we had to treat between 1,200-1,500 patients. We increase the capacity up 
to 1,000 patients but we get 2,000 to 3,000 patients. Those who can afford 
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are going to the private sector. The rest are coming to the public hospital. 
If the private sector would not be there we would have more than 10,000 
patients in the same medical college hospital. There would be a problem to 
receive treatment. When the private sector is reducing load on the gov-
ernment there is no reason not to discourage the private sector (Key in-
formant interview, representative AL, 12 December 2014). 
The BNP representative saw a vicious link between poverty, higher 
fertility and poor reproductive health suggesting that poor people con-
tinue to overpopulate and thereby remained mired in poverty and ill [re-
productive] health because they are either too selfish, short-sighted, or 
poorly educated to restrict their family size to the limits of their house-
hold resources, and by extension, to limit their procreation for the 
greater benefit of Bangladesh. Thus, he argued, a national family plan-
ning programme (linked to but distinctly separate from the other health 
programmes) is essential, reflecting a paternalistic view towards the poor: 
First of all we have to educate the poor and motivate them to understand 
that they should not have children beyond their means. Second, they 
should educate the children properly. Third, they should think of the na-
tion at large, the number of mouths that the nation can feed. (Key infor-
mant interview, representative BNP, 12 May 2008). 
Assigning women to their biological reproductive role, he saw 
women’s empowerment (especially through employment) as an essential 
tool to reduce existing health inequality. The representative offered no 
concrete strategies for improving women’s status. He rather suggested 
that women have the responsibility to “come up and establish their 
rights”. 
Being the political party in power, the AL representative strongly fo-
cused on the government’s commitment and highly emphasised on 
proper implementation to ensure health equity for the poor specially 
women: 
Policy is important, but the most important is the implementation. Previ-
ous governments also implemented the same policy, but 60 per cent of the 
government medicine used to be sold in the private market. You can say 
government medicine used to be stolen from the public hospital and poor 
people didn’t receive proper treatment. We did not only improve proper 
monitoring, we changed the packaging of government medicine with 
green and red papers, with big letters we wrote, “not for sale”. If someone 
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steals the medicine and goes to sell them in the private shop, the shop 
owner will be afraid to buy them, the person will be at risk of being caught 
with the label on it and the client will be afraid to buy that medicine from a 
shop. There will be barrier from three sides. Due to these measures now 
the medicine is available and poor people are getting their treatment in the 
public hospitals. 
To improve maternal health we are giving EmOC training to one doctor 
and an anaesthetist for each sub-district hospitals and made it mandatory 
for them to work at the sub-district hospitals at least 2/3 years. Now we 
don’t have shortage of doctors at the sub-district level. These show strong 
government commitment for policy implementation. You can see the re-
sults are visible in the national statistics. Maternal mortality has reduced 
significantly. (Key informant interview, representative AL, 12 December 
2014). 
He also gave emphasis on follow-up and programme continuation 
emphasising revitalisation of the community clinics to ensure care at the 
“grass-root” level. 
All four political party representatives showed a paternalistic ap-
proach to reproductive health for women. Their suggestion ranges from 
effective policy formulation to efficient implementation; from quality 
services through more resource allocation to access to education, em-
ployment and health care services. But none of the state actors men-
tioned that women should be actively involved in the planning, monitor-
ing and implementation of measures to achieve their own reproductive 
health agenda. 
3.4.3 Production of knowledge on reproductive health: research 
institutions 
To analyse the type of knowledge being produced by disciplinary institu-
tions to represent women’s reproductive health need, key informants 
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from three research institutions NIPORT, BIRPERTH and ICDDR,B 28 
were interviewed. 
Meanings of reproductive health 
Among these three research institutions, NIPORT was directly involved 
in policy forums, while ICDDR,B and BIRPERTH contributed indi-
rectly through their research results. All three research institutes were 
established in the 1970s and 80s with the objective to control population 
growth. This ideology was very much reflected in their conceptualisation 
of reproductive health, overly biased towards fertility reduction. 
NIPORT and ICDDR,B representatives were critical (in different de-
grees) about the shift from Family Planning to the Integrated Reproduc-
tive Health agenda and showed support for family planning programme 
priority to sustain the past achievements. 
The NIPORT representative deplored the organisational shift from 
family planning and population issues to reproductive health issues since 
ICPD Cairo. He called for strengthening and supporting the family 
planning components of reproductive health programmes and policies: 
[Since ICPD], people suddenly started talking too much about Reproduc-
tive Health, taking imbalance with Family Planning. We thought it is very 
important that we don’t shift too far away from Family Planning, even 
though both are very important and should go hand in hand (Key infor-
mant interview, representative NIPORT, 5 May 2008). 
Similar to NIPORT, the ICDDR,B representative felt that the gov-
ernment should not lose the ground gained over the past decades in 
population control, stating that: 
Before the population policy intervention, the condition of our country 
was severely dangerous. The government’s shift to a broader reproductive 
health and empowerment agenda had jeopardised the future economic se-
                                                 
28 NIPORT receives major financial support from the Government of Bangladesh. Some addi-
tional funding is provided by donors (including USAID) for specific projects and surveys. 
BIRPERTH is also a government–established research institute, which conducts nationwide 
surveys on contraceptive use and reproductive health behaviour. The third research institute 
ICDDRB was originally established to research on diarrheal diseases. Over the years ICDDR,B 
expanded its research projects on reproductive health issues, including maternal health, family 
planning, reproductive tract infections, and HIV/AIDS. It also provides training on STIs, offers 
baroscopic sterilisation, and has organised at least one workshop for madrassa (religious school) 
teachers, to encourage them to introduce reproductive health issues into their religious curricula. 
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curity of the country, by diverting valuable human and financial resources 
from a still-needed population programme in Bangladesh (Key informant 
interview, representative NIPORT, 5 May 2008). 
Two interviewees at the BIRPERTH centre were reluctant to speak 
on policy issues, since they considered themselves principally as scientists 
and not policy actors. Despite strongly supporting family planning pro-
grammes, they did specify that women’s rights and empowerment need 
to be incorporated more fully into family planning programs. They 
added that the burden remains on women (not men) to choose and use 
contraceptive method, hinting at the lack of male participation in family 
planning programmes. 
Being directly involved in the policy forum, the representative of 
NIPORT identified male dominated culture as responsible for this con-
traceptive burden on women: 
You know, it is a male-dominated society. If you look at the CPR rate, the 
use of condoms is increasing. So you cannot say that the men are not 
coming. But if you look, the sterilisation clients are mostly women, even 
though the non-scalpel vasectomy is the safest method, and it’s available 
everywhere in the country. Very few males are using it, even though the 
FP directorate is giving more emphasis on male participation, but cultur-
ally, male participation - not only in FP, but also in reproductive health—
women are not being helped much to go to ante-natal care. Campaigns are 
helping, but there is a long way to go (Key informant interview, represen-
tative NIPORT, 5 May 2008). 
Given the fact that BDHS data discussed in the introductory chapter 
has shown that condoms are mostly used by educated “couples” and the 
private health care market provides most of the condoms, this statement 
highlights that poor men are seen as ignorant about the family planning 
programme. The representative did not mention the cost of condoms as 
a barrier for poor men. 
One interesting finding among all three research institutions is their 
positive attitude towards Menstrual Regulation (MR). The NIPORT rep-
resentative said, “I am a very strong supporter of MR…I think MR is 
doing a very good role, and we should make it stronger in practice”. The 
BIRPERTH representative mentioned that access to morning-after pill 
could really reduce unsafe abortion rate. 
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Perceived obstacles/ proposed strategies to ensure reproductive 
health 
Availability of services and women’s economic solvency were seen as a 
crucial factor in accessing reproductive health care (with an emphasis to 
family planning) services. The NIPORT interviewee’s strongest recom-
mendations were to decentralise government health services and to place 
a stronger emphasis on improving women’s post-natal care-seeking be-
haviour hinting that it would provide opportunity to give contraceptive 
counselling after childbirth. 
Two BIRPERTH representatives did specify that women’s rights and 
empowerment need to be incorporated more fully into family planning 
programmes. They added that most women lacked proper information 
on the choices available to them. One representative suggested, “Women 
have to be economically solvent before they can have better reproductive 
health knowledge and claim their rights”. 
Women’s “economic solvency” was cited as a critical prerequisite for 
improving their reproductive health, health awareness, and health-
seeking behaviour. This reflects how women’s empowerment is under-
stood in instrumental terms to ensure their reproductive health and well-
being. None of these research organisations talked about the privatisa-
tion of health services and women’s unequal access to the private market 
for their health care needs, but all research institutes believed that NGOs 
working for the benefit of the government had been successful in gradu-
ally elevating women’s awareness and social status. 
These research institutes have created a space for systematic produc-
tion of “evidence” to inform policy. NIPORT is directly involved in pol-
icy forums, and provides statistics, survey results, technical reports, and 
direct advice to the government. One of its important research projects 
is the Demographic and Health Survey, which is a reliable point of refer-
ence for reproductive/population policy makers. 
Rural women’s reproductive needs constructed by these research in-
stitutions become the “truth”. They all share a strong bias towards fertil-
ity control, conceptualisation of women’s empowerment in instrumental 
terms to ensure reproductive health, and the absence of any recognition 
of the structural inequalities that create the existing health inequality, 
thus making a perfect match with the policy discourse. 
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The knowledge produced by these research institutes on the claimed 
“need” for long-term contraception among poor women, fosters the in-
terests of health service providers, international donors and multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. This construction of needs created by disci-
plinary research institutions further shapes the government policy of of-
fering long-acting (implant) contraception under donor supported essen-
tial service package to poor women. Knowledge produced through 
research institutions thus shapes the reality by influencing the shaping of 
practice. 
3.4.4 Development NGOs 
To understand the dynamics of the relationship between the government 
and NGOs29, a few NGOs were selected on the basis of their important 
involvement in policy formulation and service delivery. The NGOs that 
were interviewed can be roughly divided into two groups: the large, na-
tional NGOs like BRAC and Grameen, and other internationally funded 
NGOs like Engender Health (EH), FPAB and Friendship. The NGO 
category of health provider also includes private companies like the So-
cial Marketing Company (SMC)30. The organisations interviewed provide 
a variety of direct health care services in the domains of family planning, 
maternal and child welfare, and emergency obstetric care. Besides service 
delivery, FPAB and Engender Health are also involved in policy forums, 
which include advocacy and lobbying, providing technical assistance to 
                                                 
29 The category of NGOs covers a variety of private and civil society organisations. Some of the 
NGOs are registered with the DG FP Directorate and working in the remote areas, where gov-
ernment services are difficult to reach. Several of these NGOs began with family plan-
ning/population services and later shifted their activities to incorporate broader reproductive 
health and primary health care activities. Besides the big national NGOs like BRAC and 
Grameen there are other small NGOs like Friendship who is involved in health service provision 
among outreach population. 
30 SMC is the major provider of government-subsidised contraceptives (mainly condoms and 
pills), as well as some for-profit health products, such as the oral re-hydration therapy “Orsaline” 
and iron supplements. SMC primarily markets short-term contraceptive methods but has found 
through market research that there is also demand for longer-term methods (which is of course 
in line with current Government priorities). SMC’s activities include public health campaigns 
(through media and in-school presentations) accompanying their health products, market re-
search, distribution of various branded contraceptives in 20,000 pharmacies, and some advocacy 
campaigns. Recently, the company is calling for government support to allow a corps of unoffi-
cial “rural medical practitioners” (people with professional degrees, but not necessarily medical 
degrees) to be trained in providing clinical services such as insertion of IUDs. 
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the government, revising policies and guidelines and providing training 
to different levels of health care providers. 
Meanings of reproductive health 
Despite divergences, development NGOs conceptualise reproductive 
health in terms of equitable access to reproductive health care services. 
As national NGOs, BRAC and Grameen follow all government health 
and population policies, including MR. The BRAC representative agreed 
that at one point in the past, health policies had been geared primarily 
toward family planning rather than population health and wellbeing, but 
he was satisfied that since the 1990’s (particularly since ICPD), the mes-
sage had improved: 
Now we are not saying anymore that “you have to keep your family small, 
but also that you have to keep them healthy and, to take care of the good 
health of all of the family members. So this is a shift in our approach” 
(Key informant interview, representative, BRAC, 21 May 2008). 
The Grameen representative referred to the Alma Ata declaration as 
the foundation for comprehensive, needs-based primary health service 
provision. Grameen Health claims to be “mainly service-oriented”, and 
to be the pioneer of micro health insurance programmes in Bangladesh. 
The NGO also introduced a full diagnostic centre and limited (needs-
based) clinical facilities. In the reproductive health domain, the NGO 
appoints a cadre of Community Health Assistants (who have completed 
up to 12 years of schooling) to reach the community members with 
health education and services. The RH programmes attend to safe moth-
erhood and delivery, ante-natal and post-natal care, teenage RH services, 
and Emergency Obstetric Care. Grameen also began providing MR ser-
vices in response to the high number of unwanted pregnancies. 
In discussing gender issues, the Grameen representative did not speak 
much on the issue of women’s rights, but did mention gender-specific 
health vulnerabilities (including social causes), such as rural women’s 
higher risks of HIV/AIDS (due to husband’s multiple partners), the re-
luctance of rural women to visit a male doctor, the low skills of tradi-
tional birth attendants, and the young age of marriage. In one instance, 
the interviewee stated that he had refused to provide MR service to one 
Hindu woman, on the grounds that the man who accompanied her to 
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the clinic appeared not to be her husband. This reflects that restrictive31 
MR policy and the moral judgment of the provider took precedence over 
women’s personal claims to their reproductive rights. 
SMC representative claimed that they view reproductive health as the 
right of all women as well as “eligible couples” to have access to a range 
of contraception. Recently in their marketing campaigns they are trying 
to encourage male involvement in seeking reproductive health services 
and products. The reason for this is not inspired to reduce the dispro-
portionate contraceptive burden on women but due to the fact that 
“men are the primary decision makers in the family and they have the 
most purchasing power”. Given women’s low purchasing power, SMC 
representative viewed availability of contraceptive as a way to empower 
women, saying, “We are trying to empower women with the availability 
of contraceptive methods”. 
The FPAB32 representative acknowledged that policies had generally 
been geared toward family planning in the past, but appeared satisfied 
that other components of reproductive health services (including post-
partum care, EmOC, and safe motherhood) have been integrated with 
the support from international donors. 
FPAB is one of the few stakeholders that actively supports abortion 
as a woman’s right and actually provides the service to women. FPAB 
presents its current package of services as the “5 A’s: Access (to contra-
ception), Abortion, AIDS, Advocacy, and Adolescent Health”. Yet, 
while the interviewee noted that “it’s a woman’s body, she obviously 
should take the decision”, she also stated that the organisation required 
the consent of a male guardian (not necessarily husband) in order to per-
form an MR. 
While many of the USAID-funded NGOs were reluctant to discuss 
USAID’s anti-abortion/ anti-MR stance, the interviewee from Engender 
                                                 
31 MR policy demands husbands consent to use the service. 
32 Besides service delivery, some of the NGOs are also involved in policy forums. Family Plan-
ning Association of Bangladesh (FPAB) and Engender Health (E.H) are two of such NGOs 
interviewed. 
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Health (EH)33 considered it as “a little funny” that USAID don’t fund 
abortion-related programmes but did fund post-abortion care. He did 
not feel compromised by donors’ restrictions noting that EH had previ-
ously supported a large post-abortion project with USAID funds. 
Perceived obstacles/ proposed strategies to ensure reproductive 
health 
The government-NGO collaboration is seen as a unique and successful 
partnership in Bangladesh to provide health care to the “hard to reach” 
population. However, co-ordination and monitoring this large number of 
NGOs to achieve its objective was considered as a problem: 
There is NO good mechanism for monitoring the NGO sector. A mecha-
nism is there, but it’s not able to keep up with the actual situation. It’s not 
set up to provide supervisory support to the large number of NGOs in 
this sector, which is growing fast. If you look at it from the eyes of the 
government, it is a problem, because each NGO may have different poli-
cies and strategies, which may not be aligned with the national strategy. 
We’ve been urging the government to have a stronger co-ordination and 
monitoring mechanism, which has not been happening yet (Key informant 
interview, representative, Engender Health, 4 May 2008). 
While Engender Health strongly supported government emphasis on 
long-acting contraception, the Friendship representative criticised the 
“supply ethics” of the family planning programme, saying: 
Government told us to address the copper T and sterilisation in each of 
our 104 chars (river bank areas) we’re working. We told the government 
that we should start with condom, and then we will think about other con-
traceptives. It sounds nice in the policy. But the field scenario is different 
from our thinking. Without going to the field, you can’t even realise the 
problems of the poorest of the poor (Key Informant interview, represen-
tative FRIENDSHIP, 6 June 2008). 
                                                 
33 Engender Health (E.H) another influential actor (representing medical professionals) offers 
technical assistance to the government on population and health issues. According to the inter-
viewee, a milestone event in RH and population policy formulation, in which E.H played a sig-
nificant role, was the development of national standards for family planning service delivery. 
Engender Health has been one of the only NGOs invited to participate in the development of 
key national strategies in the domain of reproductive health, including the National Strategy for 
Maternal Health, the Adolescent RH Strategy, and the National Guidelines for Service Delivery 
on STIs and RTIs. E.H has a couple of projects working on fistula in 20 districts, also providing 
technical assistance to the Ministry of Health. 
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A few other NGOs advocated for legalisation of abortion to ensure 
women’s reproductive right. For example the FPAB representative said: 
Worldwide movement is going on to legalise abortion law. Though 
through MR, several lives of women are saved but the government do not 
want to lobby for this. Besides the word “sexuality” is a mistaken notion. 
Sexuality is mistakenly refers to have sex with somebody. So making sex-
ual rights a national policy is seen as spoiling young generations (Key in-
formant interview, representative, FPAB, 19 June 2008). 
Despite differences in their views and opinions, these development NGOs 
supported privatisation of health care provided that the government should 
take care of the poor and strongly emphasises on the availability of reproduc-
tive health care services to ensure women’s reproductive health and rights. 
Among all the development NGOs, FBAP was the strongest in favour 
of privatisation, arguing: 
Universal coverage in the health sector was ultimately detrimental to the 
quality of government care. If free service for all is stopped and ensured 
only to the poor people, then the primary care for the poor will be better 
ensured. (Key Informant interview, representative, FBAP, 19 June 2008). 
BRAC interviewee tended to emphasise geographic isolation naming 
isolated areas such as Sylhet and Chittagong and some unspecified “cul-
tural factors” as the main obstacles to better health access. The Engender 
Health representative further emphasised other social aspects such as educa-
tion and employment for women to protect their health rights. 
Being a development partner of the government, except Friendship, none 
of them had any major disagreement with government policy directions. In 
the context of India, some Unnithan and Heitmeyer (2012:307) argued 
that in the partnership with the state, NGOs are caught within the para-
digms of neo-liberalism34 and market ideology, which they seek to sub-
vert. This seems to be relevant in Bangladeshi context as well. 35 
                                                 
34 By neo-liberalism I mean, a market-based techniques of government within the terrain of the 
state itself, where new constructions of “active” and “responsible” citizens and communities are 
deployed to produce governmental results that do not depend on direct state intervention (Fer-
guson 2009: 172). 
35 Hours (1995) considers that the NGOs in Bangladesh represent a new class of educated elites, 
holding a neo-liberal discourse of western development. 
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3.4.5 Women’s organisations 
Representatives from three women’s organisations, Naripokkho, Ubinig 
and Bangladesh Mohila Parishad (BMP) (three interviews), which are 
pioneering women’s organisations in Bangladesh, were interviewed. This 
group of women’s organisations include both academics and activists. 
These organisations are amply rights-based, promoting an advocacy 
agenda of women’s empowerment rather than providing reproductive 
health care services. 
Meaning of reproductive health 
Women’s rights organisations conceptualise reproductive health in rela-
tion to women’s subordinate position, patriarchal norms and unequal 
gender power relations. Naripokkho, with other women’s right based 
organisations, actively protested in reaction to the death of a woman due 
to coercive contraception (Implant) in the 1980s. During that time the 
issue of health rights and choice gained attention in the public domain. 
Beside campaigns and protests they started advocacy and lobby with the 
government to push women’s health rights issues on to the policy 
agenda. Naripokkho was involved in organising and participating in a lot 
of workshops and seminars at the national and international level to 
identify the cause of maternal deaths in Bangladesh. Naripokkho with 
their research and publications started to raise awareness regarding safe 
motherhood issues. In the mid-1990’s, Naripokkho changed its opposi-
tion position and became a strategic partner with the Government. A 
Naripokkho member was invited to be a delegate of the government to 
the ICPD conference in Cairo. In their realisation: 
It is not enough to lobby for policy change. Whatever is said in the meet-
ings and seminars has no impact on women’s lives. The main beneficiaries, 
the women, don’t know what there is in the policy. They only know that 
they have no access to the services. Services must be accessible to women 
if we want to reduce health inequality and maternal mortality in Bangla-
desh. (Key Informant interview, representative, Naripokkho, 17 May 
2008). 
As a civil society organisation, Naripokho was engaged in the consul-
tation process during the preparatory phase (1996-1998) of HPSP design 
(discussed in Chapter Three), at the invitation of the donors and the 
government, although its implementation became a government-donor 
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driven programme disconnected from civil society participation (Jahan 
2003: 183). However, Naripokkho contributed by lobbying with the in-
ternational donors to make the government committed to safe mother-
hood programmes to reduce maternal deaths. 
In contrast, Ubinig36 took a categorically radical stance against all 
population programmes, arguing that the government (supported by the 
donor and pharmaceutical communities) uses women’s bodies as instru-
ments to implement a eugenic and Malthusian population-control mis-
sion. Ubinig’s representative considered that powerful corporate interests 
are acting through women’s docile bodies to market reproductive tech-
nologies, whether they be promoting fertility drugs (in the West) or using 
women as “guinea pigs” to test new contraceptives (such as Implant) in 
the developing world. Implicated in the corporate/pharmaceutical “con-
spiracy”, the donor community was also accused by the interviewee of 
having ulterior motives in the areas of reproductive health promotion 
and making use of women’s social inferior position to advance their own 
agenda. In the opinion of the representative, the term reproductive rights 
serves the interest of population control: 
All the donors are interested in pouring money into women’s rights pro-
grammes, as long as they’re taking care of their fertility. (Key Informant in-
terview, representative, Ubinig, 4 June 2008). 
Given the complete rejection of clinical contraception, Ubinig is call-
ing for the promotion of traditional contraceptive practices such as 
withdrawal and periodical abstinence instead of “imposing clinical meth-
ods on women”. 
Reproductive health was defined by one interviewee of BMP as “the 
rights of women to protect their own bodies”. The interviewees stressed 
that women remained largely defined by their reproductive capacities: 
This reproductive function is creating a barrier for women, physically, 
mentally, and socially, through the family, society’s systems. As a women’s 
rights group, it is our foremost duty to deconstruct these gender ideolo-
gies. Reproductive rights are the fundamental issue of our organisation, 
                                                 
36 Ubinig is one of the more radical women’s rights activist organisations. Ubinig is primarily a 
lobbying and research organisation that has from the start strongly opposed fertility control and 
is currently involved in research and advocacy campaigns against new reproductive technologies. 
Ubinig receives most of its support from private, international donors with ‘feminist agendas’ and 
does most of its advocacy through publishing and attending international conferences. 
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because every problem for women starts from centring the women repro-
ductively. (Key Informant interview, representative, BMP, 11 June 2008). 
BMP strongly feels that the current programme doesn’t ensure 
women’s reproductive health and rights and the burden remains on 
women to use contraception. 
All three organisations strongly criticised donor influence over popu-
lation and reproductive health policies, arguing that most of the pivotal 
policy changes over the decades had been donor-driven or internation-
ally imported: 
Whenever any issues (such as reproductive health) become highlighted in-
ternationally, the government goes for implementing those, without cross 
examination. Does it relate to our cultural context or not? They are fully 
donor driven. (Key Informant interview, representative, BMP, 11 June 
2008). 
All women’s organisations consciously avoided using the term repro-
ductive health rather used women’s health (narir shashtha) due to the 
fear of backlash. To give an example a BMP representative mentioned 
that the slogan “My body, my rights” that had previously been promoted 
by Naripokkho experienced backlash, because it had been imported 
wholesale from Western feminism, which was inappropriate in the Bang-
ladeshi context. 
Perceived obstacles/ proposed strategies to ensure reproductive 
health 
Women’s organisations perceive aggressive population control policy, 
unequal access to services and an oppressive culture as barriers to 
achievement of women’s reproductive health and rights. One similarity 
among these three organisations is their stance against privatisation. All 
three organisations have been lobbying hard for the past several years 
against the privatisation of health care (promoted primarily by the World 
Bank). They think the government should provide the services to ensure 
women’s access to services. Ubinig’s representative believed that the do-
nor community, especially the World Bank, dictates the policies of the 
Government of Bangladesh, leading the government more and more in 
the direction of privatisation of health services. 
Although all three women’s organisations ideologically disagree with 
the government policy approach, all of them have different priorities, 
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policy stances, advocacy campaigns and different relationships with the 
government and other development actors. 
BMP doesn’t oppose family planning services outright, seeing that 
they could be useful tools for women’s empowerment and independence 
if accompanied by sexuality education, property rights, income inde-
pendence, and other basic human rights that Bangladeshi women need in 
order to be aware of and claim their reproductive health rights. 
Rather than seeing women’s need for a particular contraception, 
Naripokkho suggests access to a wider range of contraception accompa-
nied by proper information, arguing: 
Of course we need to bring down the fertility rate, but the government 
approach is not the one that we support. Women need to be given the in-
formation and the choice. Government should not give the targets, or 
convince the clients to have permanent contraception. (Key Informant in-
terview, representative Naripokkho, 17 May 2008). 
Ubinig demands the incorporation of TBAs in the government SBA 
training programme, arguing: 
In the absence of proper health care access, rural women are dependent 
on the TBAs for centuries. TBAs have years of experience in helping 
women during delivery. With proper training and tool kits for delivery they 
can do a better job than the FWAs after six months of training. To save 
the life of rural women it is better to train those TBAs until there is a good 
alternative. (Key Informant interview, representative, Ubinig, 4 June 2008). 
BMP’s major critique on the national policies was the instability, 
mismanagement, corruption, male domination, and lack of commitment 
of each subsequent government. Referring to the abandonment of the 
community clinic initiative, one interviewee noted, “One of the major 
problems is that the existing government never finishes the unfinished 
projects of the previous government”. 
Despite a moral support in favour of abortion, women’s organisations 
weren’t raising their voice because they don’t want to lose the MR op-
tion, which has already been legalised up to 8-10 weeks of pregnancy. 
Although this is inspired by population control objectives and requires 
husbands’ consent, women’s organisations argue that if services are in 
place women can have an MR within 10 weeks of pregnancy even at the 
upazila level, which is already a big advantage for the women. They be-
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lieve that with education, information and economic independence, 
women should be able to demand their own reproductive health rights. 
The popularity of female foeticide in neighbouring India remains a cause 
of concern for women’s organisations not to lobby for abortion. 
Representatives of women’s organisations argued for holistic, long-
term, and fundamental gender-power shifts to bring about a better envi-
ronment for women’s reproductive health and rights. Their proposed 
long-term solutions include developing a national sexuality education 
curriculum, teaching adolescents about their bodies and rights; gender-
sensitive budgeting throughout the government and in the health sector 
in particular; increased representation of women in government policy 
making bodies; and a greater reliance on Bangladeshi development ex-
perts, rather than international consultants, in developing and imple-
menting national health strategies and programmes. None of these or-
ganisations however has indicated any attention to the diverse practical 
and strategic needs of various indigenous groups in their development 
agenda. In that sense they also homogenise poor and tribal women’s 
practical and strategic needs. The Bengali middle-class-led mainstream 
women’s right organisations seem to fail at engaging with the questions 
of ethnicity (Guhathakurta 2004). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Although one objective of population policies has been to ensure access 
to health care services to the disadvantaged population, especially the 
poor, women and marginalised groups, analysis of policy discourse 
shows how policy actors with their diverse power relations negotiate 
over the meanings, priorities and evidence underpinning policy formula-
tions. The analysis suggests that policy is a product of existing social rela-
tions and structural arrangements that provides a discursive construction 
of the reality at the same time as it shapes the reality by influencing prac-
tices. Despite adopting an integrated reproductive health care approach 
in the mid-1990s, multiple interest groups and institutional arms of the 
state exercise forms of covert power via policies, discourses and knowl-
edge produced by disciplinary institutions aiming to govern the repro-
ductive behaviour of the poor. 
Despite divergences there is an overarching alliance of ideology 
among diverse policy actors: donors, the government, civil society or-
 STATE, POLICY AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH DISCOURSES IN BANGLADESH 117 
 
ganisations and professional organisations in relation to the means and 
ends of population policy. Higher fertility among the poor is depicted as 
a matter of national concern, contributing to household poverty and 
constraining development. The way health inequality has been framed 
and subject positions are created in the policy discourse becomes in-
strumental in legitimising fertility reduction under the imperative of 
macro-economic development goals. 
There also exists a divergence between conceptual understandings of 
reproductive health and discursive practices. Despite incorporating a 
comprehensive reproductive health care agenda, lack of real commit-
ment and resource constraints have led to adopting a narrow “essential 
service package” approach, offering limited health care choice to poor 
women. National and international policy actors have chosen to interpret 
what is considered essential to achieve macro-economic development, 
according lower priority to broader health care access. 
Policy discourse is also not limited to government texts and docu-
ments. Donor commissioned research through disciplinary state insti-
tutes constructs reproductive health need of poor women for long-term 
contraception, fostering the interests of a powerful alliance of health ser-
vice providers, international donors and multinational pharmaceutical 
companies. 
At the same time, persistent inequality in access to maternal health 
care services is interpreted as a lack of demand for health care services, 
depicting poor women as passive, ignorant, victims of culture and lack 
agency. The way health inequality has been framed, conceptualised and 
interpreted in the policy, has justified targeted MCH-FP services in the 
public sector through a safety net programme to reach the poor, women 
and disadvantaged population. 
The state however is not a monolithic unit. An alliance of private, 
public and CBOs/NGOs health care providers come together to create 
demand and supply of health care goods and services, reinforcing dual 
health care systems, private for the well-off and public-NGO safety net 
for the poor and the marginalised, sustaining health inequality. 
Women’s organisations conceptualise existing health inequality in re-
lation to women’s subordinate position, patriarchal norms and unequal 
gender power relations. Although critical of the population control ob-
jectives of the current population policy, women’s organisations recog-
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nise that availability of contraception and menstrual regulation services 
could ensure reproductive health of poor women if accompanied by 
other means of empowerment. Although women’s organisations mobi-
lise a reproductive health and rights discourse, they strategically avoid 
using the term in public discourse due to the fear of backlash from Is-
lamic groups. They are silently negotiating at the national level with the 
government and other development partners to create a platform to cre-
ate collective consciousness of women to claim their own reproductive 
health and rights. 
Given the absence of poor women’s voice in the policies and discus-
sions except for the women’s organisations (and the absence of tribal 
women’s voice even in these organisations), the chapters that follow will 
show how women experience, give meaning to, contradict or resist state 
policies and programmes in their daily life focusing on the village of 
Gachhabari37. 
 
                                                 
37 For the validation of data and future comparative study the original name of the village is used 
in the study. 
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4 The village of Gachhabari 
4.1 Introduction 
From the centre of the capital Dhaka, the study village Gachhabari is 148 
km northeast via Joydevpur on the Tangail to Minensingh highway. The 
village falls under the Auronkhola union (among 11 unions) of the 
Madhupur sub-district (among 19 sub-districts) of the Tangail district. 
On the west boundary of the village close to Chapait is Hawda beel38. On 
the east boundary is the Madhupur forest area. On the south is the Jal-
chatra Chest and Leprosy Hospital. On the north boundary is Amlitala 
village. One main road known as Boro rasta (Big road)/Hospital road, 
running from the south to the north, connects to the main Tangail-
Mymensingh highway at Jalchatra bus stop with Madhupur Forest office 
and “Reserve forest/Eco Park”, splitting the village into two. The larger 
part of Gachhabari village is on the south side of the hospital road. 
As shown in the sketch map drawn by local informants (Drawing 4.1) 
Gachhabari village can be divided in five main paras (blocks): Purbo para 
(East block), Dokkhin para (South Block), Moddho para (Middle block), 
Uttor para (North block) and Faram para (Farm block). Faram para is 
divided in two sub-blocks: small block and big block. Purbo para, Uttor 
para and small block of Faram para fall on the east side and Dokkhin 
para, Moddho para and big block of Faram para fall on the west side of 
the hospital road. The forest office is situated on the east side of the 
hospital road in Uttor para, which marks the last boundary of the Gach-
habari village with Amlitala village. 
                                                 
38 A beel is a Bangla term for a lake-like wetland with static water. In the winter when the water 
dries out this land is used for rice cultivation. 
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Drawing 4.1 
Drawing of Gachhabari village 
 
Source: Done by participants during focus group discussions (copied in English by the 
researcher), 17 May 2008. 
 
Official government perceptions on land rights differ from those of 
village people. The forest department claims most of the land on the east 
side of the hospital road as state property or khash land. Whereas, local 
residents claim this as their recorded land and live under the fear of evic-
tion. 
According to local residents once upon a time Gachhabari was full of 
Sal trees. That is how Gachhabari was named from gach (trees) and bari 
(a cluster of houses). This type of forest land is not suitable for wet rice 
cultivation. Pineapples, ginger and bananas are grown on this land. On 
the west side of Moddho para is the Hawda beel, which is the most fer-
tile land for rice cultivation. There are additional rice fields in Dokkhin 
para and Moddho para. These paras also have two ponds, which are the 
source of fresh fish in this area. In terms of industry there is a Karitas 
handloom project producing cotton cloth in the middle block. There is 
North 
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no village market in Gachhabari village. On the east are Pochish miles 
bazar and Jalchatra bazar, and on the west are Amlitala and Ghughur 
bazar. 
There are several schools in and around the village. A missionary 
primary school (Fatema Rani Prathomik Biddaloy) is situated in the mid-
dle block and a Government primary school is in Faram para. In the 
middle block there is also a seminary school for religious (Christian) edu-
cation. A missionary high school (Corpus Cristi High school established 
in 1966) is situated in Jalchatra, the neighbouring village. 
4.2 Changing population and ethnic composition in 
Gachhabari 
According to the existing literature, before 1964 Madhupur was only in-
habited by Garos39 (Burling 1997). However, according to the local resi-
dents, Garos and Hindu Koch were the original inhabitants of Gachha-
bari in earlier times and a large number of Bengali Muslim population 
came in Gachhabari already in 1962. In 1959 under the Bangladesh Agri-
cultural Development Corporation (BADC), the Bangladesh government 
established the “Madhupur seed production farm” in Kakraid (a 
neighbouring union). The Government acquired land from local Bengalis 
in Kakraid and resettled them in Gachhabari; the area where the resettled 
Bengalis started to live became known as Faram para (Farm block), since 
they had been displaced by the establishment of the seed farm. Again in 
the 80s the military government resettled poor landless Bengalis into this 
area, who were environmental refugees due to river bank erosion, and 
provided them with five acres of khas land, which Garos still claim as 
their communal property (Satter 2006). Gradually, more Bengalis from 
neighbouring villages stated to migrate into Gachhabari village. Nowa-
days “outsider” Bengalis make up the majority. 
Data from my 2008 household survey confirmed this: the majority of 
the population of Gachhabari (76.8 per cent) were mainstream Bengalis. 
The rest belonged to the Garo ethnic group (17.7 per cent) and the 
Hindu minority group (5.5 per cent) (Table 4.1). 
                                                 
39 The indigenous (non-Bengali) population in Bangladesh is estimated at 15 per cent (Bal 2000). 
Among the indigenous population are 200,000 Garos (Nokrek 2013), which is 1.25 per cent of 
the total population. The Garos prefer to call themselves Mandis, which means human. I used 
the term Garos and Mandis interchangeably in this research. 
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Table 4.1 
Population distribution based on ethnicity in Gachhabari 
Ethnicity Frequency Percentage 
Bengali Muslims 1,932 76.8 
Adivasi Garos 446 17.7 
Hindu Koch 138 5.5 
Total 2,516 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
The multi-ethnic nature of the population is reflected in the spatial 
location of residents. There are three mosques for Muslims, two 
churches for Garos, a Hindu temple and separate graveyards for the 
population of three ethnic communities. The first mosque “Tamiz Uddin 
Jaame Mondol mashjid” was named according to its founder Tomiz Ud-
din Mondol in 1975. Shuruz Akanda founded “Gachhabari Kha para 
Akanda Jaame mashsjid” in 1980. In 2001 another big Mosque named 
“Gachhabari Kweti Jaame mashjid” was established by Samsh Uddin. 
The establishment of three mosques in one village shows communal 
competition based on religious affiliation. Every year a waz Mahfil (reli-
gious gathering) is organised in the winter for religious preaching with 
loud loudspeakers. 
In the middle block there is a temple and a graveyard for Hindus, The 
graveyard for Christians is in Purbo para and another graveyard for the 
Muslims is in Faram para. In the neighbouring village Jalchatra, there is a 
Christian missionary for the Garos. Another missionary is in the 
neighbouring village Pirgacha. 
All the Garos in Gachhabari village have been converted into Christi-
anity from their old animistic religion called Sangsarek40. In the Madhu-
pur area, the first conversion work took place by the Australian Baptist 
missionary in 1893. Since 1928, the Catholic missionary came in Madhu-
pur. As part of missionary development work the Corpus Christi Parish 
was established in Jalchatra in 1960. Separating from Jalchatra, St. Paul’s 
                                                 
40 Garos believed that the world is populated by spirits (mite) that demand periodic sacrifices. 
The spirit can cause diseases by biting a person. The symptoms of the disease indicate which 
spirit is causing it, thus allows different kind of sacrifices. Some spirits are too strong and kill 
their victim no matter what efforts are made to drive them away. Harmony between the people 
and those spirits is maintained by yearly sacrifices. 
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Church was established in 1993 in Pirgacha, at the heart of the Madhu-
pur forest area. An integrated human development approach with estab-
lishment of schools, hospitals and life skills training accomplished the 
rapid conversion among Garos. Currently, the Catholics number around 
14,000 in the parishes of Jalchatra and Pirgacha (Homrich 2007). Christi-
anity has offered Garos a modern identity and a significant boundary 
marker in a country overwhelmingly dominated by Muslims (Bal 2000). 
Besides a distinct belief system, what makes Garos significantly dis-
tinct from the mainstream Bengali population is their unique matrilineal 
kinship system. The kinship system followed by the Garos, is called 
Ma’chong (motherhood) (Playfair 1909; Sangma 1981). All the members 
of a Ma’chong believe in a common ancestress that bonds them together 
in a sense of attachment (Marak 1986; Burling 1963). Daughters and 
sons both belong to their mother’s Ma’chong and carry on their mother’s 
title. 
This matrilineal system originated from Garo customary livelihood 
systems. Adivasi Garo communities had been practicing “shifting culti-
vation”, commonly known as slash-and-burn, swidden or jhum cultiva-
tion, over several generations in Madhupur. The special characteristic of 
jhum is that it was a community based practice. Each household culti-
vated as much land as needed to meet their household consumption and 
the land was usually divided among all the households by the nokma, the 
head of the village (Marak 1986; Richil 1985). 
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Pictures 4.1 & 4.2 
Artwork of God “Misi Saljong” (above) Garo girls in traditional dress (below) 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
According to Garo mythology, the story of jhum cultivation began 
with a virgin girl (rai, bima, randi, michik). Garos believe that a virgin 
girl used to collect wild fruits in the dense forest with rapt attention. The 
God “Misi Saljong” (picture 4.1) took pity on the virgin girl observing 
her hardship and asked her to worship him. The virgin girl offered wor-
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ship (puja) by burning fire and generating smoke with natural incense 
(dhup). God was pleased and rewarded her with seeds of various crops 
and explained how and when to sow them. Thus the Garos received the 
seeds of various crops through the virgin girl. Thus, women gained the 
best knowledge regarding seed selection and preservation (Playfair 1909). 
This significant contribution of Garo women in their traditional live-
lihood system provided them a very distinct status compared to the 
mainstream Bengali society. A matrilineal system offers Garo women 
customary land right and ownership and control over resources. Follow-
ing the customary laws, inheritance is restricted to the female line only. 
Property is passed on from mother to daughter and never to a son. 
However, not all the daughters equally inherit property. The most suit-
able of all the daughters is selected to inherit property. Often the young-
est daughter is selected as the heiress (nokna) because of her age and 
ability to take care of her parents in old age. If the parents are wealthy 
they might consider giving a share of their properties to other daughters 
as well. If a woman is childless or has no daughter, another woman of 
the same clan would be appointed to inherit her property. If the heiress 
dies, her husband cannot inherit any property. Nokkrom, the husband of 
an heiress (nokna), is considered merely a custodian and the manager of 
his wife’s property. The nearest male relatives (chras) will look after the 
family property until another heiress is found (Marak 1986). 
The Garo community is organised through matrilineal and matrilocal 
norms. After their marriage men generally move to their wives house. 
Therefore, Garo women don’t have to face the trauma of moving to the 
house of their newly married husband or in-laws, which is typical for the 
patrilineal and patrilocal Bengali women (Burling 1997). 
Although Garos still follow their unique matrilineal-matrilocal system, 
the jhum cultivation has been banned since 1962 by the state. However, 
to cherish the memory of jhum cultivation, Garos still celebrate the 
Wangala festival, which is a thanks-giving ceremony after harvesting rice 
in which Misi Saljong, the god who provides mankind with nature’s 
bounties and ensures their prosperity, is thanked and honoured (Nokrek 
2013). 
The matrilineal system among Garos is based on communal rather 
than individual identity. This serves as a mechanism of social control. If 
an individual commits an offence, the whole community feels ashamed 
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of it. Garos usually don’t go to a formal court. Chras play an important 
role in conflict resolution in the community. To give an example of such 
community control on individual behaviour, the case of intra-cultural 
marriage is interesting here. There are six Garo girls married to Bengali 
boys and one Garo boy married a Bengali girl in the village, they are nei-
ther accepted by the family nor the community. In most of these cases 
(Garo girls married to Bengali boys) the marriage is arranged according 
to Muslim rules. Bengalis are patrilineal, therefore after marriage girls 
move to the husband’s house and their children take the father’s title, 
while Garos follow the opposite. For a Garo girl such a marriage is con-
sidered a serious breach of custom. To prevent this from happening, a 
decision has been taken by the elder male Garos (Chras) that in such 
cases Garo girls will lose their inheritance rights and would be expelled 
from the community. In the case of the Bengali girl marrying the Garo 
boy, she become part of the Garo family and has been expelled from her 
Bengali family as well. 
Despite the communal division between Garos and Bengalis based on 
ethnic identity, they participate in economic and social exchange. Ben-
galis are invited during Garo festivals and marriage ceremonies and vice 
versa. Separate food is arranged for Bengalis, as Bengali Muslims eat only 
halal food. Garos usually eat pork and drink rice beer which is prohib-
ited among Muslims. According to my observation, not all Bengalis fol-
low the religious restrictions about food or drinks strictly. However at 
the communal level religious identity plays a significant role as a bound-
ary marker between Garos and Bengalis. Garo women are significantly 
different in their public appearance due to the absence of purdah norms. 
Garo women have different features compared to Bengali women, and 
they wear traditional dress called dokmanda (picture 4.2) produced by 
handloom instead of a shari, which is the common dress of Bengali 
women. Garos use a different language called achick. However, the 
young generation Garos also use Bangla, which is the medium of instruc-
tion at schools nowadays. 
4.3 The class and ethnic structure of Gachhabari 
Neither Garos nor Bengalis are homogenous groups. According to the 
household survey, all groups demonstrate striking internal diversity. The 
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following tables present the education, occupation, income and land 
ownership across sex and different population groups. 
Table 4.2 
Educational level of the household members above 15 years old 
Educational level 
Male Female Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Illiterate 17 1.9 13 1.6 30 1.8 
Can only sign 66 7.5 60 7.2 126 7.4 
Primary education 689 78.4 677 81.3 1366 79.8 
Secondary education  75 5.1 33 4.0 78 4.6 
SSC41 30 3.4 26 3.1 56 3.3 
HSC42 20 2.3 20 2.4 40 2.3 
BA/ Degree 12 1.3 4 0.5 16 1.0 
Total 879 100 833 100 1,712 100 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
The overall educational level is low in the village, as shown in Table 
4.2 which shows the education status of household members above 15 
years old. According to the survey 1.8 per cent of the population are illit-
erate and 7.4 per cent can only sign their names. A large number of the 
population have completed primary education (79.8 per cent). 4.6 per 
cent have secondary level education, 3.3 per cent graduated S.S.C level 
and 2.3 per cent graduated H.S.C level. Only one per cent has a graduate 
degree (Table 4.2). Thus, although literacy rate is quite high in Gachha-
bari, most of the population have a low level of education. Males are 
slightly better off than females in education beyond primary level. 
                                                 
41 Secondary School Certificate 
42 Higher Secondary School Certificate 
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Table 4.3 
Land ownership 
 Land ownership 
Muslim Garo Hindu Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No land 67 17.0 16 20.0 1 3.4 84 16.7 
<10 acres of land 92 23.4 18 22.5 9 31.0 119 23.7 
11-50 acres of land 93 23.7 20 25.0 8 27.6 121 24.1 
50-100 acres of land 41 10.4 9 11.3 3 10.3 53 10.6 
101-500 acres of land 83 21.1 16 20.0 6 20.7 105 20.9 
>500 acres of land 17 4.3 1 1.3 2 6.9 20 4.0 
Total 393 100 80 100 29 100 502 100 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
In Gachhabari, land ownership is an important source of livelihood. 
Table 4.3 shows the land distribution among different ethnic groups. 
The land distribution pattern shows internal diversity across different 
ethnic groups. On the whole a number of households (16.7 per cent) 
don’t own any land. The majority of landowning households own below 
50 acres of land and only a few households (4 per cent) own more the 
500 acres of land. Mainstream Bengali and Hindus are in a slightly better 
position compared to Garos in terms of land ownership. 
Table 4.4 
Household Income Distribution 
Income in tk per 
month 
Muslim Garo Hindu Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
<=1,000 tk 17 4.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 17 3.4 
1,001 - 3,000 tk 98 24.9 16 20.0 6 20.7 120 23.9 
3,001 - 5,000 tk 130 33.1 22 27.5 10 34.5 162 32.3 
5,001 - 9,000 tk 97 24.7 32 40.0 10 34.5 139 27.7 
9,001 - 15,000 tk 42 10.7 8 10.0 2 6.9 52 10.4 
>15,000 tk 9 2.3 2 2.5 1 3.4 12 2.4 
Total 393 100 80 100 29 100 502 100 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
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Table 4.4 presents the distribution of (estimated) household monthly 
income across different ethnic groups. The data show significant diver-
sity both within and between ethnic groups. The majority (60 per cent) 
of households earn up to 5,000 tk, which is below 50 euro43 per month. 
28 per cent of households earn between 5,000- 9,000 tk (50-90 euro ap-
proximately) per month, 10.4 per cent households earn up to 15,000 tk 
(150 euro approximately), and only a few households (2.4 per cent) earn 
above 15,000 tk (150 euro) per month. Income distribution shows Garo 
households are slightly better off compared to Bengalis, with only 47.5 
per cent below the 5,000 tk mark compared to 62.3 per cent of Bengali 
Muslim households. In this research I consider households below the 
income level of 5,000 tk as poor, 5,001 -15,000 tk as middle income and 
above 15,000 as rich. 
                                                 
43 During 2008, when the survey was conducted one euro was equivalent to 95 tk approximately. 
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Table 4.5 
Occupations (main source of income) of adults above 15 years old 
  Male Female Total 
Economic 
Sector 
Occupation Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Agricul-
ture/Forestry
/Livestock 
Farmer (own farm) 
Farmer (tenant) 
Nursery 
Poultry 
Fishery 
Agro processing 
212 
31 
5 
1 
1 
3 
28.2 
4.1 
0.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.9 
212 
31 
5 
1 
1 
8 
24.9 
3.6 
0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
0.9 
Construction 
Carpenter 
Welding 
7 
1 
0.9 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
1 
0.8 
0.1 
Trade 
Business 
Shopkeeper 
Hawker 
Pharmacy 
102 
10 
8 
1 
13.6 
1.3 
1.1 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
102 
10 
8 
1 
12.0 
1.2 
0.9 
0.1 
Manufacturing 
Garment 
Handloom 
Textile 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0.1 
3 
1 
0 
2.9 
1.0 
0 
3 
1 
1 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
Service 
NGOs 
Veterinary doctor 
Land surveyor 
Barber 
Teacher 
Mechanic 
Beauty parlour 
Tailor 
21 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
0 
4 
2.8 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
0 
1.9 
18 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
7 
0 
17.6 
0 
0 
0 
4.9 
0 
6.9 
0 
39 
1 
1 
1 
6 
4 
7 
4 
4.6 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.7 
0.5 
0.8 
0.5 
Transport 
 
Driver 
Rickshaw/van puller 
14 
111 
1.9 
14.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 
111 
1.6 
13.0 
Labour 
Labour (agriculture) 
Labour (non-
agriculture) 
124 
86 
16.5 
11.5 
25 
0 
24.5 
0 
149 
86 
17.5 
10.1 
Others 
Fuel-wood collection 
and selling 
Stitching katha 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
33 
 
5 
32.4 
 
4.9 
33 
 
5 
3.9 
 
0.6 
Total  751 100 102 100 853 100 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
According to the survey, among 502 households 751 male members 
and 102 female members above the age of 15 have a source of income. 
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The details are shown in Table 4.5. It should be noted that the house-
hold survey included only paid labour or self-employed work directly 
productive of income Therefore, while observation suggests that large 
numbers of women help on the family farm and in forestry activities, this 
unpaid female labour is not captured in the survey. 
Agriculture, forestry and livestock sector occupy the major source of 
occupations (30.2 per cent of respondents, or 47.7 per cent if we include 
farm labourers). Significant numbers are dependent on transport (14.6 
per cent), trade (14.2 per cent) and non-agricultural wage labour (11.5 
per cent). The service sector provides only 7.4 per cent of occupations. 
For those women who report having an income, the main occupations 
are collecting and selling fuel-wood (32.4 per cent), the service sector 
(29.4 per cent, particularly employment in NGOs) and agricultural wage 
labour (24.5 per cent). 
Table 4.6 
Employment status of employed adults above 15 years old 
  Male Female Total 
Employment 
status 
Occupation 
Freq
. 
% 
Freq
. 
% 
Freq
. 
% 
Self employed 
Farmer, Tenant, Nursery, 
Poultry, Fishery, Agro proc-
essing, Business, Shopkeep-
ers, Hawker, Pharmacy, 
Barber, Tailor, Firewood 
collection and selling, 
Stitching katha, Carpenter, 
Welding, Veterinary doctor, 
Rickshaw/van puller, Me-
chanic 
503 67.0 43 42.2 546 64.0 
Irregular paid 
worker 
Garment, Handloom, 
Driver, Textile, Beauty 
parlour 
15 2.0 11 10.8 26 3.0 
Regular paid 
employee 
Land surveyor, Teacher, 
NGOs 
23 3.1 23 22.5 46 5.4 
Labourer Agriculture 124 16.5 25 24.5 149 17.5 
Labourer Non-agriculture 86 11.5 0 0.0 86 10.1 
Total  751 100 102 100 853 100 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
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Table 4.6 shows the employment status of all those reporting having a 
source of income. For men, the most common status is self-employed 
(67 per cent) while only 42 per cent of women are self-employed (mainly 
the firewood collectors) and a larger proportion (almost 60 per cent) are 
earning wages or salaries. Among the wage and salary earners, a much 
higher proportion of women have regular salaried jobs compared to 
men. Among the agricultural labourer proportion of female are also 
higher compared to men (24.5 and 16.5 per cent respectively), while non-
agricultural labour is done by only men. 
4.4 Availability of health care services in and around 
Gachhabari 
Community maps and mobility maps drawn in focus group discussions, 
separately with men and women, provide a general picture of the avail-
ability of reproductive health care services in and around the village 
(Drawing 4.2 & 4.3). Based on this information, health care providers 
can be divided into three main groups: public health care providers, 
NGOs and private health care providers including formal and informal 
sector. 
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Drawings 4.2 & 4.3 
Community Mapping (above) and mobility mapping (below) of health care 
providers (nearby hospitals & clinics in local terms) 
 
 
Source: Drawn by participants during FGD, male, 17 May 2008. 
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4.4.1 Public health care providers 
A Satellite Clinic is the most accessible source of public health care ser-
vices in Gachhabari village. In November 2004, the Satellite Clinic was 
inaugurated in Gachhabari (Picture 4.3). 
Pictures 4.3 & 4.4 
Satellite Clinic in the study village (Above), and Upazila Health Complex in 
Madhupur (below) 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
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The clinic is open once a month to provide reproductive health care 
services at the community level. The clinic provides contraceptive pills 
(SHUKHI) and injections (Depo-Provera). Besides family planning, the 
Satellite Clinic provides health care service namely, Tetanus Toxoid (TT) 
injection for pregnant women and immunisation vaccinations (EPI) for 
children. A Health Assistant (HA) provides EPI service and Tetanus 
Toxoid (TT) injection to pregnant women and the Family Welfare Assis-
tant (FWA) provides family planning service at the same time. These HA 
and the FWA are mainly based at the Upazila Health Complex in 
Madhupur. Under the supervision of FWAs, the field based Family Wel-
fare Visitors (FWVs) pay house visits to motivate couples to use contra-
ception. FWVs also inform women about the opening date and time of 
the Satellite Clinic, since it has no fixed opening day. Women with com-
plications are referred to the Upazila Health Complex from the Satellite 
Clinic if needed (Picture 4.4). 
While the Satellite Clinic is situated at the centre of the village, the 
Upazila Health complex (UHC), which is the lowest level of public 
health care facilities in the rural areas, is within a radius of 10 km of 
Gachhabari. Besides general health care services the (50 bed) UHC has a 
maternal and child health unit (MCH) and a family planning unit. The 
UHC offers safe delivery and free MR services within 8 weeks of preg-
nancy. At the family planning unit of the THC, long term clinical meth-
ods such as implant and sterilisation services are provided twice a week. 
The brand of implant that the government is providing is called Nor-
plant, locally known as “kathi bhora” (putting five sticks inside upper 
arm skin). 
This long-term contraceptive service delivery is strongly encouraged 
through offering incentives. Norplant clients receive 75 tk (appx. € 0,75) 
on the day of insertion, after one month 50 taka during the first check-
up and 60 tk (appx. € 0,60) after 6 months during the second check-up. 
Vasectomy clients receive 500 tk (appx. € 5) and a lungi (a piece of cloth 
for men as an alternative to pants). Female sterilisation clients receive 
500 tk and a shari. 
The public district hospital is situated in Mymensingh, which is 5 
hours drive by car from the village, and up to eight hours by bus. 
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4.4.2 NGO health care providers 
As a strategic partner of the government, NGOs play a very important 
role in providing reproductive health care services in the community. 
BRAC and Smiling Sun are two major reproductive health care providers 
in Gachhabari. 
BRAC, a NGO, started their health programme in the study village in 
January 2006. BRAC has five health workers and one health assistant 
(Shastho Shebika). All of them are female. Each health worker covers 
300 households. BRAC health workers organise one group meeting each 
month at a convenient location in the village for about 20-25 partici-
pants. Health workers go from door to door and inform about the date, 
time and place of the group meetings. During these meetings anti natal 
check-up of pregnant women, family planning and health and hygiene 
matters are discussed. The main message of these group meetings is 
“small families are generally healthier and happier”. BRAC also has a 
pharmacy in the village to sell contraception and general health care 
medicine. 
Since the government health workers aren’t sufficient to cover the 
health care services in the remote areas, as a partnership with the gov-
ernment, BRAC is also providing antenatal health care for women for 
which the government is responsible (Perry, 2005). On the Satellite 
Clinic’s opening days, BRAC provides maternal health care while the 
government provides EPI and contraception supply. As a part of antena-
tal care, pregnant women receive free iron tablets which BRAC receives 
from the government. BRAC health workers also measure blood pres-
sure, weight, anaemia, diabetes and the position of the child of pregnant 
woman at the Satellite Clinic. However, this service is not free. BRAC 
members have to pay 10 tk (appx. € 0,10) and non-members 15 tk (appx. 
€ 0,15) for the antenatal check-up. If the pregnancy is risky BRAC health 
workers advise women to go to the UHC, a formal referral isn’t possible 
though. 
Reproductive health care services provided by Smiling Sun, a USAID 
funded NGO are situated in the neighbouring village called Kakraid. 
Smiling Sun delivers pills, IUD and injectables provided by the govern-
ment to their clients. Although the public family planning services are 
subsidised, Smiling Sun charges a service cost to the clients. The Gov-
ernment supplied SHUKI Pills cost 2 tk (appx. € 0,02) and contraceptive 
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pill Femicon costs 12 tk (appx. € 0,12). Injectables, which are given free 
at the government Satellite Clinic, cost 20 tk (appx. € 0,20) and Condoms 
cost 10 tk (appx. € 0,10) per pack, which was also given free before, un-
der the government family planning programme. All services are offered 
to married couples only. 
Besides family planning services, Smiling Sun provides general health 
services which are not subsidised. Smiling Sun offers treatment for lower 
abdominal pain, STDs and RTIs. Critical patients are referred to the 
UHC or district hospitals. However, due to the anti-abortion stance of 
USAID funding, health workers are not allowed to provide any informa-
tion regarding MR or abortion or advise women to the UHC in case of 
unwanted pregnancy. 
4.4.3 Private health care providers 
There are formal and informal private health care providers in and 
around the village. Among formal private health care providers, in the 
vicinity of the UHC, there are several private clinics and diagnostic cen-
tres, Chowdhury clinic and Khan diagnostic centres are most popular 
among the villagers. The Jalchatra chest disease hospital, which was es-
tablished in 1996 by the Damien Foundation under the Tangail TB & 
Leprosy Control project and the Mission of Charity Hospital which has 
been build in 2006 in Gachhabari also provides treatment for general 
health care facilities. In addition, there are more than a dozen pharmacies 
in Madhupur and three pharmacies at Jalchatra bazar, which is around 
the corner of the village. 
During community mapping a number of informal providers such as 
Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and local healers were also identi-
fied as primary sources of reproductive health care in the community. 
Among Bengalis local kaviraj and among Garos kamal are known to 
cater for most of the reproductive and sexual health problems. 
4.5 Patterns of health care service use in Gachhabari 
According to the household survey, members of 247 households (of the 
total 502 households surveyed) didn’t visit any health care facilities for 
any kind of health care services for themselves or for any family mem-
bers during the last six months prior to the survey (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7 
Use of health care services per household 
Reproductive health seeking behaviour Frequency Percentage 
Didn’t visit any health facilities for treatment 247 49.2 
Did visit different health care providers 255 50.8 
Total 502 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
Members from 255 households visited health facilities within the last 
six months prior to the survey. Members of 255 households visited vari-
ous health care providers depending on the type of health care need with 
a total of 1,328 visits during the six months prior to the survey. The de-
tails are shown in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 
Health care providers visited among the study population 
 Types of Health care providers  Frequency Total Percentage 
 Government  
 
Government district 
Hospital  
130 
222 16.7 
Sobuz Chata 8 
Thana Health Complex 52 
 Satellite Clinics 25 
Health worker 7 
Private health care 
providers 
 
Private Clinics 262 
934 75.9 
Private doctors 236 
Paramedics 54 
 Pharmacy 
Missionary Hospitals 
382 
74 
Traditional Health 
care providers 
TBAs/Kaviraj/Kamal 83 83 6.3 
Homeopathy Homeopathy 8 8 0.6 
Home treatment Home treatment 7 7 0.5 
Total  1,328 1,328 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
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Given the availability of different types of health care providers, most 
of the reported visits were to the private health care providers (75.9 per 
cent of all visits). Private health providers include private clinics, diag-
nostic centres pharmacies and charitable missionary hospitals. The Gov-
ernment health service covered only 16.7 per cent of the visits. In addi-
tion, 6.3 per cent of visits were to the traditional health providers. In a 
few cases homeopathic or home treatment was also reported. 
Table 4.9 shows the reported reason for the most recent visit to a 
health care provider. Most of the members of the households visited a 
health facility for children’s illnesses (29.4 per cent). 18.4 per cent went 
for a routine check-up. 14.5 per cent went to the health facilities for gen-
eral illness for themselves and 12.2 per cent for other family members, 
mostly elderly people in the household. In terms of reproductive health 
care services, 14.5 per cent of the households visited a health provider 
for family planning, 5.1 per cent for postnatal and 2.4 per cent for ante-
natal care. Members from two households (0.8 per cent) mentioned go-
ing to a provider for abortions. 
Table 4.9 
Reasons for visiting health care providers 
Reproductive health seeking behaviour Frequency Percentage 
Children’s sickness 75 29.4 
Routine check-up 47 18.4 
General sickness like fever, cold, cough, weakness (Counsel-
ling) 
37 14.5 
Sickness of other family members 31 12.2 
Family planning 37 14.5 
Post natal care 13 5.1 
Antenatal care (Pregnancy test) 6 2.4 
Delivery 7 2.7 
MR/Abortion 2 0.8 
Total use of health care services 255 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
In summary, this chapter has provided a brief sketch of the ethnic 
and social composition of Gachhabari village. As we have seen, there is a 
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clear communal division between mainstream Bengalis and indigenous 
Garos based on ethnicity. At the same time both communities are highly 
fragmented in terms of income, land ownership and educational 
achievements. Hence, the differences in gender relations between main-
stream Bengalis and indigenous Garos have to be understood in intersec-
tion with their internal diversity. 
This chapter has further provided a mapping of health care services 
available in and around the village. In the chapters that follow, I explore 
the significance of gender and its intersection with existing structural 
inequality as well as the space for negotiation within households, com-
munity and market to contemplate reproductive health practices in 
Gachhabari focusing on childbirth, contraception, abortion and fertility 
behaviour. 
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5 
Gender, ethnicity and 
contraception and abortion 
practice in Gachhabari 
5.1 Introduction 
Focusing on contraception and abortion practices, this chapter discusses 
how the complex intersection and interaction between gender, ethnicity 
and economic forces shape reproductive practices in Gachhabari. The 
chapter illustrates how men and women actively participate in the repro-
duction and contestation of gendered norms through the use of contra-
ception and abortion practices. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section ex-
plores men and women’s contraception practice and their meanings and 
justifications of their contraceptive choice. The second section illustrates 
women’s perceptions and reasons of their unwanted pregnancy. It fur-
ther explores constraints and possibilities that women experience in 
terms of using MR/abortion to terminate their unwanted pregnancy. 
5.2 Overview of Contraception prevalence and methods in 
Gachhabari 
The household survey shows that the contraceptive prevalence rate 
among the ever-married women surveyed44 is 64.5 per cent (Table 5.1), 
which is slightly higher than the national average (62 per cent) (BDHS 
2014). 
                                                 
44 In each household, one ever married female member was interviewed. Preference has been 
given to women between reproductive age group of 15-49. In the case of more than one married 
woman belonging to this age group in a household, the younger woman was selected for the 
interview. Since my interest also concerns fertility behaviour, only if there was no married woman 
in the reproductive age group in a household, women above the reproductive age group or wid-
ows were selected for the interview. 
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Table 5.1 
Contraceptive prevalence rate 
Contraceptive prevalence rate Frequency Percentage 
Use Contraceptive methods 324 64.5 
Do not use Contraceptive methods 178 35.5 
Total 502 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008 
 
Further details of contraceptive use are given in Diagram 5.1. Among 
contraceptive users, the majority use birth control pills (72.8 per cent), 
followed by injections (9.6 per cent) and the natural method (6.8 per 
cent). Interestingly some women mentioned mixed methods such as the 
combination of the pill and condoms or the pill and injections. A few 
women are sterilised (2.8 per cent) and the rest of the female users are 
using Norplant (2.5 per cent). Condom use is only 3.1 per cent (and 
some additional combined with pills). Male sterilisation is significantly 
low at 0.6 per cent. 
Diagram 5.1 
Use of different contraceptive methods in the study village 
 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
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This pattern of contraceptive use method is quite similar to the na-
tional level BDHS data, except that the use of natural methods is higher 
in the village compared to the national average. Otherwise, this data pro-
vides three clear patterns i) domination of female dependent methods; ii) 
uncontested popularity of the pill and iii) low use of permanent and male 
dependent methods. 
Charts 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3 
Use of contraception according to ethnicity 
 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
A closer investigation of contraception used by men/women from 
different ethnic backgrounds (Charts 5.1, 5.2 &5.3) provides an interest-
ing insight into contraception practice. The use of contraception is low-
est (56 per cent) among Garos compared to mainstream Muslims (67 per 
cent) and minority Hindus (59 per cent). 
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Table 5.2 
Types of contraception use per ethnicity 
  Garo Hindu Muslim 
 
 
Freq. 
Per-
centage 
Freq. 
Per-
centage 
Freq. 
Per-
centage 
Male de-
pendent 
method 
Vasectomy 1 1.9   1 0.4 
Condom 4 7.4   6 2.3 
Natural 
methods 
12 22.2 2 15.4 8 3.1 
Female 
dependent 
method 
Pill 35 64.8 9 69.2 192 74.7 
Injection     31 12.1 
Sterilised 2 3.7 1 7.7 6 2.3 
Pill & Con-
dom 
    2 0.8 
Pill 
&injections 
    3 1.2 
Implant     8 3.1 
IUD   1 7.7   
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
There is also some quite interesting variation in the type of contracep-
tion used by different groups, as shown in Table 5.2. Although the birth 
control pill is the most popular method among all groups of women, 
natural methods (22.2 per cent) and condoms (7.4 per cent) have the 
highest use among Garos. Injections (12.0 per cent) and implants (3.1 
per cent) are only used among Bengali Muslim women. One Hindu 
woman is the only IUD user (7.7 per cent). The proportion of sterilised 
women is higher among the Hindu minority (7.7 per cent) and ethnic 
Garo women (3.8 per cent), although the number of women using the 
method is quite insignificant. Despite all groups of women having the 
same contraceptive supply available, what lies behind this diversity in 
contraception practice? 
Based on the household survey data I have tried to see the different 
type of contraception use across different income groups of 
men/women (Diagram 5.2). Although Gachhabari is a relatively poor 
area, compared to the average per capita income of Bangladesh, disag-
gregation by household income clearly shows that injections and implant 
are more frequently used by the poorer group of women Condom use is 
also higher among poorer groups, however it should be noted that con-
dom is proportionately higher among Garos. The use of pills is evenly 
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distributed as pills are available both in private and public sector. How-
ever, poor women use government supply pills and richer women buy 
pills from the private sector. The number of sterilised women was too 
small to draw conclusions from the fluctuating sterilisation pattern 
shown in Diagram 5.2. 
Diagram 5.2 
Contraception choice per income group (Y-axis: number of users, X-axis: 
Income group45) 
 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
                                                 
45 1<1,000 tk; 2= 1,001 - 3,000 tk; 3=3,001 - 5,000 tk; 4=5,001 - 9,000 tk; 5=9,001 - 15,000 tk 
and 6>15,000 tk per month. 
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Interestingly the use of natural method reduces with the increase in 
income, this suggests that poor households are more dependent on natu-
ral methods due to the fact that it doesn’t cost money. Another pattern 
that stands out for almost all contraception types is that the very poorest 
(group 1) use no contraception at all (only one case of injection and one 
of sterilisation, no others), which draws attention to the importance of 
looking at the use of Menstrual Regulation or abortions to regulate their 
fertility. 
The following sections illustrate how a combination of gender, eth-
nicity and economic factors shape contraception practice in Gachhabari. 
5.2.1 Men’s Contraception practice and rationales: similarities 
and differences 
Narratives of men and women reveal a complex understanding of the 
uses and abuses of contraceptives. 
One perception about vasectomy is related to masculinity. There ap-
pears to be social stigma attached to vasectomy. Due to this stigma men 
who have undergone the sterilisation operation are looked down upon in 
the community. This stigma was explicit when a female government 
health worker shared her own experience during her field visit describ-
ing: 
One day I was passing by a tea stall next to the primary school building, 
four to five men were drinking tea at the tea stall and chatting. At that 
moment one man from the group pointed to a man in the distance and 
said to the others, look there goes the “castrated” man and all of them 
burst out laughing (Service provider’s interview, Gachhabari, 17 July 
2008). 
Calling men who have undergone vasectomy castrated46 (Khasha 
koraichey) is a matter of shame to their masculinity. There seems to be a 
belief that those men have lost their sexual power (focus group discus-
sion outcome). 
                                                 
46 Castration is a surgical process done among animals (especially among goats) to increase meat 
production by changing their hormonal balance. Castrated animals do not qualify to be sacrificed 
as religious offering. 
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However further discussions revealed that there were additional rea-
sons. It was a hot summer noon when I was interviewing a thirty seven 
years old Bengali participant Payra Banu, a mother of three children who 
was suffering from the side effects of contraceptive pills. Normally men 
are not at home at that time. As usual her husband had left home in the 
morning with his rickshaw van, but this time he came home to drop 
some groceries. He overheard our conversation while his wife was talk-
ing about her health complaints. He didn’t expect me to be present in his 
house. The atmosphere became a bit uncomfortable to me. To initiate a 
normal conversation, I introduced myself and politely asked him why he 
wasn’t considering using a method himself in the case of his wife’s sick-
ness. He reacted to me saying: 
The government gives five hundred tk (appx. five Euros) to get a vasec-
tomy done, but even if you give me five Lac (500,000 tk, appx. € 500,-) I 
wouldn’t do it. Whatever side effects my wife is suffering from, she has to 
use a method otherwise she can stop it. But I am not going to do a vasec-
tomy even in front of a military gun point (Interview, Hanif Miah, Bengali, 
46 years old, Gachhabari, 28 April 2008). 
He left the house almost immediately after dropping the groceries. 
Continuing the conversation, Payra Banu defended her husband for not 
using contraception saying: 
Sister, don’t talk about any methods that have anything to do with my 
husband. I know, my husband is very sincere to me and he has no inten-
tion to have a second wife. He only cares for the family (shongshar). My 
husband is a rickshaw van puller. It is a hardworking task (porishromer 
kaj) to pull a loaded rickshaw van. If he wouldn’t be able to do his work 
anymore after an operation (vasectomy), how will our family survive? 
My husband tells me you take the pill or injection or do something else. 
There are many methods for women. But if I do a vasectomy (he says), I 
wouldn’t be able to perform any hard work to run this family (shongshar) 
anymore. I also hear from other people that men can’t work hard after the 
operation. I heard from my relatives in another village that young men 
who work in the NGO did this kind of method. They can rest after the 
operation. If my husband have to stay at home for 10/12 days after the 
operation where can we get money from to run this family if he doesn’t 
work? I never worked outside. I can’t work as a day labourer or pull a rick-
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shaw van like my husband. (Interview, Payra Banu, Bengali, Gachhabari, 
28 April 2008). 
Picture 5.1 
An anonymous man in Gachhabari village 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
Similar to Payra Banu other women’s narratives justified accepting the 
side effects of contraception for the greater benefit of the household. 
For example Shewly, a thirty-five year old woman, suffering from severe 
menstruation and lower abdominal pain since the insertion of Norplant, 
said: 
I am a woman, I can stay at home. I can stay in bed if I am sick due to side 
effects from contraception. But my husband is a man. He has to work 
outside and bring money for the family. Do women go in the sun? Do 
they go to plough land? Do they work as day labourers? It is better for the 
family if I suffer instead of my husband. (Interview, Shewly, Bengali, 
Gachhabari, 9 June 2008). 
These narratives highlight how notions of masculinity and femininity 
are linked to different types of contraception. Since households are 
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largely dependent on male wage work, women take up contraception for 
the greater benefit of the households, releasing men from contraceptive 
responsibility. 
Despite the availability of the service at the UHC, only two men in 
the village have undergone vasectomy; Shuvas (Garo) and Jamil Miah 
(Bengali). Their experience can further illustrate the reason for reluctance 
towards male sterilisation in the village. Shuvas is a 38 year old commu-
nity forest guard. He used to work as a day labourer and an occasional 
van puller in the past. He is a father of two sons and a daughter, his 
younger child was three years old when he did his vasectomy. In his 
words: 
Garos are generally careless about method. Now they are using different 
methods at their wives’ initiative. I heard about this method from my wife 
for the first time. She received the information from the female health 
worker in the village. I talked to the female health worker. She organised 
three men, two from Gachhabari and one from a neighbouring village to 
go to the hospital for sterilisation. She told us the government will give a 
lump sum money and a monthly allowance (ekkalin taka dibey abar 
mashey mashey kichu dibey). Three of us went together and had vasec-
tomy done. The doctor was polite, after the operation he told us (individu-
ally) to follow some advice. For example, for a few days we were not sup-
posed to do any heavy work and sexual intercourse. At the beginning I felt 
some problem. Now I don’t feel any problem anymore. 
Reflecting back it was a good decision because there is no risk of making 
my wife pregnant anymore. But sometimes I feel sad thinking that I would 
never be able to become a father anymore, even if I wish. (Interview, Shu-
vas, Garo, Gachhabari, 13 October 2008). 
Jamal Miah is a 48 years old landless rickshaw van puller, he owns 
only the plot of land on which his house is built (Boshot vita). He has 
three living children, one son and two daughters. Three children died. In 
his words: 
Due to our poverty, my wife went to the forest to carry firewood even 
during her pregnancy. Three of our children died after they were born. 
Couldn’t bring them to the doctor, only consulted a local “kaviraj”. Being 
unable to provide for the family once I went to the forest to cut trees. But 
I was caught and put in jail for six months, which made the situation even 
worse. 
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After I got released from the jail, I heard from another van puller that the 
health worker is bringing people to the hospital for a method. The gov-
ernment will give money for that. I thought I can’t even keep my children 
alive after they were born, it is better to stop having more children. On top 
of that I will receive cash. Unfortunately, after the operation I became 
weak and can’t pull rickshaw van full time anymore. (Interview, Jamal 
Miah, Bengali, Gachhabari, 14 October 2008).  
It might be that Jamal Miah’s physical weakness is due to a combina-
tion of having a difficult time in jail, lack of proper nutrition and rest af-
ter the operation and aging, however, during discussions other partici-
pants often took him as an example of how vasectomy makes men 
physically weak. A common statement given by many participants was, 
“we know from those who have done vasectomy that it makes men 
weak”. Shuvas further mentioned that he discussed about this method 
with others in the village but generally men are not interested in this 
method. 
Despite the stigma attached to vasectomy, neither Shuvas nor Jamal 
Miah mentioned any cultural norms as a barrier to vasectomy. The moti-
vation of Shuvas and Jamal Miah to accept vasectomy was purely finan-
cial. However, Shuvas complained that he was misinformed about a 
monthly payment, while Jamal Miah complained about the loss of his 
income after the operation, as he can’t work full time any more. Shuvas 
is comparatively young and he found work as a forest guard which 
doesn’t demand heavy work anymore compared to pulling a rickshaw 
van which he used to do occasionally before the operation. 
In the rural community words spread from mouth to mouth very 
quickly. The experience of Shuvas and Jamal Miah created more negative 
attitude towards vasectomy in the community. It also illustrates how the 
field worker might have manipulated the information about a monthly 
compensation to get clients, which is not in line with the official docu-
ment, which creates mistrust in the government family planning pro-
gramme. Above all, the loss of income after the operation is in no way 
comparable to the incentives they have received. For Jamal Miah it also 
implies long term loss of income. The reality of poor men is that their 
labour is the only capital that they have and if they lose it, their own sur-
vival and the survival of their family members is put in danger. During 
an interview a 38 year old well-off Garo participant Badal said: 
 GENDER, ETHNICITY AND CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION PRACTICE IN GACHHABARI 151 
 
Field workers target poor men to convince them to do a vasectomy. They 
lure them with incentives. Field workers get relief (khalash) as soon as the 
method is done. They don’t care what happens with the clients after the 
operation, whether they follow the restrictions or rest properly. The reality 
is that if poor people don’t work for a day they will not have food on their 
plates. They work on a daily basis for their survival (Tara in aney din 
khay). Men might have problem after the operation if they don’t take 
enough rest and continue to do heavy work or don’t take medicine prop-
erly if needed. (Interview, Badal, Garo, Gachhabari, 3 September 2008). 
There seems to be another perception among men and women alike 
that vasectomy reduces men’s sexual performance. Badal (the Garo in-
formant just quoted above) also expressed his dislike towards vasectomy 
saying: 
I know a fieldworker in my NGO who took half a day leave from the of-
fice to do a vasectomy and continued his work without saying anything to 
anybody. His vasectomy caused him marital unrest. His wife complained 
that he couldn’t “perform” anymore and got involved in an extra-marital 
relation. My colleague also regrets saying, “May be I took a wrong deci-
sion. I don’t feel comfortable. I don’t feel pleasure any more”. (Interview, 
Badal, Garo, Gachhabari, 3 September 2008). 
The other Bengali participant Jamal Miah also believed that vasec-
tomy reduced his sexual performance. 
Another perception about vasectomy is related to its permanency. 
Those research participants who were using contraception for birth spac-
ing and had not reached their desired number of children were not ready 
to consider permanent methods either male or female. In addition, poor 
couples that already reached their desired number of children but have 
experience of child mortality showed their reluctance to use permanent 
contraception. Aman Ali, a forty-two year old participant justified his 
wife using contraception instead of him by saying: 
If I perform a vasectomy I wouldn’t be able to produce any children any 
more. If my wife takes Norplant, she would be still fertile. She can have a 
child after five years again (Interview, Aman Ali, Bengali, Gachhabari, 27 
June 2008). 
This statement actually demonstrates pragmatism and preference for 
non-permanent contraception over permanent ones. While vasectomy 
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causes permanent infertility, most of the female methods such as pills, 
injectables, IUD and implant are not associated with permanent infertil-
ity. By choosing non-permanent methods couples preserve their option 
to have children in the future if they are not absolutely certain to stop 
childbearing permanently. Similar evidence was found in another large 
scale comparative study (Hutter and Sahu 2012) showing Muslim women 
in Bangladesh prefer temporary contraception, while the opposite is true 
in India, dominated by Hindu majority. 
In general both Garos and Bengalis showed reluctance towards vasec-
tomy due to the perception that vasectomy might cause problems in the 
future. Although the breadwinner’s norm is not as strong among matri-
lineal Garos like Bengalis, Garo men’s reluctance towards vasectomy is 
linked to their matrilineal system. Following the customary laws among 
Garos, children belong to their mother’s clan. Further conversation with 
Shuvas reveals that in case of maladjustment, Garo men lose their right 
over their children and have to leave their wife’s house (Unlike Bengalis 
Garo men generally move to their wife’s house after marriage). There-
fore Garo men want to preserve their reproductive power for the future. 
This attitude gets further intensified by a patriarchal mentality which 
promotes reluctance among Garo men to accept contraceptive responsi-
bility either vasectomy or condoms. 
A similar mix of reasons/perceptions emerges about the use of con-
doms. A focus group discussion organised with men from mixed ethnic 
groups for this research documented their perceptions about condoms, 
as summarised below: 
 Local people know about condoms from Radio, TV and local health 
worker and friends. 
 Local people are not aware that condoms have an expiry date. No-
body checks it before using it. 
 Local people mostly buy Raja condom which costs 3 tk, condoms 
for 5 tk or even 35 tk are also available at the local pharmacy. 
 Men often say condom is not a safe method, it breaks during sex. 
Sometimes young men claim to their peers that they use double 
condoms for protection. However, there is not much truth behind 
such statements. Young men make such claims to show-off their 
masculinity (pourusotto phute uthey). 
 Condoms are neither comfortable nor enjoyable. 
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 1215Using condom is problematic (bhejal); one has to put it on and 
take it off in the dark, is it not problematic? 
 It creates problem during ejaculation. It feels like sperm can’t flow 
easily, something is blocking the head of the penis. 
 Men desire the sperm to flow from free (unmukto) penis. Men con-
sider this as a great satisfaction in sex. But using condom spoils this. 
 Condom contains “haram” (opposite to halal, which is forbidden 
according to religious precept) components. 
 Condom creates infection inside women’s vagina. 
 It is not possible to put a condom without an erection. At the point 
of erection, the effort of putting a condom in the dark reduces the 
erection. Ultimately it reduces sexual pleasure. 
 It is difficult to store and dispose of condoms. Married couples usu-
ally keep them under the pillow or bed, but always wonder where to 
throw after using them. 
 The size of condom is problematic. One size doesn’t fit all; it is of-
ten loose and creates an irritating noise (awaj) if air gets stuck inside. 
When couples sleep in the same room with their children, making 
noise during intercourse is embarrassing. For those who have a fat 
penis, the rubber of the condom blocks blood circulation and cre-
ates pain. 
 The criteria to determine whether a condom is good or not depends 
on whether it breaks easily, thickness, comfort and cost. Generally 
costly condoms are good. 
 Even the poor quality condoms have a cost. Poor people cannot 
spend money to fuck their wives. Those are for the rich people in 
the towns. 
 Some women don’t like their husbands to use condoms. But, some 
women enjoy sex more when their husbands use condoms. The lu-
brication of the condom makes it easy to insert inside women and to 
take it out. 
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 Men who drink alcohol (mod) and go to prostitutes47 use condoms 
more. If men don’t take the initiative on their own, prostitutes also 
put the condom on men. Wives of those men are also afraid of 
them because they do all nasty things (ultaplata akam). “They insert 
from the front and also from the back”. 
 Sometimes men are afraid to use condoms. Because if men want to 
use condoms, their wives suspect them and say, “You might have 
gone to bad places (having sex with prostitutes), that is why you are 
putting this thing on”. (FGD with men Gachhabari, 17 May 2008) 
 
A combination of these factors ranging from cost and storage prob-
lem to fear of creating mistrust, gossip and rumours created a negative 
attitude towards condoms as an unreliable method of contraception. 
A separate focus group discussion conducted with women from 
mixed ethnic groups further supported these perceptions. The women’s 
group further confirmed that condoms are mostly being used with pros-
titutes not with wives. Women giggled about seeing used condoms lying 
around in the jungle when they go to collect firewood. (FGD, female, 
Gachhabari, 6 March 2008). 
Despite the easy availability of condoms in local shops and with 
BRAC health workers, during a discussion a local pharmacy owner men-
tioned: 
Men don’t buy condoms for themselves as frequently as they buy contra-
ceptive pills like Femicon and Nordate for their wives from my shop. 
(Service provider’s interview, Gachhabari, 5 June 2008). 
                                                 
47 There is no formal brothel in the village. Men usually go to the brothels in Tangail and My-
mensingh. However, floating prostitutes come to the forest area for sex exchange. Their custom-
ers mostly come from outside. Some rickshaw van pullers usually work as brokers to bring cus-
tomers. They can recognise who is a customer and target them and bring them to the destination 
and promise safety of the clients. These floating prostitutes cost between 40 to 100 taka, while 
going to a brothel in Tangail and Mymensingh costs more money and extra travel cost. A hijra 
(third gender) was also known as a prostitute in the village. Recently s/he moved to Tangail. 
Some men from the village also visit him/her. It is considered safe to visit a hijra as there is no 
risk of pregnancy and provides various ways of sexual act. Men can have oral and anal sex with a 
hijra in exchange for 10-20 tk. Men learned these from blue films. This is why it is called English 
kam (the English act). There is also a house inside the forest area where sex exchange happens 
with the backing of local administration. Mostly rich people have access there. 
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The household survey showed that among 324 contraceptive users 
only 10 couples were using condoms. In addition, an ethnic difference 
was found in the use of contraception showing proportionately higher 
condom use among Garos compared to Bengalis. (I will come back to 
this point later in this section). An ethnic difference was also profound in 
terms of the use of natural methods among Garos, which is primarily 
male dependent. Garo men and women regardless of their economic 
status and level of education showed their preference for natural meth-
ods48. Garo couples receive a compulsory training from the Church be-
fore their marriage. During this training they receive training about natu-
ral methods with a booklet called “bibaho porichoy” (Introduction to 
marriage). This booklet makes a difference between “birth control” and 
“birth regulation” and prohibits any “unnatural” birth control methods 
including partial sexual intercourse (withdrawal), prevention of concep-
tion (gorvo nirodh), sterilisation (bondhakoron) and abortion (gor-
vonash) (Mohapatro 1975:250). However, it permits “birth regulation” 
through following the “safe period” due to socio-economic and health 
reasons. If the menstrual cycle is more or less between 28 to 32 days, 
counting from the first day of menstruation, the middle 10 to 21 days is 
considered risk period. Before and after that period till the next men-
struation is considered safe period. 
However, women’s narratives varied greatly on how they practiced 
the natural method. For example some older generation women said, 
“My husband didn’t come to me before 22 days after menstruation”. 
Other women said, “After 10 days of my menstruation, my husband 
came to me on uneven days (bijor diney), like day 11, 13, 15, 17, 19 & 
21, not on even days. After the 21 days have passed there were no re-
strictions”. 
In discussions a number of Garo women mentioned that, “Natural 
method doesn’t cost anything, it is free. We can save money from con-
traception. We feel comfortable following this method”. However, this 
was not a fool proof method. Many women also mentioned about the 
miscalculation of their safe period leading to unwanted pregnancy. The 
case of my highly educated Garo participant Godhuli is a good example 
of this. 
                                                 
48 Natural method was also mentioned by older generation Bengali women. Among Bengalis 
natural method also includes withdrawal. 
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Godhuli is a high school teacher, and wife of an educated Garo 
leader. She is 37 years old, a mother of four children. In her words: 
We received training from the missionary on natural contraception. We 
followed that method from the beginning. We planned our second child 
five years after our first child. We also planned to have our third child five 
years after the second one. But we did a miscalculation. I couldn’t remem-
ber the exact day of my menstruation. The third child was born one and a 
half years after the second one. After the third child was born, I tried pills. 
But I felt dizzy and gained weight. Since our fourth daughter was born we 
are combining natural methods with condoms. 
We don’t use condoms every day. But we follow safe period. We only use 
it during the risky period. Having the knowledge of safe period made it 
easy to use condoms and to avoid the side effect from modern contracep-
tion. (Interview, Godhuli, Garo, Gachhabari, 6 August 2008). 
While the Church rejects modern family planning methods in the 
form of intervening in the natural functions of the body, condoms seem 
to be an acceptable form of contraception among Garos. This explains 
the relatively proportionately higher use of natural method and condom 
use among Garos compared to Bengalis (although it should be noted 
that the numbers are small, at only 7 per cent even among Garos). Due 
to the fact that couples have to attend this compulsory training pro-
gramme together, both men and women believed in this. However, fur-
ther discussions revealed that educated Garos are better capable of fol-
lowing the training and keeping track of women’s menstrual cycle, while 
illiterate/low educated Garos often make miscalculations. In addition 
well-off Garos could afford to use condoms to avoid “accidents” during 
risky period, but poor Garos mostly relied on natural methods. 
5.2.2 Women’s contraceptive practice 
Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews revealed women’s pref-
erence for the pill over any other contraceptive methods. The main rea-
son for the preference is due to women’s association with regular men-
struation. Women anonymously mentioned: 
The pill is the best contraceptive method. No other contraceptive method 
can regulate the menstruation other than the pills. (FDG, female group, 6 
March 2008). 
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However, in discussions a number of women mentioned a quality dif-
ference between the government-supplied pills (Shukhi) and the pills that 
are available in the market. A number of women complained of dizziness 
and nauseous feeling while using Shukhi pills and felt better when they 
used pills (such as Nordate and Femicon) from BRAC, or from the local 
pharmacy. But they have to pay for it. 
Trying to understand the difference between government supplied 
and other contraceptive pills that are available in the market, I found 
contradictory statements among key informants regarding the quality of 
government supply free Shukhi pills. One of my key informants ex-
plained:  
In the Shukhi pill, the Oestrogen and Progesterone level is not adjusted 
according to the menstrual cycle, rather it contains a constant high level of 
those components. In the absence of a health check-up prior to the use of 
contraception, this might cause problems for women having high blood 
pressure (Key informant interview, representative, Engender Health, 
Dhaka, 4 May 2008). 
In contrast, another key informant mentioned: 
There is no quality difference between government supplied pills and the 
pills that are available in the market. The price varies due to the fact that 
one brand is subsidised by the government. If it wouldn’t be subsidised 
there would not be any price difference. Different price does not mean 
that the quality is different. They are produced by the same manufacturer 
(Key informant interview, representative, maternal and child health unit, 
Gov, Dhaka, 26 December 2014). 
During key informant interview with the representative of Social Mar-
keting Company (SMC), I learned that different kinds of contraceptive 
pills are available in the market for different groups of women according 
to their capacity to pay. In the view of the representative: 
Actually, for Social Marketing one of our strategies is to segment the 
population. So we would have a pill for the low-income population, the 
Femicon pill is for the lower segment of the market. Then we have an-
other pill for the upper segment of the market, the Nordic 28. There is 
also a pill from the government sector, which is free of cost. All of our 
products are priced and branded for different segments of the market. We 
use commercial marketing techniques, but everything is for the benefit of 
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the population (Key informant interview, representative, Social Marketing 
Company, Dhaka, 19 May 2008). 
Despite these contradictory opinions of different key informants, dis-
cussions with women from the three ethnic communities highlighted the 
side effects from pills provided by the subsidised family planning pro-
gramme. 
Consequences and Use of Multiple methods 
During discussions women often mentioned that due to side-effects they 
would switch between methods. To give an example, Afroza, a thirty-five 
year old Bengali woman, mother of three children shared her experience 
describing: 
I used free pills for a long time. Since injectables became freely available at 
the community clinic, I started taking it. I choose to take injections be-
cause I couldn’t keep my head straight while taking government Shukhi 
pills. If I can’t hold my head straight how can I maintain my shongshar 
(household)? However, after switching to injectables, my menstruation 
stopped. I feel like a pregnant woman (nauseous). The body has its own 
rules. If menstruation stops, it creates problem inside the body. At this 
moment, I am taking pills from BRAC to regulate my menstruation. After 
some time, I will switch back to injectables again. I will continue like this. 
(Interview, Afroza, Bengali, Gachhabari, 14 May 2008). 
Afroza can’t afford to buy pills from BRAC on a regular basis. That is 
why she decided to switch between free injectables and combine it with 
pills from the private sector to minimise the cost and the side–effect of 
injectables. 
Convenience was another consideration for several women to switch 
from pills to injectables. Women have to take pills every day, sometimes 
they forget to take it. Among my fifty participants, only one mentioned 
that her husband reminded her every night to take her pills. A reminder 
could have helped many others to take pills regularly. In any case, in-
jectables for three months seem to be a good alternative to many 
women. But it comes with side-effects. Similar to Afroza, two other 
women in the village were creative enough to combine injectables with 
pills, and a few other women switched to Norplant. The case of Rupali is 
discussed here as an example. 
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Rupali is a 28 years old landless Bengali woman and a mother of two 
children. Her husband is a rickshaw van puller. They decided not to have 
any children anymore. However, finding the right method and managing 
the side-effects of contraception is still a struggle. In her words: 
I didn’t use any method immediately after my marriage. Within a year my 
first child was born. After that I started to take pills. But sometimes forgot 
to take it. I became pregnant for the second time within a year after the 
first child was born. After the second child I took injections for 7 years 
straight. But injection stops menstruation. I feel sick. 
My husband and I do not want to have any children. But my husband is 
afraid of doing a vasectomy; that is why I inserted Norplant (Shami pod-
hoti doray, tai nijei kathi voira ashlam). After the insertion I menstruated 
twice, after that my menstruation stopped for ever. I feel pain in my whole 
body and can’t sleep at night. I feel suffocation (oshthir oshthir lagey). A 
few days ago I felt quite weak and my husband got saline and sleeping pills 
from the local pharmacy. I talked to the health worker who took me to the 
hospital to insert the Norplant, she said even if the sticks are removed 
from my arm, it is not going to solve my complaints. Because once in-
serted it is already dissolved in my whole body. 
I received 75 tk during insertion and 50 tk during a follow up visit. I was 
told that I would receive 50 tk every month after the insertion. However, a 
return trip to the Thana health complex already costs 50 tk, it is not worth 
the effort, so I didn’t go to the hospital anymore. (Interview, Rupali, Ben-
gali, Gachhabari, 21 July 2008). 
Rupali inserted her implant six months before our conversation. Her 
story demonstrates that switching from one mode of contraception to 
the other doesn’t necessarily solve the problem of side-effects; women 
continue to experience similar or ever worse type of side-effects. 
Narratives of women reveal trying different strategies to deal with 
side effects. Ramisa’s case provides a good summary to illustrate this. 
Ramisa is a 30 year old Bengali housewife and a mother of two daughters 
10 and 4. Her husband is a day labourer. She shared her contraceptive 
experience: 
After my first child was born I took Pills (maya bori) for five years 
straight. Then I stopped and had my second child. I have developed white 
discharge from using pills for a long time. People say injection reduces 
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white discharge that is why I decided to switch to injections. But I didn’t 
menstruate for three months. Injections are also not always available at the 
satellite clinic. Women also had to pay 20 tk for the injections at the satel-
lite clinic. 
The health worker told me if I would take Norplant, I didn’t have to worry 
for five years. But after the insertion my menstruation stopped. I tried 
birth control pills for a month. After finishing all the white pills, I took red 
pills, but menstruation didn’t come. My husband also bought 2 tablets 
from the local pharmacy describing the symptoms, but didn’t help. I am 
planning on going to the hospital soon with the health worker. (Interview, 
Ramisa, Bengali, Gachhabari, 29 July 2008). 
Women’s experience of side-effects of implant varied significantly. 
Some women complained that their menstruation stopped, while some 
other women complained of constant menstruation, affecting both their 
wellbeing, their ability to perform their household responsibilities and 
conjugal relationships. The story of Boishaki, a thirty eight year old Ben-
gali woman, haunted me for quite a while. Boishaki shared her miserable 
story: 
We are poor. We already have two children. We can’t feed them properly. 
Two years ago we decided not to have children anymore. I went to the 
UHC and had Norplant inserted. From the first month on, I have con-
stant menstruation. I went to the UHC with the health worker and begged 
the doctor to remove my Norplant (kathi). The doctor told me he will not 
remove it whether I live or die. We are poor we can’t afford to buy sani-
tary napkins from the market. We use old pieces of cloth during menstrua-
tion. We have to wash it, dry it and reuse it. If it rains it doesn’t dry prop-
erly. It always feels messy and smelly. My husband left me and married a 
second wife. Private doctors demand money to remove the implant. My 
husband doesn’t bother to pay for the doctor as he already married to a 
second wife. I’m living my life in hell. (Interview, Boishaki, Bengali, Gach-
habari, 7 May 2008).  
Boishaki’s testimony shows that prolonged menstruation (which was 
considered a problem by men during FDG) due to the side effect of us-
ing hormonal contraception makes women vulnerable in terms of conju-
gal relationship. Another study found how a woman attempted to com-
mit suicide, in response to domestic violence against her, because of her 
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inability to provide the necessary post-harvest labour due to excessive 
bleeding following her contraception use (Kabeer 1994a:235). 
In the absence of proper management of side effects, although Boi-
shaki didn’t receive support from her husband, Shumi, a thirty seven year 
old Bengali woman, mother of three children who inserted Norplant five 
years ago, was supported by her husband for the removal after she has 
been refused at the UHC. Shumi shared her experience saying: 
Right after inserting Norplant, I began to menstruate constantly. It never 
stopped. Doctors at the Upazila Health Complex told me that it is not 
possible to take it out before the five years of expiry date. Once inserted it 
should stay in the body for five years. But our conjugal life was going 
down the drain and my husband became tired of it. My husband took me 
to a private doctor and removed the Norplant. We paid five times more to 
remove it than what I received during the insertion. However, I remained 
sick for quite a while. It is only recently I feel better after the validity of the 
Norplant has expired. (Interview, Shumi, Bengali, Gachhabari, 18 May 
2008). 
In total eight women were using Norplant in Gachhabari for a dura-
tion between 2-24 months during this study. All of the five that I inter-
viewed mentioned moderate to severe complications. 
Despite experiencing side-effects, the above discussion shows that 
women are not only passive victims but show their resilience and try to 
manage their side-effects by using resources at their disposal. They de-
ploy a number of strategies by: switching between contraception, com-
bining different methods, seeking help from the health workers or their 
husbands and by sending their husbands to get medicine from the local 
pharmacy to treat the symptoms. 
One glaring difference in contraception practice in terms of ethnicity 
is Garo women’s resistance towards injectables and implants. Discus-
sions with a number of Garo men and women reveal that Garos have 
less trust in government family planning methods. All 31 injectables us-
ers and eight implant users were mainstream Bengali women. 
Two Garo women accepted permanent contraception in the mid 
1970s, since Pills and condoms were not available around that time. The 
decision to take permanent contraception was linked to the economic 
condition of the household at that time. A 53 year old Garo woman, Ta-
lope’s describes that period: 
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Mandis used to do jhum cultivation before. It required clearing the forest 
for cultivation, which required more family members. Nobody cared how 
many children they had at that time. After banning jhum cultivation, life 
became difficult. We used to collect potatoes, boil them with salt to eat. 
We took care of the forest for our own survival. When we collected pota-
toes we made sure that the plant stays alive so that it grows more potatoes. 
When Bengalis started to collect potatoes they uproot the plants. Potatoes 
became less available. We could have something to eat for one meal not 
for the other (ekbela khailey arek bela khaite pari nai). I also collected 
hoti (a kind of corn) to make barley to feed my children. I chopped trees 
and carried twigs from the forest and sold them in the market. I already 
had two daughters and a son. Two later children died. One child was born 
on a Thursday, started to cry and never stopped, died on the following 
Tuesday evening. The child turned yellow, black and red. His tongue got 
stuck on the upper pallet. My husband called a Kaviraj (traditional healer), 
who gave him herbal medicine, closed the house from evil spirits (ghor 
bondho korlo), but nothing worked out. A similar thing happened with the 
other child as well. I couldn’t bear to see the sufferings of my children 
anymore. I heard about sterilisation operations from a Bengali health 
worker. I consulted two of my sisters and three of us have had the sterili-
sation operation done. I didn’t even ask permission from my husband. 
When he found out he was upset. But I made him understand (ami tarey 
bujhaichi). (Interview, Talope, Garo, Gachhabari, 13 August 2008). 
Due to the banning of jhum cultivation (which I will explain in Chap-
ter Seven in details), elder Garo women faced livelihood constraints. A 
lack of prospect for the future generation pushed some elder Garos to 
accept permanent family planning. 
Talope worked hard with her husband. Together they cleared up some 
jungle for cultivation, gradually they have bought some land from other 
Garos and educated their children. Now her daughters are working in a 
beauty parlour in the capital and her son is learning carpentry in Madhu-
pur. Talope’s case helps to understand how contraception decision is 
deeply related to the economic and material condition of the households. 
The voices of men and women from the Bengali and Garo communities 
presented above contradicts the assumptions and interpretations in the poli-
cies (discussed in Chapter Three) of poor women’s homogeneous need for 
long-acting contraception. Besides convenience, many women accepted long-
acting contraception due to the side-effects of previous contraception. 
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Women are not only experiencing the similar or worse side effects, since they 
have accepted implant, but they were also not aware of the side-effects they 
have encountered. This needs to be realised to interpret women’s practice of 
long-acting contraception as “preference” (which policy claims). Garo 
women’s dependency on natural methods also cannot be interpreted only in 
terms of ideological restrictions or cultural norms, but also the cost of the pill 
from the private market and condoms, which they prefer. 
Perceived problems in the existing family planning programme 
Discussions and narratives of men and women revealed a number of 
limitations in the existing family planning programme. A focus group 
discussion of women from mixed ethnic communities revealed that 
women lack information on how to use pills properly. During a body 
mapping exercise while women were drawing how pills work as a contra-
ceptive method on women’s body, their perceptions were documented. 
The drawing read: “contraceptive pills turn men’s semen (birjo) into wa-
ter” (Drawing 5.1), which prevents women from getting pregnant. 
Drawing 5.1 
Female body mapping 
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Source: Drawn by participants during FGD, female, 25 April 2008. 
 
Due to this perception, during an in-depth interview an illiterate 
woman mentioned taking pills only on the days she had intercourse. 
When her husband migrated to the cities or to another places to work 
for a few days as a seasonal worker, she skipped taking the pills. In the 
absence of any knowledge on how pills work illiterate women couldn’t 
justify taking pills every day, while they aren’t having sex. Two other 
women waited for their husbands to return home after their seasonal 
work to buy new pills from the pharmacy, while the old strip was fin-
ished. 
It was further revealed that women’s perception about iron pills in the 
strip of contraceptive pills made women skip those. Women thought the 
purpose of the iron pills was to regulate menstruation. Normally women 
should have started taking iron pills from the strip when the white pills 
were finished and continue taking them until they were finished and then 
start taking white pills again. However, after taking one or two iron pills 
if the menstruation starts, women stopped taking iron pills anymore. 
When the menstruation was over after taking a purifying bath (pak 
kosol), women restarted taking the white pills from a new strip. 
The local health worker was aware of such misperceptions of women 
regarding the use of pills. During a discussion with a BRAC health 
worker, she said: 
Illiterate women do not realise the importance of taking iron tablets. 
Women also don’t have proper information about what to do if they for-
get to take the pill for a day or two. If they forget to take pills and become 
pregnant they blame the pills for their unwanted pregnancy (Service pro-
vider’s interview, BRAC, Gachhabari, 13 July 2008). 
Health workers further emphasised that skipping the iron tablets 
make women anaemic. Women however, put the blame for their lack of 
information on how to use pills properly on the government policy shift 
from door–step to clinic based service delivery. During discussions it 
became apparent that family planning fieldworkers used to go to visit 
houses to distribute pills and explain how to use them. Now women 
have to go to the Satellite Clinic to get pills or injectables, which de-
mands extra time. Women are often busy with their household work and 
forget the opening date, which is once in a month. Family Welfare Assis-
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tants (FWAs) at the Satellite Clinic don’t have the time to explain how to 
use pills properly anymore. 
During my visits at the Satellite Clinic, the supply of pills was insuffi-
cient. Some women received them, some didn’t. Three women were 
even given one packet of pills containing strips for three months. They 
were recommended to visit the Satellite Clinic in the following month to 
receive more pills. 
In another focus group discussion organised with men of mixed eth-
nic groups, their perceptions towards family planning programme 
emerged as summarised below: 
 The main problem of current family planning programme is that 
men or women who are using these methods are never informed 
about the side-effects. 
 Nobody knows what Norplant, copper T or vasectomy is. Men have 
a vague idea about these methods. Men who have done a vasectomy 
couldn’t explain where/which vein or tube has been removed or 
tied off. A male participant mentioned that his semen tube (birjo 
nail) is taken away so that semen cannot come out anymore, but 
men are not well informed before undergoing this method. When 
men were asked what happens with the semen after vasectomy, their 
response was that semen turns into water inside the body and comes 
out during urination. 
 Women who were using implant were told that three/four/five thin 
copper sticks are to be inserted under the skin of the upper arm for 
three, four or five years which is removable after use. Nobody could 
explain how these small sticks are going to prevent women from 
getting pregnant. A general idea was that these sticks are going to 
destroy female eggs. Other idea was that these sticks turn men´s se-
men into water during intercourse. 
 IUD is not used so much in the village and participants had no clue 
about that method. The government clinic is mainly giving emphasis 
on Norplant. 
 Norplant has health consequences. Women who use Norplant can’t 
do heavy work. They often suffer from sickness. Their health dete-
riorates gradually. 
 To take a permanent method one has to go to the hospital with a 
health worker, it involves difficulties (jhamela). 
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 After vasectomy men’s sexual power deteriorates. They can’t enjoy 
sex like before. 
 Those who use Norplant or vasectomy are teased socially. It is be-
lieved that they have lost their sexual power. 
 Female contraception makes women anaemic, it causes irregular 
menstruation and women lose their eye sight. (FGD, men, 17 may 
2008). 
These statements from focus groups suggest that men and women 
not only lack information how to use contraception properly, they are 
also not informed about the side effects of contractions they “chose”. 
They also perceive side-effects as a package that comes along with a par-
ticular contraception, not being able to realise the possibilities to solve 
them. 
Privacy and confidentiality are not ensured in the way family planning 
programme operates. In discussions with a number of men and women, 
going to the upazila health complex for Norplant and vasectomy with a 
health worker was also perceived as a problem. During discussions it be-
came apparent that to get vasectomy done, men always have to go to the 
UHC with a government health worker (male health assistant who is re-
sponsible for child immunisation programme in the service area). If men 
go to the UHC alone to keep this a secret, they are rejected. In a discus-
sion in response to the rejection of men in case they are not accompa-
nied by a health worker, the family planning officer at the UHC, said: 
In the past some vasectomy clients were never found back. Because of the 
monitoring and follow-up, clients should always come to the UHC with a 
health worker from his area (Service provider’s interview, Family Planning 
Office, UHC, Madhupur, 30 July 2008). 
Bearing in mind that the FGD among men revealed that vasectomy 
clients are teased socially, it is quite understandable that those vasectomy 
clients didn’t want to be traced back for follow-up. However, an anony-
mous Family Welfare Visitor (FWV) further mentioned that these un-
written rules are created to serve the purpose of health workers to meet 
their targets, saying: 
By imposing these unwritten rules fieldworkers get the chance to reach 
their target. If the fieldworkers can’t reach their target their salary is with-
held (Service provider’s interview, FWV, UHC Madhupur, 30 July 2008). 
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This shows how setting priorities and targets in the policy are opera-
tionalised in practice, which actually works against achievement of the 
targets. The Family Planning Officer at the UHC was aware of the 
stigma related to vasectomy, which discourages male clients to accept 
sterilisation. However, instead of eliminating the barrier of going to the 
UHC with a local health worker, he tried to emphasise the difference 
between vasectomy and non-scalpel vasectomy (NSD). Whatever the 
differences might be between vasectomy and NSD in terms of medical 
procedures, going to the UHC accompanied by a local health worker 
puts a man into risk of being the subject of community gossip (seen in 
the case of Jamil Miah and Shuvas). This situation shows a contradiction 
between follow-up and counselling and privacy and confidentiality of the 
“client”. 
Another contradiction between the policy priority and men’s need 
was expressed in terms of the cost of condoms. A policy shift towards 
long acting contraception (injectables, implant) along with permanent 
(sterilisation and vasectomy) contraception created dependency on the 
private sector for short acting contraception such as pills and condoms. 
For instance, condoms which were previously distributed free from the 
family planning programme are not distributed free anymore. Condoms 
are available in local pharmacies. BRAC health workers also sell contra-
ceptive pills and condoms and get a commission on the sale. During an 
interview, a BRAC representative justified imposing a cost for pills and 
condoms, saying: 
If we would not have taken any money for contraception from the client it 
would not matter for BRAC. But women would not value the service. 
Women received plenty of birth control pills and condoms from the gov-
ernment in the past. But they didn’t use them properly. When they buy 
“Nordate”, which costs them 30 tk (app. € 0, 30) and “Femicon” which 
costs 16 tk (appx. € 0, 16) and per condom costs 2 tk, then they use them 
properly. When condoms were given for free by the family planning pro-
gramme, children used to blow them as balloons. (Service provider’s inter-
view, BRAC field worker, Gachhabari, 13 July 2008). 
Despite being no longer free, it seems that small children still play 
with them as balloons. While two BRAC health workers were promoting 
small family norm among women in a group meeting, children were busy 
playing with condoms (Pictures 5.2 & 5.3) a few meters away from them. 
However, in a context where male use of contraception is already signifi-
168 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
cantly low, stopping free distribution of condoms has put a further bar-
rier to pay for condoms on their acceptance. In addition, due to the fact 
that Garos are more inclined to use condoms, this affects them more. 
Pictures 5.2 & 5.3 
Kids playing with condoms (above) Health worker promoting FP (below) 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
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We have seen that women highlighted side-effects from government 
supplied pills; a number of women mentioned their inability to afford 
pills from the private sector, which they would have preferred. Women 
also perceived the supply of contraception as a problem in the family 
planning programme. I mentioned earlier that during my visit to the Sat-
ellite Clinic, the supply of pills and injectables was insufficient. In addi-
tion, women who came to receive an injection for the first time were re-
jected. The FWV explained: 
Women who do not have any children yet, are not given injections as a 
contraceptive method, they can only receive pills49. Women who have at 
least one child and wish to start injections as a birth control method 
should come to the Satellite Clinic to receive the injection while they are 
menstruating (Service provider’s interview, FWV, Satellite Clinic, Gachha-
bari village, 5 July 2008). 
She further explained: 
As a side-effect, injectables can sometimes make women infertile. That is 
why it is not given to women who don’t have any children yet. Women 
who have at least one child should come during their menstruation to 
make sure that they are not already pregnant before starting an Injection. 
(Service provider’s interview, FWV, Satellite Clinic, Gachhabari village, 5 
July 2008).  
However, the Satellite Clinic opens once a month. The chance that a 
woman will be menstruating during the opening day of the Satellite 
Clinic is small. If women wish to start Injections during menstruation as 
suggested, and if it is not the opening day of the Satellite Clinic women 
can get the service from Smiling Sun, another NGO in the neighbouring 
village and pay 20 tk (2 euro cent). While the service at the Satellite Clinic 
is supposed to be free, discussions with women revealed that women 
were also charged 20 tk (appx. € 0.20) for injectables at the Satellite 
clinic. During an interview with the FWA at the Satellite clinic when I 
asked the reason for that payment, she informed that due to the shortage 
of the government supply, FWA had to arrange injectables from an 
                                                 
49 However, supply of pills weren’t sufficient enough. 
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NGO and provide those to their “clients”.50 Otherwise women would 
have missed their regular injections. However, women who were not 
able to pay didn’t receive their regular injectables. In any case women 
weren’t charged during my visit to the Satellite Clinic. Although women 
were offering money to the FWA in front of me, the FWA told women 
they do not have to pay, because government supply has been re-
assured. I wondered whether women were charged after all in my ab-
sence at a later stage. During an interview with a key policy stakeholder, I 
understood there was a national level problem with the supply of in-
jectables, as they were imported. (Key informant interview, representa-
tive AL, 12 December 2014). 
Contradictions between health care provider’s and women’s prefer-
ences were also evident. The example of Kohinoor can illustrate this 
point. Kohinoor is a forty-two-year old Bengali woman, a mother of four 
children from a landless poor family. She was using injections (which are 
effective for three months only) and wanted to take Norplant and be 
safe for five years, but she was rejected. She described: 
I would have preferred to take Norplant. Then I wouldn’t have to think 
for five years. I even went to the hospital (UHC) with the health worker. 
But the doctors refused to give me implant. The doctor told me it is not 
allowed by the government to give Norplant to any women who already 
have four children. The doctor insisted that I would accept a permanent 
method. I left the Upazila Health Complex and continued to take injec-
tions from the Satellite Clinic. (Interview, Kohinoor, Bengali, Gachhabari, 
14 July 2008). 
Kohinoor was afraid of undergoing a sterilisation operation. There-
fore, she wanted to use Norplant and be safe for five years. She thinks 
after five years she might have started her menopause and then she 
wouldn’t have to use any method any more. However, the health pro-
vider didn’t show any respect for Kohinoor’s choice for contraception. 
During an interview, the Family Planning Officer responded to this 
case saying: 
I suggest that women who have two living children take permanent meth-
ods. If they disagree then I advise them to take Norplant. We are told (by 
                                                 
50 In the interview with the FWA and also in the policy document, women are always referred to 
as clients. 
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the authority) not to give Norplant to women who have three living chil-
dren, but still we are giving the method to them. But we don’t provide 
Norplant to women who already have four living children. They can only 
receive permanent methods (Service provider’s interview, Family planning 
Office, UHC, Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
Referring to Norplant, the Family Planning Officer further men-
tioned: 
These methods are not for the rich. Rich are motivated themselves. Poor 
clients need to be motivated to use other methods than only pills. Other-
wise we will not have clients that use different methods. Everyone would 
do the same (Service provider’s interview, Family Planning Office, UHC, 
Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
It appears that despite the availability of a range of contraception, 
they are not accessible to all women. Young, newly married women are 
given pills. Women at least having one child are given injections and im-
plants. Older women having at least two or more living children are 
“motivated” to use permanent methods. The above example shows that 
women may perceive this as contrary to their choice.  
The family planning programme was also perceived as gender biased. 
In discussions, it appears that female field workers are from the commu-
nity, and therefore share common cultural norms. A common sentiment 
shared by many women can be summarised in the narrative of Fouzia, a 
twenty one year old woman, who said: 
Fieldworkers also tell us that men’s methods are not good. They make 
men weak. Men are the one who have to do the heavy work. Women 
don’t have to do heavy work like men. That’s why fieldworkers motivate 
only women to use contraception. (Interview, Fouzia, Bengali, Gachha-
bari, 18 September 2008). 
Further discussion with a female field worker reveal that female 
fieldworkers do not have the mandate to motivate men. In a discussion 
with the local field worker when her daughter-in-law was suffering from 
side-effects of pills, when I asked her why her son is not using any con-
traception the fieldworker with great frustration said, “There is nobody 
to talk to men and make them understand to use contraception”. She 
further acknowledged that she can’t talk about contraception with her 
own son and convince him to accept male contraception. 
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BRAC health workers also organise group meetings to encourage 
family planning, but men are not involved in those group meetings or 
motivational work either. A BRAC health worker mentioned: 
We organise one group meeting every month in the village among 20-25 
women. Men are also invited to attend these meetings. But they never 
come. Men are not motivated to use contraception. They don’t care. (Ser-
vice provider’s interview, BRAC, Gachhabari, 13 July 2008). 
While the health worker blames men as being ignorant about family 
planning programme, it is linked to the exclusion of poor men in the way 
family planning programme has been designed and implemented. These 
motivational meetings are organised in someone’s house or in an open 
space during noon, when men are not around, which of course allows 
women to move freely in the village to attend these meetings. 
The evidence thus suggests that the contraceptive practice among 
Bengali and Garo communities in Gachhabari is shaped by the local con-
struction of masculinity and femininity and its link to different types of 
contraception as well as national policy priorities, providing access to 
certain types of subsidised contraception and putting barriers to other 
types by imposing fees and by including/excluding certain members of 
the households. 
5.3 The experience of unwanted pregnancy 
Given the constraints and opportunities in the family planning pro-
gramme discussed above, the following section discusses women’s ex-
perience of unwanted pregnancy and how women deal with it.  
One perception related to unwanted pregnancy is muta pet, which 
means becoming pregnant sooner after giving birth to a child. After the 
birth of a child, normally women stop menstruating for several months 
to years. Women wait for the menstruation to start again before starting 
any contraception to prevent the next pregnancy. But unfortunately 
many women become pregnant again without starting menstruation fol-
lowing a childbirth. Parboti, a twenty five year old Bengali woman, 
mother of two children shared her experience of unwanted pregnancy: 
After my first child was born, I haven’t re-started menstruating, but be-
came pregnant again before planning anything. I wanted to abort the foe-
tus. My husband didn’t fully agree, but I went to the hospital anyway with 
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a health worker. However, the nurse told me that I didn’t have enough 
blood in my body. Even if I could have arranged to transfuse blood, still it 
would be risky. Later I decided to continue my pregnancy, but I would 
have preferred not to have another child so quickly after my first child. 
(Interview, Parboti, Bengali, Gachhabari, 11 April 2008). 
Such unwanted pregnancy due to muta pet points to the absence of 
family planning counselling and contraceptive planning after child deliv-
ery. This link to the lack of family planning counselling is missing in the 
policy discourse that links “unwanted pregnancy” with short-acting 
“contraceptive method failure” and justifies a shift to long-acting contra-
ception for the poor (as discussed in Chapter Three). 
Another perception is related to misuse or irregular use of modern 
contraception. In discussions, women often mentioned they forget to 
take pills. Women’s narratives also considered unavailability of free con-
traception as method failure. According to Jaigun (a thirty two year old 
woman, mother of three children), her last child was born due to contra-
ceptive method failure (podthotir bhuley). She explained: 
I took pills for a long time. Recently I switched to injections as they be-
came available at the Satellite Clinic. But after a while it wasn’t free any-
more. Women had to pay 20 tk for injectables. I missed one injection and 
became pregnant. (Interview, Jaigun, Bengali, Gachhabari, 6 June 2008). 
This narrative is interesting since poor women redefine “contracep-
tive method failure”, as a failure of the public health care system to en-
sure supply of subsidised injectables for the poor. 
Another perception was related to pregnancy beyond socially ex-
pected norms, which includes not only pregnancy of unmarried women, 
but also old age pregnancy51. The case of Phul Banu (a forty nine year 
old Bengali woman and a mother of five children) can explain this: 
I was taking birth control pills for many years. After using the pill for such 
a long time my menstruation stopped. I thought I might have reached my 
menopause and not be fertile anymore. As soon as I stopped taking pills, I 
become pregnant. We had already married off our two daughters. I dis-
cussed it with my husband. He said, “at this age we are supposed to play 
with our grand children. If you give birth to another child, people will 
                                                 
51 This phenomenon is known as “grandmother complex” among educated people in the cities, I 
couldn’t find a Bangla term for that. 
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laugh at us”. I also felt it would be embarrassing to face our son-in-laws 
with my big belly. (Interview, Phul Banu, Bengali, Gachhabari, 9 August 
2008). 
Further discussion with Phul Banu revealed that sexuality at an old 
age is stigmatised in the community. Therefore, she committed a self-
induced abortion (explained later in this chapter). 
While official discourse around family planning mainly defines un-
wanted pregnancy in terms of unmet need for modern contraception, the 
above narratives provide an alternative discourse of unwanted pregnancy 
linked to the local cultural context and the absence of adequate family 
planning counselling after childbirth. The following section explores 
women’s experience of using MR/abortion to terminate their unwanted 
pregnancy. 
5.3.1 Use/abuse of MR services: husband’s consent, cost and 
time limit 
Although there is a distinction between abortion and MR52 in terms of 
policy (Akhter 2001), women simply refer to it as removal of a foetus 
(pet phela, baccha nosto or gorvo nosto). A mix of reasons/perceptions 
emerges about the use/misuse of MR services in case of unwanted preg-
nancy. One major reason is related to the time limit. Individual women’s 
testimonies, personal observation and discussions with service providers 
reveal that although services are legalised up to 10 weeks of pregnancy, 
in practice the service is not available at the UHC beyond 8 weeks. An 
anonymous FWV at the UHC mentioned: 
We have cannula to perform MR till 10 weeks of pregnancy and our 
FWVs are capable of doing MR up to 10 weeks of pregnancy. However, 
due to some unwritten rules at the UHC, MR is not done beyond 8 weeks 
(Service provider’s interview, FWA, UHC, Madhupur, 5 July 2008). 
In contrast, in a discussion with the medical official at the UHC, he 
mentioned: 
                                                 
52 To deal with unwanted pregnancy, Menstrual Regulation (MR) service has been integrated in 
the family planning programme and the service is made available at all major public hospitals and 
health facilities within 10 weeks of pregnancy in 1989 (Akhter 1996a; Akhter and Rider 1996; 
Akhter 2001). The MR Service is available at the UHC in Madhupur. 
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Women beyond 8 weeks of pregnancy are refused because the logistics 
aren’t available at the UHC to perform MR beyond that stage. (Service 
provider’s interview, Maternal Health and Child Care Centre, UHC, 
Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
Due to this restriction, MR service is not widely used at the UHC. On 
an average only 2 to 3 women are reported to use MR services (within 8 
weeks of conception) in a month. The UHC didn’t disclose the informa-
tion how many women are refused every month due to the time limit. 
Concerned persons mentioned that mostly poor women go to the gov-
ernment hospital to perform an MR, because due to their poverty an-
other child would be a burden for them. However, illiterate women are 
often too late to receive a formal MR service. 
Further discussions with a number of women and local field workers 
reveal that although the service is officially free, women are charged a 
price. Women beyond eight weeks of pregnancy are charged between 
500-1,000 tk, (approx. 5-10 Euros) depending on the duration of their 
pregnancy to get the service. In that case the service is done at home of 
the health care provider. This shows various sanctioned and unsanc-
tioned ways of service provision where the boundaries between public 
and private health care provider are blurred. Another study (Rashid 
2011) also found a similar trend in health care provision in other areas of 
Bangladesh. 
Husband’s consent appears to be a factor for the limited use of MR 
service. According to the official rules the information that is required to 
perform an MR is: marital status, number of children, age of the young-
est child, LMP (last menstrual period) and the consent of the husband. 
Although the availability of MR Service at the UHC provided the op-
portunity for married women to use the service, women have to negoti-
ate with their husbands to receive permission. The outcome of the nego-
tiation varies depending on women’s negotiation power. Two cases (Joy 
Banu and Shufia) can illustrate the dynamics of such negotiation. 
Joy Banu is a forty-eight-years old Bengali woman and mother of four 
children. She performed MR twice. The first MR was a two months 
pregnancy and the MR went well. Nine months after the first MR she 
became pregnant again. Her husband didn’t agree with her, to have an-
other MR sooner after the first one. Joy Banu bargained with her hus-
band saying: 
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You are unable to provide food and education (khowa pora) to our four 
living children. You can’t take the children to visit a doctor when they fall 
ill. Why do you want more children? To let them suffer? My husband kept 
quiet and allowed me to perform another MR. (Interview, Joy Banu, Ben-
gali, Gachhabari, 15 July 2008). 
The narratives of Joy Banu show that legalisation of MR and the 
availability of the service provided women the opportunity to negotiate 
in the household. She also used the breadwinner’s norm to her advantage 
to claim her right to use the service. However, not all women have the 
same bargaining position as Joy Banu. 
Joy Banu already had four living children before she went to do her 
first MR. When Shufia (a twenty two year old Bengali woman, mother of 
two children) wanted to terminate her second pregnancy, she was not 
able to negotiate hard. In her words: 
I wanted to abort my second child which was conceived due to contracep-
tive method failure. I was taking pills but forgot to take them regularly. I 
wanted to have a gap of a few years before having my second child. Ini-
tially my husband agreed. He runs a grocery shop; he doesn’t have any 
time to take me to the hospital. He told me if I can arrange with the fe-
male health worker to go to the hospital, I can abort the child. Later he 
changed his mind and said to me, “Why do you want to abort the child? Is 
it from me or from a secret affair (jaira ponda)”? In the end I continued 
my pregnancy. (Interview, Shufia, Bengali, Gachhabari, 3 June 2008). 
These cases highlight how women experience the policy restrictions 
on MR service differently. The negotiation might be affected by many 
factors, such as duration of marriage, intra-spousal communication, 
number of children, reason of MR, health concerns and so on. Husband 
and wife might have different opinion and logic to do or not to do an 
MR, and not all men should be labelled as pro-natal or anti-MR. 
Unmarried women are also officially excluded from access to the MR 
service. However, it seems that women who have money can manoeuvre 
the rules to get the service, albeit at a price. The local fieldworker said, 
If you pay extra money you can get the service, it doesn’t even matter 
whether you are married or not. If the pregnancy is within two months, 
nurses will do it in the hospital. If you develop any problem, you can go 
back to the hospital. Nurses will check you and give medicine or arrange 
to perform a D&C if necessary. If it is beyond two months, they will do it 
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at home. You have to pay more money and the nurses will not take any 
risk if you face any problem. They will tell you, “I told you beforehand af-
ter two months it would be at your risk”. As you took the risk, you would 
have to pay for any treatment for complications. (Service provider’s inter-
view, field worker, Gachhabari, 10 July 2008). 
Due to the restriction on time limit, cost and demand for husband’s 
consent, many women fall back to back-door or unsafe abortion provid-
ers. Those providers neither require any formal registration nor demand 
any consent from the husband. 
5.3.2 Unsafe abortion practices and consequences 
In the focus group discussion among women from mixed ethnic groups, 
illegal abortion appeared to be an open secret. A private clinic and a fe-
male private health practitioner’s chamber were mentioned as common 
abortion providers in the village. Abortion complications can result from 
abortion done by untrained personal, or abortion done in the hospitals 
or clinics in an unhygienic way. The boards shown in Pictures 5.4 and 5.5 
below read: “Name of the practitioner, specialised in female disease and 
delivery, Birth Control injectables are available here” (left), “Anonymous 
Clinic and Hospital” above the Bata (shoe shop) (right). 
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Pictures 5.4 & 5.5 
Unregistered practice (above), poorly maintained private clinic (below) 
  
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
Discussions with a number of women and health providers made it 
apparent that women often choose an unsafe provider due to their in-
 GENDER, ETHNICITY AND CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION PRACTICE IN GACHHABARI 179 
 
ability to pay a high cost at the formal private clinics. Women’s narratives 
reveal that unsafe providers seem to be a good deal in terms of cost. The 
case of Rabeya is a good example to illustrate this. Rabeya is a thirty eight 
year old poor Bengali woman and a mother of four children. She is a 
housewife, her husband is a shop-keeper in Jalchatra bazar. In her words: 
We have already four children due to our (me and my husband’s) igno-
rance. We can’t feed them properly. I started taking injectables. So I was 
not menstruating (due to injectables). Slowly my tummy became thicker 
and thicker and I was having symptoms of pregnancy. By the time I real-
ised it, I was already four months pregnant. Then it took me another 
month to decide for an abortion. I went to the UHC with my sister-in-law 
with the permission of my husband. 
I was refused because my pregnancy was five months old. But a nurse told 
me that it could be done but it would have cost me 500 tk (appx. € 5). I 
couldn’t afford to pay that much. When we left the hospital a broker took 
us (me and my sister-in-law who accompanied me to the UHC) to a fe-
male doctor’s chamber. We agreed for 300 tk and a lady doctor tore my 
panipata (performed an amniotomy) and sent me home. She gave me one 
pill to take when I would arrive home. As soon as I arrived home, the foe-
tus came out with a heavy flow of blood and severe pain. I became fever-
ish. I was half dead for two days. My relatives found out about my situa-
tion and scolded me. Later, they became sympathetic and could not watch 
me die. My brothers took me to the female doctor’s chamber. My brothers 
told the “lady doctor” to think about the consequences if I would die. The 
lady doctor then called a big doctor and arranged to clear my tummy. This 
time she did not charge me any money. My life was saved. I will never do 
this again in my life. (Interview, Rabeya, Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 August 
2008). 
Rabeya’s story highlights a new form of risk that has been emerged 
due to side-effects of injectables. Women could not make a distinction 
between the experience of pregnancy and discontinuation of their regular 
menstruation induced by the long-acting contraception. By the time they 
discover their pregnancy it is beyond the official time limit for MR ser-
vice. 
Further discussions with women and health providers further confirm 
that when women are rejected by formal health care provider, women 
use back-door services from public health providers. An anonymous 
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case of a woman in the village shared by the FWV is an example of this. 
The FWV described: 
One patient came to the UHC to perform an MR. I refused her because 
the duration of her pregnancy was already beyond 12 weeks. Then the lady 
went to a nurse who works at the UHC. The nurse performed an abortion 
at her house secretly in return of money. The lady was send back home 
with serious pain in her abdomen and high fever. After two weeks she 
came back to me and was begging for her life. While doing her Per Vaginal 
(PV) examination, to my surprise she appeared two months pregnant after 
her abortion. The nurse did a partial abortion; half of the dead foetus was 
still inside her womb which was causing serious cramp and fever. I did a 
D&C at the UHC to save her life. In addition, I gave her antibiotics that I 
received as a doctor’s sample from a pharmaceutical company (Service 
provider’s interview, FWV, Satellite Clinic, Gachhabari village, 5 July 
2008). 
The ambiguity around MR policy (discussed in Chapter One) con-
tributes to the misuse of the service. Since MR is incorporated in the 
family planning programme, the Family Welfare Visitors (FWVs) are of-
ficially trained to give MR service in the family planning unit of the 
UHC. However, women often go to the nurses at the maternity section, 
who are neither trained nor officially responsible to perform MR ser-
vices. Nurses strike a deal to do it at home beyond official records. Ra-
beya’s case further illustrates how a network of brokers is active to lead 
women to secret abortion providers. 
Given the official demand for husband’s consent, poor unmarried 
women often fall victim to secret abortion practice. The case of my Garo 
informant Mohua (19 year old during the interview) is an example of 
this. Mohua was made pregnant by her boyfriend when she was 16. Mo-
hua’s grandmother took her to the UHC. Although pre-marital sex is not 
a big deal among Garos, Mohua was denied the service. However, a 
nurse from the UHC agreed to do it secretly at home and demanded 300 
tk (appx. €3). The abortion was not done properly and caused Mohua to 
have serious health problems. She suffers from acute lower abdominal 
pain and severe blood loss during her menstruation. She became very 
weak and sick. With the help of her grandmother she received treatment 
from the missionary hospital and recovered a bit. After a year she was 
married off with the same boyfriend. She feels pain during intercourse 
since her marriage. She became pregnant again at the age of 18. Her 
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pregnancy was complicated. The missionary hospital bore the cost of her 
delivery. She complains of a bad conjugal life due to the problem related 
to her unsafe abortion. Mohua’s case illustrates how restrictive laws put 
unmarried women’s life into risk of unsafe abortion complications. 
During an interview53 with “Dr. Dalia Khan”, whose name was 
mentioned by several women in the village as an illegal abortion pro-
vider behind her private practice, the provider mentioned that she 
doesn’t have any registration with the government. She isn’t also re-
quired to keep any record of her practice for any government moni-
toring or audit. 
She mentioned that poor women often don’t keep track of their men-
strual cycle (also found in Akhter and Khan 1996a). They count their 
menstrual cycle according to the moon cycle (purnima and amabosh-
sha). They wait for two moon cycles to confirm their pregnancy. More-
over, poor women need more time to gather money and to use their so-
cial network to reach the hospital. Therefore, by the time they arrive at 
the hospital their pregnancy is often already beyond 8 weeks. She further 
mentioned: 
Some women try to terminate their pregnancy with abortion pills which 
are now available in the market. But it doesn’t work. After waiting for a 
long time finally they decide to go to the UHC. By that time they are well 
beyond their time limit to use the service at the UHC. After being rejected 
from the hospital they come to my clinic. (Service provider’s interview, 
private practitioner, Madhupur, 17 September 2008). 
She mentioned that married women who already have a young child 
of 7/8 months old and become pregnant again are most desperate to 
terminate their pregnancy. She justified her service arguing: 
Women become so desperate that they cry and fall on my feet. They re-
quest me so much that I feel pity for them. I just rescue them from their 
crisis, sometimes without any money. They don’t want to have a child at 
any cost. If I don’t do it, they’ll go to a TBA or attempt self-induced abor-
tion. They come to me to keep it a secret and I ensure their privacy (Ser-
vice provider’s interview, private practitioner, Madhupur, 17 September 
2008). 
                                                 
53 I explained this particular interview in my methodology chapter in the section on ethical reflec-
tion. 
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She also acknowledged some accidents, but defended herself by say-
ing: 
It is not something that I can see with my eyes. I have to do it only based 
on the feeling of my hands (hater andaj). That is why sometimes some 
part of the foetus can still remain inside. Women also can’t tell the dura-
tion of their pregnancy accurately. That also causes mis-estimation (Service 
provider’s interview, private practitioner, Madhupur, 17 September 2008). 
Poor women can’t afford to do an ultra-sonogram or pregnancy test 
from private diagnostic centres to confirm the duration of their preg-
nancy accurately. Therefore, abortion is done without any diagnostic test, 
only based on Per Vaginal (PV) examination. If something goes wrong 
patients can’t claim anything because there is no registration, no referral, 
no witnesses; everything happens behind the curtain. 
The provider further admitted that she has neither any medical educa-
tion nor any formal training or license to perform MR/abortion. Her 
brother was a medical doctor at the UHC a few years back. She managed 
to get a certificate from her brother as an intern during his job period. 
Then she opened her own clinic next to the hospital. She provides the 
abortion service under cover of maternal health care services. When she 
can’t manage a case her brother who was a medical doctor at the UHC 
and now transferred to another city comes on an emergency call or helps 
her out by prescribing medicine over text message. 
These findings show although the legalisation of MR saved many 
women’s lives from unsafe abortions, back-door and illegal services are 
still causing serious damage to women. Many providers are practicing 
illegally in conditions where abortion is not done properly, without ster-
ile equipment or the providers don’t remove the entire foetus, leading to 
infections and other complications (also found in Azim and Nilufar 
1996; Shameem et al 2004)). In the absence of a strong government 
monitoring system, illegal practices are jeopardising poor women’s health 
and wellbeing. The contradiction in the MR policy that requires hus-
bands consent but it doesn’t require a pregnancy test also appear to con-
tribute to abortion complications. 
Discussions with a number of women provided evidence of tradi-
tional abortion practices in the village. A sharp root of a plant locally 
known as aaigga tita or rosbotika or ubud nengra (the plant and root are 
shown in pictures 5.6 and 5.7) is used for this purpose. 
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Pictures 5.6 & 5.7 
Plant and its root used for induced abortion 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
This practice seems to be in decline and only practiced among poor 
elderly women. Phul Banu, the forty-nine-year old woman and a mother 
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of five children who became pregnant at an old age performed this 
method. In her description: 
The plant is uprooted then washed and a straight root is cut into a piece of 
eight fingers long. The sharp end of the root is inserted into the vagina. 
The other end of the root is tied with a rope and tied with the upper leg 
(thai) to prevent the root from going too deep inside. After inserting the 
root women lie in bed. If the foetus is three months old then it will come 
out in two hours. If the pregnancy is five months old then it will take two 
days for the foetus to come out completely. (Interview, Phul Banu, Ben-
gali, Gachhabari, 9 August 2008). 
She further explains the consequence of this method: 
Women will have so much fever that they will shiver and they will grind 
their teeth after inserting the root. She will need thick clothes and blankets. 
The pain and fever will continue until the whole foetus comes out. If a 
part of the foetus remains inside the pain will not reduce. The part of the 
foetus will be rotten inside and create an infection (Gha). The belly will 
distend (Pet phula dhorey) and she will have serious pain in the lower ab-
domen. At this point if women are not taken to the hospital they will die. 
(Interview, Phul Banu, Bengali, Gachhabari, 9 August 2008). 
Despite knowing the fatal risk, she opted for this method because it 
doesn’t cost any money. Further discussion revealed that this plant in 
commonly known in the village. Women usually collect this plant from 
the local jungles and apply it themselves. 
According to local gossip, in the last ten years three women died in 
the village due to using self-induced abortion. Discussion with a senior 
nurse at the UHC revealed that in the case of several pregnant women 
who were taken from the study village to the hospital with severe bleed-
ing, herbal roots were detected during ultra-sonogram and Dilation and 
Curettage (D&C) was done to remove the roots. However the nurse 
mentioned that the use of this method is decreasing. Nowadays women 
go to a medical provider (mostly illegal to do it secretly) to terminate 
their unwanted pregnancy. It is however cynical that UHC provides a 
D&C to treat the complications due to unsafe abortions but it doesn’t 
provide legal safe abortion services. 
An ethnic difference was found in terms of MR/abortion practices. I 
use three cases (Shantana, Godhuli and Rafiqul Islam) to illustrate this 
point. 
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Shantana is 32 years old landless Garo woman. She was allowed to 
build her house on a piece of land owned by a rich relative of her 
ma’chong. She and her husband work on the land of her rich relative. 
She had three children and became pregnant for the fourth time. After a 
conversation at a local tea stall, she asked me to visit her at home. Ac-
cording to our appointment I went to meet her. She was lying down on a 
mat on the floor in her dark mud house. She told me, 
I gave birth to three children before, but I never felt so sick during my 
pregnancy. I am dizzy I can’t keep my head straight. I also didn’t want to 
have another child. It is already difficult with three children. We were fol-
lowing natural method. But something might have gone wrong. (Inter-
view, Shantana, Garo, Gachhabari, 25 September, 2008). 
Shantana works as a day labourer. Due to her pregnancy sickness she 
stopped working for a while. She was thinking of an abortion. She asked 
advice from her rich female relative, but the relative said, “It is forbidden 
to kill a foetus (gorvonash nishedh). I don’t give my consent, but if you 
decide it is your own risk”. She asked for my help. I wanted to talk to her 
husband. Next day I went early in the morning before her husband left 
the house. He gave his consent to terminate the pregnancy. We agreed, I 
would wait for them at Jalchatra bazar, Shantana’s husband would bring 
her there and we would take a tempo (10-passenger vehicle) to go to the 
hospital. Next day I was waiting at the bazar. Shanata came alone, her 
husband didn’t show up. I was surprised. I took her to the hospital. The 
nurse already knew me for several months. She checked her and called 
the doctor. The doctor said to me straight: 
She is already four months pregnant we can’t perform an MR at this stage. 
I know you might take her somewhere else and get it done. But she is 
anaemic. It would be very risky for her. (Service provider’s interview, 
UHC, Gachhabari 27 September, 2008). 
The doctor suggested her to eat healthy and give birth to a healthy 
child and be careful for the next time. I agreed with the doctor and re-
turned home with Shantana. 
Godhuli is a 37 year old well educated Garo woman. During a discus-
sion with her husband, he described: 
We followed natural method since our marriage. We planned our second 
child five years after our first child was born. But the third child was born 
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after one and a half years. We were not prepared. My wife also developed 
an asthma problem during her pregnancy. She had difficulty breathing. We 
were in a dilemma whether to save the mother or the child. But how can 
we do it? According to our religion it is equivalent to killing. I talked to 
one of my doctor friends. He said, “The reality is that you have to choose 
between your wife and the unborn”. Finally, I decided to save the mother. 
I told my wife to get ready to go to a private doctor that my friend sug-
gested in Mymensingh. When we arrived at the doctor I told him, “we are 
well-educated. We would like to know about the procedure and the effect 
on both the mother and the child”. The doctor explained about three pro-
cedures ranging a cost between 4,000-8,000 tk depending on the level of 
pain reliever. When the doctor was explaining the three procedures, I was 
sweating. I told him, “Can we go outside? I forgot my money bag”. In re-
ality I was feeling guilt. I took my wife in a good restaurant, ate Biriyani54 
and went back home. My wife was upset with me for quite a while saying, 
“You chose for the child not me”. But after hearing everything from the 
doctor it sounded horrible to me. In every procedure the foetus will be 
taken out by pinching on it (khocha diye diye ber kore ana). The preg-
nancy was also three months old. It also has health risk on my wife. Luck-
ily, my wife didn’t have breathing problem anymore and the childbirth 
went well. After that child my wife gave birth to another child. (Interview, 
Dulal, Garo, Gachhabari, 6 August 2008). 
These two cases illustrate how Garos experience moral restrictions to 
perform MR/abortion. 
Rafiqul Islam is a 38 year old Bengali trader, father of 3 children. He 
owns two plots under the social forestry project. He describes the situa-
tion of his wife’s unwanted pregnancy: 
Two children are enough in this current time. We have three. We were us-
ing condoms but we made a mistake in calculation (hishabey bhul hoiya 
gechey ga). If it was within two months it could have been possible to 
abort the foetus with pills. I took my wife to a doctor. The doctor said the 
pregnancy was already four months old. It would be harmful to do an 
abortion. That is why we kept the child. (Interview, Rafiqul Islam, Bengali, 
Gachhabari, 21 August 2008). 
                                                 
54 A famous Bengali rice dish with chicken. 
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When I asked whether he considered it as a sin his response was, “If 
you calculate everything is a sin. If you give birth to children and you 
can’t raise them as a human being with proper education that is also a 
sin”. He added: 
Earning is my responsibility. Looking after the family is my wife’s respon-
sibility. My wife has to tell me what she wants. I will consider whether it is 
necessary or not. It is my responsibility to take care of her. If I do not have 
time I will ask my sister or mother-in-law to bring her to the doctor. I also 
help her after child delivery. Some people tease me. But I think it is also 
my responsibility to look after the children. (Interview, Rafiqul Islam, 
Bengali, Gachhabari, 21 August 2008). 
In all the above three cases, the pregnancy was not terminated. How-
ever, these cases help to illustrate how class and ethnicity shape abortion 
decisions. Godhuli is from an educated well-off family, she was taken to 
a private doctor in the district town. But Shantana is from a poor family, 
she didn’t have the money to go to the UHC until I took her there. Dis-
cussions with a number of Garo participants and TBAs confirmed that 
due to conversion into Christianity, abortion is considered a sin among 
Garos. Shantana even told me that her husband was afraid that is why he 
didn’t show up to join to the hospital. No wonder I didn’t find any Garo 
women except Mohua who had an abortion. While rich Garos can go to 
a private doctor in another town to do an abortion secretly (although in 
the case above he changed his mind), poor Garos are mostly dependent 
on help from the missionaries, therefore afraid to go against the Church 
rules. Shantana didn’t share the news of her pregnancy and her desire for 
an abortion except her well-off relative, who eventually discouraged her 
to terminate her pregnancy. 
The Bengali participant however, didn’t consider abortion as a sin, 
but rather gave a different explanation of what is considered a sin. The 
Bengali participant was even aware of the abortion pill. In all cases men 
were convinced that an abortion was necessary. However, none of them 
took a pro-active decision. Narratives of abortion experiences of women, 
discussed in the previous section further revealed that women often used 
the network of female relatives, local field workers or TBAs, and men 
were often absent during secret abortion practices. Another study 
(Bhandari et al. 2008) considers this minimal involvement of male part-
ners in reproductive decision as lost opportunities to discuss longer-term 
sexual and reproductive health needs including contraception needs, 
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which could prevent the chances of women needing to seek 
MR/abortion services in the future. A responsive family planning pro-
gramme that reflects poor men and women’s needs and perceptions 
would certainly help women to prevent unwanted pregnancy. To make 
the service safe for women who need them requires addressing the fun-
damental ambiguities in the policy and accountability in service delivery 
mechanism. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Contrary to the individualistic notion of agency (suggested in the policy), 
this chapter has provided insight how a complex interplay between gen-
der, ethnicity and economic forces shape contraception and menstrual 
regulation/abortion practices in Gachhabari. 
There is a widely spread perception among men and women alike that 
vasectomy reduces men’s physical strength. Incentives to undergo a va-
sectomy are insufficient to compensate the household income loss suf-
fered during the recovery of the operation. Since households are mainly 
dependent on men’s physical labour, vasectomy is not a practical solu-
tion. Although the breadwinners’ norm is not equally strong among Ga-
ros, they too show reluctance towards vasectomy. 
A range of concerns including pleasure, safety, gossip, fear of mistrust 
and rumours inform a negative perception towards condoms as an in-
convenient method of contraception. A policy shift that occurred in the 
mid-1990s, from short-acting (pills and condoms) to long-acting (injec-
tions and implant) contraception further implies condoms are no longer 
available for free. Given the greater preference for condom among Ga-
ros they are more affected. Ideological restriction on invasive contracep-
tion further leads Garos to be more dependent on natural methods. In-
terestingly, a few older women used sterilisation since it was the only 
available method in earlier times. Bengali women are the only user of 
injectables and implant. The pill remains the most used method among 
Garos and Bengalis. 
While the use of contraception by women has been projected as an 
indicator of empowerment in the policies and discourses on family plan-
ning, the findings point to a more nuanced picture. The analysis of con-
traceptive practice indicates that notions of masculinity and femininity 
are linked to different contraceptive methods to make women from all 
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ethnic groups to take on the contraceptive responsibility for the greater 
benefit of the household. This process is reinforced by female focused 
family planning programmes, which require minimum involvement from 
men, put user fee on condoms and do not ensure confidentiality in va-
sectomy. Policy further reinforces gender hierarchy by demanding hus-
bands’ consent to use MR service. 
Based on the evidence given in this chapter it can be argued that 
women are neither victim of unequal gender relations nor passive bene-
ficiaries of government family planning programme. Women’s narratives 
show they are resilient and deploy resources at their disposal to deal with 
side-effects of contraception by switching between different methods or 
sending their husbands to get the pill from private market or to get 
medicine to treat the symptoms. Women also use existing cultural norms 
to their advantage to assert their claims to exercise their right to use 
menstrual regulation services, manoeuvre official rules for the time limit 
or husbands consent to use menstrual regulation service or use secret 
abortion practices, although this sometimes puts women’s health and 
wellbeing at risk. This indicates that while women are able to negotiate in 
the household to exercise their choice and agency they face constraints in 
the health care market. This finding resurrects the importance of looking 
at intra-household gender power relations as well as cultural and struc-
tural factors in explaining women’s agency in reproductive decisions. 
 
   
191 
6 
Culture and health seeking 
practices in pregnancy and 
childbirth in Gachhabari 
6.1 Introduction 
Looking at pregnancy, childbirth and after delivery health care practices, 
the chapter discusses how a combination of cultural factors and health 
system factors impinge on women's access to available formal health care 
services. 
The chapter is organised around two overlapping themes. First, it ex-
plores cultural factors that shape women’s decision for home delivery. 
Second, it identifies health sector factors that discourage poor women to 
use public health care services during pregnancy, childbirth and to ad-
dress other reproductive health care needs. 
6.2 Cultural and socio economic rationales for childbirth 
at home in Gachhabari 
In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that the lack of Emergency 
Obstetric Care (EmOC) during childbirth remains a major cause of ma-
ternal mortality in Bangladesh. According to the most recent data only 
42 per cent of the births are attended by skilled health professionals in-
cluding trained TBAs and the rest are attended by untrained TBAs or 
relatives. In addition, only 37 per cent of the births take place at a health 
facility. Still the majority of the births (63 per cent) occur at home, most 
of which are assisted by untrained TBAs and relatives (BDHS 2014). 
Despite the availability of childbirth services at the Upazila Health 
Complex, located within a 10 km radius from Gachhabari village, home 
delivery was common among Garos and Bengalis. According to the 
household survey, only twenty-four children were born in the health fa-
cility, which is 5 per cent of the total births, while 95 per cent of births 
occurred at home. What were the reasons, perceptions/rationales and 
practical considerations behind the dependency on home deliveries as-
sisted by TBAs (locally known as dais)? 
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6.2.1 Birth as “natural”: normal vs. complicated delivery 
One major reason for home delivery was related to the perception about 
normal and complicated delivery55. The case of Shobita and Golapi can 
illustrate this. In the early morning of November 2008, when I went to 
visit Shobita (Garo participant) who was pregnant, I met a ten year old 
girl who was carrying her younger sibling in the front yard of Shobita’s 
house (Picture 6.1). Shobita’s house seemed quiet. I asked the girl 
whether Shobita was at home. The young girl informed me that Shobita 
gave birth to a child. Due to the silence in the house I asked whether 
Shobita went to the hospital for delivery, the girl replied, “Shobita’s hus-
band wanted to take her to the hospital, but it wasn’t necessary. Shobita 
gave birth at home normally”. 
Picture 6.1 
The girl in front of Shobita’s house 
 
Source: Fieldwork photos 
                                                 
55 Afsana and Rashid (2000) also documented similar perceptions related to childbirth among 
women in other rural area in Bangladesh. 
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I didn’t expect a ten year old girl to be sharing the childbirth news up-
front due to the fact that Bengali women in the village associated child-
birth with shyness. The way the girl explained giving birth at home as 
normal and justified not taking Shobita to the hospital by her husband 
took me by surprise. I went inside the house and found the new born 
baby sleeping while Shobita was tidying up her room silently. 
Shobita was 24 years old at that time. This was her first child delivery. 
Her husband was a rickshaw van puller. They got married five years ago. 
Since her marriage she wanted to bear a child. She neither used any con-
traception nor visited any doctor for infertility treatment. She believed 
some women become pregnant later compared to other women. In the 
end, she conceived four years after her marriage. Despite having a long 
desired pregnancy, she did not go to any health care facilities for any 
pregnancy check-up, although BRAC, a NGO, was providing maternal 
health care services in the village in partnership with the government. 
She explained: 
Dolly mashi (maternal aunt) checked me regularly and told me my preg-
nancy was normal. I didn’t feel any problem either. If I went to BRAC for 
pregnancy check-ups, every time I would have to pay 15 tk. (members pay 
10 tk). Going to the hospital means at least 50 tk travel cost. I thought it 
wasn’t necessary. (Interview, Shobita, Garo, Gachhabari, 6 November 
2008).  
When her labour pain started, Shobita’s husband called Dolly dai 
immediately. However, it took her some time to deliver the child. Sho-
bita described the birth experience: 
Dolly mashi checked me and said it wasn’t the time yet. She left and told 
my husband to call her again if the pain increased. The pain was coming in 
waves and lasted for one full day and a night. Finally the child was born 
around 3 in the morning. The child wasn’t coming out easily. Mashi had to 
insert her hand to pull the baby out. The pain was so much that it didn’t 
even matter to me if she inserted her hand inside. I was only hoping the 
pain would be over as soon as I deliver the baby. After the delivery mashi 
cleaned me up and gave me a herbal drink for my comfort. My husband 
also got some pain killer from the local pharmacy according to her sugges-
tion. (Interview, Shobita, Garo, Gachhabari, 6 November 2008). 
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Shobita had the support also of her sister during the birth. The resi-
dential arrangement amongst the Garos is such that sisters live close to 
each other. After marriage among Garos, other than the heiress, women 
move to individual houses and their husbands move to their wives’ 
houses which are in close proximity. If it was necessary to bring Shobita 
to the hospital her sister would have also supported her financially. 
However, due to the fact that her delivery was progressing well without 
major complications, it wasn’t considered necessary to go to the hospital. 
Women went to the hospital only if there were complications. Golapi 
(Garo woman) was 19 years old when she gave birth to her first child. 
She was taken to the hospital when a dai failed to assist her to give birth 
at home. She lived in a well-off Garo relative’s house in exchange for 
helping in the household until her marriage. Coming from a landless 
poor family, Golapi didn’t own any property. She moved to her hus-
band’s household after marriage, although this is not a common practice 
among Garos. Her husband worked as a night guard in a factory in an-
other district. Golapi was living with her mother-in- law in the village. 
She never visited any doctors after she became pregnant. Her mother-in-
law arranged for an NGO worker, who had received training on child-
birth from World Vision (an NGO), to assist during delivery. On the day 
of Golapi’s delivery her husband wasn’t present, but coincidentally the 
female well-off relative went to visit Golapi in her in-laws’ house. Golapi 
described the event: 
I was so exhausted; I could barely push the baby. The NGO worker pulled 
the baby out, but he wasn’t breathing. The dai and my mother-in-law got 
busy with the child. After oil massage the child started to breath. The dai 
(NGO worker) cut the cord, but my placenta didn’t come out yet. The 
NGO worker asked to get an injection from the local pharmacy. When it 
didn’t work out a local kaviraj was consulted to give me pani pora (holy 
water). When the pani pora failed, my relative convinced my mother-in-
law to take me to the hospital. My placenta was removed by a nurse at the 
hospital four/five hours after my delivery. Thanks to my relative for sav-
ing my life. (Interview, Golapi, Garo, Gachhabari, 7 November 2008). 
Golapi’s case illustrates also that young women rely on the knowledge 
of elder family members during childbirth. These elder women often rely 
on traditional practices to assist with home deliveries. 
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Discussion with a number of Bengali women revealed that they also 
perceive childbirth as a natural process not requiring formal medical as-
sistance. For example Parboti, a twenty-seven-year-old Bengali woman, 
mother of two children, said, “When the head of the child comes on the 
mokam (uterus), dais (TBAs) just have to pull the baby out”. 
To express women’s preference for home delivery a common senti-
ment shared by many women was, “by the grace of Almighty God I 
never had to go to the Hospital during delivery”. “I prayed to God to 
give birth normally at home”. Both Garo and Bengali women rely on 
home delivery unless they experience severe complications. As a result 
women often delay seeking care in the hospitals during complications 
and that can sometimes be fatal. 
6.2.2 Faith and Trust in traditional birth attendants 
Another reason for home delivery was related to the views and percep-
tion about local TBAs. In the absence of skilled health professionals, 
women in the village have long been dependent on the TBAs for genera-
tions. TBAs are locally known as dai, dhatri or dhoroni. They are gener-
ally middle-aged or elderly women who are members of the community 
and have mastered their skills through observing birth events, by assist-
ing senior TBAs and by using their own intellect (also found in Afsana 
2005). 
The TBAs are cheap, they are from the same community and are 
readily available to help women at any time during home delivery. After a 
delivery, TBAs normally receive a new cloth (shari) or some cash, ac-
cording to the capacity of the delivering women’s household, as a gift 
but they never demand anything beforehand for their service. Among 
seven TBAs in the village, four have received training on safe delivery 
from a non-government organisation called Caritas in collaboration with 
the St. Paul missionary in Pirgacha (a neighbouring village). 
All the women expressed faith and trust in the knowledge and exper-
tise of these TBAs. In particular they showed their appreciation and re-
spect for how Shomola dai (a senior Garo TBA) was capable of helping 
women to give birth even during complicated situations such as the de-
livery of dead foetus or of twins. Fouzia, a twenty-one-year-old Bengali 
woman, mother of one child, said: 
196 CHAPTER SIX 
 
Shomola dai helped my mother when I was born, my mother’s birth went 
without any complications. When I became pregnant I wanted her to help 
me during my delivery (Interview Fouzia, Bengali, Gachhabari, 17 March). 
Women in Gachhabari thus make their decisions on child delivery 
based on the village traditions and depend on the experience, knowledge 
and resources of the local dais. 
Even educated women showed their preference for home delivery in 
the presence of local TBAs. Godhuli, an educated Garo participant, and 
a high school teacher in Gachhabari, who gave birth to three children at 
home in the presence of dais, stated: 
This is a habit (obvash) to give birth at home. We believe our dais are well 
trained. They are well capable of assisting during normal childbirth. If the 
child is stuck or if the placenta doesn’t come out on time, dais will tell us 
to go to the hospital. Going to the hospital costs money. Many people 
cannot afford that (Interview, Godhuli, Garo, Gachhabari, 6 August 
2008). 
Godhuli’s narrative illustrates that while women rely on the knowl-
edge and skills of local TBAs for safe home deliveries they also trust that 
they would refer them to the hospital during complications. In many in-
stances TBAs also join women in the hospital. 
A focus group discussion conducted among seven TBAs further re-
vealed that TBAs (dais) possess vast knowledge to deal with complicated 
(julum) delivery. For example, when the cervix does not open up suffi-
ciently dais put some coconut oil on the index finger and help to open 
the cervix (harer chipi) by gently pushing on the joint. One dai ex-
plained, “If someone doesn’t open it up, how will the baby come out 
alone”? Dais also help to open the mouth of the cervix (chala) by turn-
ing it outside for the child to come out easily and help to close it after 
delivery. They also mentioned the importance of maintaining hygiene 
while assisting women. During normal delivery, TBAs only wait for the 
baby to come out naturally. In the case of a breech position, the dais ex-
plained: 
At different months of the pregnancy the position of the child changes. 
With the maturity of the pregnancy the head of the child should move 
downwards close to the cervix. If the baby stays in a breech position when 
labour pain starts, with oil massage the head should bring down first. Only 
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after that by gently pushing on the belly of the delivering woman the child 
will come out easily. (FGD among TBAs, Gachhabari, 25 April). 
If any other part of the body than the head comes out first (usually 
one arm or one leg), then dais have to push the part inside first, rotate 
the body and bring the head into the right position, before assisting with 
delivery. TBAs were also aware that if the placenta (fuler nari) doesn’t 
come out after delivery women will die and therefore women should be 
taken to the hospital to remove the retained placenta immediately. 
Each community relies on their own dais. Bengalis households gener-
ally call a Bengali dai and Garo households call a Garo dai during child-
birth. However, the assistance during childbirth also goes beyond com-
munal boundaries. Due to the expertise of Shomola dai, she is also called 
during the delivery of Bengali women when Bengali dai can’t manage. 
Due to the trust in the capacity and knowledge of local dais, they seem 
to be the best option for many women. 
6.2.3 Concern about purdah/privacy 
Discussions with a number of Bengali women revealed that there are 
additional cultural norms that promote home delivery relying on local 
TBAs. Bengali women often associated childbirth with the Bangla term 
lajja and shorom, meaning being shy or bashful or timid or being 
ashamed (Dasgupta 1980).56 Due to these norms pregnancy and delivery 
are considered as private matters, which were not discussed publicly. A 
husband or a family member would refer to a pregnant woman as “sick” 
while she was pregnant. 
 Due to these lajja norms, many Bengali women prefer to give birth 
secretly at home and endure their labour pain silently. As Sabiha, a nine-
teen-year-old Bengali woman mother of one child said: 
                                                 
56 Lajja/shorom symbolises the shyness of Bengali women, socially constructed as a normative 
feminine characteristic. It is often said that shyness is the clothing of Bengali women (lajja Ben-
gali narir bhushon) (Haque 2000). The opposite of lajja is the term shameless (be-
laj/beshorom/behaya). The term lajja is also connected to sex. The sex organs of males and 
females are named “lajja sthan” (place of shame). Due to patriarchal norms, shyness regarding 
body and sexuality is part of the socialisation process of women since childhood (Hossain and 
Mashuduzzaman 2006b). 
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I didn’t scream during delivery. Because people will realise that I’m giving 
birth. It is a matter of shame (shoromer bepar). People will find it out any-
way, after the child is born. (Interview, Sabiha, Bengali, Gachhabari, 29 
April 2008). 
Some women even mentioned their preference to give birth at night 
so not to spread the delivery news in public. Due to lajja norms, women 
were not comfortable with the idea of their husbands being present dur-
ing delivery. Farida, a thirty-five-year-old Bengali woman, mother of 
three children reacted to the idea of husband’s presence during delivery 
stating: 
If husbands would be present during delivery, women would feel shy. 
They will suffer from more pain. Husbands’ presence will prevent women 
from pushing the baby (hul dewa), which will eventually delay the birth. 
(Interview, Farida, Bengali, Gachhabari, 11 April 2008). 
 Husbands only wait outside and make themselves available if needed. 
Otherwise, delivery is considered solely a married women’s business and 
thus confined to the private space. 
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Pictures 6.2 & 6.3 
TBAs demonstrating traditional ways of child delivery: Bengalis (above) and 
Garos (below). 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo during FGD, TBAs, 25 April 2008. 
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Further discussions revealed that giving birth in the hospital is con-
sidered bepurdah (violation of purdah norms) among Bengali women. 
The focus group discussion with traditional birth attendants revealed 
that the traditional way of giving birth is different from a hospital deliv-
ery (as demonstrated in Picture 6.2). Traditionally, Bengali women take a 
squatting position as if sitting on a toilet. A woman bends her body for-
ward, hugging a close female relative, while leaning on her knees. In this 
process women try to maintain purdah by not exposing their private 
part. The TBA stays behind the delivering woman and waits for the baby 
to come out naturally. A good TBA is known not to touch or insert her 
hands into the birth canal during delivery. 
In the hospital, women usually have to lie on their back spreading 
their legs wide open, while other patients are present. The delivery room 
in the hospital is usually crowded and thus privacy is not assured. Giving 
birth in the hospital also involves vaginal examination. Sometimes 
women are also required to undergo an episiotomy (a surgical incision 
made in the area between the vagina and anus to enlarge the opening of 
the vagina to prevent uneven perineal tear). 
 To give a sense of the lack of privacy in government hospitals I will 
share the story of Shornolota, a nineteen-year-old Bengali woman, whom 
I met at the Madhupur UHC during the repair of her perineal tear after 
her first delivery. In the maternity section of the UHC, there were two 
big wards for the patients. The labour room was next to one ward. There 
were no doors, only curtains to separate the labour room from the pa-
tients’ ward. I was looking for a nurse (a key informant) who was busy in 
the labour room. I could just walk in and found the nurse busy repairing 
the perineal tear of Shornolota after her home delivery. Next to Shor-
nolota, another woman was screaming in her labour pain, lying on a bed 
covered with plastic sheet full of stains. Two of her female relatives were 
accompanying her, while the nurse was busy with Shornolota. I was 
watching the nurse repairing the perineal tear without any anaesthesia. 
Shornolota was biting her lips to suppress her pain. When the nurse was 
making a knot on a stitch, it came off making a tear on the stitched area 
and Shornolota started to bleed. I felt a serious cramp in my own belly 
and could not stand there anymore. I left the labour room and went out-
side to breathe some fresh air. I returned to the hospital after about an 
hour. Meanwhile Shornolota had been transferred to the maternity ward. 
I went to her and asked why she did not go to the hospital for delivery, 
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in which case she might not have to suffer from so much pain from the 
repair of her perineal tear. Her response was: 
How can I decide for myself to go to the hospital when I am in labour 
pain? My guardians have to decide whether to take me to the hospital or 
not. A TBA (dai) already delivered the baby at home but the head of the 
baby was so big that I got this big tear. I was bleeding to death and the 
dai, who attended my childbirth, suggested my guardians to take me to the 
hospital. (Interview, Shornolota, Bengali, UHC, Madhupur, 20 July). 
After so much suffering, when women are taken to the hospital, they 
experience lack of privacy. This situation is compounded by the lack of 
female doctors at the maternity section. 
Garo women’s experience is rather different. They neither mentioned 
any purdah norms that prevented them from going to the hospital, nor 
made a distinction between the private and the public spaces. Garo 
women also didn’t reject the idea of husband’s presence altogether, but 
considered that women have the bodily experience to associate and deal 
with childbirth naturally. Therefore, in most cases female relatives or 
TBAs assisted during childbirth. However, some elder Garo women 
spoke of their husbands assisting during childbirth for pragmatic rea-
sons. Shomola dai, the most senior TBA in the village, shared her own 
childbirth experience: 
Madhupur was full of Sal and Gojari forest. There were only a few Garos 
living in the dense forest of Madhupur. We used to build our houses 2 to 3 
miles away from the jhum plot, which was our main cultivation system. 
Before the liberation in 1971, Garos never build their houses with mud. 
We used to build houses with bamboos and canes raised from the ground 
to prevent attack by wild elephants and tigers. It wasn’t easy to find some-
one to help during childbirth like nowadays. Sometimes the labour pain 
started while working with my husband in the field or in the middle of the 
night. My husband couldn’t leave me unattended to call someone. I asked 
my husband to help me, he was scared. I cut my cord with a sickle (kachi) 
and he cleaned up and kept an eye on the baby, while I could rest (Inter-
view, Shomola, Garo, Gachhabari, 13 August 2008). 
Garo women’s childbirth experiences challenge the binary between 
home vs. hospital delivery. Although Garos don’t practice jhum cultiva-
tion far from the house anymore, during discussions Garo women also 
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mentioned giving birth in the jungle while they went to collect firewood 
or wild potatoes accompanied by other women. Younger Garo women 
like Shobita, Golapi and Godhuli also didn’t associate their preference 
for local TBAs with any cultural norms that restrict their access to the 
hospital. Their reliance on the TBAs is rather pragmatic. Since the mis-
sionary started TBA training to prevent maternal mortality in Madhupur 
forest area due to the lack of health care facilities, Shomola dai and oth-
ers joined and became trusted TBAs in the community. 
During the focus group discussion with TBAs it was further revealed 
that Garo women take a similar delivery position as done in the hospitals 
(Picture 6.3). The TBAs stand in front of the delivering women while 
assisting during childbirth. Garo TBAs believe it provides more visibility 
and accessibility from the front. Garo TBAs also consider that the posi-
tion Bengali women take is not convenient and may cause problems. 
They also claimed, during their TBA training they were trained to assist 
delivery from the front side. However, Bengali TBAs seem to follow 
their own customs. Although purdah and physical shyness was not a rea-
son for home delivery among Garos, privacy was desired by all women. 
6.2.4 Balancing wage/household labour and childbirth 
In Gachhabari, most women are busy from dawn to dusk with their 
household chores. Childbirth occurs in between those activities without 
too much fuss. As Farida, a thirty two years old Bengali woman, a 
mother of three children, described her childbirth experience: 
During my third delivery I was sweeping the yard in the morning. Right at 
that moment I felt a cramp in my lower belly. I had experienced labour 
pain before. I know how it feels. I immediately ran to the toilet. I didn’t 
even have the time to fetch water to use in the toilet. I asked my sister-in-
law to give me some water to use in the toilet. I quickly washed myself. As 
soon as I came out from the toilet I gave birth in the backyard. I could not 
even reach my room. (Interview, Farida, Bengali, Gachhabari, 11 April 
2008). 
Rural women’s full-time responsibility for household tasks (Chowd-
hury 2009; Ahmed 2007) seems to remain even during pregnancy and 
childbirth in their conjugal homes. This naturalised demand on female 
labour was further reflected in women’s stories about the differences in 
giving birth at the parental house (maika) or at the in-laws’ house (sho-
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shural). Traditionally, Bengali women move to their in-law’s house after 
marriage. It is a custom in the rural area that women go to their parent’s 
house during delivery (naior jawa), especially during the first childbirth. 
This custom releases women from performing their household responsi-
bilities for a few days. Anita, a 19 year old Bengali woman, who went to 
her mother’s house during her first delivery, said: 
I had to do a lot of household chores in my husband’s house during my 
pregnancy. If I stayed in my husband’s house, I would have to do every-
thing till my delivery. Now I can just stay in bed and take rest in my par-
ent’s house if I feel tired. I know my mother will do everything for me. 
She will even serve food for me in bed. After the delivery she will take care 
of my child until I can take over. (Interview, Anita, Bengali, Gachhabari, 
17 July 2008). 
 However, not all women were as fortunate as Anita to go to their pa-
rental house during delivery. Women have to negotiate in order to bene-
fit from this custom. When a woman is away to her parents’ house, an-
other member has to take care of her domestic chores. This task 
inevitably falls on another woman in the household. A fifty-five-year-old 
mother-in-law, Jamila Khatun, mother of four children, expressed her 
dissatisfaction in such a situation by saying: 
This time I allowed my daughter-in-law to go to her parent’s house (naior) 
to give birth. But I will not allow her to go to naior anymore. It is a big 
problem for me. When she goes to naior, all the household chores come 
on my shoulder. I can’t take care of all these chores anymore at this age. 
(Interview, Jamila Khatun, Bengali, Gachhabari, 30 April 2008). 
 Among the rich households domestic help can be arranged by hiring a 
poor woman/relative. Therefore rich women can exercise more agency 
to benefit from this custom. Women in poor households have to stay at 
their shoshural (parent-in-law’s)/husband’s house and continue their 
household chores until delivery and resume their responsibility, mainly 
cooking, often immediately after childbirth. 
However, Bengali women also asserted that they do not consider 
themselves as victims of a traditional ideology of the gender division of 
labour. They tended to highlight their joint contribution in the house-
hold. This was strongly expressed by Afroza, a thirty-five-year-old Ben-
gali woman, she stated: 
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Women’s work is invisible; it’s difficult to see them. Women are busy the 
whole day in the house sweeping the house and the yard (ghor jharu, uu-
tan jharu), cooking, washing dishes, washing clothes, feeding the children, 
cleaning the cow dung (gobor phela), filling the vessel with water for the 
cow (gorur charite pani dewa), endless list of things to do. Men work out-
side, their work is visible. Men take care of the planting, fertiliser (poison), 
clearing the weeds (agacha poriskar), tilling the soil (khet kopano/nirani), 
irrigation (pani dewa) harvest and selling crops. My husband leaves the 
house in the morning and comes back at night, sometimes 10.00 at night. 
He has to hire labourers to work in the field and pay their bills. He is so 
busy that sometimes he doesn’t have time to eat his lunch. After harvest-
ing in the months of Boishakh/ Joistha (which corresponds to April/May) 
women’s work load reaches the peak. It is women’s job to boil, dry and 
store rice. Husking is done by machine. If husked once it goes for 15 days. 
I also have two cows and a goat to take care of. (Interview, Afroza, Ben-
gali, Gachhabari, 14 June 2008). 
Clearly some women have to perform more work than others. A 
common impression given by many women was “those who have shang-
sher (agricultural harvest) have more work to do, those who do not have 
shongsher have less work to do”. However, since Bengali women do not 
work as wage labour in the land, their work starts when the harvest 
comes to the house yard. However, one cannot generalize about Bengali 
women’s experience, since poorer Bengali women do go outside the 
boundary of their house yard to the forest to collect firewood to sell in 
the market. This reflects a change in the practice of purdah norms 
among poorer Bengalis. To give an example, Rupali, a 28 years old Ben-
gali woman narrated: 
Bengali women didn’t go to the forest before. Now it has changed. We 
learned from Garos. Like me there are many Bengalis who go to the forest 
to collect firewood and wild potatoes. My husband used to object at the 
beginning saying other people would criticise him for allowing me to go to 
the forest. I told him “other people aren’t paying to run our family (shong-
shar), why bother what other people say”. When men can’t provide 
women are obliged to go outside. He doesn’t object to my going to the 
forest to collect firewood or wild potatoes anymore. (Interview, Rupali, 
Bengali, Gachhabari, 21 July 2008). 
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Rupali’s narrative reflects the complexity of social reality, and shows 
how cultural norms are open to multiple interpretations, as opposed to a 
static notion of rigid culture. Women also use cultural notions and 
norms to their advantage. The patrilineal Bengali household is built on a 
notion of male breadwinner, where husband is suppose to take care of 
the income to justify keeping women under purdah. This symbolic no-
tion of masculinity as the protector of female modesty comes in conflict 
when men are not able to provide enough for the survival of the house-
hold. Faced with household poverty, women use this as a patriarchal 
bargain to challenge and negotiate purdah norms. This did lift some of 
the restriction of Purdah norms and increase their mobility, at the same 
time it also implied an increase in their work. 
The experience of Garo women is somewhat different. Garo women 
are engaged in wage labour along with their reproductive work. Ambia, a 
48 year Garo woman, gave an overview of her daily routine: 
I get up around five/six in the morning. Sweep the house and the yard, 
and then prepare for cooking. When the cooking is done, feed and do the 
dishes. Take a bath and go to work at 8.00 am. I work from 8.00 am to 
4.00 pm as a day labourer in pineapple or banana farms. Sometimes I also 
work in construction of roads. I also work as an agricultural labour during 
seasons. Sometimes I go home at noon during lunch time and do a little 
bit of cleaning up, if it has to be done and if my work is close to my house. 
Otherwise I take my lunch with me. Coming home after work, I cook 
again, eat, spend time with children…(laughter)... and sleep. If my husband 
is at home he also helps me with the cooking and cleaning. If there is no 
day labour work, then I go to the forest to collect firewood. (Interview, 
Ambia, Garo, Gachhabari, 28 March 2008). 
In this demanding combination of waged work and reproductive 
work, Ambia shared her childbirth experience: 
I give birth easily. I even continued collecting firewood from the forest till 
delivery. Five or ten days after delivery, I went to the forest again. Once I 
was in the forest the whole day, collected twigs from the trees and made 
four bundles. On the way home with my third bundle of firewood my la-
bour pain started. I arrived at home, I smoked a cigarette (tamak), laid 
back and gave birth. I cut the cord and cleaned up. When I came home 
with my third bundle, other women were still collecting firewood and 
guarding my fourth bundle in the forest. When I didn’t show up anymore 
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one of them carried my bundle home and found me with my new born 
child. (Interview, Ambia, Garo, Gachhabari, 28 March 2008). 
I wondered whether childbirth was really so easy for some women. 
The idea that Garo women are stronger57 sometimes may even have a 
racist stereotype undertone denying their health care needs. When I 
shared my concern with a physician key informant, he said that due to 
physical work Garo women might have strong pelvic muscles, which 
helps them to give birth more easily. However, further discussion with 
Ambia revealed that she had two miscarriages while carrying firewood 
from the jungle during her pregnancy. Infant and child death was also 
common among Garos. 
In contrast to the Bengalis, the matrilineal system offers Garo women 
the advantage of living in their parental house or in a separate house 
close by which implies they can receive help from their sisters and moth-
ers during childbirth. However, due to poverty they go to the forest to 
collect firewood or work as day labourer during their pregnancy, up to 
the moment of delivery. This combination of income generating work 
and reproductive work puts more demand on poorer Garos. Overall 
however the women’s responsibility for household reproduction affects 
both Bengali and Garo women who find it difficult to abandon these 
tasks and go to the hospital during pregnancy and childbirth. 
6.3 Rural health providers: issues of cost, access and care 
The reasons for reliance on home deliveries are also linked to supply fac-
tors. Focus groups and discussions with a number of Bengali and Garo 
women revealed that a combination of health care factors, namely hid-
den cost, distance and the quality of care in the public hospital further 
discourage women to seek institutional care during childbirth. The main 
differences that emerged were due not to ethnic differences but to class. 
Theoretically giving birth at the Upazila Health Complex (UHC) is 
free, but practically it involves several hidden costs besides travel cost. 
For example, UHC doesn’t provide any diagnostic facilities. If women 
are willing to give birth at the UHC they have to do several diagnostic 
tests from the private diagnostic centres at the vicinity of the hospital. 
The UHC is also not well equipped with a blood bank in case of emer-
                                                 
57 This is reflected in the title of the book ‘the strong women of Modhupur’ by Burling (1997). 
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gency. Therefore patients have to find blood donors from their relatives 
or friends if needed. During my first visit to the UHC, I observed the 50 
bed sub-district hospital as a ghost building. I wondered whether it was a 
national holiday! The maternity centre (MCH) of the UHC was being 
taken care of by two nurses, there was no duty doctor. I learned that the 
government doctor was performing private practice during his office 
hour.  
It seems like patients are left alone to deal with their problems. While 
I was looking around in the maternity centre I met a woman, who had a 
miscarriage. She was admitted to the hospital two days ago. She fell 
down in her backyard in the rain with her advanced pregnancy and was 
bleeding severely. She needed A+ blood. I talked to her relatives. They 
said that the doctors refused to do anything until blood is arranged from 
her relatives or donors. Her relatives couldn’t find a match among her 
potential blood donors and felt helpless. After two days of severe bleed-
ing and without any treatment finally her relatives decided to transfer her 
to the district (Mymensingh) hospital which is 5 hours away by a car or 
ambulance from the UHC. I witnessed them leaving the UHC with huge 
frustration. 
The absence of logistical support implies various hidden costs of 
seeking care in the public hospitals. Due to these hidden costs even a 
normal child delivery may turn out to be expensive, a factor which con-
tributes to the exclusion of poor women from access to institutional 
childbirth facilities. During an in-depth interview, Anita, a 21 year old 
Bengali woman who gave birth to a child a week before our conversation 
mentioned that she went to the UHC once for her pregnancy check-up 
with her mother. Anita was told to do an ultra-sonogram in a private lab 
since there is no such facility at the UHC. One ultra-sonogram costs 400 
tk (appx. € 4,-) at a diagnostic centre next door to the UHC. She neither 
did an ultra-sonogram nor went for a second check- up or for her deliv-
ery. Anita’s mother Madhubala said: 
If poor people were able to spend money for the private diagnostic cen-
tres, they wouldn’t go to the government hospital in the first place. If a 
woman is admitted to the UHC with labour pain, doctors will tell the pa-
tient to arrange blood, medicine, saline and food, on their own. If poor pa-
tients have to pay for everything why should you bring your patient to the 
government hospital? (Interview, Madhubala, Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 July 
2008). 
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Compared to the cost involved in normal delivery, if there is a need to 
perform a Caesarean the cost increases significantly. When I enquired 
the reason for the high cost of a C-section (5,000 tk, appx. € 50) at the 
UHC, the concerned doctor mentioned: 
There is no General Anaesthetics (GA) facility at the UHC. Therefore, a 
C- section is done with a spinal. These spinal injections are costly, which 
we have to buy from outside, that makes the Caesarean expensive (Service 
provider’s interview, Maternal Health and Child Care Centre, UHC, 
Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
During interviews women often expressed their concern about the in-
creasing rate of Caesarean at the UHC. According to the estimate of the 
medical officer, on average there are 33 normal deliveries and 4-5 C-
sections every month in the maternity section. When I asked about the 
common reasons for Caesareans, the doctor concerned could not pro-
vide any convincing answer, rather he replied by saying: “nowadays 
women are not so strong to push the baby like our mothers and aunts”. I 
was not convinced by his response. However, an increasing trend in C-
section is visible at the national level data. The most recent BDHS data 
shows a large increase in the use of Caesarean section from 2.6 per cent 
to 23 per cent between 2001 and 2014 (BDHS 2014:28). While there is 
an increasing trend in the use of C-section, women fear their delivery 
might turn out to be extremely expensive if done by a C-section. 
Reflecting back to my experience when the perineal tear of Shor-
nolota was repaired, there was another woman delivering a baby while 
two of her female relatives were waiting for the nurse to take over after 
she is done with Shornolota. The duty doctor was not around. When I 
was at his chamber he was at his private practice, just outside the hospi-
tal building. To give a justification of his absence during duty hours, he 
said: 
Rural women do not want to see a male doctor during delivery. Nurses 
take care of the deliveries. In case of a Caesarean the nurse will call me. 
Then everything is arranged in the operation theatre. Caesarean does not 
involve exposing women’s private part (Service provider’s interview, Ma-
ternal Health and Child Care Centre, UHC, Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
The duty doctor’s assumption that rural women don’t want a male 
doctor to be present during childbirth justified his absenteeism during 
office hours. However, while listening to the doctor’s justification, I 
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wondered whether the increasing number of Caesarean is a result of 
maintaining purdah norms by not exposing women’s private part to a 
male doctor to deal with complicated deliveries, which could have been 
dealt with differently! 
Besides the cost and fear of a Caesarean, the doctors’ ignorance was 
also mentioned by women during a focus group discussion as a reason 
for not giving childbirth at the public hospital. In this discussion, the 
death of a pregnant woman at the UHC due to the ignorance of the doc-
tors was mentioned as a factor discouraging poor women from going to 
the UHC during childbirth. Women mentioned that doctors are power-
ful; they covered up the case by misreporting the post mortem report 
(dhama chapa dewa) as if poor women’s life is not important. This sen-
timent was also expressed by Madhubala when she said: 
Poor people don’t get proper care in the government hospital. Doctors 
don’t have any sympathy for the poor patients. Doctors will not bother if 
patients die. Doctors will not start any treatment before knowing the sol-
vency of the patient (takar khobor). Poor patients have to suffer even if 
they are taken to the hospital (UHC). (Interview, Madhubala, Bengali, 
Gachhabari, 16 July 2008). 
The women were quite vocal about the negligence by the health care 
providers in the public hospital. Further discussion revealed that doctor’s 
absenteeism further discourages well-off families from using this gov-
ernment hospital. When patients from well-off families go to the hospital 
and don’t find a doctor on duty, they immediately bring their patients to 
the private clinic. The same doctor from UHC provides service there. 
Women complained that doctors also refer well-off patients to a particu-
lar private clinic. About the referral of certain patients to the private clin-
ics, the medical officer concerned said: 
We have to work in very difficult conditions at the UHC. UHCs are not 
equipped properly. We don’t have any GA (General Anaesthetics) in the 
hospital. If women need a GA during delivery, they need to be referred to 
private clinics or district hospitals. (Service provider’s interview, Maternal 
Health and Child care centre, UHC, Madhupur, 20 July 2008). 
Due to lack of logistics well-off families are referred to the private 
clinics. But, poor women have no option but to be dependent on public 
hospitals with their inadequate care or (more commonly) not to use 
these childbirth services at all. This practice of referring well-off women 
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to the private clinics is perceived as corruption by poor women. In Mad-
hubala’s words: 
Doctors are corrupted. Doctors can’t take money from the clients if they 
are in the public hospital. The same doctor who works part time in the 
private clinic provides better and quicker service than he does at the UHC. 
Doctors receive commissions for sending the patients to the private clinics 
and diagnostic centres. (Interview, Madhubala, Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 
July 2008). 
In summary, despite formally free childbirth services, the costs of di-
agnostic tests, episiotomy or Caesarean, doctor’s ignorance and absentee-
ism combine to restrict poor rural women’s access to childbirth facilities 
at the sub-district hospitals. While the number of patients in the private 
clinic next to the UHC is above their capacity, the government hospital 
turns into a ghost building. This situation is not unique to the UHC in 
Madhupur, but common in many sub-district hospitals in Bangladesh. As 
the well-off people start to use the private clinics the quality of govern-
ment hospital deteriorates (as also found by Chaudhury and Hammer 
2004). 
6.3.1 Suspicions and insecurity of hospital births 
There appears to be a perception among both Garo and Bengali women 
that Caesarean section is done unnecessarily at the UHC. Since 2001 a 
NGO, BRAC has been working as a partner of the government to pro-
vide maternal health care services. Maternal antenatal check-up is done 
by BRAC at the satellite clinic once a month. BRAC health workers also 
have a list of all pregnant women in the village and suggest women with 
complicated pregnancy should go to the hospital for delivery. However, 
women showed reluctance to seek care at the hospital due to a fear of 
Caesarean deliveries.  
The case of Anita, who gave birth to her first child at home a few 
days before our conversation illustrates the suspicions regarding Caesar-
ean delivery as unnecessary and a way of the doctors to earn extra 
money. She studied till ninth grade. Her family condition was not too 
bad and her mother is a health worker. However, during my visit to 
Anita at her mother’s house, her mother Madhubala explained the reason 
for not taking her daughter to the hospital for delivery based on her own 
experience, describing: 
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I accompanied a woman to the hospital for delivery. When we arrived at 
the hospital, the head of the baby already came to the mokam (external os 
of the vagina). If the woman pushed a little bit, the baby would have come 
out immediately. I requested the doctor to wait for a little longer. Alterna-
tively, he could have used the pumper (vacuum) to pull the baby out. But 
the doctor cut her vagina (performed episiotomy), which was not neces-
sary. When I requested the doctor to wait, he became angry and shouted at 
me saying, “bekkel mohila (stupid lady), what do you know”? I replied to 
him, “I know as much as you know. But only difference between you and 
me is that you can cut the vagina and I don’t”. (Interview, Madhubala, 
Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 July 2008). 
Madhubala further mentioned that the woman had to pay 300 tk for 
the episiotomy, but if it was a normal delivery she wouldn’t have to pay 
any money. In conversation, women in the village used the term “Cae-
sarean” to refer to both an episiotomy and a C-section. While an episiot-
omy costs 300-400 tk (approx. € 3-4) a C-section costs 5,000 tk (approx. 
€ 50) at the UHC. It must have been necessary to perform an episiotomy 
to avoid unnecessary complications. However, the important point here 
is to highlight that if a health worker is not convinced herself of the ne-
cessity of an episiotomy or Caesarean herself, how she can motivate 
women in the village to go to the hospital during childbirth? In fact she 
didn’t even bring her own daughter to the hospital during her delivery. 
Anita was also convinced that it was the best decision to give birth at 
home, assisted by her mother. As she said, “If I went to the hospital, 
doctors would have done a Caesarean to me by now which was unneces-
sary”. 
Another perception about Caesarean is related to the fear of physical 
disability. The case of Fabiha, a 28 years old Bengali housewife illustrates 
this fear. Her husband is a small land holding farmer. She has two chil-
dren; one son of 7 and a daughter of 2 years old. She gave birth at home. 
While giving reason for not going to the hospital for delivery, she said: 
I know it is good for me to stay at home during delivery. Dais will wait for 
a day and a night, but doctors/nurses would hardly wait for two hours. Af-
ter that they would definitely perform a Caesarean. If I went to the hospi-
tal, they would have made me disabled by cutting my belly (Amar pet 
kaitta pongu koira dito). (Interview, Fabiha, Bengali, Gachhabari, 9 July 
2008). 
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Fabiha’s fear was based on her sister-in-law’s childbirth experience, as 
she explained: 
My sister-in-law gave birth to two children at home. There wasn’t any 
problem (Kono ohubidha hoy nai). During her third delivery she had ex-
cessive bleeding. She was taken to the hospital. After examination doctor 
gave her medicine and advised to do a Caesarean. After the Caesarean she 
can’t do any heavy work at all. She can’t pump a tube-well to fetch a jar of 
water. She can’t husk a kilo of rice from the paddy (bara bana). My 
brother has to take care of everything. He runs a business; he can’t always 
stay at home. I am able to perform all my work because I gave birth at 
home (barite hoichey boilai etogula kaj korbar partachi). If I am not able 
to do these task who would do my work? Nobody would let me eat rice58 
while sitting (Amareto keu boiya bhat khaite dibo na). (Interview, Fabiha, 
Bengali, Gachhabari, 9 July 2008). 
The regular demand on women’s labour for household reproduction 
also seems to create this negative attitude towards Caesarean. Older 
women from poor households felt that Caesarean is needed only by 
women from rich households. As of Marufa Begum (a fifty-five-year-old 
woman, mother of five children), put it: 
Those who are wealthy and live a comfortable life (aramey thaka), they 
need a Caesarean. The child grows bigger inside their belly. They have to 
go up and down to the hospital and spend money for doctors. Those who 
do hard labour (porisrom), deliver normally (shustho bhabe). It is a bless-
ing from God that poor women give birth normally at home. (Interview, 
Marufa Begum, Bengali, Gachhabari, 13 July 2008). 
There seems to be a shared understanding among both Bengali and 
Garo women that doing daily household chores during pregnancy helps 
to have a smooth delivery different from well-off families. Women from 
better-off households often rely on hired labour to do the daily house-
hold chores. The need for a Caesarean among women from well-off 
families is seen, particularly by elder poor women, as a failure of a nor-
mal event, implying Caesarean wouldn’t have been necessary if these 
women had been used to doing household chores (as also found by Af-
sana and Rashid 2000:26). 
                                                 
58 In Bangla proverb “eating someone’s rice” usually refers to a wife who eats her husband’s earn-
ings where men are considered the breadwinner. 
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For poor women who have to perform their domestic tasks, the doc-
tors’ advice to take rest during pregnancy also sounded absurd. As Hoi-
monti, a fifty-three-year-old woman from a poor household, mother of 
six children said: 
As soon as you become pregnant the doctor will tell, you are not allowed 
to carry big water jars (kolosh) on your hip; you are not allowed to pump 
the tube well; you are not allowed to sweep your yard (uthan); you are not 
allowed to step on a dheki, (a wooden frame to husk rice from 
paddy/bara bana), what kind of language is this? I did everything. I didn’t 
have any problem. (Interview, Hoimonti, Bengali, Gachhabari, 15 July 
2008). 
 
  Despite this wishful thinking of elder women, the reality is rather 
complex. Zakia, a 21 year old Bengali woman from a poor family, was 
taken to the hospital after considerable suffering and had to have a Cae-
sarian. She shared her experience saying: 
We are a farming family (grihastha poribar) with unlimited chores. I also 
have to take care of my old parents-in-law. I have a very little time to my-
self. When my delivery pain started my sister-in-law called a dai. My hus-
band was working in the field. The labour pain lasted for more than 12 
hours but there was no sign of delivery. By that time my husband came 
home and the dai asked him to get a saline saying saline will increase the 
pain and help to deliver the baby. After injecting the saline my pain in-
creased terribly. Dai examined me and with disappointment told my hus-
band to take me to the hospital. After waiting the whole night my husband 
took me to the hospital next morning. The dai also accompanied me. 
Doctors said it wasn’t possible to do a normal delivery, therefore had to 
do a Caesarean immediately. It cost my husband 7,000 tk, which he bor-
rowed from our relatives. (Interview, Zakia, Bengali, Gachhabari, 10 Sep-
tember 2008). 
During the interview her child was eight months old and she was two 
months pregnant again. The doctor already told her that if she conceives 
for the second time she has to do another Caesarean, but she had not 
expected to become pregnant so quickly after her first delivery. Consid-
ering the cost of another Caesarean she was thinking of doing a Men-
strual Regulation (MR) or even an abortion. 
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During my stay in Gachhabari, another Bengali woman gave birth to 
stillborn twins. There were different opinions whether the twins were 
already dead before the labour pain started or died during the delivery 
process. Perhaps this could have been prevented with a Caesarean if she 
was taken to the hospital in time. However, the cost of childbirth re-
mains a significant barrier for many women to seek professional care 
during childbirth. 
It seems however that educated women from well-off families are 
changing their perception towards Caesarean. Laboni a 19 year old Garo 
participant, who came from a comparatively well-off family chose to do 
a Caesarean. Laboni’s husband has a permanent job in an NGO. Since 
she became pregnant she went to BRAC regularly for pregnancy check-
ups. BRAC health workers promote women to go to the UHC during 
delivery, since this is the lower level government service available for 
childbirth by trained health personnel. When she arrived at the UHC, 
there was no doctor available, but two nurses. She was taken to a local 
clinic. After examination the doctor recommended a Caesarean. Laboni 
and her husband were convinced that it might be risky to try a normal 
delivery and opted for a Caesarean. All together it cost 9,000 tk at a local 
clinic.  
These cases suggest that women’s views about Caesarean are con-
tested, and related to class. Poor women perceive it as unnecessary and a 
means for corrupt medical practitioners to generate an extra income. 
Women from well-off families perceive it as a medical intervention to 
avoid risk during complicated delivery. Some women relate it with physi-
cal disabilities and fear it might jeopardise their future contribution in the 
household which demand their labour. Hence, the decision women take 
is very much shaped by their lived realities depending on their socio-
economic context. 
6.3.2 Dealing with delivery or reproductive/sexual health related 
problems 
In this context where women mostly rely on home deliveries in the ab-
sence of skilled health professionals during childbirth, discussions and 
in-depth interviews with a number of women reveal that women suffer 
from long-term and short-term delivery-related complications, such as 
perineal tear (tears in the perineal tissue between the vagina and rectum), 
uterine prolapse (the falling or sliding of the womb/uterus from its nor-
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mal position into the vaginal area) and obstetric fistula (a hole between 
either the rectum and vagina or between the bladder and vagina). 
Narrative of both older and young women consider perineal tear as 
inevitable. For example Rupali, a twenty-eight-year-old Bengali woman, 
mother of two children said: 
During the delivery the vagina will tear a bit. Otherwise how will the baby 
come out without tearing it? After the delivery it hurts to go to the toilet 
and it burns during urination. This is the pain all women have to suffer 
even if they go to the hospital for delivery. It is unavoidable, after a few 
days it will be over. (Interview, Rupali, Bengali, Gachhabari, 21 July 2008). 
 Among elderly women uterine prolapse was reported as a major 
childbirth related problem. Khadiza Begum, a forty nine year old Bengali 
woman, mother of four children mentioned her uterine prolapse (joraiu 
neme jawa) after her last delivery. She explained: 
When my fourth child was born, I caught a cold. Two/three days after my 
delivery, I felt my nari came down, while I was coughing hard. If I sit on a 
low stool/bench if comes out side my body like a guti (lump). (Interview, 
Khadiza Begum, Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 July 2008). 
This problem is locally known as gutir rog. Khadiza Begum suffers 
from lower abdominal pain after doing any physical work and it also 
burns during urination. She was aware of the possibilities of an operation 
at the district hospital; however, she already spent many years of her life 
in this misery. She says: 
What is the use of doing an operation at this age? It is very itchy and 
smelly. It would be a matter of shame (shoromer bepar) to show this to the 
male doctors. It is better to die than to live in shame (shoromer cheye mo-
ron bhalo). (Interview, Khadiza Begum, Bengali, Gachhabari, 16 July 
2008). 
It is not surprising that as only elder women develop this problem, 
they were ashamed to speak about these problems and endured silently. 
Among young Bengali women fistula was reported as a delivery re-
lated health problem. Fistula did not have any local term but was identi-
fied with such symptoms as constant urination in drops (phota phota 
posrab howa). Fistula develops due to prolonged labour/obstructed la-
bour more especially among young mothers. During home delivery, 
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women end up waiting too long in labour pain and women with early 
pregnancy develop fistula. Among my respondents Bonna was married 
off at the age of fifteen and had her first child at the age of seventeen. 
During her delivery she developed a fistula. She suffers from severe 
lower abdominal pain and burning sensation during intercourse. 
Bonna came from a landless poor Bengali family. She gave birth at 
her parent’s house when she developed this complication. A local dai in 
her mother’s neighbourhood assisted her during delivery. Due to her 
poor health condition she stayed two months at her parent’s house after 
her delivery. Her husband and mother-in-law send several messages to 
her parents to send Bonna back to her in-laws’ house. I meet Bonna nine 
months after her delivery. When I asked her why her husband is not tak-
ing her to a doctor, she said: 
He doesn’t have money to take me to the hospital. He says my parents 
should pay for the treatment but they are poor, they can’t pay either. I 
have two younger sisters. My parents have to arrange their marriage as 
well. If they had money they would have sent me to study, not marry me 
off at that young age. (Interview, Bonna, Bengali, Gachhabari, 31 August 
2008). 
Although Bangladesh government passed the Child Marriage Re-
straint (Amendment) Ordinance in 1984, making it illegal for females to 
marry under the age of eighteen, in practice this law in not implemented. 
According to UNICEF data, still 74% of Bangladeshi girls are married 
off before the legal age of eighteen. Poor girls are often married off at an 
earlier age compared to richer girls, as younger brides require smaller 
dowries (Al-Mahmood 2012). To explain the reason of early marriage 
among poor Bengalis in the village, Phalguni Banu, a fifty-four-year-old 
woman, mother of three daughters and two sons said, 
We can see that rich people send their daughters to school and marry 
them off at a later age but we can’t. Poor people have to marry off their 
daughters earlier. Nobody can say anything against the rich people’s 
daughters. The daughters of the rich family (ghor) make jaira pet (become 
pregnant as a result of relationships before marriage) and abort the foetus. 
Nobody can say anything against them. If their daughters flee away from 
their parent’s house (palaiya jay) with a boyfriend, girls are brought back 
and their parents arrange their marriage (gochaiya dewa) with a suitable 
marriage candidate with a huge amount of dowry. If wealthy girls have an 
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abortion people will say she had a tumour operation. If our girls have a 
pimple (phora) people will say they made a pet (became pregnant due to 
extra-marital affair). (Interview, Phalguni Banu, Bengai, Gachhabari, 19 
July 2008). 
Phalguni Banu’s statement illustrates how the dowry payment pushes 
early marriage among poor households, since early marriage requires less 
amount of dowry. At the same time, with age the risk of being involved 
in a love affair increases. Marriages are usually arranged by parents. If 
parents do not consider the man/boy their daughter is having an affair 
with as a suitable marriage partner, they organise her marriage with a 
“suitable” man. In such cases the scandal of the love affair might push 
the dowry payment sky high for the poor households.  
Discussion with Phalguni Banu further revealed that due to the mixed 
ethnic community in Gachhabari, Bengali Muslim parents fear their 
daughters might get involved in love affairs with Garo boys which would 
be socially unacceptable59. To prevent this, parents arrange early marriage 
of their daughters. Another study (Rashid 2007) also found that early 
marriage results from pragmatic reasons among the urban poor. The 
pragmatic reality of poor households doesn’t match with the interna-
tional/national understanding of legal age at marriage. In the absence of 
EmOC for young mothers, early marriage and early childbirth thus con-
tribute to develop fistula. 
Interestingly, I didn’t find a single Garo woman with complication of 
fistula or uterine prolapse in the village. This might be partly due to the 
absence of child marriage practice among Garos. The household survey 
confirms that age at marriage is higher among Garos compared to Ben-
gali women (discussed in Chapter Seven). 
A focus group discussion with seven TBAs further revealed that Ga-
ros follow food restrictions and adjust their sitting position to prevent 
these complications. Shomola dai mentioned in the group discussion: 
From seven months of pregnancy till three months after delivery, women 
have to keep both legs closed when they sit to keep the baby small and to 
prevent the uterus to prolapse. After the delivery women have to eat small 
                                                 
59 During an interview with the head of St. Paul’s Church in Pirgacha it was revealed that al-
though pre-marital relation is prohibited among Muslims, a number of unmarried Bengali girls 
gave birth at the maternal centre of the missionary. The children that were born are given for 
adoption. 
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amounts of food at a time throughout the day. We don’t give sour 
(chukka) food after delivery. We also don’t give kochu60 to eat to prevent 
itching. We advise to eat more vegetables and potatoes with rice. We don’t 
give meat or fish, while Bengalis suggest eating shing and tengra fish. 
(Shomola, Garo, Gachhabari, FGD, 25 April 2008). 
Given the importance of women’s position in Garo households and 
the role of local TBAs, this knowledge might have helped matrilineal Ga-
ros to prevent fistula and uterine prolapse. Their nutrition might have 
also played a positive role in this. Garo women are not discriminated in 
terms of distribution of food in the household. Garos believe pregnant 
women should eat more to be strong to give birth easily and to be able 
to resume their work after delivery. 
In the FDG with TBAs, restriction on sexual intercourse was further 
mentioned as a reason for complications among Bengali women. A gos-
sip shared in the focus group was: 
We (Garos) believe women’s body stays soft inside for three months after 
delivery. Our men also know that. We don’t have sex for three months af-
ter delivery. After three months when everything is back to nor-
mal...(laughter)...fun starts again. Nowadays people don’t obey those re-
strictions any more (bach goch kore na). Bengalis say they don’t have sex 
before 40 days after delivery. But we see some people don’t even wait 11 
or 12 days after delivery. (Nibedita, Garo, Gachhabari, FGD, 25 April 
2008). 
Bengali TBAs showed their tacit agreement with such gossip. One 
relatively young Bengali TBA even acknowledged with blushes saying, 
“our husbands don’t obey our rejections (nishedh maney na) to wait for 
40 days”. However, these perceptions are no proof of any relationship 
between fistula/uterine prolapse and the duration of sexual abstinence 
after delivery. 
During the focus group discussion prolapsed uterus (guti rog or 
shutikar beram in local terms) was considered to be the worse reproduc-
tive health problem (projonon shastho shomossha) as husbands often re-
ject their wives because of this disease. Because of the fear of rejection 
and having a co-wife (shotin) women often hide this disease from their 
                                                 
60 A particular kind of leafy vegetable. 
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husbands and suffer silently. With time it becomes worse and impossible 
to hide anymore. Besides prolapsed uterus and fistula, irregular men-
struation and pain during menstruation (badhok rog), white discharge 
(dhatu rog) and infertility (phol dhore na) were mentioned as common 
reproductive health problems among women. Vaginal tear was men-
tioned as temporary, therefore considered as a lesser problem. 
Due to the preference for female providers among both Garos and 
Bengalis, women mostly rely on informal TBAs or home remedies for 
these complications. For example, women use a heat source (cheka) or 
herbal medicine from TBAs to treat the perineal tear. Local TBAs are 
also known to give herbal medicine against uterine prolapse, menstrual 
pain and infertility. Women sometimes consult with village doctor and 
local kaviraj. In that case men (their husbands) mostly explain the symp-
tom of the complication and get medicine. Garo women also consulted 
kamal (religious healer) for infertility problems. 
6.3.3 Men’s views and perspectives on reproductive health 
problems 
Men’s views regarding the persistence and severity of reproductive health 
problems in the community differed. In a separate focus group discus-
sion organised with men from mixed ethnic communities, they ranked 
women’s reproductive health problem in the following order: prolapsed 
uterus (shutika); white discharge (shada srab); pain during menstruation 
(badhok), physical weakness due to thin white discharge (dhatu rog) and 
irregular menstruation (mostly heavy or long duration or several times in 
a month). Men didn’t mention fistula or vaginal tear as reproductive 
health problems of women, but they identified infertility as a more se-
vere problem for women than men. In men’s perception the reproduc-
tive health problem of women having the most severe impact on conju-
gal relationships is prolapsed uterus followed by irregular menstruation. 
While women’s reproductive health problems were seen in terms of 
menstruation, delivery related problem and infertility, men’s reproductive 
health problems were mostly seen in terms of sexuality related problem. 
Men’s top four reproductive health problems included: frequent night 
pass (ghono ghono shopno dosh); masturbation (hat mara); syphilis (chi-
philis) and homosexuality (shomokamita). The list of reproductive health 
problem continued with: thin semen (dhatu patla), less semen (kom 
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dhatu), took too much time for erection (derite uttejona asha), quick 
ejaculation (druto birzo shkolon) and premature ejaculation (shamoik 
uttejonay birjopat). The most common problem was the shape of the 
penis (matha mota gora chikon) followed by impotency (dhojobongo) 
and premature ejaculation. In terms of impact on conjugal relationship 
the most severe problem for men was impotency followed by premature 
ejaculation. (FGD, men 18 May 2008). 
According to the participants of the FGD, syphilis is a new reproduc-
tive health disease in the village. Unprotected sexual contact with prosti-
tutes in the local towns is the reason for this disease. Homosexuality was 
seen as a reason related to the problem with the shape of penis (matha 
mota gora chikon) and performance during sexual intercourse (rog 
dhila), when the penis becomes weak, do not stay tight anymore. 
Focus groups and further discussions with a number of key infor-
mants revealed that men tend to depend on informal sector actors for 
treatment of these reproductive/sexual health problems. They usually 
rely on local kaviraj (traditional healer). These treatments are done se-
cretly in the village. For the treatment of impotency herbal tonic is avail-
able in the form of sticky syrup in bottles, which should be taken every 
morning on an empty stomach. To make the penis hard and thick differ-
ent kind of herbal message oil is commonly available. Four medicinal 
plants i) khuirakata; ii) ubudnengra; iii) ulot combol; and iv)shotomul 
are also known to increase men’s sexual power. During FDG a man 
claimed success by saying, “It works like magic. It makes the penis so 
hard that wife can’t breathe anymore”. While impotency (dhozobongo) 
treatment is done by local kaviraj, the cost of treatment for syphilis is 
much higher. Men usually get Glaisovin tablet from the village doctor to 
treat this disease. On the local market day (haat) herbal medicine is also 
sold to treat sexual and reproductive health problems. This type of medi-
cine claims some supernatural power that dictates the treatment in 
dreams (FGD, men, 18 May 2008). The above discussion shows how the 
absence of formal health care services also makes men rely on traditional 
and informal private sector providers to treat their reproductive/sexual 
health problems. 
These findings mirror general patterns in the health care system in 
Bangladesh. Other studies (BHW 2011, Rashid 2011, Rashid et al 2012) 
have shown that in the absence of adequate reproductive health care ser-
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vices in the formal sector, more than 80 per cent of the poor population 
(men and women) rely on the informal and private sector for their re-
productive health care needs. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Rather than the notion of rigid cultural norms or lack of poor women’s 
agency to explain the low use of public health care services (suggests in 
the policy discourse), this chapter provided insight how a complex inter-
play of health system factors and cultural factors shape childbirth prac-
tices at home relying on traditional birth attendants in Gachhabari. 
Given the fluidity of cultural norms, although some Bengali women’s 
narratives associated giving birth at home with purdah norms, at the 
same time purdah norms were lifted a bit when poorer Bengali women 
had to go to the forest to collect firewood. Garo women on the other 
hand were neither confined in the household nor experience restriction 
on their mobility in the public spaces. Yet, they also relied on home de-
liveries assisted by traditional birth attendants. 
Evidence provided in this chapter shows that cultural norms are also 
entangled with structural elements. A class differentiation was evident 
with poorer women stressing that doing daily household chores helped 
in having normal deliveries. By highlighting the household reproduction 
poor Bengali women asserted their contribution in the household. While 
these women could not abandon their reproductive work in the house-
hold, they also made light of their inability to pay for pregnancy check-
ups and child delivery stating that women from richer households need 
to go to the hospital due to their inability to give delivery at home “nor-
mally”. Poor women even rejected the need for a Caesarean during com-
plicated delivery, since it might affect their work contribution in the fu-
ture. Poor Garo women experienced more work burden since they also 
worked as wage labourer. 
Particularly the poorer Garo and Bengali women found it more diffi-
cult to trade-off between their reproductive responsibilities in the house-
hold and outside and their biological reproduction. This link to women’s 
household reproduction largely remains invisible in the policy discourse 
and health care service delivery mechanism. A study (Nasreen et al 2010) 
found that affordable safe childbirth facilities at the community level can 
reduce maternal death to a great extent. This evidence supports that 
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bringing the maternal health care services closer to women can ensure 
better access during childbirth by minimising women’s time off from 
their household reproductive activities. 
Women’s narratives also suggest that poor women do not mindlessly 
adhere to the tradition of home delivery. The reliance on TBAs was due 
to trust and an acknowledgement of their knowledge and skills. Even 
educated Garo women relied on the expertise on the TBAs to refer them 
to the hospitals if complications arise. Based on women’s voices and 
meaning of their childbirth practices it can be argued that although cul-
tural norms play a role, the hidden cost and poor quality of care remains 
the main constraint for poor women to access formal health care ser-
vices. In the absence of adequate and affordable health care services, 
poor women continue to rely on TBAs or informal health care providers 
to deal with childbirth, after delivery and other reproductive health re-
lated complications as the best available option for them. 
One interesting finding emerging from the exploration of childbirth 
practices is that in both Garo and Bengali communities, childbirth is 
seen as women’s business; therefore men stay outside the realm of deci-
sion making. This finding indicates that understanding women’s agency 
in childbirth practices require reconstructing gender power relations, also 
beyond intra-household gender dynamics, cross-cutting with class and 
ethnicity. 
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7 
The politicisation of ethnic 
identity, matrilineal ethos and 
fertility among Garos in 
Gachhabari 
7.1 Introduction 
As explained in the introductory chapter, the main reason for the focus 
on Garos in this study was their unique matrilineal system which offers 
Garo women land rights, a kinship system followed by mother’s lineage 
and a matrilocal residence pattern, while mainstream Bengalis follow the 
opposite. Due to their matrilineal kinship system, I expected Garo 
women would exercise more autonomy in reproductive decision making 
process in the household as compared to Bengali women and that this 
would lead to lower fertility. However, as will be shown in this chapter, 
the household survey found only marginal differences between the two 
groups, with both groups having the same number of pregnancies and 
Garo women having slightly higher numbers of surviving children. This 
finding left me with a puzzle, does ethnicity make any difference, and if 
so, in what ways? 
This chapter delves deeper to explore the ways ethnic and gender 
power relations intersect in shaping Garo women’s reproductive deci-
sions. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section 
presents the results of the household survey comparing fertility among 
adivasi Garos, mainstream Bengalis and minority Hindus. It then pre-
sents the views of Garo men and women which suggest reasons why, 
despite enjoying significant autonomy in their existing matrilineal system, 
Garo women have similar fertility outcomes compared to Bengali 
women from a patrilineal system, given the similar socio-economic back-
ground. 
The second section provides a historical and political perspective to 
analyse and explore the politicisation of ethnic identity and its link to fer-
tility behaviour among Garos. 
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7.2 Comparison of fertility among Garo, Hindu and Bengali 
women 
Diagram 7.1 
Number of pregnancies and living children per woman, by ethnic groups 
(average for all age groups) 
 
Source: Household Survey add year and total sample 
 
Diagram 7.1 shows the average number of pregnancies and living 
children in the different ethnic groups, based on the survey of 502 
households. While some caution is needed due to the nature and size of 
the sample of women interviewed, 61 it suggests that while women in 
both groups have experienced the same number of pregnancies, the av-
erage number of living children is somewhat higher among Garos (2.9) 
                                                 
61 One ever married woman above the age of 15 was interviewed from each of the 502 house-
holds. Preference was given to women in 15-49 age group who were married during the interview 
period. In case there were more than one woman in this age group in a household the younger 
woman was selected for the interview. In case of no women in that reproductive age group, 
women above the reproductive age group were selected for the interview. Total number of actual 
pregnancies and total number of currently surviving children of each woman was documented. 
Diagram 7.1 shows average number of pregnancies and living children across all women of all age 
groups. 
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as compared to the Bengali Muslims (2.6) and minority Hindus (2.2). If 
Muslims and Hindus were merged within one Bengali category, the out-
come would remain the same due to the very small number of Hindu 
households and a large number of Muslims. 
Dyson and Moore’s well-known study (1983) used kinship patterns as 
a locus of women’s autonomy in explaining regional fertility differentials 
in India. These authors argued that if the kinship pattern offers more 
equitable access to resources, women tend to have higher status and 
lower fertility. Although the Garo matrilineal kinship system offers Garo 
women a higher status, it seems to be not a sufficient condition to ex-
plain their fertility choice. A previous study done in Madhupur (Harbi-
son et al. 1989) further found that in the 1980s Garo women had similar 
levels of fertility compared to Bengali women (on an average 3.9 living 
children). 
Diagram 7.2 
Distribution of age at first marriage of women62 by ethnic groups 
 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
                                                 
62 Age at marriage in this study covers actual age during first marriage of 502 women who were 
interviewed. 
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Among the many factors which may influence numbers of pregnan-
cies and child survival (not all of which could be systematically explored 
in this study), one clear difference between the groups concerns age at 
first marriage. Diagram 7.2 shows a significantly higher age at marriage 
among Garos as compared to Bengali63 Muslim and minority Hindus. 
According to convention and other things being equal, a higher age at 
marriage would result in lower fertility among Garos. In preceding chap-
ters we have seen that Garo women are comparatively higher educated 
and have more access to wage work. All these suggest that Garo women 
should have lower fertility when compared to their Bengali counterparts, 
but the survey found the opposite, at least in terms of the number of liv-
ing children. 
 This finding is interesting in relation to the competing explanations of 
the determinants of reproductive behaviour discussed in the Introduc-
tion. Following the argument of Bairagi and others (2001) if the desired 
family size was the same among two groups of women in the current 
situation, “couples” would have used different modes of contraception 
including MR and abortion in the absence of modern contraception to 
achieve their desired number of children. Following the argument of 
Phillips et al. (1988) and Cleland (1994) if cheap, available and effective 
contraception could initiate reduced demand for children and lower fer-
tility irrespective of socio-economic condition, both groups should have 
shown the same level of fertility (although lower than the 1980s). But the 
higher fertility in terms of number of living children among Garos indi-
cates that the desired number of children didn’t reduce at the same pace 
among both groups of women. Given the availability of modern contra-
ception to both groups of women (as discussed in Chapter Five), and 
higher education and access to wage work among Garo women (as 
                                                 
63 The age at marriage is divided into five groups: Younger than 10, 11-13, 14-16, 17-19 and 20 
and older. Early child marriage (younger than 10) is totally absent among Garos. While 7 per cent 
of the Hindu and 9 per cent of the Muslim women got married before the age of 10, only 3.8 per 
cent of the women got married in the 11-13 age group among Garos. Many of the Muslim 
women (29 per cent) got married at this age group (11-13). Most of the Muslim women (41.6 per 
cent) got married between the ages of 14-16. While only 21.5 per cent Garos and 35.7 per cent 
Hindus were married at that age. In contrast, most of the Garo women (39.2 per cent) got mar-
ried between the ages of 17-19 compared to Muslims (only 15.7 per cent). A large number of 
Garo women (35.4 per cent) got married in their twenties, while among Muslims this number is 
quite low (only 4.6 per cent). 
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shown in Chapter Four), the household survey evidence seems to sup-
port Bairagi and others (2001). In other words, to explain fertility behav-
iour, it is the desired number of children that matters most, the access to 
modern contraception is secondary. The age specific average number of 
children among both groups of women, as shown below, further seems 
to support this argument. 
Diagram 7.3 
Average number of living children by age group of women and ethnic groups 
 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
Diagram 7.3 shows lower fertility among younger Garos as compared 
to younger Bengalis, which it to be expected given the significantly 
higher age at first marriage. Most interesting is the 35-44 age group, 
which is the most important age group before ending their reproductive 
cycle. While Bengali women in this age group reduced their fertility sig-
nificantly as compared to their elder (45-54 age group) sisters (3.1 and 
4.2 respectively), Garo women in the same age group did not reduce 
their fertility in the same level as compared to their elder sisters (3.6 and 
4.0 respectively), suggesting that despite the higher age at marriage they 
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are ‘catching up’ with their Bengali sisters who married (and started hav-
ing children) younger. Due to the lower fertility among younger Garo 
women the average number of pregnancies does not show a significant 
difference. However, from my observation and conversations with both 
Garos and Bengalis, I was confronted with a discourse of higher fertility 
desire among Garos. The interesting question that follows is to explore 
what are the reasons, perceptions and rationales for having a higher fer-
tility desire among Garos. 
A combination of possibly relevant factors emerged regarding high 
fertility amongst the Garos including the matrilineal ethos, ethnic ten-
sions, a relatively higher return from children, religious belief and norms 
and the assertion of choice to have a higher number of children. We ex-
plore these in turn below. 
7.2.1 Matrilineal ethos and the aspiration for daughters/sons 
One perception of the value of children was related to daughter/son 
preference. While son preference (and even its corollary, relative daugh-
ter aversion) is commonly reported among Bengalis and many other 
South Asian communities (Gupta and Bhat 1997; Rahman and DaVanzo 
1993; Rahman 1990; Bairagi and Langsten 1986; Chowdhury and Bairagi 
1991; Oomman and Ganatra 2002; Belanger 2006; Greenhalgh 1994), 
Garos expressed a strong desire for daughters (also found in Rao 1985). 
All Garos desire to have at least one daughter to carry on their mother-
hood. The narratives of a 47 year old Garo leader, Uzine Sangma can 
best illustrate this. 
We are matrilineal. Daughters are very important for us. After giving birth 
to three sons my wife gave birth to a daughter. But the daughter died two 
days after she was born. My wife was crying and became desperate for a 
daughter. I contacted the “father” (head) of Pirgacha missionary. He gave 
me a three months old daughter to adopt. After adopting that daughter 
from the missionary my wife gave birth to another daughter. Now we have 
five children. According to our customary law the youngest daughter will 
be the heiress (nokma). (Interview, Uzine Sangma, Garo, Gachhabari, 7 
August 2008). 
In discussions with both Garo men and women irrespective of their 
educational level or socio-economic background, the desire to have 
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daughters was mentioned as explanation of their having a higher total 
number of children than desired. 
While the desire for daughters was universal, there seemed to be a 
growing aspiration to have sons as well. The narratives of Elmer, a 40 
year old Garo rickshaw van puller, a father of six children can illustrate 
this, he said: 
As Mandis, we need daughters. Without daughters who will carry on our 
motherhood? If we don’t have a daughter of our own, we have to borrow 
daughters to become the heiress. Women do everything in our society. 
Our women maintain the household (shongsher). Nowadays our daughters 
are going to the parlours and managing the family in the village. We also 
need sons. Nowadays, I see cultivation, business, shops and markets every-
thing is run by men. Men can go to the court, they can bargain with the 
police and the forest officers. They can go to the members (local represen-
tatives) during disputes. Not everybody gives value to women’s voice (So-
bai mohilar kothar dam dey na). (Interview, Elmer, Garo, Gachhabari, 29 
August 2008). 
A number of men from different socio- economic backgrounds and 
specially educated women expressed a desire for a balanced family. God-
huli, a 37 year old highly educated Garo woman and mother of four 
children, said: 
Two sons and two daughters are ideal. We need both daughters and sons. 
Brothers and sisters can help each other. There are some places you can’t 
send your daughter at night in case of emergency. We have three daugh-
ters and a son. I still have a desire for another son. That is why we (hus-
band and wife) are not considering of doing any permanent method. (In-
terview, Godhuli, Gachhabari, 6 August 2008). 
The desire to have sons was linked to the exigencies of the land 
struggles in the area (which I will describe in detail later in this chapter). 
As Garos had to deal increasingly with eviction notices and court cases, 
the environments in courts and police station were seen as hostile to 
women, hence the need for sons as well was expressed. 
It was not possible however to determine whether the desire to have 
sons was simply a pragmatic choice asserted by some Garo men and 
women or also a diffusion of patriarchal ideology from their Bengali 
neighbours or from the Church. 
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7.2.2 Religious beliefs and the role of the Church 
Another aspect of higher fertility among Garo women was related to re-
ligious restrictions on fertility control. During discussions a number of 
elderly women (45-54) often mentioned, “It is a sin to destroy eggs 
(dimbo nosto kora pap)”. “If God gives many children what to do” 
(Bhogoban diley ki er kora)? Following conversion from their old shang-
sarek religion to Christianity (as explained earlier in Chapter Four), Ga-
ros are given religious training by missionaries. As a part of marriage cus-
toms, Garo men and women have to go through an intermediary 21 
days, from the first time they announce their intention to marry to the 
day of the actual marriage ceremony. During this time the marriage part-
ners receive training from the church to prepare them for the marriage, 
which includes the prohibition on modern family planning. 
A rejection of family planning message among elder Garos resonates 
such sentiment. For example, Priya Chishim, a 55 year old Garo woman 
from a medium socio-economic background said: 
It is only now we hear that it is good to have fewer children. Nobody said 
this kind of thing before. Those who aspire to have fewer children are 
those who don’t care about gosthi (community), they only think of their 
self-interest. We don’t understand how one can form a family (shongsher 
kora) with fewer children. Once children grow up, they wouldn’t have 
enough siblings to consult to take important decisions. (Priya Chishim, 
Garo, Gachhabari, 12 September 2008). 
Bal (2000:191) contended that the missionaries have played an impor-
tant part in the unification of Garos into a distinct ethnic community 
which they are today. A strong communal identity rather than an indi-
vidualistic self-determination, as reflected in the above statement, seems 
to reject attempts to reduce their fertility. 
Local Bengalis had their own explanation for the high fertility of Garo 
women. Revealing a tension within the village community Abdul Hamid 
(a 55 year old Bengali grocery shop owner in the village), who seemed to 
be quite prejudiced, felt that patronage from the Church was a reason. 
He said: 
It is not possible to reduce fertility among Mandis. There are many organi-
sations to help them. Mandi children get free education from the mission-
ary school. If they are a little bit educated they get jobs at Caritas (a Chris-
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tian NGO) and beauty parlours. Nobody knows what would have hap-
pened with Mandis if missionaries were not here. Mandis were illiterate 
and lived like “beast of Madhupur Jungle” (boner poshu). Missionaries 
made them educated. Now they are more educated than Bengalis in this 
area. They also get jobs easily. With the same level of education it is diffi-
cult to get jobs for Bengalis. (Interview, Abdul Hamid, Bengali, Gachha-
bari, 29 April 2008). 
Abul Hamid used a Bangla proverb, “ek mukh shona dia bhorano jay, 
dosh mukh chai dia-o bhorano jay-na”, (It is possible to fill one mouth 
with gold, not possible to fill ten mouths even with ashes), to express his 
concern about growing poverty among Bengalis and the relatively better 
position of the Garos. This theme was echoed by others, mentioned by 
both men and women. Akbar, a thirty five years old Bengali rickshaw 
puller said: 
There was no scarcity in old days. Nowadays it is difficult to provide 
proper food and education for two children. It is difficult to have many 
children; they will die of hunger. (Ager jugey ovab chilo na. Ekhon duita 
baccha hoi-lei thikmoto khawa pora jogar kora mushkil. Beshi baccha ne-
war upay nai, Na khaiya mortey hoibo). (Interview, Akbar, Bengali, 
Gachhabari, 20 July 2008). 
Similar to Bengalis, Garos also experienced growing economic hard-
ship. This is reflected when Shopon Mrong, a 30 years old Garo man 
stated: 
Previously, Garos used to own huge amounts of land and there were not 
many people living in the forest. The forest was a treasure, many varieties 
of grains and edible roots were available, such as cassava and wild pota-
toes, it was not a problem to have many children and there was always 
plenty to eat. Now one piece of land has been divided into ten smaller 
pieces. Even if someone desires to have many children it seems impossi-
ble. Nowadays even one child goes hungry. But the decision to have or 
not to have children ultimately depends on the wife. We believe having or 
not having children doesn’t work by force (Interview, Shopon Mrong, 
Garo, Gachhabari, 27 August 2008). 
These narratives illustrate that both Bengali and Garo communities 
experienced increasing poverty and scarcity of resources. As mentioned 
earlier, in comparison with a previous study (Harbison et al. 1989) done 
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in Madhupur, the household survey suggests that both Garos and Ben-
galis reduced their fertility. However, Bengalis reduced their fertility rela-
tively more than Garos. The narratives above suggest that Bengalis felt 
that they had less economic return from children. Although faced with 
economic difficulties, Garos still find relative economic return from 
children. This seems to have a mutual interest with the missionary ideol-
ogy. 
7.2.3 Relative economic return from children 
Another perception related to desire for children was the relative eco-
nomic return from children due to alternative livelihood opportunities. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork when I went to interview a Garo par-
ticipant Ambia, a 48 year old Garo woman and a mother of 10 living 
children (two miscarriages) with a Garo health worker, I asked Ambia 
why she chose to give birth to so many children (in my understanding it 
isn’t good for women’s health). Ambia started to talk with the health 
worker in Garo language64. I didn’t understand anything of what she was 
saying but from her expression I could realise that she didn’t like my 
question. After translation from the health worker I understood Ambia 
thought I was promoting government family planning and her response 
was: 
We have nothing to do with the government. The government doesn’t do 
anything for us. Why do they care if we have many children or not? Is the 
government going to take care of me when I become old? One of my 
daughters will take care of me in my old age. (Interview, Ambia, Garo, 
Gachhabari, 28 March 2008). 
When the health worker explained about my research objective and 
made it clear that I didn’t have any government family planning objec-
tive, Ambia started to speak in Bangla. Later she became friendly and 
even shared how she became pregnant with her last child when her hus-
band was completely drunk. She objected but couldn’t stop him. Further 
discussion with Ambia revealed that she used to own a large amount of 
land but lost most of it due to indebtedness to Bengali money lenders. 
                                                 
64 Nowadays all the Garos speak the Bangla language, but to keep a distance from Bengalis, Ga-
ros speak their own language among themselves. Due to the fact that Garos don't have a written 
script, young generation Garos are losing their mother’s tongue. 
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Now she works as a day labourer and depends on the forest to collect 
fuel-wood to sell in the local market and for household consumption. 
Ambia’s statement did resonate a strong anti-government sentiment. 
She also considered that I (as an educated Bengali woman) belonged to 
the “others” (as I will explain to the next section how ethnic Garos ex-
perienced exclusion from the state in a Muslim Bengali dominated coun-
try). 
Discussion with a number of Garo women revealed that during sub-
sistence economy Garo women didn’t feel the necessity to reduce their 
fertility because jhum cultivation required family labour. There was no 
concern about the number of children. A decade ago Burling mentioned 
that most people continue to feel comfortable, even proud of having 
produced eight, ten or twelve children, through the infant and child mor-
tality was also high, only a few of them survived (Burling 1997). 
Due to the banning on jhum cultivation and the loss of ancestral land, 
poverty and inequality emerged among Garos (which I will discuss later 
in this chapter). Simultaneously, Garos also experienced other changes in 
their life. The poor conditions of the Garos were a matter of great con-
cern to the Christian missionaries since the anti-colonial agitations (Bal 
2000). Missionary development work provides free education opportuni-
ties. With the help of the missionaries several NGOs such as Caritas, 
World Vision and Action Aid provide employment opportunities to 
Garo boys and girls. Additionally, since the 1980s Garo girls were able to 
have access to jobs in the cities, particularly in beauty parlours and gar-
ment factories. This situation offers Garos relatively higher return from 
children, which provided them a favourable condition to keep their fer-
tility high despite their relatively high age at marriage. 
7.2.4 Ethnic tensions and the perceived need to increase fertility 
Abdul Hamid’s statement above suggests a simmering tension between 
the two communities. A common sentiment expressed by many Garo 
participants can be summarised in the words of Petric Shimsang (a sixty 
year old Garo man), he said: 
There was not a single Bengali in the Madhupur forest area. Now we have 
become a minority in our own ancestors’ land. If we want to survive we 
have to increase our numbers. Otherwise there will be no single Garo left 
234 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
in Madhupur. (Interview, Petric Shimsang, Garo, Gachhabari, 7 August 
2008). 
This sentiment was shared by Garo men and women alike. Dipti Mrong, a 
45 year old female Garo leader of an indigenous social organisation, men-
tioned that her organisation was conducting yard meetings (uthan boithok) 
among Garo women to motivate them to refuse any family planning method 
and to produce as many children as they wish. This was despite herself having 
had a sterilisation operation after her second child. In a discussion she ex-
plained, 
I became pregnant within a year after my first child was born and my 
breast milk stopped. I was afraid I wouldn’t be able to keep my first child 
alive. In the end he survived on goat milk. My second child was born one 
and a half years after the first child. I didn’t want my child to suffer again. 
After the delivery I had a sterilisation operation. After the operation I real-
ised I made a terrible mistake. Now I tell others not to make the same mis-
take like me. (Interview, Dipti Mrong, Gachhabari, 9 August 2008). 
I had this conversation with her, when we were travelling together on 
a rickshaw through the forest area after celebrating indigenous day while 
the evening darkness was approaching. She continued the conversation 
saying, 
We need both rich and poor Garos to increase their numbers. As much as 
we need doctors, engineers and lawyers, we also need rickshaw pullers like 
this brother who is pulling our rickshaw. I feel safe travelling in the dark 
because of my mandi rickshaw puller bhai (brother). I wouldn’t feel safe 
with a strange rickshaw puller to travel through the forest in the dark. This 
place is not safe anymore because of Bengali outsiders. (Interview, Dipti 
Mrong, Garo, Gachhabari, 9 August 2008). 
The feeling of being marginalised in their ancestral land was very 
strong. Since mainstream Bengalis were resettled in Gachhabari (as ex-
plained earlier), gradually much privately owned land has shifted hands 
from Garos to mainstream Bengalis. Living on their mainly subsistence-
oriented livelihood system, Garos were not familiar with the cash econ-
omy. Many Bengalis who came to live in this area bought land from Ga-
ros at a cheap rate or grabbed the land while Garos were unable to pay a 
high interest rate against the money they had borrowed from Bengalis at 
the time of crisis. 
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A thirty-five-year old Bengali rickshaw puller Akbar, who used to take 
me from the village to the sub-district hospital, explained this during our 
long travel. He stated: 
Women used to own land among Garos. During the crisis Garo men bor-
rowed money from Bengali money lenders. Money lenders asked men to 
give land registration papers as a mortgage. Garo men got the land regis-
tration papers from their wives and borrowed money. After a few years 
Bengali land owners said, “you borrowed that much money and your in-
terest is that much. You pay the money with interest otherwise the land 
will be mine”. Garos couldn’t pay the 100 per cent interest rate, the illiter-
ate Garo women didn’t have any option but to put their finger print on 
the land transfer document. Clever Bengali landowners registered the land 
in their names with very little money that Garos borrowed against the 
mortgage (Interview, Akbar, Bengali, Gachhabari, 20 July 2008). 
In this process many Garos gradually lost their lands and land owner-
ship went into the hands of Bengalis. According to Akbar Garos lost 
most of their land because they were owned by women, saying, “If men 
would have owned the land they would have protected them better”. 
This comment is interesting since it again expresses a negative assess-
ment of the Garos as being female dominated and a general perception 
that exists amongst most Bengalis and some Garos that Garo men are 
lazy and aren’t motivated to work. This attitude towards Garo men is not 
specific to Gachhabari but seems to be a part of broader discourse re-
lated to Garo men in general. Given the patriarchal ideology among 
Catholic missionaries, it is not surprising that Bal (2000:170) also men-
tioned similar missionary voices, expressing their worries about the im-
pact of matrilineal kinship on the economic productivity and social inter-
est of Garo men and the issue of indebtedness due to money lending 
from Bengali mahajans (money lenders). 
Land disputes between Garos and Bengalis sometimes have had seri-
ous consequences. Gidita Rema of Jangalia village was stabbed to death 
by a local Bengali in a dispute over her land in 2001. Linthonas Hadima 
of Telki village was stabbed to death by local Bengalis who grabbed her 
land for the construction of a public road (Mangsang 2007). 
This doesn’t mean that Garos are systematically marginalised by the 
mainstream local Bengali population. Nowadays if something happens at 
the local level it gets media coverage. Adivasi organisations also have 
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representation in the local government body of conflict resolution. After 
these incidents the accused persons were put to justice. It is also difficult 
to say whether the motive was simply economic rather than ethnic 
domination by the mainstream Bengali population. However, strong 
communal solidarity among Garos has worked as a control mechanism 
to keep the local power in balance. Local Bengalis expressed their worry 
that if a Bengali says or does something to an individual Garo, the whole 
community from neighbouring villages will come to fight unless the issue 
is resolved. The inter-ethnic tension expressed by Garos seems to origi-
nate mainly from their feeling of becoming the minority in their own an-
cestors’ land. This tension was explicitly putting pressure on the Garo 
community and women in particular as biological reproducers of the 
community as well as preservers of the female line to keep their fertility 
high. 
The reasons given by Garos for their higher fertility however provide 
an immediate explanation of their reproductive decision. To understand 
the broad intersection of the politics of ethnicity and the desire to have a 
higher number of children among Garos, it is necessary to trace the 
changes in the region from a historical and political economy perspec-
tive. 
7.3 State, politics of ethnicity and collective need for 
higher fertility 
The creation of Garo ethnic identity is a cultural artefact of discrete his-
torical and political processes. In Chapter Four we have seen how the 
identity of matrilineal Garos was rooted in their customary livelihood 
system of jhum cultivation. 
7.3.1 Historical and political economy in Madhupur and its link to 
the Garo identity 
The Garos’ jhum cultivation was feasible due to the particular land ten-
ure system that existed in Madhupur before and during the British colo-
nial period. At that time, the sub-continent of India was ruled by Mughal 
Emperors via local zamindars (landlords). Until 1950 forest land of 
Madhupur and its surroundings was private property belonging to the 
local zamindars. The Madhupur forest land was under the control of the 
Hindu Raja of Natore, Shree Jogodindra Nath Ray Bahadur. The Raja 
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(King) of Natore dedicated the forest lands to the God Gobinda and it 
was called debottor sompotty (Gifted Property). The Raja would lease the 
forest lands to the forest dwellers and received land taxes known as 
chang pattan (Satter 2006). Under the local zamindars, the original Garo 
inhabitants of the Madhupur sal forest cultivated the land with slash-
and-burn agriculture for 5-6 consecutive years and then planted sal or 
gazari seed before leaving the cultivated plots (Dey et al 2013). The Ga-
ros were allowed to live in the fertile lowlands under registered home-
stead plots, paying a yearly rent or tax (Nokrek 2013; Satter 2006). 
When Madhupur forest land was registered in 1878, an exception was 
made to the Bengal Tenancy Act recognising the Garo Law of Succes-
sion and Inheritance from the Succession Act of 1865, No.940. Follow-
ing this exemption the lowlands along with some of the high land in the 
Madhupur Jungle were allowed to be registered in the name of female 
members of the household. A Cadastral survey done in 1914-1918 fol-
lowed the Garo inheritance law and was updated as an Act of Law in 
1925 (Satter 2006). Thus women’s right to land was codified in law. 
During the British colonial rule, in order to manage and control forest 
resources, the government of India set up a forest department and the 
control of the sal forests of the Madhupur area went under the state ad-
ministration in 1925-26. In 1927 the British government passed the In-
dian Forest Act and proclaimed Madhupur as “reserved forest”. The ma-
jor objective of the law was to generate state revenue from the forest by 
supplying timber for railway sleepers. Garos were allowed to reside in the 
lowland areas and practice slash and burn on the higher forest blocks, 
but they were prohibited from cutting the valuable sal/gazari trees. (Dey 
2013:8). 
Following the division of the Indian sub-continent, the Government 
of Pakistan passed the East Pakistan Private forest Act of 1947 and the 
East Pakistan State Acquisition & Tenancy Act of I950, which made the 
forests non-retainable under private ownership of zamindars and the 
management of the forest land went directly to the authority of the re-
gional Forest department (Satter 2006). Subsequently, slash-and-burn 
cultivation was condemned as environmentally destructive (Chakma 
2005) and formally banned by the Pakistani government in 1955 (Khale-
que 1986). 
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After banning jhum, the government of Pakistan declared Madhupur 
forest as “national park” on 42,000 acres or 11 square miles of the forest 
lands in 1962, where nineteen Garo villages were situated. The govern-
ment of East Pakistan wanted to evict the Garos from Madhupur Forest 
and put them in a cluster village at Phulbagchala. Poresh Chandra Mree, 
who was a Union Parishad (local government body) Chairman and a 
Garo leader of Chunia village, started various communications with the 
central government. The government was convinced that the project 
would cost a lot of legal battle and the social consequence would be 
enormous, and therefore suspended the project (Satter, 2006:65). 
Soon after that the political situation took a different turn. In 1964, a 
riot broke out and a war began between India and Pakistan. Due to 
communal violence in India, Garos in Northern Mymensingh witnessed 
a sudden influx of Muslim Bengali refugees from Assam, India followed 
by landless Bengali from other places in Bangladesh/East Pakistan. This 
riot has had much significance for non-Muslim Garo community in rela-
tion to their land and identity. Bal (2000) has documented the impact of 
communal violence on Garos in the border area of Mymensingh: 
The arrival of Bengali newcomers coincided with thievery and intimidation 
of the non-Muslim population and with illegal settlements on the lands of 
Garos and their non-Muslim neighbours. Rumours rapidly spread 
throughout the border area that more Bengalis would come to rape and 
kill. Within one month, almost all the Garos from the border area fled the 
country. (...) The influx of Bengalis frightened the Garos because they 
tried to occupy Garo lands and robbed villages, especially at night. At the 
same time, the houses of neighbouring Hajongs, Dalus, and Banais were 
set on fire. At night, Garos could see houses burning everywhere around 
their own villages (Bal 2000:184-185). 
Although no refugees were dumped in Madhupur and violence did 
not erupt, however, a gradually growing stream of Bengalis began to 
move into formerly Mandi areas of Madhupur. The composition of the 
population began to shift and Mandis began to feel like strangers in their 
own villages. The news from their relatives of Northern Mymensingh 
also increased their tension and insecurity as a non-Muslim minority 
group. Some of them decided to flee to India, and others found them-
selves surrounded by Bengali neighbours (Burling 1997:68). 
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Communal tension intensified due to the acceptance of the “Enemy 
Property Ordinance” by the East Pakistan government, whereby prop-
erty of those residing in India came under the control of the Pakistan 
government. This law is reported to have been misused by migrated 
Bengalis to occupy land from Garos (Bal 2000). In Madhupur more land 
shifted ownership through straightforward purchase. Due to the fear 
raised by the Enemy Property Ordinance among non-Muslim groups, 
Garos were not in a position to bargain a fair price for their land (Burling 
1997). Those who didn’t sell their land before they had left to India, 
found their lands had been occupied by Bengali refugees after the war, 
when they returned; Garos and Hindus claimed their rights to their an-
cestors’ land. But the act favoured Bengali Muslims and the Garos and 
Hindus have lost in the court cases (Mangsang 2007). It also involved 
spending a great deal of money on court cases to get back the land that 
had been declared enemy property (Bal 2000). There were stories in the 
village that many Garos spent more money on court cases than the ac-
tual value of their land. Some simply gave up. 
In most of the writings on Garos, 1964 came to be known as “the 
first riot”. Before that the struggle of Garos was simply “local” experi-
encing the banning of a livelihood system that Garos had been depend-
ent on for generations. The “divide and rule” tactics of the colonial gov-
ernment intensified the magnitude of exclusion and marginalisation by 
categorising them as a non-Muslim minority group (the other) in a Mus-
lim dominated region. The communal insurgencies, intimidation and in-
vasion of Garo inhibited areas by refugee and migrant Muslim Bengalis 
illegally or under the protection of the state together go far towards ex-
plains the “othering” of the non-Muslim Garos based on their minority 
religious identity. 
This ethnic tension continued under the post colonial state of Paki-
stan. In the Pakistani election in December 1970 the majority of the seats 
were won by the Awami League, an East Pakistani political movement 
led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman. Before that the centre of Pakistani party 
politics had always been in the Western half of the country. Political ten-
sion arose when the Awami League advocated for more autonomy for 
the Eastern half. Tension escalated and the second riot, the independent 
war of Bangladesh started, which had far worse experience for Garos 
(Burling 1997:71). 
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Since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman kept religion out of politics and mobi-
lised Bengali identity as a nationalist discourse of a secular state (Bal 
2000:192), many Garo men and women actively participated in the free-
dom struggle. According to Ball (2000) many Garos chose the side of the 
Freedom Fighters and dreamt of a country freed from Pakistani domina-
tion, which was based on religious ideology. Meghna Guhathakurta 
(2012) argues that in a state dominated by one religious community, mi-
norities tend to be seen as a “vote bank” for one major political party 
which is considered to be more secular. Thus, non-Muslim Garos have 
been considered to be a source of political alliance for Awami League in 
pre-1971 Pakistan and post-1971 Bangladesh. 
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the newly formed 
government promised that “tribal” people will have full rights over their 
ancestral lands and will not be evicted (Satter, 2006:33). In fact, the con-
stitution of independent Bangladesh was written at Dukhola Rest House 
near Chunia village in Madhupur forest. Dr. Kamal Hossain, a freedom 
fighter and a powerful political leader at that time, who was the minister 
of Law in 1972-73, was close friends with the family of Garo leader 
Poresh Chandra Mree (UP chairman, introduced earlier). When the 
Prime Minister, Bongo Bondhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassi-
nated on the 15th of August 1975, many Garo young men also took part 
in the protest. Later the Government of Bangladesh, then the President 
Ziaur Rahman appointed many Garos in the BDR (Bangladesh Rifles), 
police and army. On February 14, 1976 President Ziaur Rahman de-
clared publicly at Mymensingh town public hall that “No Garo will be 
evicted from Madhupur Jungle” (Homrich 2007). 
Non-Bengali Garos, however did not fit into the nationalist discourse 
of independent Bangladesh (Bal 2000). The process of “othering” and 
exclusion of non-Bengali Garos continued by categorising them as 
“tribal” population in the constitution of Bangladesh. 
Although having a friendly relationship with the political party in 
power favoured Garos until Ziaur Rahman’s regime, this situation began 
to change with the onset of the military government in 1982, and “the 
re-emergence of religious identity as a marker of Bangladeshi national-
ism, which was used by successive ruling regimes as a tool to offset the 
more linguistic-based Bengali nationalism (Guhathakurta 2012: 298)”, 
which was already problematic to embrace non-Bengali Garos in a Ben-
gali nation state. A Forest Gazette Notification was issued in 1984 by the 
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military government. According to this notification the total area of the 
“reserved forest” was declared as 42,767.27 acres of land which included 
many areas of the personal land of the Garos. When this was challenged 
in the court and in the Land settlement office, the Bangladesh Govern-
ment refused to recognise tenancy rights and stopped collecting taxes on 
these lands (Homrich 2007). Since 1984, the Forest Department claims 
that many Garos are squatters (even though it is their traditionally owned 
ancestral land) and successive governments have issued eviction notices 
and filed cases under the Revised Forest Act. In 1990 at the end of rule 
of the National Party of President Ershad, the government of Bangla-
desh amended the Forest Act of 1927. The amendment raised the pun-
ishment from 6 months to 5 years imprisonment plus a tk 5,000 fine for 
entering into the reserve forest area with the intension to “destroy” for-
est resources and included a sub-section making the verdict non-bailable 
(Satter 2006:69). 
According to local estimates, at least 6,000 cases have been filed 
against local Garos for violation of the Forest Act. Those who have been 
arrested suffered in jail for years without any trial. Some people have 
been accused several times for the same incident (Interview, Eugene E. 
Homrich St. Paul’s Church, Pirgacha, 25 October 2008). 
At the same time, the process of eviction continues under the name 
of various development projects. To generate revenue from the “re-
served forests” a number of forest development projects were set up. In 
1985 the government handed over 15,000 acres of forest land to the 
Bangladesh Forest Industry Corporation (BFIDC) for rubber plantation 
and 50 acres of forest land has been given to a project called Charaljani 
Silviculture. These development projects included Khas and registered 
land from Garos. Due to conflict between the Forest Department and 
local people the forest department could hand over a total of only 10,647 
acres of land for the proposed projects. The Forest Department was also 
alleged to have evicted local people from land occupied and used by 
them from the project area without any compensation (Satter 2006:45; 
Mangsang 2007). 
The historical evidence provided above shows how the shift in forest 
land management from local zamindars to the Forest Department and 
the subsequent declaration of “reserve forest” denied Garos right over 
their ancestral land, and this struggle to retain and reclaim their land con-
tinues today. This process also reflects a shift from tension between 
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Muslim and non-Muslim communities to a tension between the tribal 
Garos and state agencies, the Forest Department in particular. 
In the following section, I explore how Garos experience exclusion or 
marginalisation in various forest development projects based on their 
ethnic identity. 
7.3.2 Exclusion from the forest development projects 
In 1990, the government of Bangladesh introduced a 25 million dollar 
“Social Forestry project” funded by the Asian Development Bank and 
the World Bank (Gain 2002; PROSHIKA 2000). My respondents re-
membered this project and the way in which they were excluded: 
In the beginning of the project the Forest Department followed the Social 
Forestry policy imposed by the ADB and World Bank by including some 
Garo households. Later in the second round in 2000, the Forest Depart-
ment did not follow the policies. According to the official rules plots were 
supposed to be distributed among local inhabitants living within a one km 
radius of the plantation area. The idea was that local households who re-
ceive these plots have to take care of the woodlot plantation for 10 years. 
Seven years after the plantation they would have received two third of the 
turn over from the sale of the trees. Three years after that, they would re-
ceive another two third of the turn over from the second round of sale. 
They made contracts with outsiders in exchange for bribes violating the 
policy. They received Tk.10,000 to 30,000 per plot (one hectare). But the 
local poor Garos could not pay bribe so they were deprived of participa-
tion in the Social Forestry projects. Garos are given less than five per cent 
of the plots as a token gesture, even though there were more Garos living 
close to the plantation plot. The rest is given to Bengalis, even those who 
don’t live in and around the area. (Interview, Badal, Garo, Gachhabari, 3 
September 2008). 
A Bengali trader told me he received two plots, one on his name, and 
the other on his wife’s name. He even acknowledged bribing forest offi-
cers to receive these plots. He further justified the decision of not dis-
tributing plots among poor Garos stating: 
If plots would be distributed among poor Garos, they wouldn’t be able to 
protect the plots against thieves. If plots are distributed among well-off 
people they can better take care of their plots. They can invest to clear the 
undergrowth in their plot and buy fertilisers to make the trees grow faster. 
Trees would grow taller and yield a better price when sold. Thieves would 
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be more afraid to cut tress from powerful Bengali plot owners than poor 
Garo women (Interview, Rafiqul Islam, Bengali, 38 years old, Gachhabari, 
21 August 2008). 
Again it is interesting that the perceptions of Bengalis place the blame 
on the fact that women own the land and there are rumours among local 
residents that Garos who were given plots in the first round couldn’t 
yield good profit. 
In addition to exclusion, Garos experienced restriction on their access 
to forest resources on which they are dependent on for generations. In 
2001, the Government declared the establishment of an Eco-Park in the 
Madhupur Forest area and proposed to build a brick wall enclosing 3000 
acres, with 3 watching towers, 13 picnic spots and 10 guest houses. This 
development intervention not only included the land that Garos claim as 
ancestral, but it would also block the roads that Garos have used for cen-
turies to access non-timber products such as food, medicine and house-
hold supplies. Suspicion was expressed by Garo leaders: 
The Eco-Park will isolate all Garo villages and will block the roads we 
have used for centuries. In the near future we will have to pay to enter and 
exit our villages by paying fees at the gates of Eco-Park. The tourists from 
outside would come to pass their leisure times. They will play loud music 
with mikes. If it happens then the mikes will be played from 13 picnic 
spots and 10 guest houses at the same time. Will not the wild birds and 
animals be scared? How long can the forest dwellers stand it? Moreover it 
will affect our social lives and the peace in the forest cannot be main-
tained. Who knows if the guest houses will turn to ghost houses! (Inter-
view, Ginet Nokrek, Garo, Gachhabari, 12 December 2007). 
Garos have already paid a high price due to the declaration of reserve 
forest and felt that making a wall around the forest would make their life 
even worse. A number of Garos from neighbouring villages had lost 
their lives in the hands of forest guards for entering into the reserve for-
est. Bihen Hagiok of Joynagacha was shot to death while he was collect-
ing fuel-wood in April, 1996. Adhir Dopu of Sataria village was shot to 
death while he was helping his wife to collect edible roots in November, 
1999 (Mangsang 2007). 
Garo men and women from all Garo villages protested against the es-
tablished of the wall around Eco-Park, under the leadership of Piren 
Snal. On January 3, 2004 a shooting on a peaceful demonstration killed 
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Piren Snal65 and 25 were wounded (Mangsang 2007). The Eco-Park pro-
ject was stopped temporarily after that incident. However, again Cecilia 
Snal of Sataria village was shot while she was collecting fuel-wood in the 
jungle in August 2006. In addition, many Garos had to suffer in jail for 
trespassing the Forest Law by extracting forest resources. Local Garos 
complained that many of these cases are false. They alleged that right 
before forest officers moves to a new post by rotation, they file many 
false cases. It shows their good performance and helps to get promotion 
in the new post. I did not investigate whether these allegations were right 
or wrong. However, this allegation resonates the growing tension be-
tween Garos and the forest department. 
Garos also rejected the “social forestry project” initiated by the forest 
department in 2007. The Forest Department took initiative to plant trees 
on khas land under the project, which was meant to be based on volun-
tary participation. The Forest Department with the help of the Bangla-
desh Army started planting trees on crop land and even on homesteads 
that Garos claim as their registered land. My respondents suspected it 
was a way to take control over the contested land and evict Garos, say-
ing: 
The local forest officer promised that 40 per cent of the benefit would go 
to the participants but there were no written contracts. This was a way to 
capture “our” land by the forest department (Interview, Dulal, Garo, 
Gachhabari, 21 August 2008). 
Narratives of Garos show they share a common history of communal 
violence, banning of their traditional livelihood systems, loss of land 
ownership and exclusion from forest development projects and restric-
tions on access to the forest resources. Mistrust and suspicion expressed 
by Garos reflect not only their exclusionary experience but also their 
self-identification that unifies them as an ethnic community based on a 
shared history of exclusion and resistance. 
                                                 
65 Since 1962 under the leadership of Poresh Chandra Mree Garos are organised for their land 
rights. To protest against Eco-park project Garos were mobilised in 2004 under the leadership of 
Piren Snal. 
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7.3.3 Collective Action to preserve land and identity 
Garos in Madhupur have been formally organised since 1962 through 
the “indigenous peoples’ association” established by Poresh Chandra 
Mree. After his death Cholesh Ritchil took the leadership. Under his 
guidance, Garos have protested against the Eco-park project since 2001. 
Garos were again mobilised against the “social forestry” project in 2007. 
In several villages, when the Forest Department went to plant trees, 
Garo men and women resisted together. In the description of Shuninda, 
a 35 year old Garo woman: 
When the Forest Department came with the army to plant trees on our 
banana plots or homestead garden, they hired day labourers from other 
neighbouring villages. We women went in front of the army to resist them 
planting Eucalyptus and other foreign tress. We asked our men to stay be-
hind because the army would have arrested our men. The army would not 
easily arrest and torture women. The Forest Department hired some of 
the poor Hindu female day labourers from another neighbouring village. I 
recognised some of them and said to them, “The Forest Department is us-
ing you to work against us. The Forest Department don’t plant trees 
themselves. Without your help they wouldn’t be able to do the work. You 
are elderly women, it wouldn’t be pleasant if you are beaten by our men, 
so please leave”. Due to our protest the Forest Department had to stop 
planting trees but they destroyed our banana plots before we knew it. (In-
terview, Shuninda, Garo, Gachhabari, 5 September 2008). 
Later on, the Forest Department used legislative power to stop the 
resistance by arresting their leader. Cholesh Ritchil66 and Protap Jambil 
(another Garo with whom Cholesh was on a motor bike) were arrested 
on a charge of conspiracy against the state department. They were taken 
to Kakraid Army Camp and tortured. Protap was treated in Madhupur 
Hospital and dumped in his home village at night. Cholesh was tortured 
terribly; his whole body had black and blue bruises. He was sent to the 
Madhupur Hospital where he was declared dead from high blood pres-
sure and a heart attack, while it is widely known that he died as a result 
                                                 
66 At the time the movement against the National Park started Garos were organised under Joyen-
shahi adivasi unnayan shomiti. The chairman of this shomiti was Benedict Mangsang. He was 
also one of the members of the Eco Park Committee. Cholesh Ritchil was general secretary. 
When the movement against Eco Park started all indigenous communities united under the name 
of Adivasi songram Oikko parishad. 
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of torture by the Army (Homrich 2007:6; Human Rights Watch 2008:53; 
Ramakrishnan 2013:240). 
These instances show the political struggle of the Garos to assert 
claims over their ancestral land and resistance against eviction. This po-
litical struggle is another factor motivating Garos to increase their num-
bers to strengthen their communal power. This sentiment was reflected 
when John Dafo, a 33 year old Garo leader vividly stated: 
Sister, there are three types of power in the world: power of money, power 
of knowledge and power of the majority. We Garos don’t have money; we 
don’t have access to higher education, so we can’t gain the power of 
knowledge either. We need power of the majority for our survival. We 
need to increase our numbers. (Interview, John Dafo, Garo, Gachhabari, 
12 September 2008). 
This sentiment was also reflected in Shuninda’s opinion when she 
said: 
If we were smaller in numbers the Forest Department would have easily 
planted trees on our land and later would have claimed as Forest Depart-
ment’s property. We were higher in numbers, Forest Department didn’t 
succeed to capture our land easily. But many Garos have already given 
their lives in the hands of forest guards. Many young Garos are moving to 
the cities for a better life leaving their ancestors’ land. If we don’t have 
enough people to resist gradually the Forest Department will take over. 
We are sure the forest department will come back soon, next time may be 
with more army. (Interview, Shuninda, Garo, Gachhabari, 5 September 
2008). 
The political struggle for their rights over ancestral land and resistance 
against eviction have fostered the self- identification and categorisation 
of Garos based on a collective ethnic identity, highlighting their matrilin-
eal kinship system, which encourage Garos to increase their numbers for 
group survival. This is however, does not mean that Garos are a ho-
mogenous group. The next section will explore the internal diversity and 
the dynamics of gender power relations among Garo households. 
7.3.4 Changing livelihoods: class differentiation and changing 
gender power relations 
Garos can no longer be characterised as a semi-egalitarian (Bal 2000) 
community, as they used to be during subsistence economy. The transfer 
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of forest land from private ownership of zamindars to state authority 
and the banning of jhum cultivation created internal diversity among Ga-
ros. After banning jhum, households with more active labour force were 
able to secure control over some lowlands close to their homestead for 
permanent agriculture and private ownership of land emerged, while the 
majority of the Garos became landless. This process of acquiring land 
created new categories of poor and rich division in a relatively egalitarian 
Garo community (Mohsin 1997). 
Subsequently, the subsistence livelihood system of jhum cultivation 
has been replaced by commercial agricultural production. Cash crops 
such as pineapples and bananas were introduced in Madhupur with the 
influence of Bengali migrants. In the view of local residents, extensive 
use of chemicals and introduction of exotic plants has damaged local 
biodiversity and different species of honey bees for which Madhupur 
was famous for have disappeared. The head of the St. Paul’s Church 
said: 
Do you know that the name Madhupur came from Madhu which means 
honey and Pur which means place? Several species of honey bees were 
found in Madhupur forest. Now they are extinct. Now many Garos say we 
better rename Madhupur as Bishpur. 67 (Interview, Eugene E. Homrich St. 
Paul’s Church, American, Pirgacha, 25 October 2008). 
Entry into the labour market was on unequal terms for Garo women 
and men. One third of the Garo households were landless in the village. 
Men didn’t have a fixed income. Landless Garo men mostly worked as 
van/rickshaw pullers or day labourers. Sometimes they might earn just 
enough for daily consumption, sometimes not. A shift from subsistence 
to commercial economy and private ownership of land also changed 
Garo women’s position in the production system. Landless Garo women 
do work in the plantation plots as day labourers. During discussions with 
a number of Garo participants it was revealed that female workers re-
ceived 100 tk and male workers received 120 tk as a daily wage, although 
women performed tedious and more time consuming tasks in the planta-
tion plots. Most of the plot owners are Bengalis. A Bengali plot owner 
justified unequal payment for Garo women working on his plot, saying: 
                                                 
67 The local term people use for pesticide is bish (poison). 
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Women have less physical power to work. A man can do more work than 
a woman given the same amount of time. Women are also less intelligent. 
A man will think what to do next, organise and plan accordingly. A 
woman will wait for the instruction. They cannot plan and mange inde-
pendently. When I hire women I always have to be around to give them 
instructions. (Interview, Rafiqul Islam, Bengali, Gachhabari, 21 August 
2008). 
The statement of Bengali plot owner indicates how women’s unequal 
pay and discrimination as a day labourer is justified based on an essen-
tialist gender bias. 
At the same time, since the Forest Department has put restrictions on 
entering into the forest for the preservation of natural forest and conser-
vation of bio-diversity, Garo women face specific vulnerabilities and 
risks while collecting fuel-wood. There were rumours that Garo women 
had to pay a bribe to enter into the forest and women were also intimi-
dated by the forest guards when they went to collect fuel-wood. In a dis-
cussion with Orchita, a thirty two year old Garo woman when I ex-
pressed my interest to join her inside the forest, she refused, stating: 
Sister, there are leeches (small tropical animal that sucks human blood) in 
the forest. We carry salt with us against leeches (she even showed me salt 
folded in a piece of plastic that she was holding in her palm). But, there are 
also human leeches in the forest. We are familiar with all the tiny routes in-
side the jungle. We can run away faster from those human leeches. But 
how are you going to escape from them? We can’t take you with us and 
leave you behind in the jungle. (Interview, Orchita, Garo, Gachhabari, 23 
October 2008). 
To avoid the potential risk of abuse and rape, women never go alone 
inside the forest. They always go in a group of three or four. They never 
send a child in the forest to collect fuel-wood. I also heard about the 
rape of a Garo woman by the forest guard, which has been covered up. 
One Bengali man in the village told me, “Good women never go to the 
forest”. But for the poor landless Garos there is no alternative. Orchita 
and her husband are landless and work as daily wage workers. The days 
when she is not hired for labour work, she goes to the forest to collect 
fuel-wood. As Orchita explained: 
I don’t have any alternative. If I don’t go to the forest and bring fuel-wood 
to sell, my children would be hungry. When my children are hungry they 
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come to me and cry. Men don’t stay at home; they stay outside to look for 
work. They will not see when the children are crying, when men return 
home children are asleep. (Interview, Orchita, Garo, Gachhabari, 23 Oc-
tober 2008). 
Therefore Garo women have no option but to carry heavy bundles of 
fuel-wood from the forest even during their pregnancy. When I met my 
42 year old Garo participant Shulekha, carrying a heavy bundle of fuel-
wood I didn’t even realise that she was pregnant. Six months later when 
I have met her again I was surprised to see that she had given birth to a 
child recently. She said: 
I’m considering going to the forest to collect fuel-wood soon. I can’t stay 
at home anymore. Now I need more money for the child to buy food and 
clothes and to take him to the doctor if he falls sick. If I don’t go to the 
forest, how can I take care of my child? My husband is old he can’t do 
physical work anymore. He will stay at home and look after the child while 
I go to the forest. (Interview, Shulekha, Garo, Gachhabari, 1 November 
2008). 
Due to my urban gender bias I assumed that it was women’s role to 
collect fuel-wood from the forest. But during conversation with 
Shulekha I understood it is not due to the gender division of labour but 
due to the restriction from the forest department. Shulekha mentioned: 
Men aren’t allowed to enter into the forest by forest guards. There are 
thousands of court cases against Garo men for entering into the forest. 
Men don’t go to the forest because of the fear of court cases by the forest 
department. (Interview, Shulekha, Garo, Gachhabari, 1 November 2008). 
The notion of femininity as being the preserver of the nature privi-
leged Garo women to still enter into the forest, since the forest guards 
seem to believe women would not destroy forest resources as Garo men 
would do. This change in the gender division of labour due to the shift 
in livelihoods led to an intensification of women’s reproductive work 
and an increase in labour time since women also have to cover a long 
distance to collect fuel-wood for their household consumption due to 
massive deforestation.  
The meagre sources of income and support from forest resources are 
now under threat due the ongoing deforestation process, despite vigilant 
forest guards (also documented in Gain 1995; 1998 and 2002). Priya 
250 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Chisim, a 55 year old Garo woman, a mother of eight children recalls the 
changes: 
The rice Garos used to produce during jhum is called mimandi. We used 
to make holes in the soil and put seeds of mimandi rice mixing with dif-
ferent types of vegetables, ginger, papaya, mustard and melon. When jhum 
was banned we started to produce rice on the lowlands68. But mimandi 
rice doesn’t grow on the low lands. We learned to cultivate “hybrid” rice 
from Bengalis. With hybrid rice one can’t grow vegetables and fruit any-
more, one can only produce rice. Many wild potatoes, vegetables and me-
dicinal plants used to grow under the shade of big trees. We were still able 
to get them from the forest. Now the big trees are gone. Many vegetables 
and medicinal plants don’t grow anymore. The number of people living in 
the forest area has also increased significantly. The forest has been com-
pletely plundered (bon ujar hoye gechey). (Interview, Priya Chisim, Garo, 
Gachhabari, 12 September, 2008). 
The forest department and Garos blame each other for the de-
forestation. Garos have a saying, “beray bagan khay (the fence eats the 
garden)”. Garos consider the forest as their motherland, which needs to 
be taken care of and allow for its regeneration for their own survival. 
While the forest department blames Garos for extracting the forest re-
sources and put restrictions on their access to the reserve forest, Garos 
blame the corrupt forest guards, saying: 
Forest guards are thieves themselves. They are vigilant at day time and re-
strict Garos to enter into the forest, at night they allow thieves to load big 
trucks by cutting valuable trees and get their share. A forest officer was 
caught with a huge amount of cash money under his mattress. Where this 
money comes from? How can the forest guards blame Garos while they 
are the one selling the trees at night? How can the thieves enter into the 
forest with their trucks and leave the forest loaded with trees without for-
est guards noticing them? (Interview, John Dafo, Garo, Gachhabari, 33 
years, Gachhabari, 12 September). 
The point here is not to prove who is to blame, but to highlight the 
shrinking forest resources. Given the influx of Bengali population, Garos 
also realised that they can no longer rely on the forest resources for their 
survival. 
                                                 
68 Although not everyone could acquire lowlands. 
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This realisation has further pushed young generation Garos to mi-
grate to the cities and look for alternative livelihoods. Unlike elder Ga-
ros, nowadays young Garos are involved in non-agricultural activities 
such as garment manufacture, poultry farming and working in beauty 
parlours. Since the 1980s beauty parlours and the garment industry be-
came popular sectors in the cities in Bangladesh. Garo girls have man-
aged to get access in the parlour sector due to their loyalty, hardworking 
attitude and fair complexion. One renowned parlour owner in Dhaka 
city mentioned that 90 per cent of her parlour workers are Garo girls. 
The parlour owner characterised Garo girls as “trustworthy”, “hardwork-
ing” and “less demanding”. However, the entry of Garo girls in the city 
parlours is based on a vertical relationship of Bengali parlour owners and 
Garo girls as informal workers. Garo girls are working at the lower strata 
in the parlours, while managerial work is performed by the educated 
mainstream Bengali girls. (Pictures 7.1 & 7.2). 
Picture 7.1 
Three generation Garos 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
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Picture 7.2 
Garo girls at a beauty parlour 
 
Source: Researcher’s photo. 
 
The subsequent shift from subsistence livelihood system to commer-
cial monoculture and beauty parlour and other informal sector changed 
Garo women’s position in terms of gender relations in the production 
system. Their intra-household gender relations appear to be under con-
stant negotiation and change as well. 
7.3.5 Changing matrilineal-matrilocal norms and intra-household 
dynamics 
The idealistic construction of matrilineal Garos, where household rela-
tions are typically characterised by mutual cooperation rather than domi-
nation (Harbison et al. 1989; Burling 1968) portrays a static and timeless 
gender-power relation among Garo households. However, the prevalent 
matrilineal system followed by Garos appears to be under a constant 
process of contestation and change. The discourse around the attributes 
of Garo men and women represents Garo women as hardworking and 
Garo men as lazy and not motivated to work. These attributes (women 
as hardworking and men as lazy) appear to be linked with their matrilin-
eal kinship norms. For instance, Tutul Shimsang, a thirty-seven year old 
Garo man said: 
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Our women have to work hard because it is their household (shongshar). 
We can’t possess any property; we have to move in to our wives’ house af-
ter marriage; if my wife dies today, I will be immediately thrown out from 
her house; I even do not have any right over my children. What is the use 
of working hard? (Interview, Tutul Shimsang, Garo, Gachhabari, 3 August 
2008). 
Liton Shimsang was articulating a rationale for why Garo men feel 
discouraged to work. However Burling (1997) criticised the argument 
that matrilineal kinship in general or the matrilocal residence in particular 
can be blamed for the somewhat passive behaviour of some Garo men. 
Rather than pointing to the kinship system as explanation, Burling men-
tioned the lack of their traditional role and livelihood alternatives as a 
reason for such attitude. Once Garos were characterised as “worriers” 
and “blood thirsty head hunters” (Playfair 1905). Their matrilineal sys-
tem wasn’t considered a limitation in those days. 
The underlying resentment in the statement above seems to arise also 
from the interaction with the majority mainstream Bengalis in Gachha-
bari. Being the majority, Bengalis project their patrilineal, patrilocal 
norms as an ideal norm. I have witnessed Garo marriages during which 
men move to their wife’s house and heard members of the Bengali 
community saying this is ridiculous and “less civilised” than their patriar-
chal kinship system. Due to confrontation with these “ideal” mainstream 
patrilocal norms, Garo men have started to blame their matrilineal sys-
tem, and a process of assimilating the patriarchal values of the Bengali 
society that surrounds them has started. Some, especially educated Garos 
are now shifting to patrilocal residence. This could have some impact on 
Garo women’s freedom and autonomy. Some wealthy Garos are also 
giving a share of their property to their sons. However this depends on 
the parent’s voluntary wish, it is not a rule. A Garo leader, Uzine 
Sangma, explained: 
Following our matrilineal customs only daughters inherit property, but we 
are also Christians. In Christianity both daughters and sons inherit prop-
erty. We discriminate our sons from property rights. Nowadays Garo girls 
are becoming more educated than Garo boys. Educated girls don’t want to 
marry less educated boys. Our girls are also going to the cities and taking 
jobs in the beauty parlours and garments industry. We are afraid if our girls 
marry with boys from other communities, Garos will lose their land. Now 
we are thinking of making amendments in our inheritance law, to give land 
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also to sons and if our girls marry in a different community they will lose 
their right on their property. (Interview, Uzine Sangma, Garo, Gachhabari, 
7 March 2008). 
A Garo author further argues that although a female heiress (nokna) 
owns the property, if she isn’t capable of managing it, the chras (male kin 
from mother’s clan) have the right to take her property away and hand it 
over to another heiress (Nokrek 2013). 
The influence of patriarchal norms and the ideal of the male bread-
winner is also entering into Garo women’s perceptions. As 32 years old 
Garo participant Orchita said: 
Bengali women are privileged. Whatever their husbands buy from the 
market they can just cook those. Among Garos, we can’t demand anything 
from our husband. My husband would say, “What do you expect from 
me? This is your family (shongshar), why don’t you go and get it”? If I ask 
him to buy anything from the market he will ask money from me. I will 
have to go out and borrow money from others. I have pain in my heart 
but can’t say anything. (Interview, Orchita, Garo, Gachhabari, 23 October 
2008). 
There also appear to be contested views regarding the gender division 
of labour among Garos. Although Burling (1997) argued that Garos fol-
lowed a natural division of labour, other authors argue that since jhum 
cultivation there is a gender division of labour among Garos (Playfair 
1909), where women’s work is more restricted to subsistence production, 
reproduction and care (Dey et al 2013; Khaleque 1986), while men 
dominate in the public spheres (Bal 2000; Dey et al 2013). Discussions 
with a number of Garo participants reveal that Garo men and women 
perform different tasks, however they don’t attach any value to their 
tasks as superior or inferior rather see them as complementary. Ginet 
Nokrek, a 75 year old village head explained the division of labour 
among Garos, saying: 
We mandis do not make a distinction between men and women’s work. 
Everyone can do everything. There are some tasks like cooking, taking 
care of the children and cleaning the house usually done by women. And 
some tasks such as taking care of the cattle, guarding the fields and shop-
ping are done by men. But we don’t have any restrictions (badha dhora 
niyom) that men shouldn’t perform women’s work or vice versa. Mandi 
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men also cook and take care of the children and wash their wife’s clothes 
whenever necessary. There is no shame in doing women’s tasks. Women 
also go to the market and do shopping according to their preference 
whenever they want to. (Interview, Ginet Nokrek, Garo, Gachhabari, 12 
December 2007). 
Despite the different interpretation of division of labour among Ga-
ros, Garo men surely dominate in public affairs. At the same time the 
matrilineal system offers Garo women freedom of mobility in public 
spaces, a total absence of purdah norms. The owner of a beauty parlour 
in the capital city mentioned that Garo girls could make their space in 
the beauty parlours due to the fact that they do not have restrictions on 
their mobility. Bengali girls wouldn’t be allowed to move alone to the 
cities to work in the parlours. 
Discussions with a number of Garo men and women reveal a paradox 
in women’s position in the matrilineal Garo household. Women are seen 
as head-worker, confident, moving alone in public spaces without any 
hesitation and can work in the field as wage labourers. At the same time 
they are also expected to show respect to their husbands. This is re-
flected in the fact that during my household survey women mentioned 
their husband’s name as household head except for the households with 
no adult male. In a discussion, a 40 year old educated female Garo par-
ticipant Khushi Machi said, 
Nowadays I see husbands manage everything. They only ask for our per-
mission. Without our signature they wouldn’t be able to sell our land. 
Husband will say, there is no other option but to sell the land. What do 
you say? We have no option but to say “yes”. We are matrilineal, women 
have more power on paper. But we show respect to our husbands. If we 
don’t give them permission they wouldn’t be able to sell the land. But we 
think what he is doing, is doing for the best interest of the family. (Inter-
view, Khushi Machi, Gachhabari, 26 October). 
Although the general impression is that Garo women have more 
power in decision making than their husbands, the narrative above 
shows how women’s decision is taken in a symbolic sense. Analysis in 
the previous chapters further showed Garo men showed reluctance to-
wards vasectomy. Although condom use was proportionately higher 
among Garo than Bengali men, more women than men take the contra-
ceptive responsibility. Despite no restrictions on mobility Garo women 
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hardly used hospital services during pregnancy check-ups and child de-
livery. 
A paradox was also reflected in the discussion around wife-beating 
among Garos. There were rumours in the village that Orchita’s husband 
is alcoholic and he beats her occasionally. This did not match my pre-
assumption about Garo women’s autonomy and the strong role of 
ma’chong69. I asked Orchita why she didn’t complain to her ma’chong 
against her husband. Her response was: 
When he makes a mistake I think OK this is the first time, he might not to 
do it for the second time. When it happens for the second time, I think 
OK give him another chance. If I complain to my ma’chong, my relatives 
will call his relatives and both parties will decide to give him a punishment 
and ask me if I would still be willing to be married to him. If I decide to 
break the marriage then my children will lose their father. He will have to 
leave this family. I am still having patience. Let’s see how it goes. If he 
doesn’t change at all I have to bring it up to the attention of my ma’chong. 
(Interview, Orchita, Garo, Gachhabari, 23 October 2008). 
To give the other side of the story, when I asked Orchita’s husband, 
the reason he gave me was, some days he goes out to look for day la-
bourers’ work but finds nothing. When he comes home with frustration 
his wife starts to complain based on the suspicion that he might have 
earned something and spent on alcohol, which he claims not to be true. 
Unless he beats her she would not stop complaining. 
Contradictory views were also expressed by local Bengalis reporting 
that Garo husbands get beaten and kicked out from the house by their 
wives, fabricating and ridiculing Garo men’s weak masculinity. 
During conversations with Garos when I asked for the reason of wife 
beating despite having a strong matrilineal system, the common answer I 
received was, “there are good and bad men among Garos and Bengalis, 
only bad Garos will strike their hands on their wives like bad Bengalis, it 
is not a matter of patrilineal or matrilineal system”. 
We cannot generalise the experience of Orchita to the situation of all 
Garo women. However, it does indicate the need for some nuance in our 
understanding of the intra-household gender regime among Garos, 
                                                 
69 Among matrilineal-matrilocal Garos, maternal kin (ma’chong) regulate all public affairs includ-
ing family disputes. 
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which is often portrayed as “pure” harmony. The slow shifts in terms of 
patrilocal residence and inheritance rights to sons (although voluntary), 
as well as the changing discourse about men as household heads chal-
lenge a fixed, timeless romantic idea about matrilineal kinship system 
among Garos. Despite all these changes that have been going on, based 
on my observation, I would like to emphasise, the Garo matrilineal sys-
tem still offers women a higher status. Ma’chong does play a significant 
role. If Orchita’s husband is found guilty, he will be punished impartially. 
Garo women’s higher autonomy (compared to Bengali women) is cer-
tainly reflected in terms of their ownership of household resources, 
higher education, freedom of mobility and access to wage work. 
In reference to the study of Dyson and Moore (1983) and Harbison 
et al. (1989) mentioned earlier in relation to the influence of kinship pat-
terns on women’s status and its link to fertility, the evidence of Garo 
women’s experience suggests that kinship pattern alone cannot explain 
women’s agency in reproductive behaviour. The complexities and com-
bination of multiple factors - the politicisation of ethnic identity, erosion 
of matrilineal norms, changes in livelihoods, influence of the Church and 
intra-household power dynamics – all shape the gender power relation to 
inform fertility decision among Garos. 
To preserve the Garo community which is seen under threat Garo 
women “choose” to have more children. Although this choice is made 
under political and economic constraint it would be wrong to character-
ise this as implying community control over women. Garo women’s 
agency has to be understood as intersected with ethnic identity and is 
reflective of a relational (Joseph 1993; Mahmood 2001; Evans 2013; Wil-
son 2013) rather than an individualistic notion of agency. 
However the story does not end here. Despite the choices made there 
are indications also of younger Garo women who are taking reproductive 
decisions for smaller families. Among the young generation Garos, as a 
result of access to education and especially employment opportunities in 
the cities the desired number of children has declined. The ideal family 
size was two among younger women. Younger Garo women don’t see 
the need to have higher fertility anymore and relate lower fertility with 
the notion of modernity. Kazoli, a twenty year old Garo woman, who 
finished her secondary school education, working in the most popular 
beauty parlour in the capital city, represents the sentiment of younger 
generation Garos: 
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We are educated; we earn enough money to support our families. We can 
afford to buy mobile phones and nice clothes nowadays. Our parents were 
disadvantaged; they lived in the forest, they didn’t have access to educa-
tion. They were also not aware of family planning methods. (Interview, 
Kazoli, Garo, Dhaka, 5 June 2008). 
Kazoli has one daughter. She thinks having two would be enough. 
She looks forward to providing her daughter with higher education and a 
better future. Many educated Garos mentioned that with the increase in 
education Garos are becoming self-aware. In Kazoli’s words, “Education 
makes us aware of raising children properly and giving them higher edu-
cation. It would be hard to raise children properly if we had many”. Like 
Kazoli, many other younger generation Garos are becoming educated 
and moving to the cities. They might experience less control from the 
Church over their lives. At the same time they are also confronted with 
new challenges. The cost of raising children in the cities seems to be a 
concern. As the preserver of their ethnic identity they face the risk of 
loss of their property right should they choose to marry outside their 
community. Education and migration to the cities certainly increase this 
possibility. As the biological reproducer of the matrilineal community 
would they prefer daughters over sons, given the cost of raising children 
in the cities? Or would they subscribe to the mainstream norms and son 
preference would take over? 
Since the younger Garos have not yet crossed their reproductive age 
what their fertility choice would be depends on how the intersection of 
gender power relation in the household, the community, the labour mar-
ket and their relation to the state take shape in the years to come. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Given the distinct position of Garo women in their matrilineal system in 
terms of access to household resources, freedom of mobility to wage 
work, higher age at marriage and relatively higher education compared to 
Bengali women, I expected it would provide them more autonomy in 
terms of reproductive decision making to such an extent, that they would 
have a lower fertility in comparison to the patrilineal Bengalis. However, 
this was not the case. 
Garo men and women’s voices presented in this chapter suggest that 
ethnic differences in reproductive behaviour are not only based on cul-
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tural norms and values, but deeply embedded in the structural system 
which has far reaching political and material implication based on inclu-
sion/exclusion in access to resources in the broader social system. Eth-
nic categorisation based on cultural difference and matrilineality does not 
capture the political dimension of ethnicity. 
The historical evidence provided in this chapter shows that Garos 
have historically been marginalised by their “othering” by the colonial, 
post colonial and contemporary Bangladeshi state. Earlier Garo identity 
was rooted in their jhum cultivation, which was banned by the state au-
thority and Garos were denied their rights over communal land and for-
est resources. Gradually, Garos became a tribal minority group in their 
own ancestral land surrounded by a majority migrant Bengali commu-
nity. 
 Relatively high fertility among Garo as compared to Bengali women 
may be partly due to their strong desire for daughters due to their matri-
lineal norms. Despite experiencing poverty that pushed Bengalis to re-
duce their fertility, alternative livelihood opportunities for young Garo 
boys and girls, Garo women had relatively higher return from children. 
The emphasis on high fertility was also triggered by religious injunctions 
from the Church against contraception. However the most interesting 
finding regarding the reasons for the relatively high fertility of Garo 
women was linked to the politicisation of ethnic identity. As a response 
to dispossession, exclusion, and displacement by a migrant majority Ben-
gali community, and state repression Garos have organised and launched 
numerous struggles to reclaim and retain their land and identity. In this 
highly charged political context the threatened Garo community valued 
and promoted high fertility. 
The analysis in this chapter has suggested that Garo women’s relatively 
high fertility compared to the majority Bengali community is an outcome 
of their perceived need for group survival, and their preference for daugh-
ters to carry on their matrilineal system is to ensure claim and reclaims 
for land which has been codified and registered in women’s names. Sons 
were also welcomed to increase the force of their struggle and resistance. 
Although the Garo ethnic political identity does enforce a collective 
consciousness to increase their numbers, which can be interpreted as a 
subversion or subsumption of individual women’s choice and agency, 
Garo women asserted their ethnic gender identity in making a “choice” 
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to have a higher number of children. Other studies among minority 
groups (Sahu, Wissen, Hutter and Bosch 2012; Kulkarni 2002; Gangad-
haram 1999) show similar findings, arguing that high fertility amongst 
minority groups is the result of vulnerability due to their socio-
economically disadvantaged position. 
Based on the evidence presented, it can be argued that considering 
Garo women’s fertility as rational individualistic choice would divert at-
tention away from the multifaceted aspect of the context where a com-
plex combination of politicised ethnic identity based on exclusionary ex-
perience, inter-ethnic tensions, religious ideology and matrilineal norms 
and relative economic return from children all intersect and interact to 
inform reproductive decisions. 
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This study set out to question aspects of the Bangladesh “success story” 
of significant fertility decline coupled with persistent abnormally high 
maternal mortality. To provide insight into this anomaly I examined the 
existing discourses used by a variety of development actors namely do-
nors, government bureaucrats, research institutions, development 
NGOs, and political parties as well as women’s organisations based on 
interviews, along with a content and argumentation analysis of policy 
assumptions and health care service delivery mechanisms and most im-
portantly, the voices of rural poor women (both mainstream as well as 
tribal). Underpinned by a feminist standpoint approach, I have tried to 
bring women to the centre of my analysis by documenting the ways in 
which they subjectively constructed meanings and explanations of their 
reproductive practices and choices. This allowed for the expression of 
multiple interpretations shaped by the subjective experiences derived 
from the distinct position that rural women occupy as members of a 
household and an ethnic group. The findings hopefully have provided a 
counter point, a different perspective on the Bangladesh success story on 
fertility decline. 
In this concluding chapter, I first summarise the key findings, and 
conclude with reflections on the implications of this study for policy and 
further research. 
8.1 Main Findings 
8.1.1 The state: Policies and discourses 
Although reproductive rights are enshrined in the national population 
policy documents, the reality of rural women’s experiences in this regard 
are rather complex. While Sen suggests (1992) affirmative actions by the 
state to ensure women’s health and wellbeing, this study hopefully pro-
vides insight into how the multiple actors and institutional arms of the 
state contain forms of covert power through policies, discourses and 
knowledge produced by disciplinary institutes to govern reproductive 
behaviour of women to ensure macro-economic development goals. 
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Concern about “high fertility” as the main cause of poverty among the 
poor, interwoven with the national concern about macro-economic de-
velopment, leads the Bangladeshi state to align fertility reduction with 
the broader imperatives of development goals. Analysis showed that the 
national population policy is subject to global power structures. Due to 
donor dependency the government incorporated reproductive health in 
the population policy in the wake of ICPD in 1994. However, the incor-
poration of the reproductive health agenda, although progressive, was 
underpinned by an intention to mobilise greater acceptance for fertility 
control. This is reflected in the continuous setting of progressive targets 
for fertility reduction in the post ICPD policy documents. 
At the same time, lack of real commitment and resource constraints 
have led to a shift away from a comprehensive reproductive health 
agenda to a narrow “Essential Service Package” approach, offering lim-
ited choice for poor women. National and international policy actors 
have chosen to interpret what is essential in order to achieve macro-
economic goals even to the detriment of poor women’s health and well-
being. As elaborated in Chapter Three, to operationalise the ICPD 
commitment to provide integrated reproductive health care services, the 
Health and Family planning wings of the MOHFW were integrated in 
1998. Despite positive evidence emerging in terms of maternal mortality 
decline after three years of integration, two implementing wings were 
separated again partly because the decline in maternal deaths was not 
accompanied by the targeted level of fertility decline. Following the same 
logic, despite having positive results, the maternal voucher programme 
to ensure EmOC during childbirth has been withdrawn in subsequent 
policies. The overall determinants of the population policy reflect neo-
liberal principles proposing public-private partnerships to ensure health 
equity in which access to broader reproductive health care for all sections 
of the rural population remains less of a priority. 
The state however is not unitary in its intentions and involves and in-
fluences a range of different interest groups and actors. Analysis of the 
discourses and meanings associated with reproductive health of donors, 
government bureaucrats, NGO service providers, and political parties 
show, despite some variations, there is an overarching alliance of ideol-
ogy that support family planning programmes as a means to achieve fer-
tility reduction for macro- economic development. Women’s reproduc-
tive health was seen in instrumentalist terms to achieve the fertility goal 
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and little attention was paid to the existing structure of inequality and 
unequal gender relations that result in the poor reproductive health of 
women. 
In addition, despite variations amongst these policy actors there was 
also a common assumption that rural women in particular were ho-
mogenous, powerless, and ignorant victims of culture. Policy and dis-
courses paid little attention to men’s role in biological reproduction and 
male responsibility, thus family planning programmes remained mainly 
female focused. 
Policies based on “evidence” such as the Bangladesh Demographic 
and Health Survey produced by official research institutes, interpreted 
data in a limited way. Data from the large-scale surveys do not delve 
deeply into gender, class, and ethnic differences and power relations. For 
example the use of long-term contraception by rural poor women is in-
terpreted to mean that they prefer this method rather than the safer 
short-term methods. Since these researches are conducted to provide 
evidence to inform policies, the construction of rural women’s reproduc-
tive needs by these research institutions becomes “truth”. This justifies 
the policy shift from short term to long-term contraception and fosters 
the interests of a powerful alliance of health service providers, interna-
tional donors and multinational pharmaceutical companies. Provision of 
long-acting (implant) and permanent contraception (sterilisation) under 
donor supported Essential Service Package (ESP) in the public health 
care system through offering incentives to the poor further shapes the 
reality by shaping contraceptive practice of the poor. 
In contrast it was seen that the evidence, production of knowledge, 
discourses and strategies of women’s rights organisations are different. 
Reproductive health is conceptualised in relation to women’s subordi-
nate position, patriarchal norms and unequal gender power relations. In 
terms of strategies these organisations argue against privatisation in the 
health sector and advocate for a universal access approach. Rather than 
seeing women’s need only for one type of contraception, they advocate 
for a wider range of contraceptive choices as well as reproductive health 
care services. 
Although critical of the population control objectives of the policy, at 
the same time women’s organisations recognise that availability of con-
traception and menstrual regulation services, even if currently not a free 
choice, could be empowering for women. There are variations in how 
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they see the pathways for reproductive health ranging from total opposi-
tion to the policy to advocating for improvements within the policy; a 
welfarist approach. Strategies towards the state follow an “in and 
against” approach. From the discussions with these organisations a cer-
tain ambiguity emerges; despite a strong critique of the policy, they do 
not use the language of women’s reproductive rights. This strategy is 
similar to other South Asian context, where some women’s organisations 
choose to use the language that has greater resonance with their localised 
struggle for gender justice (Unnithan and Heitmeyer 2015). A major ab-
sence in their strategies are the concerns of tribal rural women and in 
that sense they also treat women’s needs as being self- evident and ho-
mogenous. 
8.1.2 Intra-household dynamics in use of contraception 
The deconstruction of the multiple discourses of actors discussed in 
Chapter Three revealed the assumptions underlying the policies and 
pathways towards women’s reproductive health and rights. The ways in 
which women’s subjectivities are constructed and normalised in policies 
and discourses, projects the use of contraception by women as an indica-
tor of women’s agency and empowerment, however the findings of the 
study point to a more nuanced picture. 
Voices of poor rural and tribal women provide insight into how a 
complex interplay between gender, ethnicity and economic forces shape 
contraception and menstrual regulation/abortion practices. There is a 
widely shared perception among Bengali men and women alike that va-
sectomies reduce men’s physical and sexual power. The local cultural 
construction of masculinity and men’s role as the breadwinner therefore 
discourages households to use male vasectomy. It is important to note 
that although the conventional male breadwinner norm is not strong 
among Garos in the same way as Bengalis, Garo men also showed reluc-
tance towards male sterilisation. At the same time, condoms seem to be 
perceived negatively due to a range of concerns including cost, pleasure, 
reliability, gossip and fear of mistrust. Nonetheless more equal gender 
relations in the household seem to be reflected in a proportionately 
higher condom use among Garos as compared to Bengalis. Ideological 
restrictions against invasive modern contraception methods such as im-
plants, vasectomy and abortion partly made Garos more dependent on 
natural methods and less on menstrual regulation and abortion services. 
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However it is interesting that older Garo women mentioned when they 
encountered livelihood insecurity due to the abolition of their traditional 
cultivation system and scarce forest resources because of the pressure 
from the mainstream Bengali population, they resorted to sterilisation in 
the mid-1970s. This was due to sterilisation being the only method avail-
able in the village in earlier times. 
The adoption of contraception by both Bengalis and Garos shows 
that women in both communities take on the major responsibility. This 
is not the result of women’s autonomous choice, but is the outcome of 
negotiations within the household where notions of masculinity and 
femininity are linked with different contraceptive methods. A range of 
perceptions come into play in the choice of methods such as loss of 
masculinity, diminishing of male sexual pleasure, suspicion, preference 
for temporary methods as well as the cost of condoms for poorer men, 
which all combine to influence women to take on the burden and risks 
of contraception.  
This process is reinforced by the way family planning programmes 
have been designed, focusing mainly on women, requiring minimal par-
ticipation from men, hence reproducing existing gender inequality. The 
assumption that contraceptive use equals women’s empowerment is 
based on an individualistic understanding of agency and does not capture 
the dynamic gender relations in patrilineal and matrilineal households 
and the process of negotiations that shape the outcome of contraception 
choice. 
Strategically or inadvertently, the neoliberal orientation of this policy 
is reflected in targeting women as clients – soft targets in a marketing 
strategy which does not challenge intra-household gender power rela-
tions. Other studies also point out that intra-household spousal commu-
nication for contraception use and husband’s participation in the man-
agement of side-effects and complications of contraception remains 
overlooked in the policy (Choudhury, et al 2012). Indeed the policy shift 
in the mid-1990s further legitimises the focus on long-acting contracep-
tion for poor women, which reduces their choice to withdraw in case of 
side-effects. The shift also implies the imposing cost of condoms, which 
puts pressure on poor men to use contraception since condoms are no 
longer free. Given the voices of poor men in Gachhabari and their pref-
erence for temporary contraception, particularly among the Garos, their 
choice is not reflected in the policy. 
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Similar dynamics enter into the use of Menstrual Regulation (MR) 
services (included under contraception in the policy documents). Al-
though MR is legal, requirements of consent from the husband (or a 
male relative) reinforces a gender hierarchy. Due to the stigma associated 
with the sexuality of older women, rather than using MR, these women 
resort to self-induced abortions to maintain secrecy, while married 
women who cannot meet the official requirement or manoeuvre the sys-
tem by paying a price, resort to cheap, illegal dangerous services. This 
evidence shows that while women are able to negotiate to exercise their 
choice and agency within the household to regulate their fertility, they 
also face constraints in the health care market. This suggests the impor-
tance of looking at health care constraints that shape women’s reproduc-
tive practice. 
8.1.3 The question of access to health care services in rural 
Bangladesh 
The deconstruction of underlying policy assumptions underpinning the 
health care service delivery mechanism (Chapter Three) portrays an indi-
vidualistic notion of agency, detached from the cultural context. The as-
sumption is that if health care services are made available in rural areas 
women will access them without any problems. 
Despite the availability of the services, voices of poor women in this 
study have provided insight why the majority of the poor Garo and Ben-
gali women gave birth at home in the presence of Traditional Birth At-
tendants (TBAs) or relatives. Both Bengali and Garo women spoke of 
the cultural and structural constraints which render access to formal 
health care services difficult for them. 
Rather than a static notion of rigid cultural norms constraining 
women, evidence shows that cultural norms are fluid and subject to re-
production, transformation and change. Although some Bengali women 
spoke of giving birth in the hospital as bepurdah (violation of purdah 
norms), at the same time purdah norms were lifted a bit when they, es-
pecially poorer Bengali women, had to go to the forest to collect fuel-
wood. Garo women on the other hand were neither confined in the 
household nor experience restriction on their mobility in the public 
spaces. Yet, they also rely on home deliveries assisted by Traditional 
Birth Attendants (TBAs). 
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The reliance on TBAs was due to trust and an acknowledgement of 
their knowledge and skills. This was reflected in the distinctions made 
between normal and complicated delivery. Only in cases of severe com-
plications did women use hospitals. A class differentiation was also evi-
dent with poorer women stressing that doing daily household chores 
helped in having normal deliveries. Cynical and slightly mocking state-
ments saying women from rich households need to go to the hospital 
due to their inability to deliver at home “normally”, was also an expres-
sion of the fact that poor women could not afford to go for pregnancy 
check–ups and institutional care. 
As other studies also pointed out significant changes have occurred in 
Bangladesh in terms of women’s education, labour force participation 
and change in cultural norms related to sexuality (Siddiqi 2014; Hossain 
2012; Rashid 2007; Aziz and Maloney 1985) and the idea that cultural 
factors are inflexible, can no longer be considered as a constraint to 
women’s access to institutional childbirth services. 
The issue of access to health care services is also linked to the pro-
ductive and household reproductive tasks of rural women. Particularly 
for the poorer Garo and Bengali women there is a trade off between the 
responsibility and labour time required for household reproductive tasks 
and getting better health care for biological reproduction. For Garo 
women it also means calculating the loss of income from wage labour. 
Even if services are made absolutely free and available in the sub-district 
hospitals, these women’s work responsibilities in the household and out-
side are difficult to negotiate in favour of their own well being. This is 
reflected even in rejecting the need for a Caesarean in a complicated de-
livery, since it could affect their work capacity. 
This linkage with women’s responsibilities for household reproduc-
tion is rarely acknowledged in policies and is invisible in discussions on 
family planning policies in Bangladesh. For instance, in the wake of 
ICPD, the debate around the shift from doorstep service delivery to 
community clinics in the integrated health care approach used a different 
logic arguing that women’s mobility to the community clinics will facili-
tate greater empowerment of women which was constrained during 
doorstep service delivery (Schuler 1999). The tacit assumption underly-
ing such a policy shift, is the notion that women’s time is “infinitely elas-
tic” (Elson 2002) and assumes a causal link between women’s mobility 
and empowerment. 
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The problem of non-utilisation of formal health care services, how-
ever is also due to the quality of the services in rural areas. The study has 
revealed some of the hidden costs due to the lack of diagnostic facilities 
and other logistics, doctors’ absenteeism, lack of privacy and inadequate 
quality of care in the public hospitals. In the absence of affordable and 
adequate quality services in the formal health care system, poor men and 
women continue to rely on informal networks and private providers with 
uncertain, even harmful practices. The quality of care in the sub-district 
hospitals as expressed by poor women, is tied with the neoliberal policies 
that discourage investing in public health care systems and advocate dual 
health care systems, consisting of a private system for the well-off and a 
public “safety net” for the poor. Despite government commitment, poli-
cies and discourses (discussed in Chapter Three) show that public health 
care service delivery has been compromised due to resource constraints. 
This situation mirrors the broader health care situation in Bangladesh 
where more than 80 per cent of the rural population are dependent on 
private and informal providers for health care need including sexual and 
reproductive health (Rashid et al. 2011). 
In policy language, persistant health inequality is interpreted as “low 
use of public health care services” due to “lack of demand for maternal 
health care”. Framing health inequality in this way, justifies confining 
intervention only in terms of improvements in service delivery, leaving 
unequal gender power relations unaddressed. One hidden/silent area in 
the policy discussions and discourses is how multiple levels of gender 
power relations come to interplay in creating existing health inequality. 
One interesting finding on childbirth practices is that in both Garo 
and Bengali communities, childbirth is seen as women’s business, there-
fore men stay outside the realm of decision making. This suggests that 
the problem of not availing formal health care services during childbirth 
is not due to women’s subordinate position or less bargaining power in 
the household, but linked to other aspects of inequality such as class and 
ethnicity. 
8.1.4 The intersectionality of women’s agency 
This study has provided insights into the multifaceted aspects of agency 
in reproductive decisions. Despite constraints and controls, women from 
both communities want to have control over their bodies and full access 
to quality health care service. In the prevailing context they show resil-
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ience and use different strategies at their disposal to deal with side-
effects of long-term contraception, switch between different contracep-
tion methods or seek help from their husbands to buy contraceptive pills 
or to get medicine to treat side effects from their local pharmacy. 
Women also use cultural norms to their advantage to negotiate for MR 
or manoeuvre official rules to use MR services or use secret abortion 
services, although this jeopardises their bodily health and wellbeing.  
I started this study on the premise that given the differences between 
the matrilineal Garo community and the patrilineal Bengali community, 
Garo women would have more autonomy and opportunities to express 
their own agency in relation to reproduction as compared to the Bengali 
women. However, the voices of tribal Garo men and women demon-
strate how ethnic differences are not only based on cultural elements, but 
deeply rooted in the structural system which has far reaching political 
and material implications, which shape their reproductive decisions. 
As elaborated in Chapter Seven, Garo women’s subjective identity is 
based on the experience of exclusion from the state authority by the 
banning of their traditional livelihood systems, the denial of access to 
their ancestral land and forest resources and their exclusion and margin-
alisation in forest development projects. 
Garo women still enjoy considerable freedom and autonomy in their 
matrilineal kinship system compared to mainstream patrilineal Bengali 
women. They have rights to ownership of land and household resources, 
have choice of marriage partner, practice mainly matrilocal residence, 
enjoy freedom of mobility in public spaces and have access to independ-
ent income from wage labour. As elaborated in Chapter Seven there 
have been changes over time eroding some of these features. While ear-
lier, Garo women could engage in pre-marital sexual relations without 
stigma, now with the influence of the Church this is not sanctioned. 
There are also shifts towards patrilocal residence and restrictions on di-
vorce and abortion. Although the Garo household today is not patriar-
chal in a classical sense, an erosion of women’s fallback position (particu-
larly the loss of communal land) and the emergence of new gender 
hierarchies have given men more bargaining power. Men still need to ask 
for agreement from women on various issues and cultural norms of gen-
der equality still exist but there are significant changes. 
The evidence suggests that Garo women’s decisions on fertility and 
other reproductive health choices are less rooted in intra-household 
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power dynamics than in broader socio-economic and political factors. 
First of all, due to their matrilineal kinship system Garos desire to have 
daughters to carry on their lineage. Secondly Garos have become a mi-
nority group on their ancestors’ land due to the influx of migrant Ben-
galis in the area. This has created pressure to preserve a collective iden-
tity as a community and the need to increase the Garo population for 
group survival. Thirdly is the role of the Church which provides security 
and refuge along with an ideological influence towards larger families 
and avoidance of modern contraception. A fourth factor is linked to 
their ethnic political identity. Jhum cultivation, which was the subsistence 
livelihood system among Garos has been banned and Garos have lost 
their right over communal land and control over forest resources, on 
which they were dependent for generations. The political struggle to re-
gain communal land rights puts unspoken pressure on the Garo com-
munity to increase its numbers. To maintain the boundaries of the com-
munity and a communal identity Garo women who wish to marry 
outside the community are threatened with expulsion and loss of prop-
erty rights. The combination of these factors has meant that Garo 
women want to have more children which is reflected in the surprising 
finding that they have not lower, but slightly higher fertility outcomes as 
compared to the Bengalis in the village. 
It has been documented that different historical situations can enforce 
certain ethnic projects that benefit members within a community in dif-
ferent ways (Chhachhi 1992). The Garo ethnic political project does en-
force a collective consciousness to increase their numbers. Rather than 
seeing this as a subversion or subsumption of individual women’s choice 
and agency, Garo women asserted their ethnic gender identity in making 
a “choice” to have a higher number of children. 
Understanding Garo women's fertility choice calls for, what Saba 
Mahmood (2001: 225) stated, a particular openness to be aware of the 
diversity of women's needs and interests, which are profoundly mediated 
by different capacities and desires that are historically and culturally spe-
cific. Garo women’s articulation of their desired number of children re-
flects constant negotiations between their ethnic identity, matrilineal 
norms, ideological belief and livelihood reality. This finding challenges 
any drawing of a simple linear equation between low fertility and 
women’s agency based on conventional indicators of empowerment 
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which is embedded in official policy assumptions and discourses and in 
many studies on population, as well as in some feminist positions. 
Interpreting Bengali and Garo women’s reproductive decisions as ra-
tional individualistic choice detached from the cultural context and exist-
ing structures of inequality (as neoliberal policy suggests), ignores the 
complexities of culturally defined conjugal contracts, differences between 
patrilineal and matrilineal systems as well as the broader political and 
socio- economic context which shape gender power relation in repro-
ductive decisions. 
The structure of the Bengali household is closer to that of a classic 
patriarchy and intra-household relations are negotiated often around 
men as breadwinners. Women’s strategies in this context tend to be cov-
ert, without openly challenging the gender hierarchy. The pattern is simi-
lar to that mentioned as characteristic of South Asian households where 
women negotiate a “patriarchal bargain”, keeping up the notion of men 
as breadwinners and protectors versus abandonment, insecurity and pos-
sible violence that may ensue with open confrontation (Kandiyoti 1988; 
Kabeer 2011; Feldman 2001; Unnithan-Kumar 2000). 
Women’s real life experiences articulated through their own voices 
indicate the need to deconstruct the conceptualisation of agency in pol-
icy and development interventions. The evidence provided in this study, 
firstly challenges the notion of Bangladeshi women as a singular mono-
lithic subject (Mohanty 1991a). Secondly it reiterates the importance of 
considering context and culture in understanding agency. Thirdly, it 
shows how multiple layers of power relations such as economic factors, 
gender and ethnicity intersect and interact to shape agency in reproduc-
tive practice. 
8.2 Policy Implications 
The findings of this research have a number of implications for future 
policy formulation and health care service delivery. In order to create an 
enabling condition for poor men and women to exercise their reproduc-
tive choices a number of issues demand attention. 
First, there is a need to revisit underlying assumptions, biases and si-
lences in the policy. Policy analysis (discussed in Chapter Three) shows 
how poor reproductive health has been conceptualised, defined and in-
terpreted as a result of poverty and higher fertility, which legitimises a 
272 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
policy approach prioritising family planning over ensuring broader health 
care. Policies, in fact, need to revisit the very assumption of the house-
hold. The underlying assumption in policy is a unitary model of the 
household, where family planning is offered to “couples”, while more 
than 90 per cent of contraceptive users are women. Since the beginning 
of the family planning programme the government has recruited only 
female family planning workers to motivate women to use contraception. 
Interviews with service providers showed that they assume it is easier to 
motivate women rather than men to use contraception. The tacit as-
sumption that the use of contraception equals women’s agency and em-
powerment, justifies female focused family planning programmes, keep-
ing men outside. Despite the availability of male contraception, its use 
has remained almost static at the 1970s level. Ensuring gender equality 
also requires men to share the contraceptive responsibility. Among Asian 
countries, Thailand has achieved significant success in male participation 
in contraception use. The Bangladesh family planning programme could 
learn from their experience. 
Second, the findings of this study indicate the need to deconstruct the 
notion of women and their needs as homogenous. This study provides 
insight into how the choice of contraception is shaped by notions of 
masculinity and femininity and their complex interaction with access to 
various types of contraception in the public and private sector as well as 
religious ideology. Another comparative study (Hutter and Sahu 2012) 
found that Hindu women prefer long-term contraception, which is re-
flected in the popularity of sterilisation in India (Saavala 1999), while 
Muslim women prefer temporary contraception. My study yields similar 
findings, indicating a mismatch between women’s preference for the pill 
and the supply driven family planning programme that promotes long-
term (implant and sterilisation) contraception for poor Muslim women. 
The fact that women with four living children can be denied an implant 
and persuaded to use sterilisation reflects this mismatch. 
The preference for the pill among most women of all ethnic groups 
and the fact that some women complained of side-effects from govern-
ment supplied contraceptive pills, indicates that the cost of contraception 
remains a concern to access short term contraception (the pill and con-
doms), since the policy shifted its focus to long-term contraception along 
with permanent contraception. This could explain the fact that more 
poorer women did not use any contraception. Besides the preference for 
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the pill, my research further found a relatively greater preference for 
natural methods and condoms among tribal Garos. If condoms were 
free, it could reduce the dependency on natural methods and the risk of 
unwanted pregnancies among the poorer Garos. These findings have 
implications for policies to address reproductive health needs among 
tribal populations. As Kulkarni (2002) points out when there is diversity 
(cultural, ethnic or religious) between various population groups, a popu-
lation policy might give priority to the concerns of dominant groups at 
the cost of the disadvantaged and minority groups. In such cases South 
Asian scholars have suggested that health care systems need to be re-
sponsive to context, gender and age specific health needs of the local 
population (Unnithan-Kumar 1999). 
Third, privacy, confidentiality and informed consent need to be en-
sured in the service delivery mechanism. Men’s narratives confirm how 
stigma attached to vasectomies puts a constraint on men to choose this 
method. The unwritten rule of going to the health facility with a health 
worker from the community puts men at risk of being exposed. In-
formed consent implies providing proper information and management 
of side-effects, counselling and health check-ups. It also implies men and 
women should be given the freedom to withdraw from contraception at 
any time if they wish to do so. 
Fourth, MR services need to be made available to reduce the risk of 
illegal and harmful abortion practices. Women’s experiences revealed 
that although MR has been made legal up to 10-12 weeks of pregnancy, 
it is not possible to receive the service beyond 8 weeks due to the lack of 
adequate medical supplies in the sub-district hospital in the research area. 
If the MR service were used properly it would offer women the oppor-
tunity to reduce the risk of illegal and back-door services, during the pe-
riod from 8 to 12 weeks to terminate unwanted pregnancies. 
Fifth, ensuring health equality and providing emergency obstetric care 
(EmOC) during childbirth require a stronger government commitment 
to provide adequate and quality health care to all. It implies real com-
mitment to strengthen the public health care system. As compared to 
other South Asian countries Bangladesh is far behind in investing in the 
public health care system (Nazneen 2001; BHW 2010). Countries like Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia (The World Bank 2009) are examples where mater-
nal mortality has been reduced significantly by strengthening the public 
health care system. Kerala in India has shown that even with modest fi-
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nancial resources it can have a huge impact on reducing maternal mortal-
ity by strengthening the health system (Freedman 2003, Freedman 2005, 
USAID and others 2012). Bangladesh can learn lessons from these coun-
tries. 
The quality of care in the public hospitals remains a constraint for 
women. Poor women still continue to be dependent on the TBAs and 
other informal providers for childbirth and other reproductive health 
care needs, due to the absence of adequate and quality care for the poor. 
Women’s narratives show how their household reproductive work re-
sponsibility remains a constraint to go to the hospital (which is approx. 
10 km away). The provision of “normal” delivery services at the com-
munity level would reduce the opportunity cost of poor women by re-
ducing their travel time. Only in case of complicated deliveries women 
need to be referred to the hospital. Re-introducing the maternal voucher 
programme could contribute positively to the reduction of the amount 
of maternal deaths. 
Sixth, the role of the local TBAs as a catalyst needs to be acknowl-
edged in the formal health care system. This study highlights how TBAs 
play an important role during home deliveries, including in many in-
stances recommending women to seek professional care and even join-
ing them at the hospital. By integrating TBAs in formal government 
training schemes, they can act as a catalyst between the community and 
the formal health care system. Above all, women’s unequal access to ser-
vices due to their class, gender, labour demand, location and ethnicity 
has to be taken into consideration in the policy to provide women with a 
conducive environment to exercise their right to safe childbirth practices. 
Seventh, policies need to ensure male participation in maternal health 
care services. One of the findings of this study is that childbirth is seen 
as women’s business, therefore men stay outside the realm of decision 
making. Hence, many men may not understand or recognise the symp-
toms of complications. This study also found that elder women play a 
significant role in both communities during childbirth. In addition, 
where women’s position in the in-laws’ house is often considered as a 
barrier to seek care during childbirth, this study shows women also move 
to their parental house before delivery as a tradition in rural areas. Fol-
lowing the matrilocal custom, Garo women live close to their mother 
and sisters and never move to their in-laws’ house. Therefore awareness 
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training among men and elderly women that have influence in decision 
making might positively contribute to seek care in time. 
Finally, my research findings raise some questions regarding the 
“Framework for Tribal Peoples Plan (TPP)” (upgraded in September 
2015) adopted under the Health, Population and Nutrition Sector De-
velopment Programme (HPNSDP) for 2011-2016. The underlying as-
sumption of this framework is that higher fertility among the “tribal 
population” is a result of the under-serviced and under-funded health 
care system (Planning Commission 2012:2). The solution was suggested 
only in terms of improving service delivery by extension and renovation 
of existing facilities and building new ones in tribal areas (Planning 
Commission 2015:1). 
The assumption that poor rural/tribal women lack demand for ma-
ternal health care service also is contradicted by my research findings. My 
study suggests that the low use of public health care services is not 
mainly due to women’s ignorance, but rather due to the poor quality of 
care, hidden cost, opportunity cost and doctors’ absenteeism and negli-
gence. One major area in which the policy discourse urgently needs to 
better reflect reality is to recognise how class inequality, market mecha-
nism and ethnic differences create the existing health inequality among 
tribal population. 
8.3 Contribution to the literature and implication for 
further research 
As already noted, my research hopes to have provided an alternative per-
spective to the family planning success story of Bangladesh. Scholarly 
debate around fertility reduction in Bangladesh mostly revolves around 
the question of whether fertility reduction is directly linked to family 
planning programmes or whether other socio-economic factors contrib-
ute to a motivational change towards adopting smaller families, in turn 
creating a demand for contraception. This micro level study places 
women in their local context and cultural setting. Men and women’s 
voices provide a deeper understanding of how complex social factors 
interact, intersect and inform each other to shape women’s agency in 
reproductive behaviour. Based on voices of Bengali and Garo women 
how they experience and navigate power in the household, community 
and the market in relation to their reproductive practice, my study con-
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tributes to the literature on agency showing the multifaceted aspect of 
agency, contrary to the rational individualistic notion of agency.  
However, it is not possible to cover all aspects of reproductive health 
practices within the scope of a PhD dissertation. Several crucial issues 
for future research can be mentioned here. 
Sexual rights are an integral part of reproductive rights (Germain 
1996) and most of the policies related to reproductive health are based 
on publicly accepted notions of sexuality (Menon 2007; Karim 2012). 
Sexuality is one of the major silence areas in policy discourse, but de-
serves proper research and policy attention in its own right. I recom-
mend, as a matter of urgency, future research to investigate how unspo-
ken assumptions around sexuality issues play a role in population policy 
formulation and how that in turn affects the access to reproductive 
health services for those who do not fit within the conventional defini-
tion of a “unitary family”, particularly among adolescents. 
My study focuses on three components of reproductive health listed 
in the ICPD programme of action, namely access to contraception, ac-
cess to safe delivery and access to safe abortion. Similar research is re-
quired covering other reproductive health components to broaden the 
understanding of the reproductive health situation of Bangladeshi 
women. These components are infant and child care, male participation 
and responsible behaviour, adolescent reproductive health, infertility 
treatment, reproductive tract infections, sexually transmitted diseases, 
HIV/AIDS, cancers of the reproductive tract and reproductive health 
needs of the disabled. 
While this study contributes to an in-depth understanding of women’s 
agency in a rural setting, further research is needed to cover urban areas. 
Studies have indicated that reproductive health conditions among ado-
lescents both in urban areas especially among slum dwelling urban poor 
(Rashid 2007; Rashid 2012), and in rural areas (Bosch 2005), require seri-
ous attention. 
Another area for further research is how women adjust, cope and deal 
with their reproductive health needs in their new circumstances due to 
displacement and migration. As the study shows, some women return to 
their parental home before giving birth especially during the first child-
birth. Usually women also move from an urban area with more health 
care facilities to a rural area where health care facilities are poor or ab-
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sent. These women also face problems due to the loss of their usual net-
work and become dependent on older women, usually their mothers. 
Bangladesh is a disaster-prone country with a high risk of floods, cy-
clones and river bank erosions, where displacement and migration are a 
common phenomenon and these women face great risks. 
Another important aspect which requires further research, is the ef-
fectiveness of different service delivery approaches. My review of popu-
lation policies showed that over time, the health care service delivery 
practice has switched back and forth, between door-to-door and com-
munity clinics, or a combination of both. A comparative study between 
consecutive implementation strategies at the national and cross-country 
level is required to establish a plausible recommendation. However, it 
has to be noted that the health outcome is not only determined by ser-
vice delivery as this study shows. It requires addressing other socio-
economic and cultural factors that constrain health care access as well as 
the criteria (fertility decline or reduction in maternal deaths) against 
which the success of the programme implementation is assessed. 
My study raised serious questions regarding the increasing numbers of 
Caesareans at the national level. Is this because access to the service has 
improved? Does the commercial interest of private doctors play a role? 
National data shows that six in ten births at the health facilities are now 
done by Caesareans, of which two thirds are done in private health facili-
ties. Macro level data further shows a difference in terms of urban versus 
rural areas as well as among rich versus poor women. The question is 
whether the difference is due to the varying access to the services or due 
to a difference in perception. My study found that poor women reject 
Caesareans because it might affect their ability to perform their house-
hold work, they also find it unnecessary. However, the study is very con-
text and culturally specific. It is not possible to draw any general conclu-
sion upon these results. It is very important to conduct further research 
at the national level, to find out both why the frequency of Caesarean 
sections has increased so dramatically, and also why poor women less 
often choose (or are offered?) Caesareans. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
I started this dissertation by introducing my 1970s childhood school 
friend Kabita from a farmer’s family, who married early, experienced in-
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laws’ pressure to bear a son and gave birth to five children. Although 
after giving birth to three daughters her fourth child was a son, the fifth 
daughter was born due to irregular use of contraception.  
I started the journey of this research out of curiosity to understand 
how the family planning success story has changed the life of many rural 
women like Kabita in this millennium to enable them to give birth to 
two children only. During my journey I took a different epistemic lens 
that tries to capture rural poor women in the complexities of their social 
reality. I observed and listened to the voices of rural women like Anita, 
Bonna, Parboti, Boiskaki, Fouzia and Kohinoor among others. I also 
came across Ambia, Orchita, Godhuli, Shobita and Mohua, tribal Garo 
women adding another dimension to their reality, speaking in a different 
voice. These voices of Bengali and Garo women sometimes joined to-
gether, and sometimes differed. These women conveyed a message that 
they were neither victims of cultural norms nor passive beneficiaries of a 
family planning success story. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the tremendous fertility de-
cline has been explained by some as a success of family planning pro-
gramme by ensuring cheap, available and effective forms of contracep-
tion in combination with increase in women’s status (The World Bank 
2008). There is no denying the tremendous achievement of the family 
planning programme in providing diverse contraceptive methods to 
those with unmet need for such methods and also by bringing the possi-
bility of fertility control within the calculus of conscious choice for many 
women (Kabeer 2001:65). There is copious evidence in favour of the 
argument that the significant fertility reduction from 6.3 to 2.3 children 
per woman is due to the increase in contraception use from 8 to 62 per 
cent between 1975 and 2014. However, drawing on the evidence from 
women’s real life experiences, this study provides an alternative explana-
tion of the family planning success story. 
Real life negotiations around contraception practice documented in 
this study challenge a simplistic linear relation between the use of contra-
ception and women’s higher status and agency. Men and women’s narra-
tives provide insight into how different types of contraception are linked 
to the notion of masculinity and femininity. Men and women do not 
challenge prevailing gender norms rather reproduce the notions of mas-
culinity and femininity through contraception practice, sustaining gender 
inequality. A family planning programme based on an individualistic no-
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tion of agency which suggests a female focused programme to achieve 
gender equality, does not capture this gendered process in explaining 
contraception use. Similar to the national level, among my research par-
ticipants it is mostly women (more than 90 per cent) that use contracep-
tion. I argue, the Bangladesh family planning programme is carefully de-
signed to focus on women without confronting existing gender norms 
and hierarchies. In fact, the requirement of husbands’ (or male relative’s) 
consent to use an MR service reflects reproduction of gender hierarchy 
in the policy. The availability of cheap or free (or even through incen-
tives) contraception, legalisation of MR and women focused family plan-
ning programme provided poor rural women the opportunity to use con-
traception. However, it would be a mistake to draw a simple causal 
relation between contraception use and women’s higher status, exercise 
of autonomous choice, and agency. 
Despite the availability of a range of contraception and MR services, 
both Garo and Bengali women spoke of constraints within the house-
hold, the community and in the health care market. However, women 
showed resilience and adopted various ways available to them in relation 
to their contraception and MR/abortion practices, although sometimes 
women put their bodily health and wellbeing at risk. This suggests that 
women’s agency in reproductive practice has to be seen in a relational 
way. Realising full capabilities of agency in the sphere of reproductive 
decision making, requires transformation of persistent unequal gender 
power relations in the household, the community and the health care 
market.  
Both Garo and Bengali women’s narratives showed it is not a matter 
of ignorance or fatalistic behaviour of poor women but hidden cost and 
inadequate quality of care in the public hospitals remain major con-
straints for poor women to ensure their access to safe childbirth services, 
sustaining their dependency on home deliveries in the presence of tradi-
tional birth attendants. This finding contradicts the policy approach that 
suggests dual health care systems - private for the well-off and public 
safety net for the poor - to ensure health equality. Women’s experiences 
indicate that the public health care system, on which poor rural women 
are mostly dependent, is not able to provide adequate quality of care. 
This finding suggests that a persistent high maternal mortality is the 
manifestation that equality in health care access is not ensured. 
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To make significant progress in the reduction of maternal mortality, 
policies need to take into consideration how privatisation of health care, 
market mechanisms, class, intra-household and ethnic power dynamics 
all combine to create the existing health inequality. Unless women’s right 
to life during childbirth is ensured the national and international com-
mitments to reduce maternal death remain hollow. 
Finally, while the mainstream policy and discourse project a linear link 
between women’s empowerment and lower fertility, the experiences of 
Garo women contradict this. Garo women’s voices provide insight into 
why despite showing a higher status in all conventional indicators of em-
powerment, they choose to have slightly higher number of living chil-
dren compared to Bengali women which does not fit into conventional 
policy assumptions. 
Based on empirical findings, this study contributes to our understand-
ing of the complex interaction of the household with class and ethnic 
dynamics that impinge on the ways women from different communities 
can express their agency and access health care services. Irrespective of 
patrilineal or matrilineal household structures, both Garo and Bengali 
women experience diverse, but similar outcome. These findings indicate 
that women’s class and gender identity in the broader system put women 
in a position where it does not guarantee their access to formal health 
care services to ensure safe childbirth, safe abortion, and treatment of 
other reproductive health complications.  
Drawing on these findings, this study suggests that a dynamic gender, 
class and ethnic relation should be central to our understanding of how 
women take reproductive decisions and access health care services. Well 
informed policies need to be aware of and recognise women’s diverse 
needs, interests, constraints and capabilities, (which are shaped by their 
mutually interlocking gender, class and ethnic positions), to enable 
women to exercise full control over their body and reproductive rights. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Policy Approaches to women in the dominant 
Development paradigms 
 
This section provides a summary of dominant development paradigms 
and its approaches to population policy and integration of 
women/gender. 
 
Modernisation paradigm 
After the World War II the modernisation paradigm based on liberal 
positive economic theories became more influential in the development 
discourse. The modernisation theory envisioned a progressive contin-
uum of economic development and growth that would bring social and 
political benefits for all citizens of all the countries with a ‘trickle-down 
effect’. It explains the transition of fertility from higher to lower fertility 
regimes, ushered by socio-economic development and a concomitant 
increase in income, urbanisation and industrialisation via the reduction of 
fertility rate. 
Within the framework of this development paradigm, policies on 
women and development took a welfare approach. As Moser (1993) has 
shown, the purpose of the welfare approach is to bring women into de-
velopment as better mothers. Women are seen as the passive beneficiar-
ies of development. The UN conventions70 based on this liberal welfare 
approach, identified women solely in their reproductive roles. Population 
policies within this paradigm offer birth control and nutrition pro-
grammes for women and lactating mothers. It is non-challenging and, 
therefore still widely popular. As Rai (2002) notes this welfare approach 
focused on the sexual division of labour and individual negotiation 
within family often left the gender relations of a society unchallenged. 
                                                 
70 In the first UN decade of development, major international institutions of development took 
shape within the liberal capitalist framework. Aid became an important mean to integrate third 
world countries into the existing international capitalist trade regimes. 
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Esther Boserup (1965) argued that women are not only engaged in 
reproductive roles, but they are also engaged in the productive roles. 
Boserup had been criticised by Beneria and Sen (1981) for her presump-
tion that modernisation is beneficial for third world countries and ig-
nores the effect of the processes of capital accumulation on women and 
not to take into account the stratification of women along with the lines 
of class. Borerup has failed to capture the new forms of subordination 
created by the modernisation process (Rai 2002; Elson and Pearson 
1981; Elson 1999).  
The crucial issue at the heart is the question of power relations among 
women and men, but also the power differences between women occu-
pying different socio-economic spaces (Rai 2002). The framework does 
not question the status quo. 
Another criticism of the “modernisation theory” came from the de-
pendency theorists. In 1963, Raul Prebisch articulated the “dependency 
theory”. A.G. Frank argued that the liberal development model was in 
fact the development of under-development. His argument shows that 
all colonial countries were underdeveloped before western capitalist 
penetration. The third world countries became underdeveloped after 
their incorporation into the international capitalist system. International 
capitalism depended upon the exploitation of the cheap resources of the 
third world; the opening up of the post-colonial states to the interna-
tional capitalist world is criticised not to enhance development, but to 
increase the dependency and exploitation. Feminists have made a 
broader critique as well on the modernisation paradigm, arguing that 
within this system, women are seen as ‘the last colony’ (Mies and Benn-
holdt 1988). Men often benefit from the oppression of women and that 
they play an active role in prolonging it, both within the private domain 
of the home but also in the purportedly neutral arena of the market place 
(Kabeer 1994a). A patriarchal dominance was maintained through the 
agencies of the state within marriage and through work legislation. It has 
been argued that it is not the men who keep women at home, though 
they may appear to be the most direct oppressors, but the structure of 
the capitalist system, which benefits from the unpaid labour of the 
housewife (Kabeer 1997). The inequalities between men and women 
could not be understood in isolation from the polarisation of the capital-
ist mode of production between centre and peripheral countries. The 
situation of women resulted from two intersecting conditions: “the con-
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tradiction between social classes” which is dominant in capitalist social 
formations, and “the contradiction between sexes” which is subordinate 
in the same type of “social formation” (Kabeer 1994a). 
 
Basic Needs Approach 
In the 1970s, the basic needs approach initiated alternative ways of envi-
sioning development, which sought to shift the focus of development 
from growth to fulfilment of basic human needs. The basic needs ap-
proach put forward the idea that poverty is not an end that can be eradi-
cated by ‘means’ of a higher income (Kabeer 1994a). It was also pro-
posed that development planning should include the explicit goal 
towards the satisfaction of an absolute level of basic needs. In that con-
text, poverty was conceptualised as an indication of the inability of peo-
ple to meet basic needs. The basic need theorists thus shifted the focus 
from the growth politics to income distribution politics (Rai 2002). This 
approach emphasises on certain minimum requirements of a family for 
private consumption of adequate food, shelter and includes essential ser-
vices provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking 
water, sanitation and public transport and health and educational facili-
ties. Finally the Basic needs approach focused on people’s participation 
in the development. The basic needs approach is further developed by 
Amartya Sen in his human development and Capabilities framework (Sen 
1984). 
Within the basic needs framework of the development paradigm, pol-
icy approaches to women and development took an equity and anti-
poverty approach. These views are epitomised in the equity approach 
used in the 1975-85 UN Women’s Decade. It challenges women’s sub-
ordinate position. Its purpose is to gain equity for women, who are seen 
as active participants in development. The main idea of equity approach 
was to remove the inequality in the division of labour between men and 
women (Kabeer 1992). It recognises the triple role and seeks to meet 
SGNs71 through top-down state intervention giving political and eco-
                                                 
71 Strategic gender needs (SGNs) are “the needs women identify because of their subordinate 
position in society. They vary according to particular contexts, related to gender divisions of la-
bour, power and control, and may include issues such as legal rights, domestic violence, equal 
wages, and women's control over their bodies. Meeting SGNs assists women to achieve greater 
equality and change existing roles, thereby challenging women's subordinate position (ILO 
1998:1)”. 
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nomic autonomy, and reducing inequality with men. This approach is 
considered threatening to, and is unpopular with governments (Moser 
1993). 
Another approach which fits under the basic needs paradigm is the 
Anti-poverty approach, which is also a WID approach, a toned-down 
version of equity, adopted from the 1970s onwards. Its underlying prem-
ise was that women are members of the poorest of the poor. Moreover, 
women’s poverty was seen as a problem of underdevelopment, not of 
subordination (Moser 1993). Anti-poverty approach geared to meet 
PGN in productive role, to earn an income, particularly in small scale 
income generating projects (Moser 1993). This approach is most popular 
with NGOs. However, the basic needs framework did not take into ac-
count that women are already overburdened. 
The politics of the needs based development approach was one of the 
liberal critiques, of persuasion, information and education rather than 
any fundamental challenge to the prevailing social relations. 
Some scholars (Rai 2002, Said 1978) argued that women’s visibility in 
the development discourse is not accidental. After the colonial period, 
while the nationalist movements of many third world countries had cre-
ated an optimism based on the discourse of equality, the language of de-
velopment and the modernisation theories ensured that they were con-
stantly characterised as “underdeveloped” and essentially a “problem”, 
which is named as “Orientalism” (Said 1978) that need addressing and 
managing. Women occupied a particular place within this oriental dis-
course (Mohanty 1991b). The portrayal of women as poorest of the poor 
allowed the orientalists to rescue the oppressed women through new de-
velopment interventions. 
Population policies within this development framework remained 
based on the welfare approach, which offers birth control and nutritional 
programmes for lactating mothers to enable them to participate in eco-
nomic activities. 
In the context of the failure of equity and anti-poverty approach, 
Southern feminists, such as Development Alternatives with Women 
(DAWN), have challenged the assumptions of the neutral goals of such 
development interventions. 
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Human Development Framework 
The Human development framework represents a powerful critique over 
many years of prevailing utilitarian approaches to measure welfare in de-
velopment studies and economics. Amartya Sen has examined sex bias in 
India and elaborated the evidence of gender differences in the health 
condition. Females show to be in worse conditions than males for a 
number of functions, such as age-specific mortality rates, malnutrition 
and morbidity (Robeyns and Humphries 2003). Sen’s quantitative appli-
cations based on aggregated data have become widespread, especially in 
development studies. The most famous one is undoubtedly the concept 
of human development, which has resulted in the construction of a 
number of indices, such as human development index (HDI), the human 
freedom index (1991), the gender-disparity-adjusted HDI (1993), the in-
come-distribution-adjusted HDI (1993), the gender related development 
index (1995), the gender empowerment measure GEM (1995) and the 
human poverty index (1997) (UNDP 2011). The functions that are in-
corporated in these indices are life expectancy at birth, education (meas-
ured by adult literacy and educational enrolment rates) and adjusted real 
GDP per capita which is taken as a proxy for a number of functions with 
material preconditions, such as being sheltered and well-fed. These in-
dexes clearly show that GDP/capita is an imperfect indicator of human 
development and that the ranking of countries according to GDP-based 
indicators and the human development indicators are different (UNDP 
2011). These approaches have had a large impact on policy making. Ac-
cording to this view, lack of reproductive health constitutes a significant 
deprivation of wellbeing in the developing countries and yet the field is 
not central to mainstream development policy. 
Sen argued that in social evaluations and policy design, the focus 
should be on what people are able to do and to be, on the quality of their 
life, and on removing obstacles in their lives so that they have more 
freedom to live the kind of life which upon reflection, they find valuable 
(Sen 1993). The human development approach also stressed on the ful-
filment of non- material needs as a part of the development process. Par-
ticipation of people in decision making that affect their lives and self-
management of development projects became an important part of this 
framework (Rai 2002). Freedom, equality and dignity came into the core 
of the development paradigm as fundamental human rights (Truong 
1997). 
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Although Huq, Amartya Sen and Murtha Nussbaum provide an im-
portant perspective on reproductive rights in human development 
framework, population policies continue to be based on basic needs ap-
proach. 
Within the broader development paradigm, parallel to the Basic needs 
approach, neo-liberal policies emerged at late 1970s. 
 
Neo-liberalism 
Since the late 1970s, neo-liberal macroeconomic policies and associated 
policies of domestic regulation have been pursued widely in the develop-
ing world. Many countries have been subject to a fiscal squeeze, resulting 
from reductions in trade and finance related taxes and from declining tax 
rates on capital. In several instances, expenditure cuts have been concen-
trated in capital expenditures affecting infrastructure, and in others, ex-
penditure on health, education, welfare and social safety nets have been 
eroded (UNRISD 2004). The neo-liberal development policy continued 
to focus on economic growth and modernisation. 
Within the neo-liberal development framework policies on women 
and development took an efficiency approach. The “efficiency ap-
proach” is the third and now predominant approach to incorporate 
women in development. Its purpose is to ensure that development is 
more efficient and effective through women’s economic contribution, 
with participation often equated with equity. This is the most popular 
approach. This approach focuses to meet PGN72 in the context of de-
clining social services by relying on all three roles of women and elastic-
ity of women’s time. 
Population policies within the efficiency approach encourage the re-
duction of fertility to enable women to participate in the productive 
work on the basis of efficiency. However, the efficiency approach as-
sumes that women are able to extend their working days to a large ex-
tent. 
                                                 
72 Practical Gender Needs (PGN) are “the needs women identify in their socially accepted roles in 
society. PGNs do not challenge, although they arise out of, gender divisions of labour and 
women's subordinate position in society. PGNs are a response to immediate perceived necessity, 
identified within a specific context. They are practical in nature and often concern inadequacies in 
living conditions, such as water provision, health care and employment (ILO 1998:1)”. 
 APPENDICES 315 
 
DAWN has criticised the negative impact of the structural adjustment 
policies on the family, and the disproportionate burden of privatisation 
that women are forced to carry. As a result of the fiscal squeeze, con-
strains on public spending have particularly negative effects on women. 
This burden was further intensified by the increased time women were 
forced to spend on income generating activities (Rai 2002). The evidence 
of the negative outcome of structural adjustment policies on women fur-
ther emphasised the importance to scrutinise macro- economic and sec-
toral development interventions from a gender perspective (Miller and 
Razavi 1998). Household rights and obligations between husband and 
wife are asymmetric, where the burden of reproduction often a demand 
on women’s health and time. Rao (2002) further argued that in a neo-
liberal context, the rights of the vast majority of women to access re-
sources, the most basic determinant of health, are being denied. 
Despite limitations, within the broader neo-liberal development para-
digm the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) came as a bench-mark 
of development for this decade. 
 
Millennium development Goals 
In September 2000, the UN Millennium Summit committed motivation 
towards achieving fundamental human rights. At the 2000 summit the 
UN General Assembly came up with 8 Goals, 18 targets and 48 indica-
tors. The Goals are benchmarks of progress towards the vision of the 
Millennium Declaration-guided by basic value of freedom, equality, tol-
erance, and respect for nature and shared responsibilities. Moreover, it 
prescribes the purpose of development as the improvement of people’s 
lives by expanding their choices, freedom and dignity (UNDP 2003). 
Thus, the human rights approach provides an opportunity to fulfil basic 
human needs, where, denial of basic human rights puts human dignity 
itself at risk (Gasper 2005; David 2002). These commitments received 
additional backing during World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in September 2002. Under the MDG 
framework, a life cycle approach emerged (Datta 2003). 
However, critics say (Rao 2002, Rao 2004) beneath the rights lan-
guage, lays a developmental goal which are fertility reduction and popu-
lation control rather than ensuring women’s reproductive health and 
wellbeing. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) remains hollow 
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unless reproductive services are available and accessible for all. The ex-
tremely low level of resources allocated to the health sector in some of 
the poorest countries mean that it is not possible to provide even basic 
universal coverage of essential health services. The health sector reform 
has contributed to slow progress on the broader commitments towards 
human rights and gender equality (Standing 2004). 
The basic limitation of population policies within MDG is its neo-
liberal orientation which put reproductive rights out of their context and 
considers women as rational decision makers. Feminist authors (Keysers 
1994) argue that the reproductive rights of women should be placed in a 
broader human rights and macroeconomic policy framework. 
Within the broader development framework, as an alternative to neo-
liberal approach Gender and Development (GAD) approach emerged 
from feminist scholars. 
 
Gender and Development (GAD) approach  
The extent, to which macro-economic policies can ensure women’s well-
being, does not depend on their ability to enhance growth. The effects of 
economic growth are gender- differentiated, as growth operates through 
various types of markets, through inter family and intra-household re-
source distribution, and through public spending. Each of these elements 
is subject to the pervasive influence of social norms regarding the roles 
and rights of women. Hence, women and men’s capabilities, their access 
to resources such as time, land, credit, income, and their ability to obtain 
social insurance or health facilities differ widely (UNRISD 2004). 
In many societies women have traditionally minimal control over re-
sources (Agarwal 1988) or decision-making power within the household 
and the community. The resources and the range of options women 
have, affects their ability to exercise their rights (Correa and Petchesky 
1994). In some regions those inequalities have taken such extreme forms 
that they result in markedly higher levels of maternal mortality, malnutri-
tion and ill health among women and girls. Such inequalities are difficult 
to explain simply in terms of differences in tastes and preferences sug-
gested by Neo-liberal thinkers. 
Feminist scholars have argued that a focus on the gender relations 
that position women within society must be at the core of all develop-
ment initiatives (Young 1989). To describe women’s subordinate situa-
 APPENDICES 317 
 
tion within a society, Young made distinction of women’s “condition” 
and “Position”, which Molyneux (1985) called “practical” and “Strate-
gic” interests (Moser 1989). Molyneux (1985: 232-233) Suggested “analy-
sis of women’s subordination and […] the formulation of an alternative, 
more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist […] such as 
the abolition of the sexual division of labour, the alleviation of the bur-
den of domestic labour and child care, the removal of institutionalised 
forms of discrimination, the establishment of political equality, freedom 
of choice over childbearing and […] measures against male violence and 
control over women”. 
Within the GAD paradigm, feminists articulated the policy approach 
to women, which is empowerment. Its purpose is to empower women 
through greater self-reliance. Within this approach, women’s subordina-
tion is experienced not only because of male oppression but also because 
of colonial and neo-colonial oppression. It recognises the triple role, and 
seeks to meet SGNs indirectly through bottom-up mobilisation of 
PGNs). It is potentially challenging, although its avoidance of western 
feminism makes it unpopular except with Southern women’s NGOs 
(Moser 1989:1808). 
Whereas, in SRHR approach, feminists affirm that women’s health 
and empowerment must be treated as ends in themselves and not merely 
as means towards the (Petchesky 2003:9) goal of fertility reduction vis-a-
vis population control. 
While gender and development remains a powerful development 
framework, population policies remain to continue in a liberal frame-
work. The next section provides a brief review of development paradigm 
in relation to population policy and its incorporation of gender and its 
limitations. 
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Dominant Development paradigms in the field of population pol-
icy 
 
Population Control Paradigm 
Over four decades, Neo-Malthusian and Eugenic ideologies driven by 
population control paradigm dominated the population policies. 
Initially the population discussion has received attention in the devel-
opment discourse in 1798, when an English clergyman and economist 
Thomas Robert Malthus published his book “An Essay on the Principle 
of Population”. The main objective of his essay was to explain the nature 
and origin of poverty in a way which would favour capitalist economy. 
His explanation of poverty as a natural product of higher fertility pro-
vided justification to implement profound structural changes, which fur-
ther put more pressure on the poor and created new opportunities to 
accelerate growth. Although, Malthus acknowledged the unequal distri-
bution of wealth contributing to existing poverty, however, he believed 
that redistributing wealth would only make poverty worse (Ross 1998). 
Malthus argued that redistribution of property through charity would 
have encouraged the poor to breed and increase the supply of labour 
which would further contribute to more unemployment and low wages 
among the poor (Lohman 2003:9). Therefore, he recommended privati-
sation as a solution to existing poverty and inequality. The way in which 
Malthus explained the relation between poverty and fertility became a 
leading ideology in the population and development discourse for several 
decades. 
Subsequent Malthusian scholars and activists established the Malthu-
sian League, which was the first international forum to discuss the popu-
lation problem formally and explained poverty and inequality as a conse-
quence of population pressure on resources. There were two schools of 
thought within the Malthusian paradigm, the "Malthusians" and the 
"Neo-Malthusians". Although Malthus viewed population growth and 
competition among workers as a necessary stimulus to industrial growth 
(Ross 1998:5), therefore his intention was not to reduce population 
growth. However Malthusians considered fertility control through war or 
disaster or delayed marriage and the Neo-Malthusians favoured birth 
control as the main solution to reduce the pressure on resources. 
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A century later Malthusianism found an intellectual ally in eugenics. 
The eugenicists believed that the ‘unfit’ should be weeded out and the 
affluent, or “gifted”, be encouraged to breed, so that the human “stock” 
could be improved (Akhter 2005b:98). 
Eugenicists were not limited to academic exercise only. They were or-
ganised, particularly in Germany, England and the United States, in im-
plementing policies consistent with their theories (Gordon 2007). The 
development and promotion of birth control was a major eugenic suc-
cess. Besides being one of the pillars of Nazism, eugenics influenced the 
birth control movement73 which retained the racist premises of its origin. 
A key programme of the eugenicists was to purify the human race by 
sterilising the “unfit” (Davis 1990:21). 
After World War II, the eugenics movement continued to thrive un-
der the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). When 
IPPF was founded in 1952, it was housed in the office of the Eugenics 
Society. From 1952 onwards, a major part of the eugenics movement 
continued under the birth control movement, with the same people do-
ing the same things, but with a new public rationale. One of the organi-
sations that promoted eugenics under the new public rationale was the 
Population Council. At the time of the creation of the Population Coun-
cil, Rockefeller echoed the “Malthusian belief” (Mass 1976:37). 
In the population and development discourse, Malthusian, eugenics 
and birth control movements thus became intertwined and almost indis-
tinguishable (Akhter 2005a:100). 
 
Reproductive Health and Rights: A Paradigm shift! 
Since the International conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in Cairo 1994, this population control paradigm has been re-
placed by a ‘new’ reproductive health and rights paradigm. During the 
conference, the population control paradigm has been replaced by a re-
productive health and rights Paradigm. To enable women to make in-
formed autonomous reproductive decisions this framework advocated 
replacing the liberal approach to improve women’s status that advocated 
                                                 
73 Marie Stopes, who was the pioneer of the birth control movement, was promoting her writings 
with accompanying love Songs to Adolf Hitler. (The Free Encyclopedia 2012). 
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female education and employment by the promotion of gender equality 
and women’s empowerment (Correa and Reichmann 1994). 
However, the reproductive health and rights paradigm continues to 
explain development as a transition from a higher to the lower fertility 
regimes with a neo-Malthusian overtone (Dixon-Mueller 1993a:4). Under 
this framework, women’s reproductive rights and empowerment are seen 
as a pre-requisite to reduce fertility (Smyth 1996:217). In addition, de-
spite sexuality being an integral part of reproductive health (Dixon-
Mueller 1993b), this aspect is missing in the way reproductive health has 
been used in the population policy. Feminist scholars emphasised on the 
separation of these two because it challenges the control and non-
recognition of women’s sexuality outside their reproductive roles (Sen et 
al. 1994b:23). Feminist scholars argue (Young 1989:102) that any discus-
sion of the management of human reproduction involves a complex set 
of issues concerning ideas to do with sexuality (especially female sexual-
ity); interconnection between sexuality and procreation; the nature of 
socially permitted relations between men and women; and stereotypes of 
womanhood and manhood. 
The ability of women to control their sexuality and fertility further 
depends on the gender system of a society (Sen 1994a; Harcourt 1997), 
wherein the gender systems are usually constructed to exploit women 
(Correa and Reichmann 1994:9). Women’s sexuality is often the symbol 
of honour and status of the family, the clan, the caste and the ethnic 
group, therefore the subordination is often being achieved through the 
subjugation, exploitation, and control over women’s sexual lives (Kitts 
and Roberts 1996:10). 
Addressing women’s sexual rights is important, because even in cir-
cumstances where women enjoy some control over economic resources, 
they still might be sexually submitted, to the male power (Fabros 1998). 
Addressing women’s sexuality further requires understanding the di-
chotomisation between “public and private spheres” (Petchesky and 
Sonia 1994:1007), which perpetuates women’s unequal access to the 
market. In most societies, women’s activities are confined to the repro-
ductive domain in the private sphere, while the public sphere, where the 
economy, politics and public affairs occur, is considered a masculine 
domain (Correa and Reichmann 1994:105; Elson 1991).  
While feminists affirm that women’s reproductive decisions are de-
termined by a complex interplay between economic forces and its inter-
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section with existing culture and gender systems, the reproductive health 
and rights framework adopted in the population policies during ICPD, 
fails to offer an analysis of existing culture and power structure. The 
rhetoric of the reproductive health and rights discourse is also linked to 
the global politics of population discourse (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991). 
 
Politics of poverty and population policy discourse 
The population policy discourse revolves around the issue whether high 
population growth rate is related in a direct, casual way to underdevel-
opment (Coontz 1961; Ehrlich 1990, Young 1989). Acceptance of a 
causal relation between population growth and underdevelopment, lead 
international development agencies to suggest development interven-
tions through population control. In the context of the Southern coun-
tries, even global warming became an argument for population control 
(Chamie 1994; Ehrich 1968). By 1968, curbing population growth be-
came central to the World Bank’s development policy, and has remained 
so ever since (Akhter 2005a). To address population problem, UN estab-
lished United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (formerly United Na-
tions Fund for Population Activities). The UNFPA sponsored three 
ICPD meetings, in Bucharest in 1974, in Mexico in 1984 and in Cairo in 
1994, bringing together the heads of state from most of the world to de-
velop a global population strategy to solve the population problem. No 
other global issue drew as much attention as population problem. 
These international conferences are of a great importance, because 
they display dominant views that shape development strategies of Inter-
national donor organisations (Smyth 1998). Besides policy directions, 
these conferences also display international power imbalances, where 
national policies are a response to international donor pressure. This 
pressure is reflected in the conditionality for loans imposed by interna-
tional financial agencies in countries with large populations (Smyth 
1998:224). 
However, this development discourse through population control has 
been criticised for its narrow focus on fertility reduction. Just to mention 
a few of them, critiques from a number of third world and socialist 
countries considered development as the best contraception (Kabeer 
1994a :189). A number of scholars also argued that the real cause of 
poverty was not population growth at all. Henry George (1879) argued 
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that poverty caused population growth, not the other way around. Paul 
Harrison (1992) further argued that India was plagued by famine not be-
cause of “overpopulation” but due to the oppressive rule by the Mughals 
and the British. Also, the great famine of 1844 in Ireland which was of-
ten cited by Malthusians as a proof of their theory was in fact an inevita-
ble outcome of land extortion by the landlords. According to these crit-
ics the politics of population discourse was to distract attention from the 
underlying inequality in the international economic order, which is the 
root cause of poverty and inequality in the third world countries 
(Escobar 1995). Instead, this reproductive health and rights discourse 
provides solutions which sustain the global structure of power (Cornwall 
2010). 
It has been documented that increasing interest of the states and 
powerful institutions such as multinational and national corporations, 
international development agents, western medicine and religious groups 
construct the context within which local reproductive relations are 
played out in reproductive decisions (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991:312). 
This process is relevant to many Southern countries. It is important 
to see how these national and international gender power relations are 
played out in the context of reproductive health situation in Bangladesh. 
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Appendix 2: Guideline for Interviewing the National level policy 
actors 
Guideline for interviewing government actors: 
 
Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
Policy 
Design  
Could you kindly share your knowledge and experience on the 
formulation of population/ reproductive health policy and its 
successes and challenges in Bangladesh? 
 Which year did you find the most important in relations to the 
formulation of population policy since the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971? Why? 
 What do you think are the major international or national 
events that shape the current health / population policy in 
Bangladesh? 
 Does the International Conference on Population and Devel-
opment (ICPD) in 1974 have an impact on the current popu-
lation policy in Bangladesh? In what ways? Is it a reproductive 
health policy? 
 What were the major concerns of the government while de-
ciding on the reproductive health / population policy? What 
socio-political, ecological, economic, and global factors did 
you think of play important roles for the policy formulation? 
 Who were the policy designers (Their professional back-
ground, Knowledge and expatriates, information providers, 
financial, materials) 
 In the process of policy formulations– what ideology of GO 
policy makers or donors or the interest of political leaders or 
professionals played a significant role? 
 Do we have an integrated health and population policy or an 
isolated health, population and family planning policy in Bang-
ladesh? What are the co-ordination mechanisms among all 
those ministries? How effectively are they working towards 
ensuring health for all? 
 What is your definition of reproductive health? 
Population/ 
health Pol-
icy makers: 
DG, Family 
planning 
&  
DG, 
HS,  
Do  Was there any donor involvement during policy formulations? 
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nor 
involve-
volve-
ment 
Who are the donors that were involved during policy formula-
tions? What was the role of the donors in the policy making 
process? 
 Each donor has different approach to support the population 
program. How did you feel about the diversity of working ap-
proaches between donors? How easy or difficult it is for dif-
ferent ministries to deals with different donors with different 
interests and approaches? 
 Which donors are more sensitive towards the reproductive 
health needs of men, women and Adolescents of different 
socio-economic, ethnic and religious origins? How?  
 To what extend a need assessment of men, women and ado-
lescents was conducted before the policy formulation? 
 How did class, ethnic, gender or religious issue get into the 
policy agenda when designing the health/population policy?  
Re-
sponse 
on pol-
icy and 
pro-
gram 
 
 What are the main characteristics of the current population/ 
health policy in Bangladesh? What are the major components 
under the current population policy in Bangladesh? Are there 
any class specific or gender specific family planning/ health, nu-
trition programme? What are those? 
 Is family planning programme subsidised? Do you deliver door-
step contraceptive service delivery system now? 
 Did the government stopped providing doorstep services for a 
while? What was reason to stop doorstep service delivery sys-
tem? Who took the decision? What was the consequence of the 
decision? When did it start again? What is your opinion about 
the decision? 
 The TFR have been reduced significantly from 6 to 2.8 in Bang-
ladesh since 1971. But the Contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) 
did not increase proportionately. What do you think is the suc-
cess of the reduction of Total fertility rate (TFR) despite of slow 
increase of CPR? 
 What could be the other causes behind the fertility reduction 
rather than only effective contraception use? 
 Is MR legal in Bangladesh? From which year. What was the 
assumption behind the legalisation of MR (Menstrual Regula-
tion) in Bangladesh? Is the MR service free? Where can women 
get the MR services? What is the time limit to perform an MR? 
Who is authorised to perform an MR? Being a Muslim country, 
how easy or difficult was to legalise MR in Bangladesh? 
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Access 
to ser-
vices 
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the legalisa-
tion of MR would bring down the unsafe abortions in Bangla-
desh, what is your experience after the legalisation of MR? 
 What is the current maternal mortality rate (MRR) in Bangla-
desh? What do you think is the cause of maternal death in Bang-
ladesh till now despite the success of family planning pro-
gramme? 
Budget 
and 
imple-
menta-
tion 
 If we look at the nature of population program in Bangladesh, 
they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. For example, 
some are towards family planning and fertility control, some 
are towards maternal and child health, awareness raising and 
motivational work. There are differentiated health needs 
among different social groups like married and unmarried, ur-
ban and rural, educated and uneducated, young and adult, eth-
nic and Bengali groups. Do you think that access to contracep-
tion and MR is available for all groups? How? Or why not? 
 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards fam-
ily planning rather than ensuring health. Access to basic pri-
mary health care by the poor is limited. Do you agree with 
this? If yes, how? If not, why not? 
 What is the total health Budget in Bangladesh? Where the 
budget comes from? How much of the budget goes to general 
health? How much is allocated for family planning? How 
much is for awareness rising and how much is for reproduc-
tive health services like safe motherhood, MR or Abortion, 
prenatal and ante natal care or infertility treatment? 
 Many NGOs and private organisations are also providing 
health services in co-ordination with the government. Do the 
NGOs and private sectors have different health policy or do 
they implement government policies? Are there any co-
ordination mechanism to integrate GO and NGO services? 
 What do you think about the success and challenge of the 
existing population/ health policy in Bangladesh? 
 What is your suggestion to make the population/ health policy 
more effective? 
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing the 
valuable information with me. 
 
 
Guideline for Interviewing development NGOs 
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Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
 
Could you kindly share your knowledge and experience on the successes 
and challenges of the implement of the policy in Bangladesh? 
 
Marie 
Stopes, 
FPAB, 
BRAC, 
GANO 
SHASTHO 
KENDRA, 
FRIENDSH
IP, 
Engender 
Health 
 
 
Organisational 
introduction 
 When did your organisation start working in Bangla-
desh? How did it establish; where the idea came from? 
What are the main objectives of your organisation? Who 
are the beneficiary group of your organisation? How big 
is your working area by geographic area and by the scope 
of work and budget?  
 How long has your organisation been involved in im-
plementing health programme? What motivated your or-
ganisation to participate in the health program? 
 Which kind of services does your organisation provide 
in the health sector? (Training, research activity, policy 
lobbying at local, national and international level, 
strengthening activities at local level, awareness on 
health rights, service delivery? 
policy making 
  How often does your organisation participate in the 
policy forums organised by the Government at district 
or national level? 
 You perhaps attended many policy forums where the 
decisions on new policy making or policy implementa-
tion are discussed and decided. Could you kindly explain 
me which year did you find the most important in rela-
tions to policy development and change since 1971? 
What were the major events in different years during this 
period? 
 Have you ever experienced a circumstance where the 
government, donors, civil society organisations and pro-
fessionals used to debate/contest for a decision regard-
ing any health related issues? How was it solved? 
 Based on your experiences, which are the influential 
actors in policy formulations? Why? 
 Do you think the power relations between donors, Gov-
ernment, NGOs and women’s group make difference in 
policy formulations? Could you please share your experi-
ences in relation to the policy formulation in Bangla-
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desh? 
 There are unequal power relations among men and 
women according to gender, class, and ethnicity. How 
do you feel about the population policy to address the 
reproductive health needs of men and women regardless 
of their age, class, marital status, geography, religion and 
ethnicity? 
 From your experience, what are the policy problems for 
making the sexual and reproductive rights issues as 
prime policy agenda in Bangladesh? 
Funding  
 What are the sources of income of your organisation? 
Who are your major donors for implementing the health 
services you are offering? How did you find the role of 
donors/their projects in implementing the health policy? 
 Each donor has different approach to support the popu-
lation program. How did you feel about the diversity of 
working approaches between donors? What are the ad-
vantages of diversity? What are disadvantages of diver-
sity in terms of co-ordination and implementation of the 
policy? 
 Which donors are more sensitive towards the reproduc-
tive health needs of men, women and Adolescents of 
different socio-economic, ethnic and religious origins? 
How? 
Reproductive 
health policy 
and services 
 Do you think that the current population policy is suc-
cessful to bring down the TFR among women from dif-
ferent class, ethnic and religious population? What are 
the underlying reasons behind the fertility reduction 
other than access to service delivery among all social 
groups? 
 Are there any mechanisms with the government to 
monitor the health services provided by the NGOs? 
 According to you what is reproductive health? What are 
the reproductive health components you are providing 
in your health programme? 
 Does your organisation have a reproductive health pol-
icy? Or do you implement government policy? If no 
then to what extent your policy is different than the gov-
ernment health programmes? 
 How would you describe the relationship between your 
organisations with the Government in terms of policy 
implementation?  
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 Do you experience any problem in implementing the 
government policy? (Co-ordination, Fund, Training, Ac-
countability)What are those? 
 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards 
family planning rather than ensuring health. Access to 
basic primary health care by the poor is limited. Do you 
agree with this? If yes, how? If not, why not?  
 
Response on 
programme 
  If we look at the nature of population program in Bang-
ladesh, they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. 
For example, some are towards fertility control and 
some are towards women’s empowerment. Which ap-
proach does your organisation follow? Is it reproductive 
health and rights approach? 
 According to you what is reproductive health? 
 What are the reproductive health care services you are 
delivering? Is your programme subsidised? Or is the ser-
vice free? Which services are free of cost? 
 Are you delivering any contraceptive methods? What are 
those methods? Where do you deliver contraceptives? 
What are the other reproductive health services you are 
providing? 
 Do you provide MR services? How much does it cost to 
have an MR? Do women have to go for a pregnancy test 
for an MR? What is the time limit to perform an MR? 
Who is allowed to perform an MR at your service? Is 
MR done under GA? Clients have to pay for MR ser-
vices? How much is the service charge? Who are mainly 
your clients? (Unmarried, married. Widow, women with 
1/2/3/ more children or no children? How frequently 
do women come for a MR? How many times do you 
perform MR to women? 
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the 
legalisation of MR would bring down the unsafe abor-
tions in Bangladesh, what is your experience after the le-
galisation of MR? 
 What do you think is the challenge and constraints for 
women to avail safe contraception and safe abortion in 
Bangladesh?  
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing the 
valuable information with me. 
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Guideline for Interviewing Women’s (right) organisations: 
 
Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
Organisational 
affiliation 
 Could you kindly share your knowledge and experience 
to work with health and rights issues in Bangladesh? 
 How long have you/ your organisation been involved 
with the health and rights issues in Bangladesh? What 
motivated you/ your organisation to participate in the 
reproductive health issues? 
 What is your definition of reproductive health?  
 What is the main agenda or issue of your feminist 
movement or activism in relation to reproductive health 
and rights? 
 Do you also incorporate men’s right in your agenda? 
Naripokkho 
Ubinig 
Bangladesh 
Mohila 
Parishad 
 
policy making 
 How would you evaluate current population policy to 
ensure women’s reproductive health and rights in Bang-
ladesh? 
 What would be the ideal health/ population policy ac-
cording to your criteria? 
 You perhaps attended many policy forums where the 
decisions on new policy making or policy implementa-
tion are discussed and decided. Could you kindly share 
your experience in relations to policy development and if 
there is any major shift in the policy since 1971? 
 What do you think is the basic motivation/ assumption/ 
logic of the government, donors, civil society organisa-
tions, academics and professionals on deciding the cur-
rent population/health policy? 
 Have you ever experienced a circumstance where the 
government, donors, civil society organisations and pro-
fessionals used to debate/contest for a decision regard-
ing any health related issues? How was it solved? 
 Based on your experiences, which are the influential 
actors in policy formulations? Why? 
 Do you think the power relations between donors, Gov-
ernment, NGOs and women’s group make difference in 
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policy formulations? How? 
The roles of 
donors   What are the sources of income of your organisation? 
Who are your major donors for implementing the health 
or rights issues in Bangladesh? 
 Each donor has different approach to support health, 
rights and empowerment issues. How did you feel to 
deal with different donors with different interests and 
approaches? 
 Which donors were more sensitive towards the repro-
ductive health and rights issues of men, women and 
Adolescents of different socio-economic, ethnic and re-
ligious origins? How?  
Perception 
towards repro-
ductive health 
and rights  
 Does your organisation have a reproductive health pol-
icy? To what extent your policy is different than the gov-
ernment policy? 
 How would you describe the relationship between your 
organisations with the Government in terms of percep-
tion towards health need of men and women? 
 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards 
family planning rather than ensuring health. Access to 
basic primary health care by the poor is limited. Do you 
agree with this? If yes, how? If not, why not? 
 If we look at the nature of population program in Bang-
ladesh, they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. 
For example, some are towards fertility control and 
some are towards women’s empowerment. Which ap-
proach do you think more effective? Why?  
 
Response on 
programme 
 Do you think that the current population policy is suc-
cessful to bring down the TFR among women from dif-
ferent class, ethnic and religious population? What are 
the underlying reasons behind the fertility reduction 
other than access to service delivery among all social 
groups? 
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the 
legalisation of MR would bring down the unsafe abor-
tions in Bangladesh vis-à-vis the maternal mortality rate 
in Bangladesh, what is your experience after the legalisa-
tion of MR? 
 What do you think is the cause of maternal death in 
Bangladesh despite the success of family planning pro-
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gramme and the legalisation of MR? 
 What is your suggestion to reduce the maternal mortality 
rate?  
Response on 
policy  There are unequal power relations among gender, class, 
and ethnicity in Bangladesh. The needs of the poor are 
different from those of the well-off members; women's 
needs are different from men's. I would like to know 
from your experiences, how do you feel about the popu-
lation program to address the reproductive health needs 
of men, women regardless of their age, class, marital 
status, geography, religion and ethnicity? 
 From your experience, what are the problems and con-
straints to incorporate sexual and reproductive health 
issue into policy agenda?  
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing 
your valuable information with me. 
 
 
Guideline for Interviewing Academics/ Research institutes: 
 
Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
Organisational 
affiliation 
Could you kindly share your knowledge and experience 
to work with health and rights issues in Bangladesh? 
 How long have you been working on population, health 
and development issues in Bangladesh? 
 How long have you/ your organisation been working on 
reproductive health issues? 
 What is your definition of reproductive health? 
 What is your major work in the field of population, 
health or development? 
 Would you please share your major research findings 
with us? 
 In what ways your work helped/ can help the policy 
makers to formulate future population or health policy 
in Bangladesh? 
Department 
of popula-
tion sciences 
ICDDR,B 
NIPORT 
BIRPERT 
policy making 
 You perhaps attended many policy forums where the 
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decisions on new policy making or policy implementa-
tion are discussed and decided. Could you kindly share 
your experience in relations to policy development and 
shift in the policy since 1971? What were the major con-
cerns for this shift in the policy? 
 What do you think is the basic of the government, do-
nors, civil society organisations, academics and profes-
sionals on deciding the current population/health pol-
icy? 
 Have you ever experienced a circumstance where the 
government, donors, civil society organisations and pro-
fessionals used to debate/contest for a decision regard-
ing any health related issues? How was it solved? 
 Based on your experiences, which are the influential 
actors in policy formulations? Why? 
 Do you think the power relations between donors, Gov-
ernment, NGOs and women’s group make difference in 
policy formulations? How? 
 There are unequal power relations among gender, class, 
and ethnicity in Bangladesh. The needs of the poor are 
different from those of the well-off members; women's 
needs are different from men's. I would like to know 
from your experiences, how do you feel about the popu-
lation program to address the reproductive health needs 
of men and women regardless of their age, class, marital 
status, geography, religion and ethnicity? 
 From your experience, what are the policy problems for 
making the sexual and reproductive rights issues as 
prime policy agenda in Bangladesh?  
Research Fund-
ing   Is your research funded by any local or international 
donor? Who sponsors your research on population and 
health issues? 
 Each donor has different approach to support health, 
rights and empowerment issues. How did you feel to 
deal with different donors with different interests and 
approaches? 
 Which donors were more sensitive towards rights based 
approach? 
 What is your definition of reproductive rights? 
 APPENDICES 333 
 
Response on 
policy 
 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards 
family planning rather than ensuring health and rights. 
Access to basic primary health care by the poor is lim-
ited. Do you agree with this? If yes, how? If not, why 
not? 
 If we look at the nature of population program in Bang-
ladesh, they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. 
For example, some are towards fertility control and 
some are towards women’s empowerment. Which ap-
proach do you think more effective why? 
 The TFR have been reduced significantly from 6 to 2.8 
in Bangladesh since 1971. But the Contraceptive preva-
lence rate (CPR) did not increase proportionately. What 
do you think is the success of the reduction of Total fer-
tility rate (TFR) despite of slow increase of CPR? 
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the 
legalisation of MR would bring down the unsafe abor-
tions in Bangladesh, what is your experience after the le-
galisation of MR? Are there any mechanisms with the 
government to monitor the MR services provided by the 
NGOs? 
 What do you think is the cause of maternal death in 
Bangladesh despite the success of family planning pro-
gramme? 
 What do you think is the success and Challenges of 
women to have access and to access contraception and 
safe abortion in Bangladesh? 
 What is your recommendation to the policy makers for 
future policy formulations 
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing 
your research experience with me. 
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Guideline for interviewing donors 
 
Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
 Policy 
Design 
Could you kindly share your knowledge on the successes and 
challenges of population policy programme in Bangladesh? 
 Which year did you find the most important in relations to 
the formulation of population policy since the independence 
of Bangladesh? Why? 
 What are the major international or national events that shape 
the current health / population policy in Bangladesh? 
 Does the International Conference on Population and De-
velopment (ICPD) in 1974 have an impact on the current 
population policy in Bangladesh? In what ways? 
 Who did you think the influential actors in policy formula-
tions in the light of ICPD? What was the role of donors in 
the policy decisions? 
 What do you thing are the major concerns of the population 
policy in Bangladesh? What socio-political, ecological, eco-
nomic, and global factors did you think of play important 
roles for the policy initiative? 
 How did cultural identify and value of actors shape the deci-
sion of implementation of particular intervention approach?  
 Did you remember any event where contestation between the 
government and donors/project did take place with regard to 
deciding population programs? Or dispute on any decisions in 
policy implementation stage or new health policy design? 
UNFPA 
AUSAID 
 
Perception 
towards 
reproduc-
tive health 
 How would you definition of reproductive health and repro-
ductive rights? 
 What is your opinion about the reproductive health and rights 
situation in Bangladesh? 
 If we look at the nature of population program in Bangladesh, 
they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. For example, 
some are towards family planning and fertility control, some 
are towards maternal and child health. Which programme do 
you find effective? Why? 
 What do you think is the success and challenges of the exist-
ing population/ health policy in Bangladesh? 
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 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards 
family planning rather than ensuring health. Access to basic 
health care is limited by the poor do you agree with this 
statement? Why? Why not?  
 What can be done to make the reproductive health services 
more available and affordable? 
Pro-
gramme 
implemen-
tation  
 For how long have you been supporting population pro-
gramme in Bangladesh? (5year term, ten year term) 
 What is the total budget you are spending per year in Bangla-
desh on health sector? What are the main components of 
health programme you are funding? (family planning, MR, 
Condoms, sae motherhood, Education, motivation, aware-
ness raising) 
 Many NGOs and private organisations are also providing 
health services. Do you also support NGO services? Which 
are those NGOs that provide health services under your 
funding? 
 How do you co-ordinate GO and NGO programmes? 
 Do you think that the current population policy is successful 
to bring down the TFR among women from different class, 
ethnic and religious population? What are the underlying rea-
sons behind the fertility reduction other than access to service 
delivery among all social groups? 
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the le-
galisation of MR would bring down the unsafe abortion rate 
in Bangladesh, what is your experience after the legalisation of 
MR in Bangladesh? 
 What do you think is the cause of maternal death in Bangla-
desh despite the success of family planning programme? 
 What do you think is the constraints and possibilities for 
women to have access to contraception and safe abortion in 
Bangladesh? 
 
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing your 
views and experiences with me. 
 
 
Guideline for Interviewing Political parties 
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Themes Topic guide to be probed  Interview-
ees 
Political 
agenda 
 What are the health and population issues in your political 
agenda? 
 What is your opinion about the current population/ health 
policy/ programme in Bangladesh? 
 What do you think is the success and challenges of the exist-
ing population/ health policy in Bangladesh? 
 Some Critics say that population policy has been towards 
family planning rather than ensuring health. Access to basic 
health care is limited for the poor do you agree with this 
statement? Why? Why not? 
BNP 
Bangladesh 
Awami 
League, 
Communist 
party, 
Jamaiti 
Islami 
Perception 
towards 
reproduc-
tive health 
 How would you definition reproductive health and reproduc-
tive rights in the context of Bangladesh? 
 What is your opinion about the reproductive health and rights 
situation in Bangladesh? 
 If we look at the nature of population program in Bangladesh, 
they are heterogonous in terms of approaches. For example, 
some are towards family planning and fertility control, some 
are towards maternal and child health. Which policy do you 
think more effective for Bangladesh? Why? 
Response 
on popula-
tion Pro-
gramme  
 It was expected that the access to contraception and the le-
galisation of MR would reduce the unsafe abortion rate in 
Bangladesh, what is your opinion and experience regarding 
the legalisation of MR in Bangladesh? 
 What do you think is the cause of high maternal death in 
Bangladesh despite the success of family planning pro-
gramme? 
 What do you think is the constraints and possibilities for 
women to have access to contraception and safe abortion in 
Bangladesh? 
 After your political party came in power are you changing the 
population policy or are you continuing to implement the 
same policy? 
 If you are changing the health policy of the previous govern-
ment what changes are you going to make? 
 
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and for sharing your 
research experience with me. 
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Appendix 3: List of Key informants interviewed 
 
No
. 
Type of 
stakeholder  
Institutional Affiliation Number of 
respondents 
1 GOB Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 1 
2 DG, Family planning, MOHFW 1 
3 Research 
institutes 
NIPORT 1 
4 ICDDR,B 2 
5 Bangladesh Institute of Research for Promotion of Es-
sential & Reproductive Health and Technologies 
(BIRPERTH) 
2 
6 Donors UNFPA 1 
7 USAID 1 
8 NGO/Civil 
society or-
ganisa-
tions/servic
e providers 
 
DMCH 1 
9 Marie Stopes 1 
10 FPAB 2 
11 BRAC, health section 1 
12  Engender Health 1 
13 Gano Shastho Kendra 1 
14 Ad Din Welfare Centre 1 
15 Smiling Sun Franchise Program 1 
16 FRIENDSHIP 1 
17 Grameen Kalyan, Grameen Health   1 
18 Social marketing company 1 
19 Women’s 
organisa-
tions 
Ubinig 1 
20 Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, 3 
21 CWFD  1 
22 Naripokkho 1 
23 Political 
party 
Communist party 1 
24 BNP 1 
25 Awami league 1 
26 Jamaat-e-Islami 1 
27 Advisor, Care taker government 1 
28 Academics Dhaka University (Population Sciences and Women and 
Gender Studies Department) 
3 
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Appendix 4: Household survey Questionnaire 
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Appendix 5: List of female participants for in-depth interviews 
No Name Age Ethnicity Number of children Education Occupation 
1 Orchita 32  Garo 3 (Vasectomy) 
No Edu-
cation 
farmer 
2 Shuninda  35 Garo 3 5th grade housewife 
3 
Jamila 
Khatun 
55  Muslim 4+ 2 miscarriage 
No edu-
cation 
housewife 
4 Joy Banu 48  Muslim 4(2 MR) 5th grade housewife 
5 Payra Begum 37  Muslim 3 (Pill user) 5th grade housewife 
6 Madhubala 53  Muslim 6 
No Edu-
cation 
housewife 
7 Kazoli 20  Garo 1 10th grade Parlour worker 
8 Anita 19  Muslim 1 
10 th 
grade 
housewife 
9 Phul Banu 49  Muslim 
5 (self induced abor-
tion) 
No Edu-
cation 
housewife 
10 Sabiha 19  Muslim 1 5th grade housewife 
11 
Nilima 
Sangma 
24  Garo 3 5th grade farmer 
12 Ambia 48 Garo 10+2 miscarriage 10th grade farmer 
13 Parboti 25  Muslim 
2(unwanted preg-
nancy) 
5th grade  housewife 
14 
Phalguni 
Banu 
54  Muslim 5 5th grade  house wife 
15 Fabiha 28 Muslim 2 (pill user) 5th grade  house wife 
16 Mohua 19 Garo 1+ (1 abortion) 8th grade house wife 
17 Shobita 21 Garo 1 H.S.C housewife 
18 Afroza 35  Muslim 3 (injection user)  3rd grade housewife 
19 Fouzia 21 Muslim 1 (injection user) 5th grade 
 
housewife 
20 Bonna 18  Muslim 1(Fistula) 5nd grade housewife 
21 
Moyna 
Mazhi 
22 Garo 1 10th grade Parlour work 
22 
Sulekha 
Chishim  
45 Garo 7 
No Edu-
cation 
farmer 
23 Shufia 22  Muslim 
2(unwanted preg-
nancy) 
5th grade house wife 
24 Ramisa 30  Muslim 2(Norplant) 5th grade  housewife 
25 Shumi 37  Muslim 3 (Norplant) 5th grade house wife 
26 Farida 32  Muslim 3+ 1miscarriage 5th grade Field worker 
27 Rabeya 38  Muslim 4+ unsafe abortion) 
no educa-
tion  
house wife 
28 Shewly 35  Muslim 3 (miscarriage)Implant 
no educa-
tion  
house wife 
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29 Natasha 25  Muslim 2 4th grade housewife 
30 Kohinoor 42  Muslim 4(Injection user) 5th grade house wife 
31 Laboni 19 Garo 1 (Caesarean) H.S.C house wife 
32 Zakia 21  Muslim 1 (Caesarean) 8th grade house wife 
33 
Khushi 
Machi 
40  Garo 3 H.S.C teacher 
34 Priya Chisim 55  Garo 8 5th grade farmer 
35 Jaigun 32  Muslim 
3 (1 miscar-
riage)(unwanted preg-
nancy) 
5th grade house wife 
36 Hoimonti 53  Muslim 6 
No edu-
cation 
house wife 
37 Talope 53  Garo 3 (3 died) 
no educa-
tion 
farmer 
38 
Munni 
Mankhin 
23 Garo  1 H.S.C. NGO worker 
39 
Sapna 
Chisim 
35 Garo 2 (Natural method) H.S.C. NGO worker 
40 Dipti Mrong 45  Garo 2 1oth grade Activist 
41 Shulekha 42  Garo 3 
no educa-
tion 
farmer 
42 Godhuli 37  Garo 4 H.S.C teacher 
43 Shantana 32  Garo  
3 (unwanted preg-
nancy) 
5th grade day labourer 
44 
Khadiza 
Begum 
49 Muslim 4 (UP) 5th grade housewife 
45 Boishaki 38  Muslim 3 (Norplant) 10th grade housewife 
46 Golapi 19  Garo 1 5th grade housewife 
47 
Ketuki Nok-
rek 
50  Garo 6 
no educa-
tion 
farmer 
48 
Dipali 
Mrong 
40  Garo 6 
no educa-
tion 
farmer 
49 Rupali 28  Muslim 2(Norplant) 5th grade housewife 
50 
Marufa 
Begum 
55 Muslim 5 3rd grade house wife 
 
 
348 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PRACTICES IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
 
Appendix 6: List of male participants for in-depth interviews 
No Name  age ethnicity 
Number of 
children 
education Occupation 
01 
Patric 
Shimgsang 
60  Garo 6 10th grade Agriculture 
02 Riaz Miah 35 Muslim 3 No education Day labourer 
03 Shopon Mrong 30 Garo 3 9th grade Carpenter 
04 Jamil Miah 48  Muslim 3 (Vasectomy) 5th Grade 
Rickshaw Van 
puller 
05 Akbar Ali 35  Muslim 2 8th grade 
Rickshow van 
puller 
06 John Dafo 33  Garo 1 4th grade agriculture 
07 Antaz Ali 87 Muslim 9 No education agriculture 
08 
Mr. Sabor 
Uddin  
27 Muslim No children No education agriculture 
09 Hafiz Miah 35 Muslim 2 No education Day labourer 
10 Elmer Sangma 40  Garo 6 No education Agriculture labour 
11 Md. Hanif Miah 46 Muslim 6 No education Van puller 
12 
Gonendra 
Nakrek  
61 Garo 3 H.S.C 
Service, 
agriculture 
13 Rafiqul Islam 38 Muslim 2 S.S.C 
Agriculture 
business 
14 Shurjo Sangma 55  Garo 4 2nd grade agriculture 
15 Dulal 37  Garo 3 9th grade NGO service 
16 Md. Aman Ali 42  Muslim 2 No education Day labourer 
17 
Md. Nasir 
Uddin  
36 Muslim 2 HSC 
Agriculture busi-
ness 
18 
Md. Malek 
Miah  
46 Muslim 3 2nd grade 
Agriculture, NGO 
service 
19 Uzine Sangma 50 Garo 4 s.s.c 
Job at Demiel 
foundation 
20 
Md. Akter 
Hossain 
42 Muslim 3 4th grade Service agriculture 
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21 
Md. Julhas 
Uddin 
47 Muslim 2 No education Van puller 
22 Abdul Hamid 55  Muslim 4 10th grade 
Grosary shop 
owner 
23 Ginet Nokrek 75 Garo 6 5th grade agriculture 
24  Badal 38  Garo 4 Masters Teacher 
25 Shuvas 38  Garo 3 (Vasectomy) 
5th grade 
education 
Community forest 
guard 
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Appendix 7: List of local level service providers for interviews 
 
No Name  Organisational 
affiliation 
position 
01 Dr. A.M Parvez 
Rahim  
Madhupur 
Thana 
Union Parishad Nirbahi Officer (UNO) 
02 Dr. Narayan 
Chocroborti 
UHC Medical officer, Maternal health and Child care centre , 
UHC 
03 Abdur Rahman UHC Family planning Officer 
04 Morium  UHC Nurse 
05 Nurun Nahar FWA Satellite clinic, Gachhabari 
06 Krisna Machi FWV Satellite clinic, Gachhabari 
07 Rohima Akter HA Satellite clinic, Gachhabari 
08 Johura Begum Government 
health worker 
Community health worker 
09 Dr. Fatema 
Jahan 
Private practice Private practitioner, Madhupur 
10 Father Uzin Father Pirgacha St Paul’s Church  
11 Father Homrich Father Pirgacha St Paul’s Church 
12 Aanna Dalbot Nurse Pirgacha St Paul’s Church, maternity unit 
13 Feluchita Nok-
rek  
Nurse Pirgacha St Paul’s Church, maternity unit 
14 Najma  BRAC Programme officer, health 
15 Shonchita 
Mankhin 
BRAC Health Assistant 
16 Gonendra Nok-
rek 
Local phar-
macy 
Pharmacist 
17 Shochita Shurjer Hasi Local NGO 
18 Shomola Azim TBA Community member 
19 Asia Bewa TBA Community member 
20 Zainul Abedin Local journalist Local representative Gachhabari area 
21 Hornath 
Mankhin 
Religious healer Community member 
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Appendix 8: List of focus group discussion topics 
 
To understand existing knowledge about reproductive health, I will con-
duct FGDs among men and women separately. Participants will be given 
the following topics and statements to share their opinion. 
 
Reproductive health issues 
 Family planning; 
 safe motherhood; 
 safe abortion facilities, 
 infant and child care, 
 male participation, 
 adolescent reproductive health, 
 infertility treatment and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 
 HIV/AIDS 
 polygamy and VAW 
 
General 
 Women should give birth of her first child at the age of 20 
 Women should remain a virgin till her marriage 
 Unmarried women shouldn’t become pregnant 
 It is easy to understand/know whether a woman is virgin or 
not 
 It is difficult to understand/know whether a man is virgin or 
not 
 Every couple needs at least one son 
 Poor people need more children for their old age security 
 Parents shouldn’t discuss sex with adult children 
 Sexual health education in the secondary schools will encour-
age boys and girls to experiment with sex 
 Masturbation makes a man impotent 
 
Menstruation and pregnancy 
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 Menstrual blood is impure 
 Couples shouldn’t have intercourse during menstruation 
 Women can become pregnant during menstruation 
 Women should eat less during pregnancy to give an easy de-
livery 
 The husband should be present during the delivery of his wife 
 
Contraception 
 Condoms aren’t as effective for contraception as pills or injec-
tions are 
 Condoms reduce the pleasure during Sex 
 Women who use contraception may become promiscuous 
 Condoms are made of impure (Napak) elements 
 Men should use condoms with prostitutes not with their wives 
 Contraception is women’s business and man shouldn’t have to 
worry about it 
 Women shouldn’t hide the use of contraception from their 
husbands 
 Amount of intercourse have consequence on reproductive 
health 
 Women can prevent pregnancy by not having intercourse dur-
ing certain period in her menstrual cycle. 
 
Abortion 
 If an unmarried women becomes pregnant due to a love affair 
she shouldn’t go for an MR/Abortion 
 If an unmarried women becomes pregnant of a rape she 
shouldn’t go for an MR/Abortion 
 Unmarried women should have access to legal and safe 
MR/Abortion 
 Women have the right to have an MR/Abortion even if the 
husband disagree 
 If abortion is not done in the hospital women can have seri-
ous health problem or die. 
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Men's group 
 Women should be married off maximum at the age of 18 
 Working women aren’t obedient to their husbands 
 Housework is women's responsibilities even if they have a job 
 Women aren’t good at financial management 
 Higher educated women can’t be a good wife 
 Daughter’s should get more education than sons 
 Husbands can beat a disobedient wife 
 Men become inactive after vasectomy 
 Condoms reduce the pleasure during Sex 
 Women should do an MR if she has an unwanted pregnancy 
even if husbands don’t agree. 
 
Women's group 
 One’s husband can’t be ones friend as well 
 Women should refuse to have intercourse if husband has an 
STD or if women don’t want to be pregnant and the husband 
doesn’t want to use condoms 
 It is a shame to discuss about sex with one’s husband 
 Men don’t want to use condoms 
 women should use contraception secretly if their husbands 
don’t allow them to use contraception 
 Women should be married off as early as possible to safe the 
honour of the family 
 Adolescent girls shouldn’t mix or play with boys before mar-
riage to avoid any unwanted pregnancy. 
 Adolescent girls should stay at home for their safety 
 Women should give their income to their husbands if they ask 
 Women shouldn’t do a job if their husbands don’t like it 
 Women shouldn’t leave her husband even if he marries an-
other women or goes to prostitutes 
 Sons should get more education than daughters 
 
Give me your opinion regarding the following statements: 
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Gender roles 
 Men should earn money to maintain the family 
 Men should not cook or do household works 
 Women should stay at home to maintain purdah 
 Women should give birth of her first child right after her mar-
riage to prove her fertility 
 If women delay marriage after the age 20 then there is a pos-
sibility that she can become infertile 
 Polygamy is against women’s rights 
 
Women’s Rights 
 Woman should decide how many children she wants to have 
 Staying at women’s house (in-law’s house) after marriage is 
not prestigious for man 
 State laws ensures women’s equal rights to man 
 Kinship system should be determined according to father 
 Existing customary laws do not protect women’s rights 
(dower, inheritance, alimony) 
 Women have right to divorce and right to choose partner 
 Women have the right to control over her income 
 Women have the right to education, health care, security 
 Women have the freedom of mobility 
 Women have control over own body and sexuality. 
 women are privileged to have a Maternal leave 
 In case of rape perpetrator should give alimony for the child 
 It is the best solution to arrange marriage between the rapist 
and the victim of rape 
 
Nutrition and hygiene 
 Parents should teach their children about personal hygiene 
during puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, delivery and their 
daily life 
 Money can give access to a doctor but can’t ensure good 
health 
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 Women should eat less during pregnancy to give an easy de-
livery 
 Women should give birth at home to maintain purdah 
 Breastfeeding can protect women from going pregnant during 
lactating period. 
 
Body and sexuality 
 Women should remain a virgin till her marriage 
 It is easy to understand/know whether a woman is virgin or 
not 
 Adolescent girls shouldn’t mix or play with boys before mar-
riage to avoid any unwanted pregnancy or premarital sex 
 Adolescent girls should stay at home for their safety after their 
puberty 
 Parents shouldn’t discuss sex with their adult children 
 Sexual health education in the secondary schools will encour-
age boys and girls to experiment with sex before marriage 
 Women should not masturbate 
 Women do not have climax 
 Women should not show interest of sex 
 Unmarried women shouldn’t be pregnant 
 Masturbation makes a man impotent 
 The use of alcohol affect men’s potency 
 Promiscuity is allowed for man 
 Children from unmarried women should not consider as ille-
gal child 
 HIV is a sexual disease 
 AIDS patients do not look healthy 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix 9: Background information of the population in the 
survey 
This section provides an overall idea on the population and sex structure 
of the study population based on the household survey conducted in the 
study village over 502 households. 
 
Ethnic diversity in the study village 
The research village consists of a population from different ethnic 
groups. Majority of the population are (76.8 per cent) Muslims. The rest 
belong to Garo ethnic group (17.7 per cent) and Hindu minority group 
(5.5 per cent) (Table 9.1). Though, Hindus and Muslims are mainstream 
Bengalis, in this research Hindus are kept as a separate group to see the 
diversity due to their minority position. 
Table 9.1 (Appendix) 
Population distribution based on ethnicity in the studied village 
Ethnicity Frequency Percentage 
Muslims 1,932 76.8 
Garos 446 17.7 
Hindus 138 5.5 
Total 2,516 100.0 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
Total numbers of the households interviewed were 502 and the total 
population is 2,516. In 502 household total male members are 1,281 and 
female 1,235 which is 50.9 per cent male and 49.1 per cent female 
household members (Table 9.2). 
 APPENDICES 357 
 
Table 9.2 (Appendix) 
Sex composition of the total population 
Sex Frequency Percentage 
Male 1,281 50.9 
Female 1,235 49.1 
Total 2,516 100.0 
 Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
It is interesting to see the male female ratio according to the age 
structure of the population in the study village. In the 1-4 age groups 
there are more girls than boys. The number of girls decreases sharply in 
the 5-9 age groups. Then the number again increases in the 15-34 age 
groups. Again the number of female decreases significantly in the 35-64 
and 65 onwards (Table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 (Appendix) 
Age Group according to Sex composition 
Age Group Sex Total 
  Male Female  
>4 103 118 221 
5-9 156 143 299 
10-14 142 142 284 
15-19 130 137 267 
20-34 350 403 753 
35-49 227 195 422 
50-64 111 78 189 
65+ 61 19 80 
Total 1280 1236 2516 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
The reproductive age group (15-49) covers 706 Men among which 
546 are Muslims, 125 are Garos and 36 are Hindus. Among 735 Women 
in the same reproductive age group 564 are Muslims followed by 129 
Garos and 42 Hindus (Table 9.4). 
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Table 9.4 (Appendix) 
Sex composition of the reproductive age group according to Ethnicity 
Religion 
Age Group (15-49) 
Total 
Male Female 
Muslim 546 564 1,110 
Garo 125 129 254 
Hindu 36 42 77 
Total 706 735 1,442 
Source: household survey, 2008. 
 
Above table shows more female than male in the reproductive age group. 
   
 
 
 
 
